F.S1
copy1

45th Anniversary

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

SUPERIOR DUPLICATE

OCTOBER

1967

VOL·46 NO·1 $2·00 A COPY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

## OCTOBER 1967


THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—FIFTY YEARS AFTER

Its Nature and Consequences . . . . . *George F. Kennan* 1

Origins of the Cold War . . . . . *Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.* 22

The Soviet Economic Reform . . . . . *Yevsei Liberman* 53

The Kremlin and the Third World . . . . . *Philip E. Mosely* 64

What is Left of Communism? . . . . . *George Lichtheim* 78

Viet Nam: Crisis of Indecision . . . . . *Robert Shaplen* 95

Asia After Viet Nam . . . . . *Richard M. Nixon* 111

Malnutrition and National Development . . . . . *Alan D. Berg* 126

China's Next Phase . . . . . *Robert S. Elegant* 137

Growing Independence in Canadian-American Relations *John W. Holmes* 151

The Population Crisis: Reasons for Hope . *Frank W. Notestein* 167

Gold and the Dollar . . . *William F. Butler and John V. Deaver* 181

Living with the Real Japan . . . . . *George R. Packard III* 193

Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *John G. Stoessinger* 205

Source Material . . . . . *Donald Wasson* 224



HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
*Editor*

PHILIP W. QUIGG
*Managing Editor*

*Editorial Advisory Board*

ALLEN W. DULLES — HENRY A. KISSINGER — JOHN J. McCLOY
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER — WILLIAM L. LANGER — PHILIP E. MOSELY
GEORGE F. KENNAN — ISIDOR I. RABI



Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. All mail, including correspondence about subscriptions, should be sent to this address. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $8.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Printed at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.



Vol. 46, No. 1. Copyright 1967, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

## *CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE*

*GEORGE F. KENNAN,* of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton; formerly Ambassador to the Soviet Union; formerly head of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State; Ambassador to Jugoslavia, 1961–63; author of "Soviet-American Relations 1917–1920," "Realities of American Foreign Policy," "On Dealing with the Communist World" and other works * * * *ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.,* Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities, City University of New York; formerly Professor of History, Harvard University; Special Assistant to the President, 1961–64; Office of Strategic Services, 1943–45; author of "A Thousand Days," "The Age of Roosevelt" and other works * * * *YEVSEI LIBERMAN,* Professor of Economics, Kharkov University; a principal author of the current Soviet economic reform; author of "Ways of Raising the Profitability of Socialist Enterprises" and other works on productivity and automation * * * *PHILIP E. MOSELY,* Director of the European Institute and former Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; former Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Political Adviser, European Advisory Committee, London, 1944–45; author of "The Kremlin and World Politics," "The Soviet Union Since Khrushchev" and other works * * * *GEORGE LICHTHEIM,* a former editor of *Survey,* London; recently a visiting lecturer at Columbia and Stanford Universities; author of "Marxism," "Marxism in Modern France" and "The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays" * * * *ROBERT SHAPLEN,* East Asia correspondent of *The New Yorker;* formerly *Newsweek's* Bureau Chief in Shanghai; author of "The Lost Revolution" and other works * * * *RICHARD M. NIXON,* Vice President of the United States, 1952–58; Republican candidate for President, 1960; author of "Six Crises" * * * *ALAN D. BERG,* Chief of Food Resources and Regional Development, A.I.D. in New Delhi; former Deputy Director of the Food for Peace program in Washington and Co-chairman of the U. S. Government Interagency Committee on Combatting Malnutrition * * * *ROBERT S. ELEGANT,* Chief of Bureau, the *Los Angeles Times,* Hong Kong; former Asian correspondent for *Newsweek;* author of "The Dragon's Seed," "The Center of the World" and other works * * * *JOHN W. HOLMES,* Director-General of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1953–60; member of the directing staff of the National Defense College, Kingston, Ontario, 1951–53 * * * *FRANK W. NOTESTEIN,* President of the Population Council, New York; former Professor of Demography and Director, Office of Population Research, Princeton University; co-author, "The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union" and other works * * * *WILLIAM F. BUTLER,* Vice President and Director of the Economic Research Department of the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York * * * *JOHN V. DEAVER,* Vice President and Associate Director of the Economic Research Department of the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York * * * *GEORGE R. PACKARD III,* Visiting Lecturer, School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, Washington; Assistant to the U. S. Ambassador, Tokyo, 1963–65; author of "Protest in Tokyo."

*The articles in* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reproduced by special permission
from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1967.
Copyright by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc., New York.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 46 OCTOBER 1967 No. 1

*THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—FIFTY YEARS AFTER*

# ITS NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES

*By George F. Kennan*

IN March 1917, in the third year of the Great War, the political system that had prevailed in Russia for several centuries—namely the Tsarist autocracy—suddenly collapsed. Signs of its disintegration had been mounting ominously for a year or two; the likelihood of its early demise had been widely sensed; yet no one expected it to come just at that moment. For a century in the past, its overthrow had been the dream of liberal and radical oppositionists, some of whom had schemed, worked, even suffered martyrdom, to bring it about. Yet its collapse, when it came, was not the immediate result of any such efforts. It fell because the strains of conducting a prolonged major war, superimposed on more basic weaknesses and problems of adjustment, were simply too much for it.

The trouble began when irregularities in the food supply led to street disorders in the capital city. Compared to ones that had occurred in the past, these disorders were not of an unusual or particularly dangerous nature. Nevertheless, the régime proved incapable of controlling them and restoring order. The war had taken its toll of the best units of the old army, with their relatively high morale and good discipline. The garrisons in the neighborhood of the capital, to which appeal had to be taken in the effort to restore order, were now manned by raw and semi-demoralized recruits. They refused their collaboration, disobeyed orders, fraternized with the unruly crowds and declined to support the police. In this development, the hollowness of the authority of the régime was at once revealed. It suddenly became apparent to everyone that "the king was naked"—naked, in this instance, of effective support from any quarter. In the short space of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

few days, the monarchy, lacking effective defenders, fell of its own weight.

Even today, a half-century later, it is difficult to assess the meaning of this collapse. Was the Tsarist autocracy so largely an anachronism, were its weaknesses and failures of such gravity, that it was bound to fall in any case at an early date, and did the war merely hasten its end? Or was it Russia's participation in the war that destroyed what would otherwise have been, for the régime, a reasonable chance of adjustment, of adaptation, of survival into another age?

The question is hypothetical. There can of course be no authoritative answer. But it will be useful to glance at some of the background circumstances and, in the first instance, at certain of the more basic weaknesses of the régime.

Russia, at the outset of this century, was still predominantly an agricultural country; yet the agrarian system was unsuitable and inadequate to the needs of the modern age. The régime was well along, by 1914, in the implementation of an extensive program of modernization, designed to shift the weight of agricultural production from the landed estate and the village commune to the small, independent farmer-proprietor. There are many who feel that this was the most promising approach ever taken to the great problems of rural land ownership and of the organization of agricultural production that confronted Russia as the legacy of serfdom. But in 1914 this program was still only partially completed in the physical sense. And what had been accomplished here had scarcely begun to affect as yet the most dangerous aspect of the problem, which was the state of mind of the peasant himself: bitter, skeptical, withdrawn, frighteningly alienated not only from the régime itself but from the entire educated Russian society out of which that régime—or any conceivable Russian régime—had to be recruited.

No less disturbing were the deficiencies of the political system. In 1906 the effort had been undertaken by the Tsar, under heavy pressure, to modernize the political institutions of the country by adding to them a representative legislative branch in the form of the State Duma. The Duma survived formally as an institution down to 1917; but restrictions on the franchise, evoked by a combination of the Tsar's timidity and the provocative and defiant behavior of many of the deputies in some of the initial sessions (1906 and 1907), had so narrowed its representative quality

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as to render it incapable of functioning as a really effective bond between people and government. In earlier times the need of such a parliamentary bond had not been great. Now, with the rise of literacy and particularly with the growth of a large professional and technical intelligentsia, its absence was keenly and dangerously felt.

Closely connected with this imperfection of the political system was a situation that might well be viewed as the most deep-seated and ominous of all the weaknesses of the autocracy. This was the extensive alienation from its spirit and purposes of large parts of the intelligentsia generally, and of the student youth in particular. This situation was not of recent origin. The disaffection of these elements had been a prominent feature of Russian political life for at least a half-century. From the standpoint of the prospects for survival of the autocracy, its importance could scarcely be exaggerated. It worked nefariously in two ways. It operated on the one hand to enrich the ranks of the revolutionary opposition. But by the same token it served to impoverish the bureaucracy—to impoverish it in talent, in intelligence, in imagination. Had the talents and enthusiasms of those many brilliant youths who early found their way into the revolutionary movement been enlisted in the constructive undertakings of the régime, instead of being rejected, the achievements of the Tsarist government might have been of a decisively different order.

Closely connected with this problem of the alienation of the intelligentsia was the problem of national minorities. It is obvious that the romantic nationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so closely linked to language, tended to disintegrate the great multilingual empires, particularly the Austrian and the Russian, just as it tended to unite peoples of a common tongue. In Russia the effect of this nationalism was felt, again, in two directions. Among the Great Russians it stimulated cultural chauvinism, anti-Semitism and demands for the forceful russification of the national minorities. Among the minority peoples it provoked precisely those feelings, sensitivities and ambitions most calculated to make them resent such pressures and to demand cultural and political autonomy.

The extent to which this national unrest fed the revolutionary movement may be judged from the fact that a majority in the Social-Democratic Labor Party, out of which the Bolshevik faction emerged, was made up of members of the national-minority

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

groups. At a time when nationalism was rapidly becoming the dominant political emotion of the age, and in a country where the majority or near majority of the population (depending on how you classified the Ukrainians) was made up of national-minority elements, no government could expect to have an easy time of it. But the Tsar's government, showing itself in the final decades of its power disgracefully receptive to all manner of chauvinistic and anti-Semitic influences, seriously disqualified itself for the promulgation of any hopeful approach to this problem.

To all these weaknesses there must be added the personal failings of the Tsar, Nicholas II. How long Fate would have given it to him to continue to bear the crown, had the vicissitudes of the war not intervened, one cannot know. But to have had favorable chances for survival, war or no war, the system of the autocracy could not have waited long for a more capable autocrat—one better educated, wider in outlook, more seriously motivated and, above all, more fortunately married. Nicholas had his virtues, and the clearer light of historical distance reveals him as a pathetic rather than a sinister character. But one could not run a great empire on tact, charm and good manners alone. His limitations, fatal under the stress of a great war, were such as to constitute a danger to the dynasty even in time of peace.

The picture was, of course, not all dark. The positive features and achievements of the Tsarist autocracy have tended to be lost from sight behind the dust and clamor of the Revolution. Soviet historians, in particular, have been at no pains to draw attention to them. The rate of industrial development in the final decades of Tsardom was impressively high. So, also, was the progress made in the direction of general education. Improvements in social legislation were not negligible. The judicial system was far from perfect, but it was well in advance of the political system in which it was imbedded. Russian cultural life enjoyed, in the final decades and years of Tsardom, a feverish vitality. The Russia of those years was truly a great battleground of negative and positive forces, working and contending within the same political framework.

What, then, the outcome might have been had there been no war is most unclear. One thing alone is certain: if there was any chance for the autocracy to evolve peacefully and successfully into another age, there could not be added to its long-term

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

burdens—added to them for the second time in a decade—the strains of a great modern war. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 had already brought the system to the verge of collapse. How anyone seeing this—be it the Tsar's ministers or his French allies—could have imagined that it could with impunity, only ten years later, take upon itself the far greater strains of a war with Germany, remains one of the mysteries of the age. Perhaps the autocracy, all unknowing, was already doomed to an early demise when the Tsar gave the order for mobilization in July 1914; that it was irrevocably doomed from that moment on is beyond the realm of speculation.

II

The fall of the autocracy in February 1917, leaving Russia not only without a government but without any acceptable and traditional procedure for choosing a new one, could be no more than the first phase of the great process we have in mind when we speak of the Russian Revolution. There remained to be endured a long agony of contest to determine who and what should take the place of the Tsars as the rulers of the traditional Russian lands. Even the so-called October Revolution—the seizure of power by Lenin and his associates in the major urban and industrial centers at the end of 1917—was not the final answer to this question. A further three-year ordeal of civil strife, embracing the various allied interventions, the civil war in all its phases and even the bizarre Russo-Polish War of 1920, had still to be lived through before it could be said that the Russian Revolution was complete. And if the first great question of the Revolution concerns the reasons for the decline and fall of Tsardom, the second—no less complex and no less baffling—concerns the chain of causes and events by which there finally emerged, as Tsardom's successor, the extreme radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party—a faction whose members, then known as the Bolsheviki, were soon to appropriate to themselves, and to establish in world usage, the designation of Communists.

The success of the Bolsheviki could not possibly be explained by their numbers. The membership of the faction—or of the party, as we may now call it—as of March 1917 was tiny. Nor did it enjoy great popular support outside its own ranks. Elections held in December 1917, at a time when the party was already in control of the main centers of population and enjoying the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prestige of a dramatic political success, showed it to have the support of only about one-fourth of the voters, and to be well outstripped in this respect by just one group of its rivals in the Socialist camp: the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It was, however, not at the polls but in countless obscure skirmishes and manœuvres on the scattered battlefields of the civil war that the issue of the succession was to be decided.

Here there were both positive and negative factors that proved decisive for the Communist victory. On the negative side there was the fact that none of the major rival factions or parties was well situated to establish itself in power. The monarchists and reactionaries disqualified themselves from the start and forfeited every possibility of adequate popular support, particularly among the peasantry and the intelligentsia, by opposing the February Revolution and favoring the return of the old order. To the peasantry, this meant the return of the landlords; to the intelligentsia, the return of reaction, obscurantism and bumbling incompetence. To oppose the October Revolution was still, in 1918–20, a possible political position; to oppose the February Revolution was not.

The Liberals were of course the first to attempt the governing of Russia in the immediate aftermath of the February Revolution. Victims of the characteristic nineteenth-century association of liberalism and nationalism and therefore dedicated to the continued prosecution of the war, opposed at all times by the monarchists and reactionaries on the Right, supported at first only weakly and later not at all by the moderate socialists on the Left, confronted with a virtual rival government in the capital city in the form of the Petersburg Soviet, which alone commanded the obedience of the workers and the military rank-and-file, these well-meaning Liberal figures wore themselves out in the space of three or four months in the contradictory effort simultaneously to prosecute a major war and to guide the country through its greatest of constitutional crises. By midsummer of 1917, their strength was spent; the Revolution had left them behind.

The moderate socialists, including both Socialist-Revolutionaries and the remainder of the Social Democrats (other, that is, than the Bolsheviki), were briefly the successors to the Liberals in the Provisional Government. After that, they constituted over the period of the civil war the main political opposition to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist power. They lacked military and administrative skills, vigor of leadership and unity of popular appeal. The Socialist-Revolutionaries lacked support in the big cities, the Social Democrats in the countryside.

Not only were the various non-communist elements handicapped individually as candidates for the succession, but they were unable even to collaborate effectively in opposing the Bolshevik bid for power. The hatreds and suspicions that divided moderate socialists from the monarchistic and conservative ex-officers with whom they were ostensibly allied in the effort to unseat the Bolsheviki were no whit less intense than those that divided them from the Bolsheviki themselves. The reactionaries were already discredited. The unnatural alliance with them tended to discredit the socialists in the eyes of the masses. At the same time, the mutual antagonism of the two elements frustrated the effectiveness of their joint military-political action against the Communists. Increasingly, as the civil war progressed, the ex-officers tended to edge their moderate-socialist associates out of the camp, thus antagonizing the peasants and forfeiting popular support for the anti-Bolshevik cause generally.

So impelling were these realities that it is tempting to say that Bolshevism triumphed because no unity existed among its major political opponents, and none of those opponents, in any case, would have been remotely capable of ruling the country. But it would be an oversimplification to attribute the Communist success solely to these negative factors. No less central to it were positive ones as well: the extraordinary discipline, compactness and conspiratorial tightness of the Communist Party; the magnificent political leadership—bold, ruthless, determined and imaginative—given to it at all times by its dominant figure, Vladimir Il'ich Ulyanov-Lenin; and the driving, unrelenting military leadership which the party gave to the Red Army units in the civil war. In the vast fluid confusion that followed the breakdown of the old order, the cutting edge of these qualities was of far greater effectiveness than any of the shifting, undependable winds of popular sympathy. The Bolsheviki came out ahead very largely because they were, in this maelstrom of poorly organized political forces, the only political force that had hardness, sharpness, disciplined drive and clearly defined purpose.

But the feelings of the popular masses were not wholly irrelevant to the outcome. These masses had been insufficiently

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attached to Tsardom to defend it in its moment of trial. They were insufficiently opposed to Bolshevism to oppose it in its moment of challenge. If the Russian army, as Lenin said, "voted with its feet" in the process of its disintegration, the population as a whole voted with its apathy, its skepticism, its unwillingness to defend listlessness and incompetence on the Tsarist side, its equal unwillingness to oppose a fierce political will on the side of the Communists. This vote became the popular mandate of the Soviet régime.

III

This, then, in crude outline, was the Russian Revolution: the passing of power in the traditional Russian lands from the enfeebled hands of the Tsarist autocracy to something which the Russian-Communist leaders themselves have always liked to describe as a "dictatorship of the proletariat," but which the more skeptical eye of the non-communist historian finds difficulty in recognizing as anything more than a dictatorship of the Communist Party. And as one tries, from the perspective of a half-century, to review the significance of this great transition, three features of it stand out.

The first of these, often obscured to Western vision by the events of the intervening years but basic to any understanding of it, is the essential altruism of purpose that underlay this revolution. For nearly a century in the past, the greatest public issues of Western society had revolved around the problems of the distribution of wealth in an economic environment not yet one of plenty. The initial effect of the Industrial Revolution had been to sharpen old injustices, to create new ones, to open up new forms—temporary no doubt, but appalling in intensity—of hardship, suffering, exploitation and degradation. These effects made themselves felt in Russia some decades later than in England and Germany. As problems in Russian life they were reaching their peak around the turn of the century and in the immediately ensuing years. The outlook that inspired the Bolsheviki and brought them finally to power was founded on an understandable desire to correct these anomalies, to eliminate social injustice and economic exploitation, to assure to the servant of the machine the comfort, security, dignity of status and sense of community of which the Industrial Revolution and the workings of the capitalist system were conceived to have robbed him. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tensions and troubles of the intervening years should not cause us to forget that this was, measured against the circumstances then prevailing, a noble dream, supported by a great earnestness of purpose, and pursued by thousands and tens of thousands of people in Russia, including many of the Bolsheviki, with a selfless dedication that has few parallels in the history of our time.

It was a dream, furthermore, which had meaning—more meaning than it would have today—to people far beyond the limits of the Russian Empire. In 1917 millions of people across the continent of Europe had been reduced to desperation by social distress or by the sufferings of the World War or by a combination of the two. One cannot understand the meaning of the Russian Revolution unless one recalls the vast thrill of excitement and anticipation that went through great portions of the world public as the news of this event reached them. Tsardom, in its helpless ineptness, had permitted itself to stand before the eyes of the world as the symbol of an obsolescent and oppressive feudalism. To many millions beyond Russia's borders the Russian Revolution appeared initially as a great breakthrough of hope. Here were boldness, grandeur of concept and elevation of purpose bursting through the empty crust of tradition and privilege in one of the most backward and miserable of European countries. Here was the first great attempt to defy the evils of modern industrialism by setting against it a political system founded on the dignity and social innocence of the common working man—dedicated to the realization of his needs, his dreams, his aspirations.

One will not do justice to the complexity of the Revolution, on the other hand, if one does not recognize, along with the fundamental altruism of purpose, the extreme harshness, ruthlessness and opportunism of method, as well as the vindictive hatred addressed to members of the propertied or privileged classes in Russia and elsewhere, by which the early Bolsheviki were inspired. If the dream was a noble one, looking to the eventual achievement of a world without social injustice, the means and process by which this goal was to be approached were of a diametrically opposite character. Here, in the promulgation and consolidation of the Revolution, conflict, violence, dictatorial method, the disenfranchisement and punishment of great masses of people were all to have their place. It was through the inflicting of great new suffering that the abolition of all previous suffer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing was to be achieved. What was launched into the world by the Russian Revolution was a force committed on the one hand, by its vision of the future, to altruistic, even utopian, aims (though ones that by no means assumed the brotherhood of all men), but on the other hand, by its methodological concepts, to undertakings in the face of which great new conflicts, misunderstandings, resentments and cruelties were unavoidable. Nor did this undertaking prove to be immune, over the course of the years, to the workings of that law of politics by virtue of which the means come eventually to be indistinguishable from the ends.

It is, then, according to the relative value one attaches to ends as opposed to means in human affairs that the positive and negative elements of the Russian Revolution will stand out through the prism of historical retrospection. But whichever value predominates—whether one sees this as a hopeful breakthrough or only as the onset of new misunderstanding, conflict and misery—one is obliged to concede to the Russian Revolution the status of the greatest political event of the present century. It deserves this description by virtue of the profound exemplary effect it had across great portions of the globe, of the alteration it produced in Russia's relations with the great powers of the West, and of the changes it brought to the life of one of the world's great peoples. A glance at each of these areas will not be out of order.

## IV

It was in its exemplary effect beyond Russia's borders that the Bolsheviki themselves saw the greatest importance of the Revolution. We have already noted the preoccupation of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century society with the problem of the distribution of wealth. The Bolsheviki never doubted that they possessed the key to the solution of this problem on a universal scale. The triumph of socialism in Russia, to take the metaphor that was then most commonly employed, was to be the spark that would ignite the dry tinder of revolution across the European continent.

As all the world knows, this particular dream was never realized. A variety of factors operating in the Western countries—the power of nationalism, the greater strength and solidity of the traditional political and social establishments, the powerful competition to communism presented by moderate-socialist political forces and the strong positions occupied by a reformist, evolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionary trade unionism—combined to render Western Europe, and even more the United States, resistant over the long run to the power of the revolutionary example.

But there were other ways in which the Russian Revolution had important political repercussions in the West. It served, in the first place, to split the socialist and labor elements in all the advanced countries. The split had actually begun during the war. It had begun in the form of a division of opinion as to which of the two principles, socialist internationalism or national patriotism, was to be the dominant force in wartime socialist policy. Those in Western Europe who had clung, as had the Bolsheviki in Russia, to the principle of socialist internationalism had opposed the war as an unworthy contest, conducted among imperialists for the benefit of imperialists. They tended, once the war was over, to cling to the association with Russian Communism into which this wartime affinity had thrown them. They accepted the Bolshevik example as authoritative. They made themselves the spokesmen for the same sort of violent revolution in their own countries that the Bolsheviki had carried out in Russia. It was out of these groups of dissident radical socialists that the Western communist parties were formed; and it was from the exemplary power of communist success in Russia that these parties continued to draw strength in ensuing decades. Increasingly, as the years went by, they became gathering points for all those elements in the Western countries whose discontent with their own societies could find no adequate outlet in normal democratic political activity—for that mutation of the human species, present in every sizeable political community, which is temperamentally incapable of adjustment to the normal delays, frustrations, compromises and disappointments of democratic political life.

Initially, most Western communists felt themselves in a sense parties to the Russian Revolution. They shared in its enthusiasms, its excitements and its international political goals. To the extent that physical proximity and ease of communication permitted, they remained in touch with the Russian Communist leaders, had a part in their councils and regarded the Russian Revolution as only the first phase of their own. It was not long, however, before the Russian Communists, proud of their own triumph, began to view their success in Russia as a proper source of authority over like-minded people elsewhere. The power of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

example was easily extrapolated into a claim on obedience. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, as the chances faded for revolution in the West and the Soviet leaders became preoccupied with the problems of national survival and competition within a capitalist environment, the foreign communist parties became pressed into the role of instruments of Soviet foreign policy.

In particular, Stalin, to whom the instigation of revolution elsewhere was always less interesting than the possibility of picking up support for the advance of Russia's national power, confronted foreign communists with the choice between accepting a blind subservience to Soviet policies that had little to do with the prospering of their own political fortunes at home or being declared traitors to the international communist movement and falling victim, accordingly, to every means of reprisal (not excluding personal terrorism) at Moscow's disposal. Only the death of Stalin and the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute that followed shortly thereafter rescued the foreign communists from this ignominious position and opened up for them new avenues of independent political activity. But by this time decades of subservience had been endured. A heavy toll had been taken of their domestic political effectiveness. The world had moved on into an era where the original postulates of Marxism-Leninism, already of questionable timeliness when Lenin expounded them, were clearly anachronistic. It was obvious that the vitality of these outlying communist parties would now have to be drawn from other sources than just the memory of the Bolshevik success in 1917–1920.

Meanwhile, Western society had been importantly affected by what would today be called the "backlash" of international communist activity. Extremism on the left of the political spectrum was bound to breed extremism on the right. There can be no question but that the sharp, provocative challenge to national outlooks and traditions and ideals implicit in practically all the activity of the Western communist parties, but particularly in their openly avowed subservience to a foreign center, had an important effect in stimulating fascist tendencies in the West. Many features of the international communist movement—the addiction to conspiratorial methods, the bewildering mixture of legal with illegal methods of operation, the use of "front" groups, the cultivated obscurity in sources of authority, the ruthless impersonality and even anonymity which Lenin had instilled into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its devotees—combined to invite the attribution to it, in primitive and anxious minds, of a certain demon image, and thus to open the way to that striving for the total externalization of evil which is the hallmark of fascist attitudes in all times and places. Particularly was this true in Germany, where the powerful communist threat in the years of the 1920s not only weakened moderate political forces by confronting them with constant attacks from the Left, but served as a pretext for the build-up of fascist forces which then attacked them no less savagely, and even more successfully, from the Right.

The effect of the example of the Russian Revolution in the West was thus not actually to produce those other revolutions of which the early Bolsheviki had dreamed, but rather to work upon political life in many places a polarization which interfered seriously with the prospects for stability and had much to do, in the end, with the failure of the post-Versailles order and the origins of World War II.

## V

Of even greater significance than the exemplary effect of the Russian Revolution on the advanced countries of the West was its similar influence on the underdeveloped peoples of the non-European world. The Russian Revolution occurred at a time when Europe's hegemony over the underdeveloped parts of the world was already passing its peak. This hegemony, a function of the great technological disparity between Europe and the rest of the world that had arisen since the opening of the world trade routes, was bound eventually to be modified by natural processes; but the First World War, draining Europe of much of its vitality as well as its capital, accelerated the process.

It was against this background that the Russian Revolution burst forth spectacularly as the first great example of successful revolt by non-Europe against Europe. It was, to be sure, a somewhat ambiguous example. Russia was herself largely a European power. She was also partly an industrial power. Her relation to Europe was not exactly that of a colony. But in the eyes of the world she was still a primitive country; her dependence on the great financial centers of the West had been extensive and humiliating (the foreign indebtedness of the Tsar's government was, by 1914, the heaviest of any in the world); for these and other reasons she presented a natural object for non-European sympathies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Russian-Communist standpoint, too, the relevance of the Russian Revolution to the revolt against Europe was not devoid of ambiguity. Anticolonial revolt was not the same thing, after all, as proletarian revolution. National liberation movements, embracing many people of non-proletarian class character, were not the same thing as working-class political parties. For the entire half-century to come, Soviet policy-makers would writhe under the dilemma: whether to oppose the possessing classes of the colonial and underdeveloped countries of non-Europe in the name of orthodox Marxism or to support them in the name of anticolonialism. A fully satisfactory theoretical answer to this question was never to be found, but increasingly, as the years went by, Soviet policy-makers would be grateful for anything that would help to weaken the proud old metropolitan powers of Europe or the United States. They were well aware of the power of their revolutionary example in just this respect, and concerned at all times to make the most of it. The statement ascribed to Lenin that the road to Paris lay through Peking is apocryphal; but the early Bolshevik leaders did believe that European capitalism could be seriously weakened, if not actually overthrown, by undermining its overseas positions, and they bent every effort to achieve just that.

This, curiously enough, proved to be the most enduring aspect of the international projection of the Russian Revolution. It is ironic that today, after passage of half a century, the field of revolutionary action by the Western proletariat, regarded in 1917 as the primary theater of coming world events, should be quiescent; whereas in the field of rebellion by non-Europe against Europe, once regarded as a secondary theater of the world-revolutionary process, Soviet policy should remain vigorous and implacable. In direct relations between Russia and the West, violence is now eschewed; all wars are bad wars; coexistence is to prevail. But when it comes to the national liberation movement, different rules obtain: violence directed to the destruction of European, and particularly American, influence and activity in other regions is good violence; wars of national liberation are good wars.

We may leave aside, for purposes of this discussion, the reasons for this curious persistence in the attack on Europe's African and Asian positions. It suffices here to note that the Russian Revolution unquestionably hastened the disintegration of Europe's colonial empire and of her political influence in other parts of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world. The record to date does not suggest that either the harm brought to Europe or the benefit brought to Russia by this development was as great as the fears and hopes addressed to it, respectively, on the two sides. But for the non-European countries themselves, the exemplary effects of the Russian Revolution were of enormous importance. The effect it had on China's political development would alone be enough to justify this conclusion, and this was only a part of the whole. In India, in Turkey and at a later date in Africa, the example of Russia's revolution was one of the outstanding environmental factors of the nineteen-twenties and thirties.

VI

These reflections lead naturally to the question of the direct effect of the Russian Revolution on relations between Russia and the leading countries of the West.

One should begin by noting that elements of an extraordinary antagonism in those relations were not unknown in earlier Russian history. Many of the characteristic features of Soviet attitudes (the strong instinct for orthodoxy, the claim to political infallibility and to a monopoly of ideological or religious truth, messianic dreams of world ascendancy, an exaggerated sense of prestige, a morbid suspiciousness toward outside powers, a determination to isolate the Russian people from contacts with the West, etc.) were characteristic features of pre-Petrine Russia. Even during the two centuries of the St. Petersburg period these traits continued to emerge from time to time to the surface of Russian governmental outlook and behavior. But in general the government of the Tsars came, during those last two centuries, to conform at least outwardly to accepted standards of behavior in international relations, to acknowledge in others the unlimited sovereignty it claimed for itself, and to embrace the principle of live-and-let-live as the essential foundation of international life.

It is idle to pretend, as do Soviet spokesmen today, that the Russian Revolution did not work a fundamental and extremely unhappy change in this state of affairs. It was not the issue of socialism versus capitalism that was the heart of the difficulty. There was no reason why great countries could not go different ways in this respect; and increasingly over the course of the years, as the two systems evolved toward each other, this dichotomy came to lose significance. The trouble was that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bolshevik leaders brought to their conquest of power in Russia a complex of attitudes toward the Western governments that gave an entirely new dimension to the conflicts, apprehensions and suspicions that normally bedevil the relations between great states. Among these attitudes were a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the Western governments, a pervasive cynicism about the parliamentary and democratic sources of their power, a denial that their peoples owed them loyalty, a denial not only of the *will* of Western governments to work for the betterment of their peoples but of their congenital ability to make any progress in this direction, a widely propagandized conviction that these governments were doomed by inexorable social forces to eventual destruction, and an openly avowed determination to do everything possible to prod these social forces into the early accomplishment of their historic mission. In the Bolshevik view, the Western governments were without exception predatory, reprehensible, devoid of redeeming features and deserving of violent overthrow. Those who manned them were seen as fit subjects for removal from power, disfranchisement and punishment. It is superfluous to point out that merely to hold such views toward other régimes, regardless of whether one tries actively to implement them, is to deny the basis for a normal international relationship. Nor did the adherence to this stance by one of the world's great governments fail to work upon the manners and habits of diplomatic intercourse a deterioration from which we are suffering to the present day.

Soviet historians have tended to place the blame for the tensions and conflicts of the ensuing decades on the Western side. The Western statesmen, they allege, saw in the Russian Revolution the rise of a force bound to threaten their capitalistic and imperialistic interests, trembled accordingly for the security of their property and power, reacted in fury and bitterness, and set about, to the best of their ability, to overthrow the world's first proletarian government.

This view was not taken entirely out of thin air. All of these things were present, in one degree or another, in the pattern of Western statesmanship. But they never made up the totality of the pattern, or even the greater part of it. And even if they had not existed at all—even had the statesmen in question been paragons of detachment, self-confidence, broad-mindedness and tolerance in their reaction to the existence of Soviet power—the rela-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionship could scarcely have been a normal one in the light of the fundamental postulates of the Bolshevik political outlook.

Over the intervening decades the discipline of international life has taken its toll of the militant intensity of these original attitudes on the Soviet side. It is not too much to say, in the case of the United States at least, that the right-wing reaction to Soviet Communism has actually proved more persistent in its emotional intensity than the phenomenon by which it was initially provoked. It will of course be long before the image of the Western world that projects itself onto the Russian-Communist vision will be devoid of some measure of distortion through the prism of Marxist assumptions. But after the passage of fifty years this factor of distortion, which in 1918 seemed to many so strong as to preclude every possibility of a normal relationship, no longer seems an insuperable impediment to peaceful and fruitful development of relations between Russia and the West. It is today in other areas—in the competition for influence in the underdeveloped regions, and especially in the nuclear weapons race where specific political differences are ignored or taken for granted and sheer fear takes over from real conflicts of interest as the source of political tension—it is in these fields, not in the direct political encounters between Russia and the West, that the greater danger now lies. The shuffle and confusion of history, which have eroded so many violent militancies in the past, are happily now well on the way to absorbing the acute East-West tensions of the early post-revolutionary period.

## VII

The most momentous of the consequences of the Russian Revolution were of course the internal ones. Obviously, changes of such magnitude in the life of the people defy brief description. The signal facts are well known. A political system of eight hundred years' standing was swept away. An entire upper class, in part the heritage of ages, was sloughed off, its members killed, driven to emigration, disenfranchised or degraded in status. In place of all this came the Communist Party, whose dictatorship, though varying in severity over the ensuing half-century with changes in personality and with successive phases of development, was never to be essentially relaxed. The nationalization of industry, that cherished goal of all Marxist striving, was carried ruthlessly to completion, only to have its significance thrown into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question in later decades by the growing evidence that management was a factor no less important than ownership. By drastic methods, and at the cost of much sacrifice and suffering, Russia was driven into the ranks of the major industrial powers. A half-century after the Revolution, living conditions for industrial workers were better than they were before it—but so were such conditions just about everywhere else. The peasantry, after a brief respite in the 1920s when it was permitted to enjoy the fruits of the expropriation of the landlords, found itself subjected to new exploitation in the form of Stalin's collective farm system, the rigors of which, as a subjective experience for the peasantry, made memories of pre-Revolutionary conditions seem rosy. From the régime's standpoint, collectivization had its uses; it may even (though this is uncertain) have contributed significantly to rapid industrialization. For the country as a whole it is difficult to view it otherwise than as a grievous setback, retarding the growth of agricultural production to a point where by mid-century it was no longer always adequate to the requirements of internal consumption. But in judging all these things one must remember that the implementation of the domestic program of Russian Communism was interrupted, and set back roughly one decade, by the war effort of the 1940s—an effort probably unparalleled in scale in the military history of mankind (unless it be by the corresponding effort of the German opponents). This effort would stand, alone, as one of the great historic achievements of the Russian people and as a lasting testimonial to their extraordinary capacity for heroism, endurance and sacrifice in a cause.

VIII

Lenin once noted with pride and elation that the Soviet régime he had founded had lasted longer than the 72 days of the Paris Commune. It has now lasted a half-century and stands, so far as anyone can see, firmly and without rival at the head of the traditional Russian state. It has had its ups and downs. Its achievements, as we have just noted, have had their negative and their positive sides. What exists in Russia today is, in so far as any political régime can form the character of a human community, the product of its endeavor. Russian society today is something that draws heavily on historical experience and national tradition, but it also reflects, in features that are probably now ineradicable, the influence of the ideologically impassioned political will to which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it has been subjected over five decades. It is in reality a civilization rather than just a national society that has been thus created —a unique civilization, not quite like anything else in the world, imperfect like every other, in many ways unsatisfying to those that bear it, but also embracing many aspects in which they take pride and satisfaction, and even some that they cherish. Its salient features have already achieved in many respects that sanction which only time and long acceptance can bestow on human institutions.

For the fact that this is so—for the fact that the experiment has gone on so long, and for the fact that it has yielded a stable civilization, capable of providing adequate outlets for many if not all of the positive human impulses—for this due credit must be given, even by those who constitute its ideological opponents, to the Russian Communist Party. In creating a new order out of the chaos of 1918–1919; in clinging to power successfully for half a century in a great and variegated country where the exertion of political power has never been easy; in retaining its own discipline and vitality as a political instrument in the face of the corrupting influence that the exercise of power invariably exerts; in realizing many of its far-reaching social objectives; in carrying to the present level the industrialization of the country and the development of new technology; in giving firm, determined and in many ways inspired leadership in the struggle against the armies of German fascism; in providing political inspiration and guidance to many of the radical-socialist forces of the world over most of this period, and to some of them over all of this period: in these achievements, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has not only stamped itself as the greatest political organization of the century in vigor and in will, but has remained faithful to the quality of the Russian Revolution as the century's greatest political event.

Those of us in the West who have never been able to accept the validity of the classic assumptions of Marxism-Leninism and who even doubt their relevance to the major social and economic problems of our time are obliged to recognize in the Soviet example that such things as devotion, determination, discipline and self-sacrifice in a political purpose create their own achievements and their own rewards, quite aside from the soundness of their ideological inspiration. The concepts and purposes of men in power are always to some extent dreams—this is only a ques-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of degree; but it is within the power of men to give reality to these dreams by the resolution and enthusiasm with which they pursue them: never quite the reality they hoped or intended to give, but one not necessarily less valuable for this measure of distortion. Even those of us in the West who have questioned the Soviet purpose and have contended at many points against the manner in which it was pursued are obliged to acknowledge, at this half-century mark, the impressive body of flesh with which the dream of the Russian Revolution has now been clothed; and we must extend to the present bearers of the Russian revolutionary tradition, even while we deny them our ideological sympathy, a respectful recognition of the great part they have taken in the authorship of the realities of our time. Their revolution has now entered, irrevocably, into the fabric of history.

On the other hand, it cannot be said that the system of power they have created and maintained has achieved complete stability —either in its relations with the non-communist world or in its relations with the great people over which its power extends. External relations are still troubled and made precarious by the neurotic view the régime takes of itself as a government among governments, by its predilection for secrecy and mystification in method, by its addiction to the use of exaggeration and falsehood in political utterance, by its persecution mania and its pathological preoccupation with espionage, by its excessive timidity and suspicion (more suitable to the former Grand Duchy of Moscovy than to a modern great power) about personal contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners, by the inordinate role it concedes to its secret police apparatus in the conduct of its foreign policy. To its own people, also, it will not achieve a stable relationship so long as it remains, like its Tsarist predecessor, unable to recognize that dictatorship is not a feasible method of governing a great people in the modern age; that no man, no party and no régime has a monopoly on either truth or virtue; and that the aesthetic and intellectual life of so talented a people as the Russians can never be successfully regimented by a political priesthood and a literary gendarmerie. There was a time, in the years just after Stalin's death, when these appreciations—essential to any successful and stable adjustment of political systems to the needs of the modern age—seemed on the way to recognition and acceptance both in Russia and in most of the communist states of Eastern Europe. In these latter countries, indeed, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trend has generally continued and gives promise of happier days. In Russia itself, unfortunately, the years since Khrushchev's fall have seen in many ways a retrogression.

If, then, the Soviet régime can look back, at this half-century point, on certain impressive accomplishments, it cannot be said to have achieved full stability either externally or internally. Great question marks still hover over the adequacy of its approaches in both areas. These question marks will not be removed until it learns to look forward, rather than backward, for political inspiration and methodology. Let us hope, in the interests of world peace as well as of the prospering of the Soviet peoples, that it will not be long until the logic of this necessity is understood and the cultivation of new attitudes begun.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reproduced by special permission
from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1967.
Copyright by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc., New York.

*THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—FIFTY YEARS AFTER*

# ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

*By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.*

THE Cold War in its original form was a presumably mortal antagonism, arising in the wake of the Second World War, between two rigidly hostile blocs, one led by the Soviet Union, the other by the United States. For nearly two somber and dangerous decades this antagonism dominated the fears of mankind; it may even, on occasion, have come close to blowing up the planet. In recent years, however, the once implacable struggle has lost its familiar clarity of outline. With the passing of old issues and the emergence of new conflicts and contestants, there is a natural tendency, especially on the part of the generation which grew up during the Cold War, to take a fresh look at the causes of the great contention between Russia and America.

Some exercises in reappraisal have merely elaborated the orthodoxies promulgated in Washington or Moscow during the boom years of the Cold War. But others, especially in the United States (there are no signs, alas, of this in the Soviet Union), represent what American historians call "revisionism"—that is, a readiness to challenge official explanations. No one should be surprised by this phenomenon. Every war in American history has been followed in due course by skeptical reassessments of supposedly sacred assumptions. So the War of 1812, fought at the time for the freedom of the seas, was in later years ascribed to the expansionist ambitions of Congressional war hawks; so the Mexican War became a slaveholders' conspiracy. So the Civil War has been pronounced a "needless war," and Lincoln has even been accused of manœuvring the rebel attack on Fort Sumter. So too the Spanish-American War and the First and Second World Wars have, each in its turn, undergone revisionist critiques. It is not to be supposed that the Cold War would remain exempt.

In the case of the Cold War, special factors reinforce the predictable historiographical rhythm. The outburst of polycentrism in the communist empire has made people wonder whether communism was ever so monolithic as official theories of the Cold War supposed. A generation with no vivid memories of Stalinism may see the Russia of the forties in the image of the relatively mild, seedy and irresolute Russia of the sixties. And for this same

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generation the American course of widening the war in Viet Nam —which even non-revisionists can easily regard as folly—has unquestionably stirred doubts about the wisdom of American foreign policy in the sixties which younger historians may have begun to read back into the forties.

It is useful to remember that, on the whole, past exercises in revisionism have failed to stick. Few historians today believe that the war hawks caused the War of 1812 or the slaveholders the Mexican War, or that the Civil War was needless, or that the House of Morgan brought America into the First World War or that Franklin Roosevelt schemed to produce the attack on Pearl Harbor. But this does not mean that one should deplore the rise of Cold War revisionism.[1] For revisionism is an essential part of the process by which history, through the posing of new problems and the investigation of new possibilities, enlarges its perspectives and enriches its insights.

More than this, in the present context, revisionism expresses a deep, legitimate and tragic apprehension. As the Cold War has begun to lose its purity of definition, as the moral absolutes of the fifties become the moralistic clichés of the sixties, some have begun to ask whether the appalling risks which humanity ran during the Cold War were, after all, necessary and inevitable; whether more restrained and rational policies might not have guided the energies of man from the perils of conflict into the potentialities of collaboration. The fact that such questions are in their nature unanswerable does not mean that it is not right and useful to raise them. Nor does it mean that our sons and daughters are not entitled to an accounting from the generation of Russians and Americans who produced the Cold War.

## II

The orthodox American view, as originally set forth by the American government and as reaffirmed until recently by most American scholars, has been that the Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression. Some have gone back well before the Second World War to lay open the sources of Russian expansionism. Geopoliticians traced the Cold War to imperial Russian strategic ambitions which in the nineteenth century led to the Crimean War, to Russian penetration of the Balkans and the Middle East and to Russian pressure

[1] As this writer somewhat intemperately did in a letter to *The New York Review of Books*, October 20, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on Britain's "lifeline" to India. Ideologists traced it to the Communist Manifesto of 1848 ("the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat"). Thoughtful observers (a phrase meant to exclude those who speak in Dullese about the unlimited evil of godless, atheistic, militant communism) concluded that classical Russian imperialism and Pan-Slavism, compounded after 1917 by Leninist messianism, confronted the West at the end of the Second World War with an inexorable drive for domination.[2]

The revisionist thesis is very different.[3] In its extreme form, it is that, after the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the end of the

[2] Every student of the Cold War must acknowledge his debt to W. H. McNeill's remarkable account, "America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941–1946" (New York, 1953) and to the brilliant and indispensable series by Herbert Feis: "Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought" (Princeton, 1957); "Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference" (Princeton, 1960); and "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II" (Princeton, 1966). Useful recent analyses include André Fontaine, "Histoire de la Guerre Froide" (2 v., Paris, 1965, 1967); N. A. Graebner, "Cold War Diplomacy, 1945–1960" (Princeton, 1962); L. J. Halle, "The Cold War as History" (London, 1967); M. F. Herz, "Beginnings of the Cold War" (Bloomington, 1966) and W. L. Neumann, "After Victory: Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the Making of the Peace" (New York, 1967).

[3] The fullest statement of this case is to be found in D. F. Fleming's voluminous "The Cold War and Its Origins" (New York, 1961). For a shorter version of this argument, see David Horowitz, "The Free World Colossus" (New York, 1965); the most subtle and ingenious statements come in W. A. Williams' "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy" (rev. ed., New York, 1962) and in Gar Alperowitz's "Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam" (New York, 1965) and in subsequent articles and reviews by Mr. Alperowitz in *The New York Review of Books*. The fact that in some aspects the revisionist thesis parallels the official Soviet argument must not, of course, prevent consideration of the case on its merits, nor raise questions about the motives of the writers, all of whom, so far as I know, are independent-minded scholars.

I might further add that all these books, in spite of their ostentatious display of scholarly apparatus, must be used with caution. Professor Fleming, for example, relies heavily on newspaper articles and even columnists. While Mr. Alperowitz bases his case on official documents or authoritative reminiscences, he sometimes twists his material in a most unscholarly way. For example, in describing Ambassador Harriman's talk with President Truman on April 20, 1945, Mr. Alperowitz writes, "He argued that a reconsideration of Roosevelt's policy was necessary" (p. 22, repeated on p. 24). The citation is to p. 70–72 in President Truman's "Years of Decision." What President Truman reported Harriman as saying was the exact opposite: "Before leaving, Harriman took me aside and said, 'Frankly, one of the reasons that made me rush back to Washington was the fear that you did not understand, as I had seen Roosevelt understand, that Stalin is breaking his agreements.'" Similarly, in an appendix (p. 271) Mr. Alperowitz writes that the Hopkins and Davies missions of May 1945 "were opposed by the 'firm' advisers." Actually the Hopkins mission was proposed by Harriman and Charles E. Bohlen, who Mr. Alperowitz elsewhere suggests were the firmest of the firm—and was proposed by them precisely to impress on Stalin the continuity of American policy from Roosevelt to Truman. While the idea that Truman reversed Roosevelt's policy is tempting dramatically, it is a myth. See, for example, the testimony of Anna Rosenberg Hoffman, who lunched with Roosevelt on March 24, 1945, the last day he spent in Washington. After luncheon, Roosevelt was handed a cable. "He read it and became quite angry. He banged his fists on the arms of his wheelchair and said, 'Averell is right; we can't do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta.' He was very upset and continued in the same vein on the subject."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second World War, the United States deliberately abandoned the wartime policy of collaboration and, exhilarated by the possession of the atomic bomb, undertook a course of aggression of its own designed to expel all Russian influence from Eastern Europe and to establish democratic-capitalist states on the very border of the Soviet Union. As the revisionists see it, this radically new American policy—or rather this resumption by Truman of the pre-Roosevelt policy of insensate anti-communism—left Moscow no alternative but to take measures in defense of its own borders. The result was the Cold War.

These two views, of course, could not be more starkly contrasting. It is therefore not unreasonable to look again at the half-dozen critical years between June 22, 1941, when Hitler attacked Russia, and July 2, 1947, when the Russians walked out of the Marshall Plan meeting in Paris. Several things should be borne in mind as this reëxamination is made. For one thing, we have thought a great deal more in recent years, in part because of writers like Roberta Wohlstetter and T. C. Schelling, about the problems of communication in diplomacy—the signals which one nation, by word or by deed, gives, inadvertently or intentionally, to another. Any honest reappraisal of the origins of the Cold War requires the imaginative leap—which should in any case be as instinctive for the historian as it is prudent for the statesman—into the adversary's viewpoint. We must strive to see how, given Soviet perspectives, the Russians might conceivably have misread our signals, as we must reconsider how intelligently we read theirs.

For another, the historian must not overindulge the man of power in the illusion cherished by those in office that high position carries with it the easy ability to shape history. Violating the statesman's creed, Lincoln once blurted out the truth in his letter of 1864 to A. G. Hodges: "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me." He was not asserting Tolstoyan fatalism but rather suggesting how greatly events limit the capacity of the statesman to bend history to his will. The physical course of the Second World War—the military operations undertaken, the position of the respective armies at the war's end, the momentum generated by victory and the vacuums created by defeat—all these determined the future as much as the character of individual leaders and the substance of national ideology and purpose.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nor can the historian forget the conditions under which decisions are made, especially in a time like the Second World War. These were tired, overworked, aging men: in 1945, Churchill was 71 years old, Stalin had governed his country for 17 exacting years, Roosevelt his for 12 years nearly as exacting. During the war, moreover, the importunities of military operations had shoved postwar questions to the margins of their minds. All—even Stalin, behind his screen of ideology—had became addicts of improvisation, relying on authority and virtuosity to conceal the fact that they were constantly surprised by developments. Like Eliza, they leaped from one cake of ice to the next in the effort to reach the other side of the river. None showed great tactical consistency, or cared much about it; all employed a certain ambiguity to preserve their power to decide big issues; and it is hard to know how to interpret anything any one of them said on any specific occasion. This was partly because, like all princes, they designed their expressions to have particular effects on particular audiences; partly because the entirely genuine intellectual difficulty of the questions they faced made a degree of vacillation and mind-changing eminently reasonable. If historians cannot solve their problems in retrospect, who are they to blame Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill for not having solved them at the time?

III

Peacemaking after the Second World War was not so much a tapestry as it was a hopelessly raveled and knotted mess of yarn. Yet, for purposes of clarity, it is essential to follow certain threads. One theme indispensable to an understanding of the Cold War is the contrast between two clashing views of world order: the "universalist" view, by which all nations shared a common interest in all the affairs of the world, and the "sphere-of-influence" view, by which each great power would be assured by the other great powers of an acknowledged predominance in its own area of special interest. The universalist view assumed that national security would be guaranteed by an international organization. The sphere-of-interest view assumed that national security would be guaranteed by the balance of power. While in practice these views have by no means been incompatible (indeed, our shaky peace has been based on a combination of the two), in the abstract they involved sharp contradictions.

The tradition of American thought in these matters was uni-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

versalist—*i.e.* Wilsonian. Roosevelt had been a member of Wilson's subcabinet; in 1920, as candidate for Vice President, he had campaigned for the League of Nations. It is true that, within Roosevelt's infinitely complex mind, Wilsonianism warred with the perception of vital strategic interests he had imbibed from Mahan. Morever, his temperamental inclination to settle things with fellow princes around the conference table led him to regard the Big Three—or Four—as trustees for the rest of the world. On occasion, as this narrative will show, he was beguiled into flirtation with the sphere-of-influence heresy. But in principle he believed in joint action and remained a Wilsonian. His hope for Yalta, as he told the Congress on his return, was that it would "spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed."

Whenever Roosevelt backslid, he had at his side that Wilsonian fundamentalist, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to recall him to the pure faith. After his visit to Moscow in 1943, Hull characteristically said that, with the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security (in which America, Russia, Britain and China pledged "united action . . . for the organization and maintenance of peace and security"), "there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

Remembering the corruption of the Wilsonian vision by the secret treaties of the First World War, Hull was determined to prevent any sphere-of-influence nonsense after the Second World War. He therefore fought all proposals to settle border questions while the war was still on and, excluded as he largely was from wartime diplomacy, poured his not inconsiderable moral energy and frustration into the promulgation of virtuous and spacious general principles.

In adopting the universalist view, Roosevelt and Hull were not indulging personal hobbies. Sumner Welles, Adolf Berle, Averell Harriman, Charles Bohlen—all, if with a variety of nuances, opposed the sphere-of-influence approach. And here the State Department was expressing what seems clearly to have been the predominant mood of the American people, so long mistrustful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of European power politics. The Republicans shared the true faith. John Foster Dulles argued that the great threat to peace after the war would lie in the revival of sphere-of-influence thinking. The United States, he said, must not permit Britain and Russia to revert to these bad old ways; it must therefore insist on American participation in all policy decisions for all territories in the world. Dulles wrote pessimistically in January 1945, "The three great powers which at Moscow agreed upon the 'closest coöperation' about European questions have shifted to a practice of separate, regional responsibility."

It is true that critics, and even friends, of the United States sometimes noted a discrepancy between the American passion for universalism when it applied to territory far from American shores and the preëminence the United States accorded its own interests nearer home. Churchill, seeking Washington's blessing for a sphere-of-influence initiative in Eastern Europe, could not forbear reminding the Americans, "We follow the lead of the United States in South America;" nor did any universalist of record propose the abolition of the Monroe Doctrine. But a convenient myopia prevented such inconsistencies from qualifying the ardency of the universalist faith.

There seem only to have been three officials in the United States Government who dissented. One was the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, a classical balance-of-power man, who in 1944 opposed the creation of a vacuum in Central Europe by the pastoralization of Germany and in 1945 urged "the settlement of all territorial acquisitions in the shape of defense posts which each of these four powers may deem to be necessary for their own safety" in advance of any effort to establish a peacetime United Nations. Stimson considered the claim of Russia to a preferred position in Eastern Europe as not unreasonable: as he told President Truman, "he thought the Russians perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security." Such a position for Russia seemed to him comparable to the preferred American position in Latin America; he even spoke of "our respective orbits." Stimson was therefore skeptical of what he regarded as the prevailing tendency "to hang on to exaggerated views of the Monroe Doctrine and at the same time butt into every question that comes up in Central Europe." Acceptance of spheres of influence seemed to him the way to avoid "a head-on collision."

A second official opponent of universalism was George Kennan,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an eloquent advocate from the American Embassy in Moscow of "a prompt and clear recognition of the division of Europe into spheres of influence and of a policy based on the fact of such division." Kennan argued that nothing we could do would possibly alter the course of events in Eastern Europe; that we were deceiving ourselves by supposing that these countries had any future but Russian domination; that we should therefore relinquish Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union and avoid anything which would make things easier for the Russians by giving them economic assistance or by sharing moral responsibility for their actions.

A third voice within the government against universalism was (at least after the war) Henry A. Wallace. As Secretary of Commerce, he stated the sphere-of-influence case with trenchancy in the famous Madison Square Garden speech of September 1946 which led to his dismissal by President Truman:

> On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the *political* affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the *political* affairs of Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. . . . Whether we like it or not, the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence. . . . The Russians have no more business stirring up native Communists to political activity in Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States than we have in interfering with the politics of Eastern Europe and Russia.

Stimson, Kennan and Wallace seem to have been alone in the government, however, in taking these views. They were very much minority voices. Meanwhile universalism, rooted in the American legal and moral tradition, overwhelmingly backed by contemporary opinion, received successive enshrinements in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, in the Declaration of the United Nations in 1942 and in the Moscow Declaration of 1943.

## IV

The Kremlin, on the other hand, thought *only* of spheres of interest; above all, the Russians were determined to protect their frontiers, and especially their border to the west, crossed so often and so bloodily in the dark course of their history. These western frontiers lacked natural means of defense—no great oceans, rugged mountains, steaming swamps or impenetrable jungles. The history of Russia had been the history of invasion, the last of which was by now horribly killing up to twenty million of its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people. The protocol of Russia therefore meant the enlargement of the area of Russian influence. Kennan himself wrote (in May 1944), "Behind Russia's stubborn expansion lies only the age-old sense of insecurity of a sedentary people reared on an exposed plain in the neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples," and he called this "urge" a "permanent feature of Russian psychology."

In earlier times the "urge" had produced the tsarist search for buffer states and maritime outlets. In 1939 the Soviet-Nazi pact and its secret protocol had enabled Russia to begin to satisfy in the Baltic states, Karelian Finland and Poland, part of what it conceived as its security requirements in Eastern Europe. But the "urge" persisted, causing the friction between Russia and Germany in 1940 as each jostled for position in the area which separated them. Later it led to Molotov's new demands on Hitler in November 1940—a free hand in Finland, Soviet predominance in Rumania and Bulgaria, bases in the Dardanelles—the demands which convinced Hitler that he had no choice but to attack Russia. Now Stalin hoped to gain from the West what Hitler, a closer neighbor, had not dared yield him.

It is true that, so long as Russian survival appeared to require a second front to relieve the Nazi pressure, Moscow's demand for Eastern Europe was a little muffled. Thus the Soviet government adhered to the Atlantic Charter (though with a significant if obscure reservation about adapting its principles to "the circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries"). Thus it also adhered to the Moscow Declaration of 1943, and Molotov then, with his easy mendacity, even denied that Russia had any desire to divide Europe into spheres of influence. But this was guff, which the Russians were perfectly willing to ladle out if it would keep the Americans, and especially Secretary Hull (who made a strong personal impression at the Moscow conference) happy. "A declaration," as Stalin once observed to Eden, "I regard as algebra, but an agreement as practical arithmetic. I do not wish to decry algebra, but I prefer practical arithmetic."

The more consistent Russian purpose was revealed when Stalin offered the British a straight sphere-of-influence deal at the end of 1941. Britain, he suggested, should recognize the Russian absorption of the Baltic states, part of Finland, eastern Poland and Bessarabia; in return, Russia would support any special British need for bases or security arrangements in Western Europe. There was nothing specifically communist about these ambitions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If Stalin achieved them, he would be fulfilling an age-old dream of the tsars. The British reaction was mixed. "Soviet policy is amoral," as Anthony Eden noted at the time; "United States policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least where non-American interests are concerned." If Roosevelt was a universalist with occasional leanings toward spheres of influence and Stalin was a sphere-of-influence man with occasional gestures toward universalism, Churchill seemed evenly poised between the familiar realism of the balance of power, which he had so long recorded as an historian and manipulated as a statesman, and the hope that there must be some better way of doing things. His 1943 proposal of a world organization divided into regional councils represented an effort to blend universalist and sphere-of-interest conceptions. His initial rejection of Stalin's proposal in December 1941 as "directly contrary to the first, second and third articles of the Atlantic Charter" thus did not spring entirely from a desire to propitiate the United States. On the other hand, he had himself already reinterpreted the Atlantic Charter as applying only to Europe (and thus not to the British Empire), and he was, above all, an empiricist who never believed in sacrificing reality on the altar of doctrine.

So in April 1942 he wrote Roosevelt that "the increasing gravity of the war" had led him to feel that the Charter "ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her." Hull, however, remained fiercely hostile to the inclusion of territorial provisions in the Anglo-Russian treaty; the American position, Eden noted, "chilled me with Wilsonian memories." Though Stalin complained that it looked "as if the Atlantic Charter was directed against the U.S.S.R.," it was the Russian season of military adversity in the spring of 1942, and he dropped his demands.

He did not, however, change his intentions. A year later Ambassador Standley could cable Washington from Moscow: "In 1918 Western Europe attempted to set up a *cordon sanitaire* to protect it from the influence of bolshevism. Might not now the Kremlin envisage the formation of a belt of pro-Soviet states to protect it from the influences of the West?" It well might; and that purpose became increasingly clear as the war approached its end. Indeed, it derived sustenance from Western policy in the first area of liberation.

The unconditional surrender of Italy in July 1943 created the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first major test of the Western devotion to universalism. America and Britain, having won the Italian war, handled the capitulation, keeping Moscow informed at a distance. Stalin complained:

> The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results . . . just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate the situation any longer. I propose that the [tripartite military-political commission] be established and that Sicily be assigned . . . as its place of residence.

Roosevelt, who had no intention of sharing the control of Italy with the Russians, suavely replied with the suggestion that Stalin send an officer "to General Eisenhower's headquarters in connection with the commission." Unimpressed, Stalin continued to press for a tripartite body; but his Western allies were adamant in keeping the Soviet Union off the Control Commission for Italy, and the Russians in the end had to be satisfied with a seat, along with minor Allied states, on a meaningless Inter-Allied Advisory Council. Their acquiescence in this was doubtless not unconnected with a desire to establish precedents for Eastern Europe.

Teheran in December 1943 marked the high point of three-power collaboration. Still, when Churchill asked about Russian territorial interests, Stalin replied a little ominously, "There is no need to speak at the present time about any Soviet desires, but when the time comes we will speak." In the next weeks, there were increasing indications of a Soviet determination to deal unilaterally with Eastern Europe—so much so that in early February 1944 Hull cabled Harriman in Moscow:

> Matters are rapidly approaching the point where the Soviet Government will have to choose between the development and extension of the foundation of international cooperation as the guiding principle of the postwar world as against the continuance of a unilateral and arbitrary method of dealing with its special problems even though these problems are admittedly of more direct interest to the Soviet Union than to other great powers.

As against this approach, however, Churchill, more tolerant of sphere-of-influence deviations, soon proposed that, with the impending liberation of the Balkans, Russia should run things in Rumania and Britain in Greece. Hull strongly opposed this suggestion but made the mistake of leaving Washington for a few days; and Roosevelt, momentarily free from his Wilsonian conscience, yielded to Churchill's plea for a three-months' trial. Hull resumed the fight on his return, and Churchill postponed the matter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Red Army continued its advance into Eastern Europe. In August the Polish Home Army, urged on by Polish-language broadcasts from Moscow, rose up against the Nazis in Warsaw. For 63 terrible days, the Poles fought valiantly on, while the Red Army halted on the banks of the Vistula a few miles away, and in Moscow Stalin for more than half this time declined to coöperate with the Western effort to drop supplies to the Warsaw Resistance. It appeared a calculated Soviet decision to let the Nazis slaughter the anti-Soviet Polish underground; and, indeed, the result was to destroy any substantial alternative to a Soviet solution in Poland. The agony of Warsaw caused the most deep and genuine moral shock in Britain and America and provoked dark forebodings about Soviet postwar purposes.

Again history enjoins the imaginative leap in order to see things for a moment from Moscow's viewpoint. The Polish question, Churchill would say at Yalta, was for Britain a question of honor. "It is not only a question of honor for Russia," Stalin replied, "but one of life and death. . . . Throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia." A top postwar priority for any Russian régime must be to close that corridor. The Home Army was led by anti-communists. It clearly hoped by its action to forestall the Soviet occupation of Warsaw and, in Russian eyes, to prepare the way for an anti-Russian Poland. In addition, the uprising from a strictly operational viewpoint was premature. The Russians, it is evident in retrospect, had real military problems at the Vistula. The Soviet attempt in September to send Polish units from the Red Army across the river to join forces with the Home Army was a disaster. Heavy German shelling thereafter prevented the ferrying of tanks necessary for an assault on the German position. The Red Army itself did not take Warsaw for another three months. None the less, Stalin's indifference to the human tragedy, his effort to blackmail the London Poles during the ordeal, his sanctimonious opposition during five precious weeks to aerial resupply, the invariable coldness of his explanations ("the Soviet command has come to the conclusion that it must dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure") and the obvious political benefit to the Soviet Union from the destruction of the Home Army—all these had the effect of suddenly dropping the mask of wartime comradeship and displaying to the West the hard face of Soviet policy. In now pursuing what he grimly regarded as the minimal requirements for the postwar security of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his country, Stalin was inadvertently showing the irreconcilability of both his means and his ends with the Anglo-American conception of the peace.

Meanwhile Eastern Europe presented the Alliance with still another crisis that same September. Bulgaria, which was not at war with Russia, decided to surrender to the Western Allies while it still could; and the English and Americans at Cairo began to discuss armistice terms with Bulgarian envoys. Moscow, challenged by what it plainly saw as a Western intrusion into its own zone of vital interest, promptly declared war on Bulgaria, took over the surrender negotiations and, invoking the Italian precedent, denied its Western Allies any role in the Bulgarian Control Commission. In a long and thoughtful cable, Ambassador Harriman meditated on the problems of communication with the Soviet Union. "Words," he reflected, "have a different connotation to the Soviets than they have to us. When they speak of insisting on 'friendly governments' in their neighboring countries, they have in mind something quite different from what we would mean." The Russians, he surmised, really believed that Washington accepted "their position that although they would keep us informed they had the right to settle their problems with their western neighbors unilaterally." But the Soviet position was still in flux: "the Soviet Government is not one mind." The problem, as Harriman had earlier told Harry Hopkins, was "to strengthen the hands of those around Stalin who want to play the game along our lines." The way to do this, he now told Hull, was to

> be understanding of their sensitivity, meet them much more than half way, encourage them and support them wherever we can, and yet oppose them promptly with the greatest of firmness where we see them going wrong. . . . The only way we can eventually come to an understanding with the Soviet Union on the question of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is for us to take a definite interest in the solution of the problems of each individual country as they arise.

As against Harriman's sophisticated universalist strategy, however, Churchill, increasingly fearful of the consequences of unrestrained competition in Eastern Europe, decided in early October to carry his sphere-of-influence proposal directly to Moscow. Roosevelt was at first content to have Churchill speak for him too and even prepared a cable to that effect. But Hopkins, a more rigorous universalist, took it upon himself to stop the cable and warn Roosevelt of its possible implications. Eventually

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Roosevelt sent a message to Harriman in Moscow emphasizing that he expected to "retain complete freedom of action after this conference is over." It was now that Churchill quickly proposed —and Stalin as quickly accepted—the celebrated division of southeastern Europe: ending (after further haggling between Eden and Molotov) with 90 percent Soviet predominance in Rumania, 80 percent in Bulgaria and Hungary, fifty-fifty in Jugoslavia, 90 percent British predominance in Greece.

Churchill in discussing this with Harriman used the phrase "spheres of influence." But he insisted that these were only "immediate wartime arrangements" and received a highly general blessing from Roosevelt. Yet, whatever Churchill intended, there is reason to believe that Stalin construed the percentages as an agreement, not a declaration; as practical arithmetic, not algebra. For Stalin, it should be understood, the sphere-of-influence idea did not mean that he would abandon all efforts to spread communism in some other nation's sphere; it did mean that, if he tried this and the other side cracked down, he could not feel he had serious cause for complaint. As Kennan wrote to Harriman at the end of 1944:

> As far as border states are concerned the Soviet government has never ceased to think in terms of spheres of interest. They expect us to support them in whatever action they wish to take in those regions, regardless of whether that action seems to us or to the rest of the world to be right or wrong. . . . I have no doubt that this position is honestly maintained on their part, and that they would be equally prepared to reserve moral judgment on any actions which we might wish to carry out, i.e., in the Caribbean area.

In any case, the matter was already under test a good deal closer to Moscow than the Caribbean. The communist-dominated resistance movement in Greece was in open revolt against the effort of the Papandreou government to disarm and disband the guerrillas (the same Papandreou whom the Greek colonels have recently arrested on the claim that he is a tool of the communists). Churchill now called in British Army units to crush the insurrection. This action produced a storm of criticism in his own country and in the United States; the American Government even publicly dissociated itself from the intervention, thereby emphasizing its detachment from the sphere-of-influence deal. But Stalin, Churchill later claimed, "adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens not one word of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reproach came from *Pravda* or *Izvestia*," though there is no evidence that he tried to call off the Greek communists. Still, when the communist rebellion later broke out again in Greece, Stalin told Kardelj and Djilas of Jugoslavia in 1948, "The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible."

No one, of course, can know what really was in the minds of the Russian leaders. The Kremlin archives are locked; of the primary actors, only Molotov survives, and he has not yet indicated any desire to collaborate with the Columbia Oral History Project. We do know that Stalin did not wholly surrender to sentimental illusion about his new friends. In June 1944, on the night before the landings in Normandy, he told Djilas that the English "find nothing sweeter than to trick their allies. . . . And Churchill? Churchill is the kind who, if you don't watch him, will slip a kopeck out of your pocket. Yes, a kopeck out of your pocket! . . . Roosevelt is not like that. He dips in his hand only for bigger coins." But whatever his views of his colleagues it is not unreasonable to suppose that Stalin would have been satisfied at the end of the war to secure what Kennan has called "a protective glacis along Russia's western border," and that, in exchange for a free hand in Eastern Europe, he was prepared to give the British and Americans equally free hands in their zones of vital interest, including in nations as close to Russia as Greece (for the British) and, very probably—or at least so the Jugoslavs believe—China (for the United States). In other words, his initial objectives were very probably not world conquest but Russian security.

## V

It is now pertinent to inquire why the United States rejected the idea of stabilizing the world by division into spheres of influence and insisted on an East European strategy. One should warn against rushing to the conclusion that it was all a row between hard-nosed, balance-of-power realists and starry-eyed Wilsonians. Roosevelt, Hopkins, Welles, Harriman, Bohlen, Berle, Dulles and other universalists were tough and serious men. Why then did they rebuff the sphere-of-influence solution?

The first reason is that they regarded this solution as containing within itself the seeds of a third world war. The balance-of-power idea seemed inherently unstable. It had always broken down in the past. It held out to each power the permanent temptation to try to alter the balance in its own favor, and it built this tempta-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion into the international order. It would turn the great powers of 1945 away from the objective of concerting common policies toward competition for postwar advantage. As Hopkins told Molotov at Teheran, "The President feels it essential to world peace that Russia, Great Britain and the United States work out this control question in a manner which will not start each of the three powers arming against the others." "The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict," said the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1944 (the only conflict which the J.C.S., in its wisdom, could then glimpse "in the foreseeable future" was between Britain and Russia), ". . . would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary." The Americans were perfectly ready to acknowledge that Russia was entitled to convincing assurance of her national security—but not this way. "I could sympathize fully with Stalin's desire to protect his western borders from future attack," as Hull put it. "But I felt that this security could best be obtained through a strong postwar peace organization."

Hull's remark suggests the second objection: that the sphere-of-influence approach would, in the words of the State Department in 1945, "militate against the establishment and effective functioning of a broader system of general security in which all countries will have their part." The United Nations, in short, was seen as the alternative to the balance of power. Nor did the universalists see any necessary incompatibility between the Russian desire for "friendly governments" on its frontier and the American desire for self-determination in Eastern Europe. Before Yalta the State Department judged the general mood of Europe as "to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic and social reforms, but not, however, in favor of a left-wing totalitarian regime to achieve these reforms." Governments in Eastern Europe could be sufficiently to the left "to allay Soviet suspicions" but sufficiently representative "of the center and *petit bourgeois* elements" not to seem a prelude to communist dictatorship. The American criteria were therefore that the government "should be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties" and "should favor social and economic reforms." A string of New Deal states —of Finlands and Czechoslovakias—seemed a reasonable compromise solution.

Third, the universalists feared that the sphere-of-interest ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proach would be what Hull termed "a haven for the isolationists," who would advocate America's participation in Western Hemisphere affairs on condition that it did not participate in European or Asian affairs. Hull also feared that spheres of interest would lead to "closed trade areas or discriminatory systems" and thus defeat his cherished dream of a low-tariff, freely trading world.

Fourth, the sphere-of-interest solution meant the betrayal of the principles for which the Second World War was being fought —the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, the Declaration of the United Nations. Poland summed up the problem. Britain, having gone to war to defend the independence of Poland from the Germans, could not easily conclude the war by surrendering the independence of Poland to the Russians. Thus, as Hopkins told Stalin after Roosevelt's death in 1945, Poland had "become the symbol of our ability to work out problems with the Soviet Union." Nor could American liberals in general watch with equanimity while the police state spread into countries which, if they had mostly not been real democracies, had mostly not been tyrannies either. The execution in 1943 of Ehrlich and Alter, the Polish socialist trade union leaders, excited deep concern. "I have particularly in mind," Harriman cabled in 1944, "objection to the institution of secret police who may become involved in the persecution of persons of truly democratic convictions who may not be willing to conform to Soviet methods."

Fifth, the sphere-of-influence solution would create difficult domestic problems in American politics. Roosevelt was aware of the six million or more Polish votes in the 1944 election; even more acutely, he was aware of the broader and deeper attack which would follow if, after going to war to stop the Nazi conquest of Europe, he permitted the war to end with the communist conquest of Eastern Europe. As Archibald MacLeish, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, warned in January 1945, "The wave of disillusionment which has distressed us in the last several weeks will be increased if the impression is permitted to get abroad that potentially totalitarian provisional governments are to be set up without adequate safeguards as to the holding of free elections and the realization of the principles of the Atlantic Charter." Roosevelt believed that no administration could survive which did not try everything short of war to save Eastern Europe, and he was the supreme American politician of the century.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sixth, if the Russians were allowed to overrun Eastern Europe without argument, would that satisfy them? Even Kennan, in a dispatch of May 1944, admitted that the "urge" had dreadful potentialities: "If initially successful, will it know where to stop? Will it not be inexorably carried forward, by its very nature, in a struggle to reach the whole—to attain complete mastery of the shores of the Atlantic and the Pacific?" His own answer was that there were inherent limits to the Russian capacity to expand—"that Russia will not have an easy time in maintaining the power which it has seized over other people in Eastern and Central Europe unless it receives both moral and material assistance from the West." Subsequent developments have vindicated Kennan's argument. By the late forties, Jugoslavia and Albania, the two East European states farthest from the Soviet Union and the two in which communism was imposed from within rather than from without, had declared their independence of Moscow. But, given Russia's success in maintaining centralized control over the international communist movement for a quarter of a century, who in 1944 could have had much confidence in the idea of communist revolts against Moscow?

Most of those involved therefore rejected Kennan's answer and stayed with his question. If the West turned its back on Eastern Europe, the higher probability, in their view, was that the Russians would use their security zone, not just for defensive purposes, but as a springboard from which to mount an attack on Western Europe, now shattered by war, a vacuum of power awaiting its master. "If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security," Harriman said in 1944, "penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical." If a row with Russia were inevitable, every consideration of prudence dictated that it should take place in Eastern rather than Western Europe.

Thus idealism and realism joined in opposition to the sphere-of-influence solution. The consequence was a determination to assert an American interest in the postwar destiny of all nations, including those of Eastern Europe. In the message which Roosevelt and Hopkins drafted after Hopkins had stopped Roosevelt's initial cable authorizing Churchill to speak for the United States at the Moscow meeting of October 1944, Roosevelt now said, "There is in this global war literally no question, either military or political, in which the United States is not interested." After

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Roosevelt's death Hopkins repeated the point to Stalin: "The cardinal basis of President Roosevelt's policy which the American people had fully supported had been the concept that the interests of the U.S. were worldwide and not confined to North and South America and the Pacific Ocean."

VI

For better or worse, this was the American position. It is now necessary to attempt the imaginative leap and consider the impact of this position on the leaders of the Soviet Union who, also for better or for worse, had reached the bitter conclusion that the survival of their country depended on their unchallenged control of the corridors through which enemies had so often invaded their homeland. They could claim to have been keeping their own side of the sphere-of-influence bargain. Of course, they were working to capture the resistance movements of Western Europe; indeed, with the appointment of Oumansky as Ambassador to Mexico they were even beginning to enlarge underground operations in the Western Hemisphere. But, from their viewpoint, if the West permitted this, the more fools they; and, if the West stopped it, it was within their right to do so. In overt political matters the Russians were scrupulously playing the game. They had watched in silence while the British shot down communists in Greece. In Jugoslavia Stalin was urging Tito (as Djilas later revealed) to keep King Peter. They had not only acknowledged Western preëminence in Italy but had recognized the Badoglio régime; the Italian Communists had even voted (against the Socialists and the Liberals) for the renewal of the Lateran Pacts.

They would not regard anti-communist action in a Western zone as a *casus belli;* and they expected reciprocal license to assert their own authority in the East. But the principle of self-determination was carrying the United States into a deeper entanglement in Eastern Europe than the Soviet Union claimed as a right (whatever it was doing underground) in the affairs of Italy, Greece or China. When the Russians now exercised in Eastern Europe the same brutal control they were prepared to have Washington exercise in the American sphere of influence, the American protests, given the paranoia produced alike by Russian history and Leninist ideology, no doubt seemed not only an act of hypocrisy but a threat to security. To the Russians, a stroll into the neighborhood easily became a plot to burn down the house:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when, for example, damaged American planes made emergency landings in Poland and Hungary, Moscow took this as attempts to organize the local resistance. It is not unusual to suspect one's adversary of doing what one is already doing oneself. At the same time, the cruelty with which the Russians executed their idea of spheres of influence—in a sense, perhaps, an unwitting cruelty, since Stalin treated the East Europeans no worse than he had treated the Russians in the thirties—discouraged the West from accepting the equation (for example, Italy = Rumania) which seemed so self-evident to the Kremlin.

So Moscow very probably, and not unnaturally, perceived the emphasis on self-determination as a systematic and deliberate pressure on Russia's western frontiers. Moreover, the restoration of capitalism to countries freed at frightful cost by the Red Army no doubt struck the Russians as the betrayal of the principles for which *they* were fighting. "That they, the victors," Isaac Deutscher has suggested, "should now preserve an order from which they had experienced nothing but hostility, and could expect nothing but hostility . . . would have been the most miserable anti-climax to their great 'war of liberation.'" By 1944 Poland was the critical issue; Harriman later said that "under instructions from President Roosevelt, I talked about Poland with Stalin more frequently than any other subject." While the West saw the point of Stalin's demand for a "friendly government" in Warsaw, the American insistence on the sovereign virtues of free elections (ironically in the spirit of the 1917 Bolshevik decree of peace, which affirmed "the right" of a nation "to decide the forms of its state existence by a free vote, taken after the complete evacuation of the incorporating or, generally, of the stronger nation") created an insoluble problem in those countries, like Poland (and Rumania) where free elections would almost certainly produce anti-Soviet governments.

The Russians thus may well have estimated the Western pressures as calculated to encourage their enemies in Eastern Europe and to defeat their own minimum objective of a protective glacis. Everything still hung, however, on the course of military operations. The wartime collaboration had been created by one thing, and one thing alone: the threat of Nazi victory. So long as this threat was real, so was the collaboration. In late December 1944, von Rundstedt launched his counter-offensive in the Ardennes. A few weeks later, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin gathered

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Crimea, it was in the shadow of this last considerable explosion of German power. The meeting at Yalta was still dominated by the mood of war.

Yalta remains something of an historical perplexity—less, from the perspective of 1967, because of a mythical American deference to the sphere-of-influence thesis than because of the documentable Russian deference to the universalist thesis. Why should Stalin in 1945 have accepted the Declaration on Liberated Europe and an agreement on Poland pledging that "the three governments will jointly" act to assure "free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people"? There are several probable answers: that the war was not over and the Russians still wanted the Americans to intensify their military effort in the West; that one clause in the Declaration premised action on "the opinion of the three governments" and thus implied a Soviet veto, though the Polish agreement was more definite; most of all that the universalist algebra of the Declaration was plainly in Stalin's mind to be construed in terms of the practical arithmetic of his sphere-of-influence agreement with Churchill the previous October. Stalin's assurance to Churchill at Yalta that a proposed Russian amendment to the Declaration would not apply to Greece makes it clear that Roosevelt's pieties did not, in Stalin's mind, nullify Churchill's percentages. He could well have been strengthened in this supposition by the fact that *after* Yalta, Churchill himself repeatedly reasserted the terms of the October agreement as if he regarded it, despite Yalta, as controlling.

Harriman still had the feeling before Yalta that the Kremlin had "two approaches to their postwar policies" and that Stalin himself was "of two minds." One approach emphasized the internal reconstruction and development of Russia; the other its external expansion. But in the meantime the fact which dominated all political decisions—that is, the war against Germany—was moving into its final phase. In the weeks after Yalta, the military situation changed with great rapidity. As the Nazi threat declined, so too did the need for coöperation. The Soviet Union, feeling itself menaced by the American idea of self-determination and the borderlands diplomacy to which it was leading, skeptical whether the United Nations would protect its frontiers as reliably as its own domination in Eastern Europe, began to fulfill its security requirements unilaterally.

In March Stalin expressed his evaluation of the United Nations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by rejecting Roosevelt's plea that Molotov come to the San Francisco conference, if only for the opening sessions. In the next weeks the Russians emphatically and crudely worked their will in Eastern Europe, above all in the test country of Poland. They were ignoring the Declaration on Liberated Europe, ignoring the Atlantic Charter, self-determination, human freedom and everything else the Americans considered essential for a stable peace. "We must clearly recognize," Harriman wired Washington a few days before Roosevelt's death, "that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know and respect it."

At the same time, the Russians also began to mobilize communist resources in the United States itself to block American universalism. In April 1945 Jacques Duclos, who had been the Comintern official responsible for the Western communist parties, launched in *Cahiers du Communisme* an uncompromising attack on the policy of the American Communist Party. Duclos sharply condemned the revisionism of Earl Browder, the American Communist leader, as "expressed in the concept of a long-term class peace in the United States, of the possibility of the suppression of the class struggle in the postwar period and of establishment of harmony between labor and capital." Browder was specifically rebuked for favoring the "self-determination" of Europe "west of the Soviet Union" on a bourgeois-democratic basis. The excommunication of Browderism was plainly the Politburo's considered reaction to the impending defeat of Germany; it was a signal to the communist parties of the West that they should recover their identity; it was Moscow's alert to communists everywhere that they should prepare for new policies in the postwar world.

The Duclos piece obviously could not have been planned and written much later than the Yalta conference—that is, well before a number of events which revisionists now cite in order to demonstrate American responsibility for the Cold War: before Allen Dulles, for example, began to negotiate the surrender of the German armies in Italy (the episode which provoked Stalin to charge Roosevelt with seeking a separate peace and provoked Roosevelt to denounce the "vile misrepresentations" of Stalin's informants); well before Roosevelt died; many months before the testing of the atomic bomb; even more months before Truman ordered that the bomb be dropped on Japan. William Z. Foster, who soon replaced Browder as the leader of the American Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist Party and embodied the new Moscow line, later boasted of having said in January 1944, "A post-war Roosevelt administration would continue to be, as it is now, an imperialist government." With ancient suspicions revived by the American insistence on universalism, this was no doubt the conclusion which the Russians were reaching at the same time. The Soviet canonization of Roosevelt (like their present-day canonization of Kennedy) took place after the American President's death.

The atmosphere of mutual suspicion was beginning to rise. In January 1945 Molotov formally proposed that the United States grant Russia a $6 billion credit for postwar reconstruction. With characteristic tact he explained that he was doing this as a favor to save America from a postwar depression. The proposal seems to have been diffidently made and diffidently received. Roosevelt requested that the matter "not be pressed further" on the American side until he had a chance to talk with Stalin; but the Russians did not follow it up either at Yalta in February (save for a single glancing reference) or during the Stalin-Hopkins talks in May or at Potsdam. Finally the proposal was renewed in the very different political atmosphere of August. This time Washington inexplicably mislaid the request during the transfer of the records of the Foreign Economic Administration to the State Department. It did not turn up again until March 1946. Of course this was impossible for the Russians to believe; it is hard enough even for those acquainted with the capacity of the American government for incompetence to believe; and it only strengthened Soviet suspicions of American purposes.

The American credit was one conceivable form of Western contribution to Russian reconstruction. Another was lend-lease, and the possibility of reconstruction aid under the lend-lease protocol had already been discussed in 1944. But in May 1945 Russia, like Britain, suffered from Truman's abrupt termination of lend-lease shipments—"unfortunate and even brutal," Stalin told Hopkins, adding that, if it was "designed as pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up, then it was a fundamental mistake." A third form was German reparations. Here Stalin in demanding $10 billion in reparations for the Soviet Union made his strongest fight at Yalta. Roosevelt, while agreeing essentially with Churchill's opposition, tried to postpone the matter by accepting the Soviet figure as a "basis for discussion"—a formula which led to future misunderstanding. In short, the Russian hope

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for major Western assistance in postwar reconstruction foundered on three events which the Kremlin could well have interpreted respectively as deliberate sabotage (the loan request), blackmail (lend-lease cancellation) and pro-Germanism (reparations).

Actually the American attempt to settle the fourth lend-lease protocol was generous and the Russians for their own reasons declined to come to an agreement. It is not clear, though, that satisfying Moscow on any of these financial scores would have made much essential difference. It might have persuaded some doves in the Kremlin that the U.S. government was genuinely friendly; it might have persuaded some hawks that the American anxiety for Soviet friendship was such that Moscow could do as it wished without inviting challenge from the United States. It would, in short, merely have reinforced both sides of the Kremlin debate; it would hardly have reversed deeper tendencies toward the deterioration of political relationships. Economic deals were surely subordinate to the quality of mutual political confidence; and here, in the months after Yalta, the decay was steady.

The Cold War had now begun. It was the product not of a decision but of a dilemma. Each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of the peace. Each then felt compelled to undertake defensive measures. Thus the Russians saw no choice but to consolidate their security in Eastern Europe. The Americans, regarding Eastern Europe as the first step toward Western Europe, responded by asserting their interest in the zone the Russians deemed vital to their security. The Russians concluded that the West was resuming its old course of capitalist encirclement; that it was purposefully laying the foundation for anti-Soviet régimes in the area defined by the blood of centuries as crucial to Russian survival. Each side believed with passion that future international stability depended on the success of its own conception of world order. Each side, in pursuing its own clearly indicated and deeply cherished principles, was only confirming the fear of the other that it was bent on aggression.

Very soon the process began to acquire a cumulative momentum. The impending collapse of Germany thus provoked new troubles: the Russians, for example, sincerely feared that the West was planning a separate surrender of the German armies in Italy in a way which would release troops for Hitler's eastern front, as they subsequently feared that the Nazis might succeed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in surrendering Berlin to the West. This was the context in which the atomic bomb now appeared. Though the revisionist argument that Truman dropped the bomb less to defeat Japan than to intimidate Russia is not convincing, this thought unquestionably appealed to some in Washington as at least an advantageous side-effect of Hiroshima.

So the machinery of suspicion and counter-suspicion, action and counter-action, was set in motion. But, given relations among traditional national states, there was still no reason, even with all the postwar jostling, why this should not have remained a manageable situation. What made it unmanageable, what caused the rapid escalation of the Cold War and in another two years completed the division of Europe, was a set of considerations which this account has thus far excluded.

VII

Up to this point, the discussion has considered the schism within the wartime coalition as if it were entirely the result of disagreements among national states. Assuming this framework, there was unquestionably a failure of communication between America and Russia, a misperception of signals and, as time went on, a mounting tendency to ascribe ominous motives to the other side. It seems hard, for example, to deny that American postwar policy created genuine difficulties for the Russians and even assumed a threatening aspect for them. All this the revisionists have rightly and usefully emphasized.

But the great omission of the revisionists—and also the fundamental explanation of the speed with which the Cold War escalated—lies precisely in the fact that the Soviet Union was *not* a traditional national state.[4] This is where the "mirror image," invoked by some psychologists, falls down. For the Soviet Union was a phenomenon very different from America or Britain: it was a totalitarian state, endowed with an all-explanatory, all-consuming ideology, committed to the infallibility of government and party, still in a somewhat messianic mood, equating dis-

[4] This is the classical revisionist fallacy—the assumption of the rationality, or at least of the traditionalism, of states where ideology and social organization have created a different range of motives. So the Second World War revisionists omit the totalitarian dynamism of Nazism and the fanaticism of Hitler, as the Civil War revisionists omit the fact that the slavery system was producing a doctrinaire closed society in the American South. For a consideration of some of these issues, see "The Causes of the Civil War: A Note on Historical Sentimentalism" in my "The Politics of Hope" (Boston, 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sent with treason, and ruled by a dictator who, for all his quite extraordinary abilities, had his paranoid moments.

Marxism-Leninism gave the Russian leaders a view of the world according to which all societies were inexorably destined to proceed along appointed roads by appointed stages until they achieved the classless nirvana. Moreover, given the resistance of the capitalists to this development, the existence of any non-communist state was *by definition* a threat to the Soviet Union. "As long as capitalism and socialism exist," Lenin wrote, "we cannot live in peace: in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism."

Stalin and his associates, whatever Roosevelt or Truman did or failed to do, were bound to regard the United States as the enemy, not because of this deed or that, but because of the primordial fact that America was the leading capitalist power and thus, by Leninist syllogism, unappeasably hostile, driven by the logic of its system to oppose, encircle and destroy Soviet Russia. Nothing the United States could have done in 1944–45 would have abolished this mistrust, required and sanctified as it was by Marxist gospel—nothing short of the conversion of the United States into a Stalinist despotism; and even this would not have sufficed, as the experience of Jugoslavia and China soon showed, unless it were accompanied by total subservience to Moscow. So long as the United States remained a capitalist democracy, no American policy, given Moscow's theology, could hope to win basic Soviet confidence, and every American action was poisoned from the source. So long as the Soviet Union remained a messianic state, ideology compelled a steady expansion of communist power.

It is easy, of course, to exaggerate the capacity of ideology to control events. The tension of acting according to revolutionary abstractions is too much for most nations to sustain over a long period: that is why Mao Tse-tung has launched his Cultural Revolution, hoping thereby to create a permanent revolutionary mood and save Chinese communism from the degeneration which, in his view, has overtaken Russian communism. Still, as any revolution grows older, normal human and social motives will increasingly reassert themselves. In due course, we can be sure, Leninism will be about as effective in governing the daily lives of Russians as Christianity is in governing the daily lives of Americans. Like the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mount, the Leninist verities will increasingly become platitudes for ritual observance, not guides to secular decision. There can be no worse fallacy (even if respectable people practiced it diligently for a season in the United States) than that of drawing from a nation's ideology permanent conclusions about its behavior.

A temporary recession of ideology was already taking place during the Second World War when Stalin, to rally his people against the invader, had to replace the appeal of Marxism by that of nationalism. ("We are under no illusions that they are fighting for us," Stalin once said to Harriman. "They are fighting for Mother Russia.") But this was still taking place within the strictest limitations. The Soviet Union remained as much a police state as ever; the régime was as infallible as ever; foreigners and their ideas were as suspect as ever. "Never, except possibly during my later experience as ambassador in Moscow," Kennan has written, "did the insistence of the Soviet authorities on isolation of the diplomatic corps weigh more heavily on me . . . than in these first weeks following my return to Russia in the final months of the war. . . . [We were] treated as though we were the bearers of some species of the plague"—which, of course, from the Soviet viewpoint, they were: the plague of skepticism.

Paradoxically, of the forces capable of bringing about a modification of ideology, the most practical and effective was the Soviet dictatorship itself. If Stalin was an ideologist, he was also a pragmatist. If he saw everything through the lenses of Marxism-Leninism, he also, as the infallible expositor of the faith, could reinterpret Marxism-Leninism to justify anything he wanted to do at any given moment. No doubt Roosevelt's ignorance of Marxism-Leninism was inexcusable and led to grievous miscalculations. But Roosevelt's efforts to work on and through Stalin were not so hopelessly naïve as it used to be fashionable to think. With the extraordinary instinct of a great political leader, Roosevelt intuitively understood that Stalin was the *only* lever available to the West against the Leninist ideology and the Soviet system. If Stalin could be reached, then alone was there a chance of getting the Russians to act contrary to the prescriptions of their faith. The best evidence is that Roosevelt retained a certain capacity to influence Stalin to the end; the nominal Soviet acquiescence in American universalism as late as Yalta was perhaps an indication of that. It is in this way that the death of Roosevelt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was crucial—not in the vulgar sense that his policy was then reversed by his successor, which did not happen, but in the sense that no other American could hope to have the restraining impact on Stalin which Roosevelt might for a while have had.

Stalin alone could have made any difference. Yet Stalin, in spite of the impression of sobriety and realism he made on Westerners who saw him during the Second World War, was plainly a man of deep and morbid obsessions and compulsions. When he was still a young man, Lenin had criticized his rude and arbitrary ways. A reasonably authoritative observer (N. S. Khrushchev) later commented, "These negative characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character." His paranoia, probably set off by the suicide of his wife in 1932, led to the terrible purges of the mid-thirties and the wanton murder of thousands of his Bolshevik comrades. "Everywhere and in everything," Khrushchev says of this period, "he saw 'enemies,' 'double-dealers' and 'spies.'" The crisis of war evidently steadied him in some way, though Khrushchev speaks of his "nervousness and hysteria . . . even after the war began." The madness, so rigidly controlled for a time, burst out with new and shocking intensity in the postwar years. "After the war," Khrushchev testifies,

> the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular, his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. . . . He decided everything, without any consideration for anyone or anything.
>
> Stalin's wilfulness showed itself . . . also in the international relations of the Soviet Union. . . . He had completely lost a sense of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in the USSR, but in relation to whole parties and nations.

A revisionist fallacy has been to treat Stalin as just another Realpolitik statesman, as Second World War revisionists see Hitler as just another Stresemann or Bismarck. But the record makes it clear that in the end nothing could satisfy Stalin's paranoia. His own associates failed. Why does anyone suppose that any conceivable American policy would have succeeded?

An analysis of the origins of the Cold War which leaves out these factors—the intransigence of Leninist ideology, the sinister dynamics of a totalitarian society and the madness of Stalin—is obviously incomplete. It was these factors which made it hard for the West to accept the thesis that Russia was moved only by a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

desire to protect its security and would be satisfied by the control of Eastern Europe; it was these factors which charged the debate between universalism and spheres of influence with apocalyptic potentiality.

Leninism and totalitarianism created a structure of thought and behavior which made postwar collaboration between Russia and America—in any normal sense of civilized intercourse between national states—inherently impossible. The Soviet dictatorship of 1945 simply could not have survived such a collaboration. Indeed, nearly a quarter-century later, the Soviet régime, though it has meanwhile moved a good distance, could still hardly survive it without risking the release inside Russia of energies profoundly opposed to communist despotism. As for Stalin, he may have represented the only force in 1945 capable of overcoming Stalinism, but the very traits which enabled him to win absolute power expressed terrifying instabilities of mind and temperament and hardly offered a solid foundation for a peaceful world.

VIII

The difference between America and Russia in 1945 was that some Americans fundamentally believed that, over a long run, a modus vivendi with Russia was possible; while the Russians, so far as one can tell, believed in no more than a short-run modus vivendi with the United States.

Harriman and Kennan, this narrative has made clear, took the lead in warning Washington about the difficulties of short-run dealings with the Soviet Union. But both argued that, if the United States developed a rational policy and stuck to it, there would be, after long and rough passages, the prospect of eventual clearing. "I am, as you know," Harriman cabled Washington in early April, "a most earnest advocate of the closest possible understanding with the Soviet Union so that what I am saying relates only to how best to attain such understanding." Kennan has similarly made it clear that the function of his containment policy was "to tide us over a difficult time and bring us to the point where we could discuss effectively with the Russians the dangers and drawbacks this status quo involved, and to arrange with them for its peaceful replacement by a better and sounder one." The subsequent careers of both men attest to the honesty of these statements.

There is no corresponding evidence on the Russian side that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anyone seriously sought a modus vivendi in these terms. Stalin's choice was whether his long-term ideological and national interests would be better served by a short-run truce with the West or by an immediate resumption of pressure. In October 1945 Stalin indicated to Harriman at Sochi that he planned to adopt the second course—that the Soviet Union was going isolationist. No doubt the succession of problems with the United States contributed to this decision, but the basic causes most probably lay elsewhere: in the developing situations in Eastern Europe, in Western Europe and in the United States.

In Eastern Europe, Stalin was still for a moment experimenting with techniques of control. But he must by now have begun to conclude that he had underestimated the hostility of the people to Russian dominion. The Hungarian elections in November would finally convince him that the Yalta formula was a road to anti-Soviet governments. At the same time, he was feeling more strongly than ever a sense of his opportunities in Western Europe. The other half of the Continent lay unexpectedly before him, politically demoralized, economically prostrate, militarily defenseless. The hunting would be better and safer than he had anticipated. As for the United States, the alacrity of postwar demobilization must have recalled Roosevelt's offhand remark at Yalta that "two years would be the limit" for keeping American troops in Europe. And, despite Dr. Eugene Varga's doubts about the imminence of American economic breakdown, Marxist theology assured Stalin that the United States was heading into a bitter postwar depression and would be consumed with its own problems. If the condition of Eastern Europe made unilateral action seem essential in the interests of Russian security, the condition of Western Europe and the United States offered new temptations for communist expansion. The Cold War was now in full swing.

It still had its year of modulations and accommodations. Secretary Byrnes conducted his long and fruitless campaign to persuade the Russians that America only sought governments in Eastern Europe "both friendly to the Soviet Union and representative of all the democratic elements of the country." Crises were surmounted in Trieste and Iran. Secretary Marshall evidently did not give up hope of a modus vivendi until the Moscow conference of foreign secretaries of March 1947. Even then, the Soviet Union was invited to participate in the Marshall Plan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The point of no return came on July 2, 1947, when Molotov, after bringing 89 technical specialists with him to Paris and evincing initial interest in the project for European reconstruction, received the hot flash from the Kremlin, denounced the whole idea and walked out of the conference. For the next fifteen years the Cold War raged unabated, passing out of historical ambiguity into the realm of good versus evil and breeding on both sides simplifications, stereotypes and self-serving absolutes, often couched in interchangeable phrases. Under the pressure even America, for a deplorable decade, forsook its pragmatic and pluralist traditions, posed as God's appointed messenger to ignorant and sinful man and followed the Soviet example in looking to a world remade in its own image.

In retrospect, if it is impossible to see the Cold War as a case of American aggression and Russian response, it is also hard to see it as a pure case of Russian aggression and American response. "In what is truly tragic," wrote Hegel, "there must be valid moral powers on both the sides which come into collision. . . . Both suffer loss and yet both are mutually justified." In this sense, the Cold War had its tragic elements. The question remains whether it was an instance of Greek tragedy—as Auden has called it, "the tragedy of necessity," where the feeling aroused in the spectator is "What a pity it had to be this way"—or of Christian tragedy, "the tragedy of possibility," where the feeling aroused is "What a pity it was this way when it might have been otherwise."

Once something has happened, the historian is tempted to assume that it had to happen; but this may often be a highly unphilosophical assumption. The Cold War could have been avoided only if the Soviet Union had not been possessed by convictions both of the infallibility of the communist word and of the inevitability of a communist world. These convictions transformed an impasse between national states into a religious war, a tragedy of possibility into one of necessity. One might wish that America had preserved the poise and proportion of the first years of the Cold War and had not in time succumbed to its own forms of self-righteousness. But the most rational of American policies could hardly have averted the Cold War. Only today, as Russia begins to recede from its messianic mission and to accept, in practice if not yet in principle, the permanence of the world of diversity, only now can the hope flicker that this long, dreary, costly contest may at last be taking on forms less dramatic, less obsessive and less dangerous to the future of mankind.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# THE SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

*By Yevsei Liberman*

THE rapid rate of Soviet economic development, begun in 1921–1922, was based upon Lenin's theory that socialism and communism could be built in our country if public ownership of the means of production was established and the economy was centrally planned.

Lenin conceded that the period of so-called "military communism" (1918–1921) had represented an attempt to establish socialism without market relations or trade, but on the basis of direct exchange of commodities between town and countryside, and that this attempt had been necessitated by the foreign military intervention rather than having been carefully worked out. Later Lenin pointed out that this had been a mistake, but a mistake that was quite understandable and even helpful. In order to find out the strength of a fortress it was first necessary to try to capture it by direct frontal attack. If this failed, there was no use in persisting in one's mistake; a long siege of the fortress had to be begun. Lenin concluded that the attempt could succeed if enthusiastically supported, but it would have to be based on economic accountability and personal material incentives for the working people.

Thus was laid the cornerstone for the building of socialist society, as a new, planned form of commodity production based on the law of value and commodity-monetary relations. It is important to bear in mind, however, that in the U.S.S.R. the law of value does not operate spontaneously, that is, anarchically, but within the framework of proportions and rates fixed in the overall economic plan. This is why the operation of the law of value never did and does not lead to economic anarchy, unemployment or crises and depressions. Just as the means of production could not be privately owned for gain, so the operation of the law of value under socialism has not led and cannot lead to the polarization of poverty and wealth and the creation of antagonistic class contradictions.

But the law of value leads to the formation of profits. Many persons in the West cannot understand how profit can be com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

patible with socialism. Here, too, we may cite history. At one time Lenin demanded that all Soviet enterprises shift to economic accountability.[1] They should operate on a "commercial basis," as he put it. Lenin urged that commercial accounting not be ignored and that battle be joined against the prejudices that hindered it and against adverse recollection of the past.

Lenin's comment about the view advanced in Bukharin's "The Economy of the Transitional Period" is quite characteristic. Bukharin had written that production under capitalism was production for the sake of profit, while production under proletarian rule was production to meet the needs of the public. He ought, said Lenin, to have made clear that under proletarian rule the surplus product does not go to capitalists but to all the working people and to them alone.

Thus, to acknowledge the necessity of commercial operations and profit-making is to acknowledge the operation of the law of value and of the commodity-monetary mechanism in the process of building socialist society.

Actually, these principles have operated throughout the history of the Soviet state, but we must admit that in particularly critical periods, *i.e.* in the years of intensive industrialization and collectivization, in World War II and in the postwar reconstruction, the operation and requirements of the law of value were restricted and sometimes even ignored. These periods demanded the utmost concentration of resources and centralized rationing of them. Moreover, since the Soviet Union was not receiving long-term financing and credits from outside, it had to restrict consumption of the available resources in order to make the necessary huge investments. This violated the principle of equivalent exchange between town and countryside, between people and state; in other words, the requirements of the law of value were not adhered to in many respects.

Such actions can be historically explained. They were, moreover, supported by the enthusiasm and heroically selfless efforts of the majority of the Soviet people. Sacrifice and enthusiasm are an immense force in the development of society (just as of the individual) at critical moments of life. But they cannot function for an unjustifiably prolonged time. Lofty virtues per se, they can

[1] *Translator's note:* "Economic accountability" is the term used to describe unsubsidized, self-contained operation of a factory. The plant "accounts for itself" and does not require state support or intervention except for certain plan goals set for it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become faults if reliance is placed on their effects for too long. They cannot provide the foundation for a massive daily and continuous improvement in the sphere of production, distribution and trade. We must not forget that if restrictions on consumption are long continued, they undermine the incentive to work, and this retards the very process of accumulation for the sake of which consumption has been restricted.

A certain disregard of the requirements of the law of value, observable over a number of years, began to inhibit the growth of efficiency in production in the 1950s and 1960s. Although rates of growth were on the whole quite high in the U.S.S.R., it was evident that we were not making use of all the possibilities and advantages inherent in the socialist system. The substitution of voluntarism and naked administrative fiat for economic stimuli produced distressing disproportions, a lower efficiency in utilizing our fixed assets, deterioration of the quality of goods, and, as a result, insufficient growth of the working people's property. This is why the objective necessity arose to revise the methods of management and bring them into greater conformity with current tasks. This gave rise to the economic discussion of 1962–1964, followed by the decision to carry out an economic reform in successive stages over a three-year period.

## II. THE FIRST RESULTS

The essential principle of the reform, now in operation for more than a year, is that what is advantageous for society as a whole should be advantageous for each industrial enterprise. Toward this end a number of measures are being adopted, including: increasing the independence of enterprises; appraising their work by the criterion of profitability; introducing payment for production assets; raising the material incentives for personnel, in ratio to the enterprise's performance, out of profits; increasing the enterprises' direct contracting with one another for the supply of goods; and establishing economically based, as opposed to arbitrarily set, prices.

Last year 704 enterprises, employing more than 2,000,000 persons, or more than 10 percent of the Soviet industrial labor force, shifted to the new system of operation. For industry as a whole the volume of output rose 8.6 percent in that year, profit increased 10 percent and labor productivity rose 5.2 percent; but the 704 enterprises which changed over to the new methods of manage-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment showed a gain of more than 10 percent in sales volume, approximately 25 percent in profit and 8 percent in labor productivity. These are average data; at individual enterprises the results were higher. This means that even now, though the economic reform has not reached its full potential, it is already putting vast latent production reserves to work. A total of more than 2,200 enterprises, including almost all the instrument manufacturing plants, many light-industry factories and mills, and ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical plants are now operating under the new system of planning and incentives.

From the manager's viewpoint, the reform has thus far brought much that is advantageous but also many cares. The pleasing aspect is that the amount of supervision by superior agencies has been reduced and the possibilities of showing initiative have increased. Practically speaking, the manager now requires supervision only in settling and gaining approval of key goals in his factory's plan; he must also be provided with up-to-date information on technical and economic developments, and, most important, must be helped in solving the practical problems of obtaining supplies for major construction and the introduction of new equipment and machinery. In principle, the manager settles all day-to-day questions independently and directly with his suppliers, clients and transportation agencies.

As for the manager's cares, they have multiplied, for under the old system, though he had far less freedom of action, his task was essentially simpler, since everything was decreed from above. His responsibility consisted merely in carrying out instructions. Now he has to search, experiment and take risks; and this is not easy, particularly at the initial stage of the reform, when the enterprises transferred to the new system of management operate in an ocean of others which still are working in the old manner. This simultaneous coexistence of two systems of management creates certain difficulties.

Most questions are now decided at the enterprises themselves and with the broad participation of the workers. It has become much easier to apply proposals for rationalization, since the needed resources are available at the enterprises themselves, out of their own profits. Finally, the wages and bonuses received by the workers have increased substantially.

The data reported indicate that in many instances bonuses issued for the first half of 1966 rose 20 percent, 30 percent, 40 per-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cent or more over those in the corresponding period of the previous year. It is true that in the opinion of many economists one should judge not merely by the percentage of increase but also by the absolute amount of the bonuses, which still seems insufficient. On the other hand, the rapid rate of growth will naturally lead to an increase in the absolute size of bonuses and in total personal earnings.

### III. THE ROLE OF PROFIT IN THE SOVIET UNION

The question of profit has been widely discussed in recent times in the U.S.S.R.—not because profit was previously unknown there or was being introduced for the first time, but because prior to the reform profit was not employed as the chief criterion or overall indicator of the effectiveness of an enterprise. Profit was only one of many required indicators which were set as goals. These indicators established as targets for the enterprise included gross volume of output, an excessively detailed list of the items to be produced, cost reduction, number of employees, output per employee, average wage, etc. The number of obligatory targets fettered initiative. Often the enterprises concerned themselves primarily with increasing gross volume of output, since their performance was judged above all by that and not by the amount of output sold, as is now the case. In addition, enterprises gave little heed to the ultilization of production assets. Trying to find the easiest way to meet the assigned volume of output, they asked and received from the state, free of charge, a great deal of equipment and new structures which they did not always use rationally and fully.

Much of this is explained by the fact that for a long time the Soviet Union was the world's only socialist country. It was faced with the task of creating industry as fast as possible and providing for the country's defense. No thought was given at that time to the quality or attractiveness of goods, not even to production cost or profit. This was entirely justified, for the Soviet Union not only withstood the war of 1941–1945 but played a decisive role in ridding the world of fascism. This was worth any price. It was our "profit" and, if you please, the "profit" of the whole civilized world.

But, as Lenin said more than once, our virtues, if carried too far, can turn into faults. This is what happened in our country when the practices of management by administrative fiat were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continued into the period after our country had entered the stage of peaceful economic competition with the developed countries of the West.

Success in this competition cannot be gained by the old methods of administrative and excessively centralized management. It was necessary to change so as to give the enterprises themselves a material stake in the better utilization of their assets and in providing the best possible service to their consumers. To do this the enterprises obviously had to be relieved of the excessive number of planned targets and their work had to be judged, first, by how they fulfilled the contracts for deliveries of commodities and, if they did this, secondly by their profit level.

Profit sums up all the aspects of an enterprise's work, including quality of output, since the price for better goods is correspondingly higher than for outmoded or relatively inefficient items. But it is important to note that profit is neither the only nor the chief goal of production. We are interested above all in output of specific commodities to satisfy consumer and producer needs. Profit is used as the chief index of, and incentive to, efficiency of production, as a mechanism for appraising and stimulating the work of an enterprise and also as a source of accumulation and investment.

By means of bonuses drawn from profits we wish to encourage enterprises to draw up their own plans which would be good—that is, advantageous—alike for society and themselves; and not only to draw up such plans, but to carry them out, something which should be encouraged at the expense of the profits. It is not a question of weakening or discarding planning, but, on the contrary, of reinforcing and improving it by drawing the enterprises themselves into the planning process, for they always know better than anyone their own real potentialities and should study and know the needs of their clients.

The introduction of contract relations with consumers or clients (for the contractual relationship now exists in a number of light industries) does not at all signify a change to regulation by the anarchy of the market. Effective consumer demand can be predicted more easily in our country than in the West, since we know the wage fund of the urban population and the earnings of the collective farmers. Hence, we can draw up well-based balance sheets of the public's income and expenditure. The total volume of purchasing power is a figure which lends itself easily to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

planning. But specifically which goods are to constitute this total, what are to be the colors of the clothing, which styles are to be used and how best to organize their production—this is not the prerogative of centralized planning. It is, rather, a matter for agreement between trade outlets and producers. Thus, our market requirements, the calculation of public demand and the planning of production not only are integral, they should support and supplement each other.

What is the difference between "capitalist" and "socialist" profit, in my opinion? The difference will be best understood if we consider: (1) how the profit is formed; (2) what it indicates; and (3) how it is spent.

From the viewpoint of private enterprise, all profit belongs to the capitalists alone. To justify this, there was long ago devised a theory that three factors—capital, land and labor—create value. Joseph A. Schumpeter, in his "Theory of Economic Development," wrote that profit is the excess over production cost. But this "cost" includes "payment" for the entrepreneur's labor, land rent and interest on capital, as well as a premium for "risk." Over and above this, profit should reward the entrepreneur if, by a fresh combination of production elements, he reduces the production cost below the prevailing average level of expenditures.

The nature of this "combination of elements" can be perceived from the fact that in the private enterprise system most profit is now derived from redistribution of income in the market in the process of exchange. It is common knowledge, for instance, that big profits are most easily obtained by the advantageous purchase of raw materials, by a monopoly-controlled raising of retail prices, by unequal exchanges with underdeveloped countries, by the export of capital to countries with low wage levels, by a system of preferential duties and tariffs, by the increase in stock-market prices through capitalization above profit, and, finally, by military orders.

In our country all these sources of profit are precluded by the very nature of socialism, under which there is neither private ownership of the means of production nor holding of stock (and hence no stock market). The level at which labor is paid depends on the productivity of the labor and is regulated by law. Prices of raw materials and supplies are planned; the market cannot be taken advantage of in purchasing raw materials or hiring labor. Nor is it possible to take advantage of market conditions to raise

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the prices of finished goods. Exchange with other countries is conducted on a basis of equality and by long-term agreements.

In the Soviet Union, by virtue of the very nature of the mode of production and distribution, profit indicates only the level of production efficiency. Profit is the difference between production cost and the factory sale price. But since in our country the price represents, in principle, the norms of expenditure of socially necessary labor, any increase in profit is an index of relative economy in production. Higher profits in the Soviet Union are based solely on economized hours of working time, economized tons of raw materials and supplies and fuel, and economized kilowatt-hours of electricity. We do not justify profits obtained from chance circumstances, such as excessively high prices, and do not regard such profits as being to the credit of the enterprise. Rather do we consider such profit the consequence of insufficiently flexible price setting. All profits of this kind go into the state budget; from such profits no bonuses are granted to the enterprises.

Now let us see what is done with profit in the U.S.S.R., that is, what it is spent on. First of all, no private individual and no enterprise as a group of private individuals may acquire profit. Profit may not be invested arbitrarily by any persons or groups for the purpose of deriving personal income.

Profit in our country belongs to those who own the means of production; that is to say, to society, to all the working people as a whole. All profit in our country goes first of all into the planned expansion or improvement of social production, and next into providing free social services to the public, such as education and science, public health services, pensions and stipends. A part is spent on the administrative apparatus and, unfortunately, quite a large part on defense requirements. We would be happy to dispense with the latter expenditures if a program of universal disarmament were adopted.

Profit used to be given insufficient importance in our country because of a certain disregard of the law of value. Some Soviet economists incorrectly interpreted this economic law as an unpleasant leftover of capitalism; they held that the sooner we got rid of it the better. Disregard of the requirements of the law of value led to the establishment of arbitrarily planned prices—prices which, moreover, remained in force for overly long periods. Prices thus became divorced from the real value of goods; profit varied greatly from enterprise to enterprise, and even from article

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to article within the same general group of goods. In these circumstances profit did not reflect the actual achievements of the producers. Because of this, many economists and managers began to regard profit as something totally independent of the enterprise and therefore an unreliable barometer of economic management. It is this mistake that many of our economists, including the author, are now trying to eradicate. And our economic reform is aimed at this. We have no intention of reverting to private enterprise; on the contrary, we want to put into operation the economic laws of socialism. Central planning is entirely compatible with the initiative of enterprises in managing the economy profitably. This is as far from "private enterprise" as the latter is from feudalism.

The law of value is not a law of capitalism, but of any form of production for the market, including planned commodity production, which is what socialism is. The difference from capitalism is that ends and means are reversed. Under capitalism, profit is the basic aim, whereas satisfaction of the needs of the public is the means of attaining that aim and is secondary. Under socialism, on the contrary, the aim is to satisfy the needs of the public, and profit is the means toward that end. This is not a verbal distinction but the crux of the matter, since in our conditions profit does not work counter to social needs but helps to satisfy them.

### IV. THE REFORM AND THE PROBLEMS

The first stage of the economic reform has confronted us with certain difficulties in realizing its basic principles—difficulties which appear to be inherent in this period of the reform. The transfer of the first 704 enterprises to the new system was not immediately accompanied by substantial changes in their relations with the superior agencies, with other enterprises, with agencies supplying materials and equipment, etc.

Necessary changes have not been fully put into effect in the methods of planning production at the level of the ministries and industry administrations—particularly in the method of setting goals for enterprises. Due to lack of experience, sometimes the same old sharply criticized targets were simply made the new ones. For example, output has been considered as being the same as sales volume; and the assortment of items produced has not always been determined in consultation with the consumer or clients on the basis of direct contract arrangements. Instances of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the inevitable deviation of practice from theory could be multiplied, but they all are due to the fact that the reform as yet covers only a limited number of enterprises. It is to be assumed that everything will gradually take proper shape.

The 1966 experience of working by the new method did show that, on the one hand, enterprises are becoming more dynamic and independent in their economic life, but, on the other hand, that the superior agencies frequently have been incapable of freeing themselves fast enough from old habits and from superfluous regimentation of the work of plants and factories. The inertia of thought, views and ideas which was so characteristic of some executive agencies over a long period has proved more persistent than had been expected.

The reform puts the old established relationships in industry to a severe test. The enlargement of the rights of enterprises is an important condition of the reform. In many cases, however, the superior agencies have proved insufficiently prepared for this development. Sometimes this has taken the form of the old bureaucratic ills—inflexibility, irresponsibility and lack of initiative, reliance upon the formality of issuing orders instead of working out economic as opposed to administrative methods of influencing production.

Perhaps one of the most significant consequences of the economic reform is the growing influence of industrial enterprises on the superior agencies. The reform is destroying and will continue to destroy many established patterns, including the distrust shown by executive agencies for production organizers and economists at the enterprises.

Unquestionably, the reform has strengthened anti-bureaucratic views and the tendency of enterprises to strive for independence. This, however, does not in the least signify that the principle of democratic centralism in the management of our economy is being abandoned. To strengthen and intensify central planning of production by combining it with the initiative and full economic accountability of enterprises is to realize the principle of democratic centralism.

The reform has not yet sufficiently permeated the administrative interrelationships between enterprises and superior agencies. This is indeed a complicated process of many steps. Complaints and mutual dissatisfactions are inevitable. First of all, the reform requires a sharp improvement in the qualifications of those en-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gaged in the management process. If the economic and organizational level of management is low, the efficiency and profitability of the enterprise are generally low. The point of the reform is to raise production efficiency, increase labor productivity and open wide the road to rapid technical improvement. As it goes on, the reform inevitably will foster the selection and promotion of the more able, both below and at the top, to executive managerial positions. The reform will not tolerate the retention of anything that is obsolete and that has failed to justify itself in our methods of management.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reproduced by special permission
from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1967.
Copyright by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc., New York.

*THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—FIFTY YEARS AFTER*

# THE KREMLIN AND THE THIRD WORLD

*By Philip E. Mosely*

THE cataclysmic defeat of the Soviet-backed Arab coalition —primarily the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria —in the third Arab-Israeli war has highlighted the basic dilemmas that confront Soviet policy-makers in their unremitting efforts to win friends and enlist allies within the "Third World" of the underdeveloped nations. It has raised to the nth degree the question of Soviet goals and Soviet means. Behind Mr. Gromyko's quick political footwork, which has been designed to rescue Russia's Arab allies from the consequences of their rash challenge and at the same time to overcome the serious blow suffered by Soviet prestige, the Kremlin and its advisers are undoubtedly engaged in an "agonizing reappraisal" of aims, strategy and tactics. The outcome of that review will have momentous consequences for the Third World, for the Soviet role in world politics and for Western and particularly American policy.

One major dilemma has dogged Soviet political strategists ever since the founding of the régime fifty years ago. That is the question whether Soviet energies and resources should be devoted to promoting the establishment of communist and supposedly obedient régimes abroad—in other words, to the advancement of world revolution—or whether Soviet purposes can be served as well or better through backing nationalist, anti-imperialist but non-communist parties and governments. Historically speaking, Lenin chose as early as 1920 to embrace the nationalist horn of the dilemma. Against the urgings of M. N. Roy, a brilliant Indian Communist, Lenin, at the Second Congress of the Comintern, urged that the nascent communist parties and the Soviet Union should lend their support to "bourgeois nationalists," for example, to the Congress Party in India and the Kemalists in Turkey, in order to win allies for Russia and break the "imperialist encirclement" of the new Soviet state. They should do so, he said, even if it meant jettisoning communist parties and accepting the risk that the new nationalist régimes, once in the saddle, might turn anti-communist at home and anti-Soviet in their policies abroad. In the long view, Lenin argued, the forced retreat of "imperial-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ism" under the blows of nationalism would hasten the eventual downfall of capitalism. In the meantime the weakening of the imperialists through the alliance between Soviet Russia and the nationalists would enhance Soviet security and Moscow's prestige.

A similar debate over this same dilemma has been waged intermittently within the Kremlin since 1952. Stalin's death in March 1953 led to sharp debates over the entire gamut of basic policies, both domestic and international. Even before Khrushchev had eliminated the "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and others in the leadership crisis of June 1956, he and his supporters had forced through a drastic reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. Over strong objections, Khrushchev pushed through the first of several reconciliations with Tito's dissident communist régime, completed the state treaty which relieved Austria of occupation by foreign troops and embarked on the first experiment in summitry at Geneva in 1955. In the same "new broom" approach, Khrushchev, with the now-forgotten Marshal Bulganin at his side, launched the first of his worldwide travels; his first visits were to India, Burma and Indonesia. As he flew from capital to capital, Khrushchev scattered lavish promises of economic, political and military assistance, and gathered the plaudits of millions of citizens of the Third World.

What have been the gains, apart from the applause, for the new Soviet policy? The first, the easiest, was to promote a new image of the Soviet Union as the friend of the recently or still-colonial nations, a newfound friend and Maecenas able and eager to help them achieve the full dignity of statehood and development. But, for the Kremlin, this was not enough. The new and favorable view of Russia, together with the prestige of its having become one of the two most powerful states in terms of industrial and military might, would, Khrushchev assumed, swiftly let loose a powerful wave of pro-Soviet and communist enthusiasm. Soon, so Khrushchev asserted, the Third World would form an unshakable alliance with the communist bloc. This, in turn, would isolate the "imperialist bloc" and deprive it of markets, investments and sources of cheap raw materials.

To facilitate this supposedly rapid evolution, the Kremlin also softened the rigidity of Stalinist doctrine. It now proclaimed that there could be many paths to communism. In some countries, it might even come to power through parliamentary elections and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without a bloody civil war; in others, the traditional recipe of the armed conquest of power would still remain the correct strategy. In some countries, the communists would share power with other parties; elsewhere they would establish monolithic rule, dictatorship. The new flexibility of strategy was codified at the international conference of communist parties in 1957.

II

Nowhere, even in Cuba, did the political recipe work out as Moscow predicted. Numerous ambitious nationalist régimes eagerly accepted Soviet assistance, but they also sought aid from Western Europe and the United States and from international institutions. Many of them, because of national prestige considerations or out of rivalry with their neighbors, accepted large amounts of surplus Soviet military equipment. But they showed no eagerness to ally themselves with the Soviet Union. India was glad to have the help of Soviet credits and engineers in enlarging its steel production. Egypt embarked on the great and indispensable task of constructing the Aswan Dam complex. The National Liberation Front in Algeria received modest but useful stores of military supplies through Jugoslav channels. The gains for Soviet prestige were substantial but they were nowhere decisive. Clearly, the countries of the Third World were impressed but not bowled over by the new Soviet approach of largesse and wooing.

The one great success—the Castro revolution in Cuba—was a windfall, an exception to the communist formula of 1957, and at times an embarrassment. A community of interests was quickly found between Castro and Moscow. To Castro, "liberation" of Cuba meant throwing off the only outside domination that mattered, that of the United States. To achieve this, he believed he needed the backing of a powerful outside state, and only the Soviet Union could provide this countervailing weight. Once Castro had burnt his bridges behind him, and had rejected all possibilities of a compromise settlement with the United States, he had nowhere to turn except Moscow.

For the Kremlin, the Cuban revolution was at first a great ideological and emotional shot-in-the-arm. Here was a poor and weak Latin American country, which had been within the United States sphere of economic, political and strategic domination for sixty years. Now, suddenly, it had stood up to its powerful neighbor and had declared its allegiance to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even if the long-established Communist Party in Cuba had been slow to shift its support from Batista to Castro, even if Moscow had known little about Castro and done less to promote his accession to power, this unexpected victory, which had been won in the backyard of the United States, seemed the harbinger of a large-scale, rapid and spontaneous movement of many underdeveloped nations into the fold of communism. The by-now somewhat stale predictions of the spread of communism suddenly gained a new savor among the faithful of many countries.

Out of the Cuban windfall Moscow's ideologues promptly elaborated a new concept: "national democracy." Henceforth national democracies, following Cuba's anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet example, would, they predicted, sprout in many parts of the globe. National democracy was defined as an intermediate stage in which an oppressed people has broken loose from "imperialist oppression" and has been taken under the wing of the communist bloc; domestically, however, it is engaged in carrying through "bourgeois" reforms and has not yet embarked on the "building of socialism." Stated in other terms, a national democracy is a state that has achieved the status of a junior associate of the Soviet bloc; only after it has entered the stage of "socialist construction" will it achieve full membership in the "commonwealth of socialist nations." Between 1960 and 1963, Soviet propaganda gave full play to the Cuban model and to national democracy. Despite this political effort, the new Soviet recipe proved to have little or no applicability.

Several factors combined to shorten the life span of the slogan of national democracy. For one thing, Castro rejected this junior status out of hand. He insisted, on the contrary, that he had always been a "Marxist" and that Cuba was already building socialism. In a rather ludicrous byplay, which lasted almost two years, Moscow kept on stressing that Cuba was still, and would continue for an undefined time, in the pre-socialist stage of national democracy. In this stage Moscow's commitments to the strategic support and economic reconstruction of Cuba were presumably less binding and less extensive. However, after the Bay of Pigs crisis of 1961 had made clear Washington's reluctance to apply direct military force to overthrow the Castro régime, Moscow finally gave in to Castro's claims and officially recognized Cuba's status as a country that was building socialism and had therefore advanced beyond the status of a national democracy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During 1963 and 1964 the central emphasis in Soviet policy and propaganda shifted to a new slogan: "revolutionary democracy." This new title was now bestowed on radical but non-communist nationalist régimes. Unlike Castro, they laid no claim to building socialism in the Soviet sense of the term, and, as in Egypt and Algeria, they were often ruthless in suppressing local communist parties. On the other hand, their sharp rejection of "imperialism" and their suspicion of the West often led them to seek Soviet political support and to hew to the Soviet line in foreign policy.

The revolutionary democracy label was applied first to several one-party but non-communist régimes in Africa, primarily to Guinea, Ghana (under Kwame Nkrumah) and Mali. Later the same label was bestowed upon the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Congo (Brazzaville). Significantly, this token of approval was withdrawn from Algeria after the overthrow and disappearance of Ben Bella; as the Boumedienne régime has reverted more clearly to a pro-Soviet stance, it has again received the accolade.

What, in the Kremlin's eyes, is a revolutionary democracy? First, the term means that the régime in question is leading its country along the "non-capitalist path" of development, bringing more and more of the economy under state control, expelling many but not all Western business interests, building up the state sector within the economy, and thus creating a large new vested interest in a state-run and state-owned economy. Second, it means that the Soviet leaders are willing to place large bets, in the form of political backing, military supplies and economic development aid, on the ability of these countries to play a dominant role in their respective regions of the world. The Kremlin believes that their power and influence will be brought to bear in ways that will diminish Western and American freedom of action and that their aims will generally run parallel with Soviet interests.

In the third place, Soviet policy assumes that, in pursuing their own interests at home and abroad, the more radical régimes will gradually adopt a more and more "Marxist" content, even though they often begin by suppressing the local communist parties, with Moscow's tacit or open approval. This is not an easy gambit for Moscow to pursue. Moscow had to exert great pressure to persuade the communists in Egypt and Algeria to give up their separate existences and their claims to inherit power in their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries. But this was necessary in order for Moscow to solidify its political alliances with the ruling one-party systems in the United Arab Republic and Algeria.

This scuttling of communist parties was apparently not easy to explain in Moscow, and in May 1964, after embracing President Nasser repeatedly during his state visit to Cairo, Khrushchev took care to inform his Moscow audience that most of the communists had been released from Egyptian prisons. Nevertheless, by publicly repudiating the distinctive role of communist parties within countries that are ruled by friendly one-party régimes, the Kremlin could hope to make it easier for former communists and crypto-communists to enter the ruling parties and thus to expand the influence of communist ideas within the governing apparatus, especially in the fields of party education and public indoctrination.

Despite the absence of success stories, Moscow has continued to act on the assumption that the "subjective" obstacles to the spread of communism—nationalist values and reformist aims of the single-party régimes—will eventually be eroded by "objective" factors, such as their growing dependence on Soviet backing, the cutting back of competing Western influences, and the need to compensate for economic difficulties by applying ever-greater doses of state monopoly over economic, cultural, educational and other aspects of life. The Kremlin believes that in the long run the leaders of one-party anti-imperialist régimes will end up by "building socialism," whether that was their original intention or not. The logic of having committed their régimes to the "non-capitalist" path will, Moscow says, eventually lead them to the building of socialism along the general lines of the Soviet pattern.

## III

The singleness of purpose with which the Kremlin formulates its policy toward the Third World has been questioned from within the Soviet Union and challenged from without by other communist régimes. The questioning and the challenges take many forms. The muted questionings from within relate more to methods and tactics than to ultimate goals. The challenges from without attack the basic assumptions of Soviet policy.

One type of questioning touches upon basic issues of the goal of economic development and the effectiveness of economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assistance, the same issues that perplex and confuse policy-makers in the West. Just what interests of the donor countries are served by large-scale transfers of equipment and advice to the developing countries? Can a few aid dollars, or aid rubles, per capita make all that difference? How much aid can the underdeveloped economies use rationally?

These questions, similar to those often asked in the West, are posed in cautious form in Soviet economic writings. Some Soviet analysts have urged that aid programs should give a higher priority to the raising of foodstuffs, so that the developing countries, with their almost completely agricultural economies, will at least be able to feed their own people without spending scarce foreign exchange to pay for imported food. Others have urged a careful study of the potential for import-replacing manufactures of simple types, primarily for consumption, rather than concentrating on large-scale prestige enterprises that may require large and continuing imports in order to operate even at a high cost. Some commentators have suggested that it is premature and unwise for underdeveloped countries to nationalize Western investments; if respected by the host government, these enterprises earn valuable foreign exchange and contribute in many ways to the training of skilled workers and technicians. Some commentators go so far as to imply that hasty nationalization may cut off a developing country from both private investment and public aid from the West. They go on to imply clearly that the Soviet Union is not in any position now to substitute its own aid for Western aid in more than a few countries.

A second field of query and doubt relates to the question of repayment of Soviet credits. Even with the low official interest rates and lenient terms for repayment, the time has come when the debtor countries are supposed to begin repayment of the Soviet credits, granted in substantial amounts since 1955. The dimensions of the problem naturally vary from debtor to debtor. In Moscow's relations with India, with its more sophisticated experience in managing the economy, the problem of gradual repayment in goods that will be useful to the Soviet economy can be coped with. In the case of the catastrophically mismanaged economy of Indonesia, however, prospects of any return are almost nil. It is also difficult to see how Egypt and Syria can make more than a partial repayment, and then only with many postponements, for the large credits they have received. Conversations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Soviet citizens suggest that many of them are aware of the substantial drain of real resources and resent the relatively poor prospects of the Soviet consumer's receiving tangible benefits in return.

To offset this widespread though politically ineffective dissatisfaction with the burden of foreign aid, the Soviet press has recently taken to stressing the concrete and direct returns that are to benefit the Soviet consumer. For example, in announcing plans for the Soviet building of a new jam factory in Guinea, the press has placed strong emphasis on the provision that 80 percent of the output will be delivered to the Soviet Union until such time as the Soviet credits have been repaid in full. This is clearly a much higher rate of return than a capitalist entrepreneur would expect to receive. The building of a pipeline from northern Afghanistan to new industrial centers in Soviet Central Asia is, the public was informed with care, to be compensated by large-scale deliveries of natural gas, in agreed proportions of the total extracted, until the Soviet contribution has been completely repaid.

A third and more sophisticated line of questioning concerns the strategy of Soviet development aid. It has, for example, been pointed out in the Soviet specialized press that Soviet aid to the public sector of India's steel industry results in the production and sale of steel at a subsidized price. However, most of the fabricating plants which benefit from both Indian and Soviet state subsidies on the steel they use are privately owned. Thus, Soviet contributions to India's economy, squeezed out of a still-modest Soviet standard of living, are indirectly promoting the expansion of the private sector of the Indian economy.

Arguing along a different line, some Soviet commentators have suggested that it is unwise for a developing country to nationalize foreign or local enterprises prematurely. If the local government is then unable to operate the nationalized firms efficiently, its hasty action may actually discredit the ideal of socialism by identifying inefficiency with public ownership and good management with private ownership. In any case, these economic realists point out, both the nationalizing of existing plants and the planning of new enterprises must be based upon careful preliminary studies of the availability of raw materials and markets, of the cost of production, of probable contributions to the country's foreign-exchange balance and of the requirements of sound and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

profitable management, rather than on a hasty or emotional decision to plunge down the road of nationalization regardless of the cost.

A fourth and even more indirect set of questions has to do with the problem of committing Soviet prestige to the support of individual leaders in developing countries. Much of this criticism and doubt can be sensed rather than pinpointed. The attentive Soviet citizen was well informed about the great attention lavished on Kwame Nkrumah during his heyday. He is equally well aware today, if only from frequent attacks on "imperialist conspiracies," of the fact of Nkrumah's downfall and exile. When the Soviet press denounces the "calumnies" of the post-Nkrumah government about Moscow's participation in subversive activities in Ghana, the thoughtful Soviet reader sometimes wonders if "some of our fellows" may have not been tarred a bit with this not-unfamiliar brush.

When Ben Bella was overthrown in Algeria and then disappeared without a trace from the public scene, Soviet citizens could not immediately forget how he had recently been fêted in Moscow, embraced, decorated with the highest Party medal and dubbed "comrade." Sukarno, too, towered high on the Soviet horizon, as a magnetic leader who fully understood the damnable vices of imperialism and the unlimited virtues of socialism. Even though Soviet propaganda can write off the collapse of the Communist Party of Indonesia as one more blot on the Chinese Communist scutcheon, this is small solace for the decimation of the Indonesian party, Sukarno's eclipse and the dropping down the drain of some $2 billion of Soviet economic and military assistance. Indeed, the more thoughtful Soviet reader may conclude that putting large political bets on this or that individual political leader in the Third World offers as many uncertainties to Soviet as it does to Western policy!

Finally, there is the muted questioning of whether and how all these Soviet efforts in the Third World add up to make a policy. In what respects has Soviet policy made significant gains? Or to what extent has it merely enlarged its commitments without enhancing its advantages? The early and optimistic Soviet expectation of rapidly spreading gains has come up against the problem of hopes that are deferred while commitments continue and mount. The political results of foreign aid have proven to be long-term and slow, complex and unpredictable. Yet the economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commitments have their own momentum, and the political and strategic commitments are laden with risks. The attempt to gain strategic advantage from the allegiance of Castro's Cuba led to the first nuclear confrontation in history, to a serious blow to Soviet prestige, and, in part, to the removal of Khrushchev. Instead of shattering the unity and stability of the Western hemisphere, Castro's régime is hard-pressed today, even with substantial and continuing aid from the Soviet Union and other communist countries, to meet the basic needs of its own people, and it will have to rely on large-scale Soviet and other subsidies for at least ten more years. In the meantime Soviet political strategy elsewhere in Latin America is complicated and embarrassed by Castro's insistence on playing a freewheeling role as the leader of revolutionary insurgency throughout the continent.

Soviet policy has resulted in a similar escalation of costs and risks in the Arab world. It is not clear whether the Soviet leaders encouraged the June 1967 showdown between Israel and its Arab neighbors, or whether they simply underwrote an independent decision by Nasser to whip a deep-set but latent conflict into a military confrontation. True, despite the Arab defeat, which was also a defeat for Soviet policy, the Kremlin has achieved its long-range goal of making itself the sole great-power patron of Arab nationalism (despite President Charles de Gaulle's attempt to play the role of brilliant second) and in forcing the United States, against its own intention and hope, into the position of the protector of Israel. The Soviet leaders may regard this gain as a sufficient long-range justification of their one-sided policy, which stands in sharp contrast to Kosygin's statesmanlike mediation of the Indian-Pakistani conflict only a few months before. Yet their actions in the Middle East have provided one more example of the dangers and costs that may beset a great power when it places its own prestige almost without reserve at the service of a weak and unstable ally.

If the Arab fiasco of June 1967 is, in Soviet eyes, the logical consequence of the Kremlin's strategy for the Middle East, then perhaps its policy-makers will decide, upon further reflection, that a long period of peace and internal growth will serve the long-range interests of the Arab peoples better than a new outburst of violence which, even if it brought success locally within the Middle East, would then lead very promptly to a new and even more dangerous confrontation between the superpowers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

The questioning, at home, of Soviet policies and performance in the Third World has been complicated by the emergence and spread of varied and dissident brands of communism, each with its own version of the "correct" policy which should be followed toward the developing countries. Of these brands, the simplest and most straightforward is Tito's. In his view, communism in a national form is bound, in the end, to triumph everywhere; that triumph can be encouraged by example and friendly aid, but cannot be imposed by any outside force. It has been natural for Tito to be lionized in the Third World, for he is the formidable personification of a régime that stood up to, and withstood successfully, two very powerful systems, Nazi and Stalinist. His example has shown that a strong régime in a weak country can accept extensive aid from "imperialism," in its reformed or repentant stage, without becoming subject to its dictates. Since Tito recommends communism, but does nothing to impose it on others, it has been easy for him to be a trusted friend to both Nehru and Nasser.

Yet, Tito's specific influence has declined over the past ten years. As the Soviet Union, with its tremendously greater economic resources and strategic power, has adopted a large part of the Jugoslav recipe for its dealings, in most respects, with the countries of the Third World, Tito's example and advice have become less important. There is something nostalgic and rather empty in his recent attempts to continue his meetings with Third World leaders, meetings at which no decisions are taken. Tito's growing tendency to come down more and more often on the side of Soviet policy is in part a reflection of his declining value both to the Kremlin and to leaders in the Third World. Having so often certified the generally honorable intentions of the Soviet leadership, Tito is no longer needed to facilitate the Kremlin's relations with the developing countries. Still, the Tito policy toward the Third World is distinct in some latent and essential respects from Soviet policy. And to that extent it remains a separate variable in the catalogue of communist policies.

The Tito policy of waiting for History to bring about communist revolution in each state is basically the line followed by communist parties in the West, and also by the Rumanian party. If the communist idea is sound—and of course they must believe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it is—then it will make its way in "Marx's good time." In the meantime it is more important to achieve acceptability and even popularity at home by insisting on the primacy of the "national" and gradual path to communism. To be consistent with this "popular-front" strategy, the Western communist parties must also deny the reality or the possibility of communism's being subject to any single directing center. To assert and believe in their own independent power of decision, they must claim the same independence for the emerging political forces in the Third World. Since many of the lines of propaganda influence run through London and Paris to the Third World, the influence of the communist parties in the West, even though it runs generally parallel to Moscow's, is not without some separate impact of its own in the developing countries.

In contrast to the gradualism and moderation of the "revisionists" and the waverings of the Soviet line between caution and sudden bursts of activist ambition, the Maoists in Peking and elsewhere regard the Third World as the main arena of their challenge to both imperialism and revisionism. As the confusions and uncertainties of the power struggle have multiplied within China, especially since mid-1966, the Maoist leaders have been calling ever more stridently for the immediate kindling of "wars of national liberation" in all parts of the world. By urging and demanding "continuous revolution" everywhere, they mark themselves off from the more cautious Soviet leadership, hemmed in as it is by the demands of its own people for peace abroad and greater plenty at home, and by the awesome consequences of any uncontrolled bipolar confrontation.

There is much that is put on for show in Peking's convulsive attacks on the Soviet leadership, as in the stylized posturing of Chinese opera. Mao (or those who use his name) does not expect to take over Soviet territory, nor does he expect that the Soviet people will heed his calls to overthrow their rulers. Communist China cannot expect to be a major nuclear power for a good many years. While the Maoists in Peking call for armed struggle within India, the supposedly pro-Chinese Communist Party has joined with moderates and rightists to form coalition governments in several Indian states.

Where the Chinese Communists are in deadly earnest is in their struggle to claim the future hegemony of violent revolution. The basic issue of the conflict between Moscow and Peking is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over the future leadership of the social revolutions which, as they both read history, are bound to be the determining force in the last third of the twentieth century. Moscow claims this leadership by virtue of its growing economic and strategic strength. Making a virtue out of China's distinctive "road to communism," Peking demands that Moscow step aside and let the Maoists capture their hegemony over the revolutionary forces in all of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Both communist centers discount, prematurely and unwisely, the growing sense of national destiny in the developing countries of the Third World, as well as the great strength and political resources of Western Europe, Japan and North America.

The Soviet leaders are genuinely alarmed about potential Chinese Communist inroads among the peoples of Southeast Asia and East Africa. Perhaps they understand better than the West the explosive character of expectations that have been aroused by the emergence of many new nations from their colonial slumber and the relatively little progress that can be achieved by them in a decade or two. Disorder and chaos have their own attraction for the impatient and quickly disillusioned peoples in the Third World, and Bakunin's motto, "To destroy is to create," may be more attractive than Lenin's stern advice, "We must learn to work!"

The Castro recipe for violent revolution, for the creation of new "Sierra Maestras" throughout Latin America, was first launched as a variant of the Peking strategy. By now it has taken on an impetus of its own, as a challenge to both Peking and Moscow. Castro's stomach may belong to Moscow, but his political ambitions are his own. The meeting of the Castroite Organization of Latin American Solidarity, held at Havana in August 1967, showed once again that the great power which pays the piper is not necessarily able to call the tune. The clash between Moscow's preference for an orderly and gradualist path and Castro's call, like Danton's for "De l'audace, toujours de l'audace!" shows more and more signs of promoting internecine warfare between rival communist groups within Latin America as well as cutting across Moscow's efforts to make the Latin American communist parties respectable members of anti-United States popular-front coalitions, with some prospects of coming to power in the not-too-distant future. Truly the Soviet policy-makers who embarked in 1955 on the new activist policy toward the Third

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World could hardly have imagined that they were embarking on a journey into the maelstrom of nationalist-Titoist, Maoist and Castroite ambitions. Beside these crosscurrents of communist conflicts, Western policy must sometimes seem staid and comfortingly predictable.

V

As the Western industrial nations watch in fascination the gyrations of Soviet and other communist policies in the underdeveloped regions of the world, they seem too often inclined to revert to a spectator role and to forget that they and their power in the world are the ultimate target of communist hopes and actions, regardless of intra-communist conflicts over the best way to "do in" the "imperialists." Indeed, the advanced countries of Western Europe and North America, as well as Japan, show many signs of cutting back their efforts to aid the countries of the Third World in what is bound to be a long, tortuous and slow process of modernization. Perhaps they, too, like Khrushchev, have let themselves be disillusioned too quickly by the failure to achieve dramatic progress in the past decade.

The French Government, which has previously been a generous supporter of the ambitions of its former colonies, is slackening its support at an alarming pace. Belgium seems more and more inclined to write off its interests in the Congo, and Britain is cutting back its aid programs. Each year the U.S. Congress imposes ever more severe restraints on American contributions to aid. There is, unfortunately, no political pressure group that can speak for the hundreds of millions of people who have achieved nationhood and are now looking for ways to clothe that new dignity in genuine substance.

If the remaining decades of the twentieth century are destined to be those in which the new nations achieve a firm place in the pattern of world politics, the peoples of the West, with their great political, economic and cultural resources, cannot afford to stand aside and leave a free field to the clashing rivalries of the communist power centers. The uncertainties and confusions that beset the conflicting centers of communist policy should, on the contrary, encourage the efforts of the Western nations to exert their great forces of example and support in the Third World more intelligently and more effectively than in the first decade of sometimes wasteful and painful learning.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reproduced by special permission
from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1967.
Copyright by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc., New York.

*THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—FIFTY YEARS AFTER*

# WHAT IS LEFT OF COMMUNISM?

*By George Lichtheim*

HALF a century after Lenin's seizure of power started the global chain reaction associated with his name, there no longer is a single center to direct what is still conventionally described as the world communist movement. The shock waves released by the original explosion continue to travel, but they follow a course profoundly divergent from that formerly traced out by the Bolshevik party and the Third International. Communism as a global phenomenon and the U.S.S.R. as the focus of a planned industrial transformation do not inhabit the same universe. Rhetorical assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, their respective lines of development increasingly point away from each other.

Ideologically, this divergence manifests itself in the slow erosion of Moscow's hold over the loyalty of its nominal followers. Dark planets circling the dying sun of the October Revolution, the communist parties of Europe, Asia and Latin America revolve in their separate orbits—now drawn together by geography or the pressures of the East-West conflict, now propelled in different directions by the resurgence of nationalism or the impact of the Sino-Soviet split. Deeply riven by the conflicting claims of Moscow and Peking, the communist movement has begun to display unmistakable symptoms of disintegration. Numerical growth is purchased at the cost of doctrinal enfeeblement. "Polycentrism," from being a heresy, shows signs of becoming the norm. Even the first principle of Leninism, the political monopoly of the single-party régime, has ceased to be sacrosanct.

The fiftieth anniversary of the October coup, by an unwelcome coincidence, falls at a time when the celebrants are confronted with the Chinese schism in a new and menacing form—an open confrontation of Asia and Russia. In the struggle to hold the loyalties of their respective followers, Moscow and Peking are increasingly driven back upon barely camouflaged nationalism. The Maoist heresy, from being an obscure quarrel over the interpretation of the *depositum fidei,* has turned into a rebellion sustained by China's ancient claims to hegemony in Central Asia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Long-standing national and cultural animosities, for years submerged by common acceptance of the Leninist creed, are rising to the surface. Even the possibility of armed conflict between the two major centers of what used to be called the Sino-Soviet camp can no longer be wholly excluded.

Concurrently with this disintegration of the Stalinist inheritance—an inheritance made possible by the Eurasian character of the régime established by Lenin's successor—there goes a revival of those aspects of the Marxist-Leninist synthesis which stemmed from European radicalism and from the pre-revolutionary Europeanization of Russia itself. As China draws further away from the original sources of the common faith, the guardians of Soviet orthodoxy are obliged in self-defense to lay stress upon those elements of the Leninist heritage that connect it with the unbroken tradition of Marxian socialism. Caught between a Western environment which imperceptibly transforms communists into social-democrats, and an Eastern heresy which eliminates the last surviving remnants of classical Marxism, the Soviet régime has come to wear a defensive look. No longer a lodestar for revolutionaries in Africa or Asia, and not yet acceptable to the democratic labor movements of the West, it is in danger of appearing irrelevant to both.

The October Revolution, in Lenin's interpretation, was to have been the opening phase of a gigantic effort to link the proletarian revolution in the West with the national and anticolonial upheaval in the East. Despite the widely advertised disputes among Lenin's successors, this perspective was shared by Trotskyists, Stalinists and Bukharinists alike. It underlay both their doctrinal quarrels over the correct line to be pursued abroad, and the actual conduct of Soviet foreign policy in the age of the Third International and beyond. Its virtual abandonment by Stalin's heirs signifies more than the normal loss of fervor to be expected from the rulers of an increasingly conservative and stratified society; it must be regarded as evidence that the perils inherent in the original Leninist program have finally become apparent to the rulers of the post-revolutionary U.S.S.R. The prime danger is a commitment to world-revolutionary utopianism which rules out any hope of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, and such a commitment the Soviet leadership at present seems determined to avoid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

What then is left of communism? The question is not intended as a pun, although recent events in China have perhaps made a degree of levity permissible. The "cultural revolution," for all its brutalities and the destruction wreaked upon the country's heritage, is too grotesque wholly to escape the penalty of ridicule. Was there ever anything to match this centrally controlled super-purge whose organizers contrived to dupe themselves with the borrowed language of popular insurrection? Anything to excel the spectacle of a mass movement supposedly launched to overcome the resistance of a handful of "plotters in high places?" Could anything have been more anachronistic than the solemn evocation of the Paris Commune—that tragic uprising of a doomed city—by military leaders acting in conjunction with a fanaticized youth movement? And was there not an element of plain buffoonery in the spectacle of millions dutifully echoing whatever slogans were broadcast over the local radio station by assorted "rightists," "leftists," "ultra-leftists," "plotters," "militarists" or all of them combined? At the very least the spectacle served to demonstrate that conditioned reflexes still count for more in China than the "thought of Mao Tse-tung."

For that matter, what was one to make of the spectacle of Mao giving the army its head, thereby contravening the first principle of a political doctrine which asserts the preëminence of the party? To say that the dictator was driven to this departure from orthodoxy by the miscarriage of his original plans is to concede that the "cultural revolution" had escaped its originator. From the three-cornered struggle between the bureaucracy, the juvenile Red Guards and the army, the last named was bound to emerge as the real (if for the moment decently silent) victor. If Mao was unable to foresee this, what was the worth of his Marxist-Leninist indoctrination? Had it not occurred to him that the synthesizing element of this particular triad must either be the party or the army, and that if the party were wrecked, the final outcome must bear a military stamp? Of what use years of brooding in the wilderness over the sacred texts if this simple conclusion escaped him? Among all the Chinese millions dutifully reciting the Maoist catechism, it would seem that the man least capable of deciphering its meaning was Mao Tse-tung himself.

It may be argued that an intensive militarization of public life

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is not in principle incompatible with the maintenance of party control, especially if the party is determined to pursue a policy of economic austerity and social egalitarianism. Such a choice could even be defended on rational grounds quite extraneous to Mao's own highly idiosyncratic version of "war communism." It can be held that in a large, poor and overpopulated country with China's special problems, a combination of military discipline and ideological rigor is an effective means (perhaps the only effective means) of wringing an economic surplus from an unwilling population. If this be granted for argument's sake, one still has to account for the transformation of a doctrine which originally expressed the spontaneous protest of the proletariat of early capitalism. The utopian literature of modern communism, as it arose after the French Revolution, was egalitarian enough, but the aims it defined had little in common with the revolutionary nationalism of the Maoist régime. Communism in those days—broadly speaking the half-century ending with the 1848 upheaval and the "Manifesto"—defined the terms in which an élite of French and British workingmen and their intellectual leaders envisaged the distant future. That future was seen under the aspect of a stateless and classless order which would inherit the economic wealth created by the industrial revolution. It never occurred to the early pioneers of this faith, or to the authors of the "Manifesto," that communism might become the "ideology" (in the precise sense of "false consciousness") of a movement seeking to substitute itself for what Marx called the "bourgeois revolution." Yet this is what has been happening in China since 1949, following the precedent set in the U.S.S.R. since 1917.

The paradox is not lessened by the fact that the Chinese have come to stress the purity of their own system as compared to the once admired Soviet model, which is now rejected as insufficiently egalitarian and tainted by bourgeois corruption. Maoism has shown itself even more terroristic than Stalinism in trying to impose uniformity and to prevent the satisfaction of immediate material wants. This kind of terrorism, if successful (a big "if"), can only serve to channel the economic surplus into those sectors of activity to which the highest political authority has chosen to give priority. There is no secret about these priorities: they are military and technological. That is to say, they are at the furthest possible remove from the satisfaction of ordinary individual and social claims.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Once more it may be said that in a poor country on the threshold of modernization this is inevitable, and that other Asian societies (India for choice) might count themselves fortunate if they possessed the social discipline required for the aim of guaranteeing all citizens a minimum of essentials. But the more this argument is pressed, the clearer it becomes that what is being asserted is the superior effectiveness of Chinese communism in promoting the aims historically associated with the capitalist mode of production and the social order built upon it: above all, the sacrifice of immediate satisfactions for the sake of building up the wealth-creating apparatus of industrial civilization. Such an achievement, however important, is quite extraneous to the original signification of the term "communism," not to mention the historic traditions of the labor movement. It is the goal of virtually every dictatorship in a backward country, be its ideology communist, fascist or simply nationalist. The originality of Maoism lies in the methods employed to mobilize the masses in the name of communism for the achievement of aims proper to any national-revolutionary movement: the industrialization of China and the acquisition of military means (including nuclear ones) adequate to the pursuit of great-power politics.

It is irrelevant in this context that these aims are conceived as forming part of the uprising of the world's pre-industrial hinterland (which also happens to be mostly colored), and it is useless to inquire how far such motives are intermingled with more traditional ones. The power of an ideology (in the Marxist sense of the term, not in the trivial meaning assigned to it by pragmatism) is measured by the degree to which it raises men above themselves, gives them a sense of purpose, drives them to sacrifice themselves for what they conceive to be the greater good. It is not the least unnerving aspect of the current situation that the moral austerity of Chinese communism has channeled the energies of a great people into a direction potentially dangerous to itself and its neighbors. The whole phenomenon, whatever the short-range determinants of the conflict between Moscow and Peking, is best understood as an upsurge of national sentiment within the limitations imposed by the acceptance of communism. The genuineness of this acceptance is just what renders the conflict so acute, since it is essential for the Chinese to adhere to the communist creed and simultaneously to impose their own interpretation upon it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The problem has been solved, as usual in such cases, by a doctrinal schism. China now has its own version of the faith: much as in an earlier age the imposition of Islam upon Persia gave birth by way of the Shiite heresy to a local variant of the conquering religion. As in all such cases, the resulting pseudo-morphosis—the underlying culture reasserting itself in the guise of the new universal faith—must be distinguished from the overt manifestations of the schism, which are largely accidental and secondary. Given the circumstances in which the Chinese Communists won power—namely by gaining the leadership of a national-revolutionary movement whose original inspiration had run dry—an attempt to "Sinify" the Marxist-Leninist inheritance was inevitable. The particular form it has taken is another matter. It is a waste of time to examine Peking's claims to doctrinal orthodoxy. The Chinese are too remote from the origins of European socialism to be taken seriously in the role of exegetes of the classical texts. What matters is that the schism has laid bare the contradictions inherent in Lenin's view of the Russian Revolution as the link between an awakening Asia and a potentially socialist Europe. In so far as Leninism signified such a vision, the Chinese are Leninists no longer, for they no longer believe that the industrial proletariat of the West has a privileged part to play in what is still called the "world revolution."

III

Marxism-Leninism is in process of disintegration. The vision of a global movement encompassing both advanced and backward countries has been abandoned by Moscow and Peking alike: by Moscow because the growing conservatism of Soviet society is incompatible with such alarming notions; by Peking because there is no longer a revolutionary workers' movement in the West which could be regarded as a reliable ally of a resurgent China. Leninism and Stalinism alike implied a commitment to the goal of a union linking East and West, the Asian peasant and the European or American city-worker. From 1920 onward, when Lenin formulated this concept at the Second Congress of the Third International, the effective political meaning of "communism" hinged upon the belief that the October Revolution had been the first act in this great drama. Leninism, both in its narrower Stalinist and in its more romantic Trotskyist understanding, was the doctrine of a world revolution. Shorn of this perspective it is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no more than the theory of the *Russian* Revolution. Inasmuch as this latter interpretation is now gaining ground among communists in the U.S.S.R. and throughout Eastern Europe, the Chinese have some cause for asserting that the Russians and their allies in the communist movement are no longer serious about the conclusion Lenin set out in his last published piece of writing, when he looked forward to a great confrontation between "the counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist East": a confrontation in which he expected the U.S.S.R. to side with China and India against Europe and America.[1]

The tacit abandonment of this line of thought by the Soviet régime does constitute a drastic revision of Leninism (though not of Marxism, since neither Marx nor his European followers had ever dreamed of such a thing). Unfortunately for the Chinese it is not really possible for the remnant of the "revolutionary and nationalist East" to assume the role once held by the U.S.S.R. Without the latter, plus its East European satellites, Maoism is no more than an Asian phenomenon, which is another way of saying that the Leninist strategy of 1920–23 has become inapplicable. If Moscow refuses the global role assigned to it in the original scheme, and contents itself with the part of mediator between West and East (or between the United States and China), there is an end to world-revolutionary strategy. It is useless to affirm that an adequate substitute can be reconstituted on Chinese soil. Anything may be asserted on paper, but in the eyes of Asian revolutionaries "Leninism" signified primarily the willingness of the Russian Communist Party to follow the line laid down by its founder between 1920 and 1923, when he explicitly defined world communism in terms of an alliance between the Russian worker and the Asian peasant. To do the Chinese justice, Moscow's departure from this line *does* represent the abandonment of at least one significant aspect of Lenin's heritage.

If the question be raised how Lenin ever came to associate the

[1] Lenin, "Better Fewer, But Better," *Pravda,* March 4, 1923 ("Collected Works," v. 33, p. 487 ff.). "In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. . . . In this sense the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured." (*Ibid.*, p. 500). This Eurasian perspective was already inherently Stalinist, in that it identified "the victory of socialism" with the military superiority of an Eastern bloc led by the U.S.S.R. As long as Moscow adhered to such notions, it was possible for the Chinese to tolerate Soviet preëminence (not to mention Stalin's personal whims). To that extent the Maoist claim to the succession is well founded.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coming triumph of what he called "socialism" with such a perspective, the answer must be that he was following out the logic of his lifelong adherence to the Populist (or Bakuninist) notion of a "dictatorship of workers and peasants," which in his theoretical scheme was to administer the tasks of the revolution during a lengthy interim period after the fall of the monarchy. As late as 1923 one finds him discussing the immediate prospects of the Soviet régime in these terms: "We . . . lack enough civilization to enable us to pass straight on to socialism, although we do have the political requisites for it. . . . We must strive to build up a state in which the workers retain the leadership of the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants. . . . If we see to it that the working class retains its leadership over the peasantry, we shall be able . . . to develop electrification . . ." etc.[2]

The naïvety of this trust in the capacity of "the workers" to exercise political leadership requires no comment. What matters is the essential coherence of the Leninist viewpoint: the Russian "worker" was to "build socialism" at home and "retain the confidence of the peasant" while doing it. In practice, the "building of socialism" devolved upon the party, which in turn became the nucleus of a new privileged stratum. For all their blinkered ignorance, the Maoists are shrewd enough to see that the jettisoning of Lenin's global strategy ("East against West") has been brought about by what they have come to describe as the degeneracy of the Soviet régime—notably the formal dismantling of the "proletarian dictatorship." It is irrelevant that the latter was always a fiction, for to a communist what truly matters is that his party should *represent* the masses. What the Chinese cannot forgive is the growing identification of the Soviet régime with the aims of the privileged stratum that has grown out of the post-revolutionary society. It is quite wrong to describe this reaction as "Trotskyist," superficial resemblances notwithstanding. The Maoists are ultra-Stalinists, that is to say, believers in the efficacy of terrorism. What was valuable about Stalin's leadership in their eyes was precisely his readiness to subordinate the material interests of all classes to the aims laid down by political authority. Mao is as certain as Stalin ever was that communism can and must be built by force—even in a country possessing no

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 501: "In this and in this alone lies our hope. Only when we have done this shall we be able, speaking figuratively, to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik, horse of poverty . . . to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and must seek—the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of the Volkhov Power Station, etc."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industry to speak of—and that the new society must remain totally subordinate to the controlling élite until such time as all its citizens have become good communists and lost their appetite for private property. All other notions (including the Trotskyist utopia of a proletarian revolution in the West) are heretical and must be rooted out, for what matters is that the transformation must be *willed*. Given the necessary willpower, the material problems will take care of themselves.

To say that Lenin opened this Pandora's Box when he committed his party to the task of "building socialism" in Russia is not to suggest that he would have welcomed the present consequences. He was after all a Russian Social-Democrat by upbringing, and for all his heresies enough of a Marxist to believe that communism made no sense without a workers' movement. At the same time it is plain enough that between 1917 and 1923 he had traveled a good distance toward the conclusions now reached by his Chinese disciples. None the less he still retained his faith in the revolutionary potential of Europe. The inherent instability of this Marxist-Leninist synthesis was masked for a while by the existence of the Third International, notably by its involvement in the mythical "German revolution"—an experiment whose outcome was the National-Socialist dictatorship, passively supported for twelve years by the bulk of the German working class. Yet if this sobering experience has made Moscow's followers more cautious, it has not shaken their doctrinal commitment to a Leninism which shall at any rate continue to bear the marks of its East European origin. It is indeed not possible for orthodox communists to accept the complete dissociation of Leninism from Marxism—something the Chinese have now brought about by setting the army and a state-controlled youth movement against the urban working class.

"Marxism-Leninism" was always a shotgun marriage, for what was original in Lenin (the notion of a world revolution centering on Russia) was not to be found in Marx. Yet for all its equivocal attempts to combine Marx and Bakunin, the Bolshevism of 1917–23 signified an unwillingness to turn one's back altogether upon the Marxian inheritance. Leninism, it was asserted in those days, was the contemporary form of Marxism, and the October Revolution, by bringing socialism to backward Russia, had bridged the gulf between Europe and Asia. One may suppose that Stalin still believed this. His successors plainly do not, and neither do the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese, whatever their propaganda may assert to the contrary. For the Maoists, the tradition of the old revolutionary workers' movement has ceased to possess any relevance. It is no longer a matter of asserting that socialism and communism *can* be built outside Europe; they *must* be built outside Europe, and there must be no illusions about the ability or the willingness of the European or American proletariat to take the lead in the matter, or even to render significant aid to China's struggle. What was once the faith of the European socialist movement has, after a century of eastward migration, become the ideology of an élite in charge of a national revolution in a retarded country.

This new Islam has its Koran, albeit due reverence is paid to the Old Testament, and why not? Pious Moslems respect the memory of Abraham, but their allegiance goes to the Prophet. The Chinese communists are unlikely to relinquish the claim that Mao stands in the direct succession to Marx and Lenin. To do so would be to renounce the universalism which has become their pride and which, to do them justice, sets them off from the parochialism of an earlier generation of nationalists, for whom the indigenous tradition had to suffice. But in the absence of any tradition linking the Chinese revolution with the Western labor movement, such manifestations of the will to believe must remain ideological. They translate not a shared experience—for what is there to connect the former nationalist agitator from Hunan with the heirs of the Chartists or the followers of Proudhon?—but the determination not to be excluded from what is perceived as a claim to universal import. This transformation of a Western faith into the fighting creed of a movement born and raised under very different stars is precisely what the term "ideology" signifies.

## IV

If the disintegration of Marxism-Leninism has the effect of leaving the Kremlin and its adherents in an uncomfortable position midway between East and West, it may be said that Lenin's heirs are thus belatedly paying for their master's originality. One could assemble quite a number of quotations testifying to the fact that in the final year of his political life Lenin had come to realize the perils inherent in what he himself on one occasion likened to the ascent of a high mountain. What this comparison amounted to was an implicit acknowledgment that the October coup had been an adventure into unmapped territory. In his customary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fashion Lenin sought assurance by invoking the example of the earlier revolution in France (a bourgeois one). Thus one finds him writing (in February 1922): "Russia's proletariat rose to a gigantic height in its revolution, not only when it is compared with 1789 and 1793, but also when compared with 1871. We must take stock of what we have done . . . as dispassionately . . . as possible. . . ."[3]

To anyone familiar with Russian Marxism, what stands out here is the casual linking of the French Revolution (1789 and 1793) and the Paris Commune of 1871—the first a successful, if sanguinary, transformation carried through by Lenin's Jacobin ancestors; the second an abortive proletarian insurrection against the bourgeois Republic which had arisen from the subsequent turmoil. It is true that the Parisian Communards of 1871 counted a good many latter-day Jacobins in their own ranks; in particular the Blanquist faction (which more or less ran the Commune) was descended from the radical republicans of the 1840s, though Blanqui himself was fond of describing himself as a "communist." It is also true that Clemenceau, the archetypal bourgeois Radical under the Third Republic, had begun his political life in the 1860s as a follower of Blanqui and in 1871 duly sympathized with the Communards, though he stood aside from the fighting. All this belongs to the inner history of French republicanism—a movement largely inspired by a Robespierrist faith in "temporary" dictatorship.

This tradition is the ultimate source of those passages in the "Communist Manifesto" (1848) and the "Class Struggles in France" (1850) where Marx paid his residual debt to Jacobinism. Marxism, in one of its aspects, has been the link between 1789 and 1917, between the French Revolution and its Russian successor. The reason is quite simply that Marx obtained his political education in the Paris of the 1840s, where the nascent communist sects were led by men like Blanqui who still thought in Jacobin terms. After 1850, Marx (and even more so Engels) abandoned these rather episodic attachments and gradually transformed themselves into democratic socialists. But this transformation became effective only in Germany and England. It was rather halfheartedly accepted in France after the disaster of the 1871 Paris Commune, and it evoked no genuine echo in Eastern

[3] "Notes of a Publicist," first published in *Pravda*, April 16, 1924 ("Collected Works," v. 33, p. 206).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe, where Marxism continued to signify the "Communist Manifesto" rather than "Capital." In a word, the Marx whom the Russians liked was the early Marx—the man of 1848. And they continued to admire Blanqui. The Russian radicals of the 1860s and 1870s, who transmitted the Blanquist faith in revolutionary terrorism to Lenin, were proud to style themselves "Jacobins." So far, so good. After all, even moderate Marxists like Lenin's teacher, Plekhanov, believed, for sound reason, that Russia would one day reënact the earlier drama in France.

For all that, Lenin's casual allusion to these French examples slid over what to a Marxist is the central difficulty. The French Revolution, after all, had been led by the bourgeoisie—and been successful for this reason. The Paris Commune of 1871, on the other hand, had been bloodily suppressed after two months, and thus could hardly count as evidence that "proletarian dictatorship" was workable. Lenin's own party had launched a victorious uprising and by 1922, when he penned his "Notes of a Publicist," had been in power for almost five years. Was Bolshevism, then, the legitimate successor of Jacobinism? And if it was, could it also claim the heritage of that luckless rebellion in 1871 which had burst the bounds of bourgeois society?

To ask such questions of course is to challenge the whole theoretical construction supporting Lenin's system of beliefs, for had he been less certain about the answer he would not have been the man he was, and neither would the Bolshevik party have become what he made of it. It was essential to his outlook, and to that of his followers, that he and they should see themselves *both* as "Jacobins" *and* as communists leading a "proletarian revolution" (and therefore also in the tradition of the 1871 Commune). The self-contradictory character of this notion was plain enough to the Mensheviks, for whom Lenin's "Jacobinism" was just what rendered his Marxism suspect. He had after all made it clear, from 1902 and "What Is To Be Done?" onward, that—unlike the mature Marx—he did *not* believe the working class could emancipate itself by its own efforts. That task, in his view, devolved upon "the party." But (as one can see from his 1922 writings) the reality of party control must on no account be allowed to weaken the faith that the October Revolution had been a "proletarian" one. In short, he was determined to have it both ways—not merely as a political leader, but as a theoretician too. When confronted with the resulting contradictions he fell back upon the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

notion that history was always producing unforeseen situations. Thus, although by 1922 his régime had come to terms with what he himself called "state capitalism," he was by no means willing to let his critics have the last word on the subject. Replying to one of them, the economist Preobrazhensky (who as it happened was a left-wing Bolshevik), he flatly asserted that some of the traditional Marxian distinctions were no longer applicable:

> Up to now nobody could have written a book about this sort of capitalism, because this is the first time in human history that we see anything like it. . . . Now things are different, and neither Marx nor the Marxists could foresee this . . . for nobody could foresee that the proletariat would achieve power in one of the least developed countries, and would first try to organize large-scale production and distribution for the peasantry and then, finding that it could not cope with the task owing to the low standard of culture, would enlist the services of capitalism. Nobody ever foresaw this; but it is an incontrovertible fact.[4]

The "incontrovertible fact" was that the proletariat had *not* "achieved power," either in October 1917 or at any other time; but had he been able to see that his party "represented" not the proletariat but the ruling stratum of a new society, Lenin could not have made the revolution. Illusions of this sort (as Marx had pointed out in connection with the French Revolution) are a vital factor in promoting those historical changes whose true meaning discloses itself after the event.

The meaning of Lenin's revolution disclosed itself under Stalin. By now it requires a considerable act of faith for anyone to believe that the political dispossession of the working class by Lenin's party was merely a temporary affair, for Soviet society plainly is neither classless nor tending in that direction. So much must be granted to its Chinese critics. What the latter fail to perceive is that this outcome was inevitable and by no means the fault of Stalin's "revisionist" heirs. Indeed the term "revisionism" makes no sense in this context, for what is being revised is merely the vocabulary. It is true that calling the U.S.S.R. a "State of the whole people" is ludicrous if one affects to retain Marx's view of the state as an instrument of coercion. But if Lenin was prepared to argue that Bolshevik state capitalism was different from ordinary state capitalism, why should not his successors claim that the state they govern is unlike any other state—not oppres-

[4] Closing speech at the eleventh congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 28, 1922 ("Collected Works," v. 33, p. 310–311).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sive but liberating? If it is a matter of revisionism, Lenin was the greatest revisionist of them all. After all, it was he who stood the social-democratic tradition on its head by seizing power and then claiming to hold it for "the proletariat." And there was Stalin's subsequent decision to "build socialism" in "one country"—a decision already inherent in Lenin's pronouncements, whatever Trotsky might affirm to the contrary.[5]

V

Does it follow from all this that there is no longer something that can be called "world communism"? A movement may be in a state of disintegration and still have considerable staying power. Moreover, the elements that are now being set free may enter new combinations. If Peking has adopted the Leninist part of the Marxist-Leninist synthesis, the West European communist parties show signs of reviving the Marxist inheritance. In doing this they are, after all, simply reverting to a tradition older than the Russian Revolution—a tradition, moreover, which grew on European soil and does not have to be laboriously retranslated into English, German, French, Spanish or Italian. Even the Russians can at a pinch revive the orthodox Marxism of Plekhanov, though doubtless they will continue to assert that he took the wrong line in 1914–18. *A fortiori* in Western Europe, where the communist parties are still rooted in the labor movement, it should not be too difficult for them to resurrect those elements of the Marxist tradition which they have in common with the social-democrats: above all, faith in the ability of the working class to emancipate itself by its own efforts and without the benefit of an omniscient vanguard of "professional revolutionaries." Conceivably the communist parties in these countries could even be brought to accept political democracy and to renounce, once and for all, the dream of one-party dictatorship, for which the preconditions are anyhow becoming increasingly unfavorable.

Something of the sort may indeed already be under way within the two largest and most important West European parties, the Italian and the French. Faced with the choice between permanent isolation and partial attainment of their aims, their leaders ap-

[5] There had of course to be a theoretical warrant: this time Marx's letter of November 1877 to the editors of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski,* setting out his reasons for believing that Russia had a chance to avoid the "fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime." As a justification for forced-draft industrialization at any cost, this was rather thin, but it has now become the warrant for what is called "communism" in all pre-industrial countries, China among them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pear to have quietly opted for virtual acceptance of political democracy and toleration of other parties. The social revolution is still affirmed, but there is no longer the same insistence that it must of necessity pass through a dictatorial phase. Since this was the line Marx and Engels themselves took after 1871, when the quarrel with Bakunin obliged them to come down firmly on the democratic side, there should be no trouble about finding scriptural warrant for a position that is both Marxist and democratic.

What stands in the way of such a reorientation is not Marx but Lenin (to say nothing of Stalin, the symbol of terrorism). The communists in the West would have to admit that the Bolshevik experience does not after all provide a suitable model for the advanced societies of Western Europe and North America. If they could bring themselves to do this—and in Western Europe the time seems to be almost ripe—their tactical problems would no longer be insoluble, and in due course they might even win the confidence of their fellow citizens. What such a realignment cannot do is to reconstitute the lost unity of the world communist movement. It is bound on the contrary to hasten its demise as a *movement,* though not necessarily as a loose assemblage of like-minded parties. For communism since 1917 has defined itself in terms of fidelity to Lenin and the Bolshevik model. A "return to Marx," whatever its attraction after World War II to the pupils of Antonio Gramsci, has little meaning for communists in Asia, Africa and Latin America. To them it signifies quite plainly the renunciation of those hopes and illusions that were symbolized by the myth of the October Revolution.

And yet one does not see how the drift away from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy can be halted, at any rate outside Eastern Europe, where the problem of gaining power has been solved. Both the rigid ultra-Stalinism of the Chinese and the traditional Marxism of Western Europe represent possible options, whereas the Leninist synthesis of 1917–23 looks more artificial with every year that passes. Too undemocratic for the West, it is still too Marxist for the East. Above all, it is too dependent upon the Marxian notion that there must be *some* concordance between the development of the productive forces and the evolution to a higher type of society, and that communism cannot simply be legislated into existence by an act of will. Lenin, after all, never quite renounced the primary assumption that socialism (let alone communism) presupposes a high degree of industrial development

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and a concomitant level of civilization. Indeed, he justified the adoption of the New Economic Policy in 1921–22 on the grounds that Russia was too backward for a shortcut to socialism. It has been left for Mao Tse-tung to take the final step of proclaiming communism the means of overcoming China's pre-industrial backwardness. In doing so he has finally stood Marx on his head, though he can hardly be aware of it.

What is rather more important is that he has severed the link between his own brand of "communism" and the historic workers' movement from which the communist protest against exploitation and alienation originally arose. For what kept this movement going for a century was the faith that the purgatory of the industrial revolution would one day be succeeded by an age when men would find something better to do than to sacrifice themselves and their offspring for the wealth-creating apparatus of capitalist industry. If the European proletariat responded to Marxian socialism, it did so because Marx had taught the workers that "capital" was stored-up labor—their own sweat and blood which had gone to build up the great pyramid of modern industry. His followers then did not conceive that "communism" would one day come to signify an iron dictatorship dedicated to the goal of extracting the last ounce of surplus labor from the toilers, for the purpose of erecting an even more monstrous structure of totally state-owned and bureaucratically controlled capital. They did not, that is to say, foresee the advent of Stalinism, still less of Maoism, which is the application of Stalinist principles to a country far poorer and more primitive than the Russia of the first five-year plan. Whatever the pragmatic value of this gigantic experiment, it holds no promise for men and women whose ancestors in the last century passed through this particular kind of hell, though to be sure the ideology then was a different one.

Nothing can cure the Chinese of their notion that they are "building communism," though in fact they are laying the foundation of yet another state-capitalist structure. The illusion is as necessary to them as the air they breathe, for it legitimizes the drive to make their country great and self-sufficient. But just because the entire nation has been dedicated by its rulers to this back-breaking enterprise, what is officially described as communism has found expression in a riot of populist and nationalist exaltation. The appeal of Maoism is to *the people of China*—all of them (minus the celebrated "handful of plotters") and to no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one besides. Here, for all the solemn tributes to Stalin's legacy, Mao and his followers have perforce abandoned even the Stalinist form of Leninism which still retained some connection with the idea of a class dictatorship exercised in the name of "the workers." Maoism is a populist ideology which equates all the toilers, and if anything prefers the peasants to the city workers. Its appeal is to "the people," not to the proletariat, and its deepest urge is to restore the primitive community of the folk, as it is supposed to have existed in a golden age before the coming of class society. In short, what we have here is the last of the great national-popular convulsions inaugurated in the France of 1793, revived in the Russia of 1917, grotesquely parodied in the Germany of 1933, and now for a change exported to Asia. Impressive enough in its own way, the phenomenon makes sense only if one dissociates it from the Marxian perspective it has inherited from a European movement of the past century. National Socialism does not acquire a different character merely because it chooses to style itself communism. But the revolution is real enough, and its ultimate direction remains to be determined.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# VIET NAM: CRISIS OF INDECISION

*By Robert Shaplen*

AS the war in Viet Nam moves well into the third year of the major phase that began early in 1965 with the deployment of large numbers of American troops, there are indications that the long and difficult conflict is in a state of irresolution, or what the communists describe as "indecisiveness." This does not mean stalemate, a word Washington officials rightly reject, since the military contest on the ground remains highly fluid and damaging to both sides, while the population and economy of North Viet Nam, subject as they are to an ever-widening pattern of bombing, are obviously being hurt (reports from the North say that half a million persons, including perhaps 100,000 Chinese, are now engaged in repairing the bomb damage). In South Viet Nam, American troops and their foreign allies, and occasionally the South Vietnamese, are continuing to win some major battles and with the help of coördinated tactical air, heavy bombing and artillery attacks are inflicting heavy casualties on the communists.

Despite these losses by attrition, however, and despite their acknowledged difficulties in replenishing their guerrilla ranks, the communists have held their own, are still able to strike back effectively, and have managed over the last six months, through continued infiltration from the North and some recruitment in the South, to increase their total number of men fighting in South Viet Nam from 260,000 to approximately 300,000, of whom some 60,000 at present are North Vietnamese. According to accounts of prisoners and defectors, as many as two-thirds of the four or five thousand men being infiltrated each month in small units into South Viet Nam are being lost within a period of months, through bombing of infiltration routes, as a result of illness (chiefly malaria or intestinal disorders) or in battle. Nevertheless, the replacements keep filtering through the Laos corridor, and in addition the North Vietnamese have committed as many as three full divisions at a time across the Demilitarized Zone for action in the First Corps area, the northernmost part of South Viet Nam; elsewhere, the communists have shown signs of shifting their strategy and tactics and of being less prone to engage in large-unit actions—company-size or better—unless, in their calculation, they either

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have the advantage of superior strength or total surprise, or unless special circumstances seem to warrant the risks. Their basic weapons, mainly of the Chinese-manufactured 7.62 millimeter family, are as good as or better than ever, and as plentiful, in spite of increasing losses of guns in battle and the Allied capture of some large ammunition caches, while their recent employment of sophisticated Russian howitzers, artillery, mortar and rockets, especially in the area just south of the D.M.Z., has enabled them to retaliate in kind for some of the artillery and bombing punishment they have suffered.

The American response to this sustained communist challenge has undergone some adjustments and alterations of its own as it has become apparent that the Allied momentum of 1965 and 1966 has slowed down and that, notwithstanding their superior firepower and mobility, the Allies cannot provide a knockout blow in 1967 any more than the communists were able to achieve such a blow two years ago. Faced with obligations elsewhere in the world, and eager to avoid having to call up reserves, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, despite some hawkish pressure from high-ranking members of the military establishment and of Congress, have limited the additional troops likely to be sent to General Westmoreland this year and early next to two reinforced divisions.

Even if the Koreans and Australians add some more troops, if the South Vietnamese increase their draft calls, thereby building up a total Allied force of some 1.3 million, the war on the ground is not likely to be anything but "indecisive." The communists cannot be expected to fall below the 1:4 ratio of total strength, and the ratio is actually less since a larger proportion of their men is engaged in fighting. In other respects, most importantly in organization of the countryside, the Viet Cong are still considerably ahead of the South Vietnamese. In the murky area of pacification and revolutionary development, after several years of repeated experimentation and reorganization, progress on the government side is still excruciatingly slow. There is a belated awareness that the regular South Vietnamese forces (ARVN) will probably never be galvanized and motivated into providing proper security for the revolutionary development teams, and that the job should be given to the local or Popular Forces, who are to be paid more money (they are still by far the poorest paid of all Vietnamese troops) and given better weapons. This overdue

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

step may slowly improve the situation, but most observers with long experience in Viet Nam have become thoroughly skeptical that the pacification program, under the present complicated and fragmented social-economic and political-military dispensation in the country, will ever really get off the ground. Consequently, there has been a shift in thinking and a new concentration on improving certain aspects of the political situation, which is at least more flexible if also more explosive. An improvement politically should all along have been a parallel objective to successful pacification and revolutionary development, which together define a good counterinsurgency program; but unfortunately it has not worked out that way.

If there are some Americans, including some in the highest places, who still believe that the war can be won militarily, or that at least the government in Hanoi can be forced by bombing and by military pressure in the South to come to the conference table, there are increasing numbers who now feel that the way to bring the conflict to an end is through political accommodation in South Viet Nam. This trend of thinking coincides with signs of a new line of thought among the North Vietnamese. While so far they show no indication of giving up or diminishing their commitment, the communist leaders directing the war effort are beginning to talk more and more, as captured documents reveal, of reaching that "indecisive" period when it will pay them to start "fighting while negotiating." General Nguyen Van Vinh, chairman of the National Reunification Commission of North Viet Nam, which directs the war in the South, still speaks of achieving "decisive victory within the next four years," but he has frequently modified this by declaring that "our policy is to continue fighting until such time as we can fight and negotiate at the same time" and has added that "while negotiating we will continue fighting even more vigorously." Vinh, further, has emphasized that "it is possible that the North will conduct negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South will also participate in negotiations while continuing to fight."

It seems likely that these possible courses of action were high on the agenda of discussion during the July meeting in Hanoi of North Vietnamese diplomatic representatives summoned home from their posts. Another topic that undoubtedly came up concerned the future relationship between Hanoi and its South Vietnamese offspring, the National Liberation Front, which it domi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nates and controls more thoroughly than ever but which nevertheless still contains non-Northern and even non-communist elements. Inevitably, if the fighting-while-negotiating phase is coming closer, the position of the N.L.F., which Hanoi has always alleged is an independent entity, will become crucial; Hanoi will have to face the problem of maintaining tight controls over the Front while simultaneously pretending to give it a looser rein. Finally, the July meeting in Hanoi and continuing discussions among North Vietnamese Communist leaders have surely been concerned with the critical national manpower and resupply problems created by the bombing; these are directly related to the complicated question of Chinese internal disorder and to China's capacity and willingness to continue sending unlimited help to North Viet Nam, primarily guns and bullets, without obtaining a pledge from Hanoi favoring Peking over Moscow in the ideological split and promising to go on fighting and not to negotiate—a pledge Hanoi is loath to give.

It is apparent that the North Vietnamese are becoming increasingly upset by the effects the Peking-Moscow clash is having on the prosecution of the war. "We are worried," General Vinh has bluntly admitted, and Le Duan, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party chairman, has declared that the large commitment of United States forces was encouraged by the American realization that "the forseeable situation would not drive them into becoming involved in a major limited war which required that they cope with the strong reaction of the entire Socialist bloc." Recently, the North Vietnamese have criticized Chinese theoretical thinking about "revisionism," which is described as "too extreme," as well as Chinese strategy and tactics of prolonged "wars of liberation." General Vinh has said, undoubtedly without having first consulted the Russians, "The Soviet Union will support us under all conditions, whether we fight, or negotiate, or fight and negotiate," and has added: "China gives us wholehearted support, but she has weak points," including her "technical ability [which] is inferior to that of the Soviet Union." More and more, the North Vietnamese are stressing their old theme of tough "self-reliance." Reading between the lines, it would seem that Hanoi's careful balancing act between Moscow and Peking, which it has managed to carry on for years, may by necessity be undergoing some revamping; events may force the North Vietnamese to make some sort of choice, or at least a shift, and this is likely to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determine what they do about any and all forms of negotiation.

In this context, there are three levels on which negotiations, or steps leading toward negotiations while some fighting in South Viet Nam continues, could take place, beginning either early next year, possibly during and after the annual Tet (New Year's) holiday, or perhaps not until after the November 1968 American Presidential election. (The election in the United States remains another important factor in Hanoi's overall calculation. If the communists decide to gamble on the mounting American debate and confusion, and to wait until after the election to negotiate, they will naturally have to reconsider the other factors enumerated above, especially any drastic change in their relations with China.)

The first of the three levels may be described as "local and political." In certain areas, a series of covert approaches might be made by South Vietnamese hamlet and village representatives to members of the Front or the People's Revolutionary Party, the southern political arm of the Lao Dong; these approaches might be followed by formal or, as is more likely initially, informal discussions and arrangements. Their ultimate objective would be the holding of new hamlet and village elections in South Viet Nam in which *all* local elements would participate; but such elections would follow a period of mutual reconciliation worked out autonomously within the village and hamlet areas concerned, with as little outside interference as possible from higher echelons of either side.

The second level of negotiations might involve discussions between Hanoi and the Front on one side and the Americans and the Saigon government on the other, and they might be engendered and facilitated in one of the many ways suggested over the last two years, either privately or publicly; such negotiations conceivably would deal with some of the basic questions such as an end to the bombing, withdrawals of troops on both sides, etc.

The third level would bring the United States and the Soviet Union into the picture together, and perhaps others, as guarantors of an agreement. The effect of such negotiations, whether they were conducted at another Geneva conference or somewhere else, would be to strengthen the hand of the Russians in North Viet Nam and leave the Americans with a role of some influence in South Viet Nam. For the moment anyway, in view of the havoc in China, the Chinese would be effectively squeezed out, which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might produce some loud propaganda screams and intensify the heat of the Moscow-Peking dispute, but not much else. Since a primary objective of both the Americans and the Russians is to persuade Hanoi to disentangle itself from Peking, which despite the strong pro-Peking sentiments among some North Vietnamese leaders may not now be as difficult as it would have been a year or so ago, a joint Russian-American move, if properly timed and executed, would no doubt contain the Chinese and restrain them from taking any rash steps that could provoke a larger war, such as a "spontaneous" eruption of Chinese troops across the North Vietnamese border. The purpose of the Russian-American détente would be the creation of an effective Vietnamese buffer zone. A further step might then be the neutralization of other parts of Southeast Asia, starting with Cambodia and Laos, both of which would be only too willing to accept this.

There is nothing to suggest that negotiations on these three levels must proceed separately, although it would seem logical that the first level must start first. At some point during the period of "fighting and negotiating" at the same time, while the first-level accommodations were being attempted, the second and even the third negotiatory level might be reached; it would seem practical, if not in fact unavoidable, that the first two levels should sooner or later be conducted simultaneously. However, for the purposes of discussion here, the three levels, and the possibilities they suggest of ending the war, will be taken up one at a time.

II

Any possibility of local arrangements between pro-Saigon and pro-Viet Cong elements in the South Vietnamese countryside must presupppose two related conditions: the existence of a government in Saigon led by civilians who have the respect of all South Vietnamese, including at least potentially that of the five million living in Viet Cong-controlled areas, and a consequent willingness on the part of the local leaders of these five million to begin a series of selective dialogues. At this writing, it is impossible to predict what the effect of the September Presidential and Senatorial elections in South Viet Nam will be. Whether or not the military ticket headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu and Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky has been elected, the key man remains Tran Van Huong, who has been the leading civilian candidate for President. Those Vietnamese who are eager to settle the war

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through accommodation—and they include almost all civilian leaders and the majority of the population—believe that Huong, if not as President then as the chosen Prime Minister, has the best chance of prosecuting a peace plan. Although he is not physically strong and is not always forceful in action, Huong, a southerner, which is important in itself for purposes of negotiation, is firm in his convictions, and more importantly he is respected for his honesty and integrity and for his dedication to the cause of seeking peace without selling out to the communists. He is for accommodation and for free elections, which ultimately might produce a pro-communist or strongly neutralist President, but he is against any premature coalition government, which surely would have that effect. He is said to favor a gradual approach to peace, locally and then regionally.

If Huong, or anyone else, is to succeed in this pursuit, the military must be held in check. This will be difficult to do unless the United States is determined finally to use its influence and leverage to restrain the generals, individually and collectively, and to give the civilians a chance to *try* accommodation. What Huong or another civilian leader would require, in effect, is a guarantee from the United States that his position would be safeguarded from coups or demi-coups of the sort that early in 1965 forced Huong himself out of office after he had been Prime Minister for three months. Since the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in November 1963, which Washington promoted and helped execute, the United States has been signally unsuccessful in the use of its leverage to influence important political decisions and events in South Viet Nam. The next few months may offer the last chance. The only other option short of withdrawal is to go on prosecuting the war through further gradual or rapid escalation to force a military decision. The search for peace, when it comes, might then include some of the same efforts at accommodation, but they would be much harder to pursue in an atmosphere of more despair, bitterness and recrimination.

If a decent and respected and unmolested civilian government can be established in Saigon, supported by an alert and active Senate (and a similar House of Representatives to be elected early in November), how could it proceed to deal with local Viet Cong elements? One must here begin with some other assumptions. The most important of these is that Viet Cong cadres in enough key areas could be persuaded that the alternatives

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offered by the Saigon representatives are worth their attention. The Viet Cong would have to believe that the opportunities to maintain a voice for themselves in the countryside, through participation in local elections and otherwise, would be worth more than maintaining a series of shadow governments while the fighting-and-negotiating continued, with the possibility of resuming prolonged and painful guerrilla warfare of course always in the back of their minds. They would have to be further persuaded that, even though many if not most of them have been well-disciplined communists, the chance to be "legal" at the low levels, and to compete more openly than clandestinely with Saigon's representatives, warrants their coöperation. To turn this around, realistically, it should be said that the impact the Viet Cong have had in the rural areas will not easily be eliminated, no matter how and when the war ends. While it is true that the communists have lost some of their popularity in the areas they hold as a result of higher taxes, rougher treatment of the local population, including conscription, food controls and so on, it is also true that the government's image through the revolutionary development program and in other ways has not come through nearly strongly nor widely enough to compensate for the essentially low regard in which the great majority of government agents are still held; these include tax collectors, the police, district and province chiefs, and individual officers and soldiers, not to mention profiteers and landlords who still engage in widespread corruption and have resumed their own tax collections whenever they can return to cleared local areas behind the skirts of government troops.

The Viet Cong cadres who might be persuaded to participate in new local elections, starting in the hamlets, would, under any circumstances, be making a calculated gamble. They are still ahead of the government in the areas they control, and would conceivably be enticed by the prospect of gaining more initially in the indeterminate and government-controlled places. A contest and a race against time would develop, and the best thing that Saigon, under pressure, would have going for itself is the establishment, finally, of a viable constitutional government whose popularity would increase in direct ratio to its ability to continue gaining the support and respect of the peasantry. This might be enhanced in various ways, including the proper implementation of the new local election regulations already in effect which call for villages to retain 40 percent of what they collect in local taxes for their own

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use, instead of turning everything over to the districts and provinces. An immediate reëvaluation of the policy on land rents would be another way of gaining popular support. It is a fact, as has recently been brought out, that the abolition or lowering of rent collections would be more meaningful to the peasants right now than the parceling out of former French or Vietnamese holdings; much of this land, along with church or communally held properties, is tied up in a vast confusion of ownership claims and general bureaucratic red tape, and it will take years to clear all this up.

The willingness of the local Viet Cong cadres (a good number of whom have been disillusioned and whose lives have been deeply disrupted by the ever-increasing violence of the war) to coöperate in a new program of hamlet self-rule would also depend on various intangible factors. The native cadres, residents of their areas since birth or for many years, would have to be convinced that by going along with Saigon's "opening to the left" they would not only preserve hamlet and village self-determination as *they* see it, but as it is part of the historic Vietnamese tradition of local autonomy. The local cadres who have been most politically active on a day-by-day, week-by-week and month-by-month basis are the nuts and bolts of the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front machine, and the control exercised over them by the People's Revolutionary Party, while it has been severe, has been in the nature of a steel hood placed over an engine composed of many small parts. Conceivably, the parts could be stirred below the hood. There is another factor: the local cadres would have to be further persuaded to gamble for the chance to maintain their own southern image, in coöperation with a southern-led Saigon government, against the threat by the North to impose its rule. There seems little doubt that the southern cadres, no matter how thoroughly indoctrinated with communism they have been, and how well disciplined, still resent being ordered about in the execution of their revolutionary duties by northern political and military officers. The fact remains, while the southerners may think in terms of ultimate reunification with the North, there is a strong tradition of southern separatism and a desire to retain a southern identity, and to develop and complete the revolution in the South prior to discussing unity. This tradition and thrust of southern revolutionary independence dates back to the 1930s. Can local nationalist and regional expression now be reinvigorated as part of a movement toward peace? Can the true nationalists in South

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Viet Nam, including among others, a considerable number of Socialists ideologically independent of both Moscow and Peking and a number of peasant labor-union cadres, be projected into the political maelstrom and given a chance to play meaningful roles among the peasantry? These may prove to be the most significant questions as the coming crisis of peace and war unfolds, and they obviously offer challenges and opportunities to both sides.

III

If the attempt to reach local accommodations looking chiefly toward new elections is at all successful, a number of by-products would soon create situations of a second-level negotiatory nature. These would include the opening of some hostile or contested areas to access by both sides; that is, districts heretofore available only to the Viet Cong would become available to government representatives, and vice versa. The regional flow of local trade would increase, and communication in and out of areas generally would become more possible. Refugees could return to their homes. It would be illusory to suppose that some degree of clandestine activity of a proselytizing nature would not continue on both sides, but this would be acceptable if the incidence of terror and assassination could be limited. The possibility of establishing local cease-fire zones suggests itself as the best way to achieve a balance of power instead of a balance of terror.

The creation of cease-fire zones would almost certainly have to be negotiated between higher authorities, between regimental or division commanders on the government side, for example, and communist zone commanders. The cease-fires might have to have the approval of even higher authorities, including central government officials in Saigon and representatives of the National Liberation Front, acting on its own behalf or as the "branch office" of Hanoi, though it would not admit to being that. Actually, there are numbers of areas in Viet Nam today where tacit cease-fires already exist between communist and government forces, each agreeing to leave the other alone, so a framework of such accommodation has been established.

Whether Hanoi would condone a formalization of such cease-fires without the Americans' first calling off the bombing of the North is surely doubtful. And whether the Americans would call off the bombing without evidence that Hanoi had ceased infiltrating reinforcements south is problematical. At this point, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bombing issues might become a matter of negotiation between the United States and North Viet Nam, or, if not yet of full negotiation, of probings or even of tentative acts of faith. In the meantime, in any event, it would not be supposed that all military activity would have ceased in the South. In fact, American search-and-destroy operations against communist main-force elements would probably have continued all along, and would probably still go on even as small cease-fire zones or truce areas were established. But the way might now be cleared to enter into the major second-level area of discussion, including cessation of bombing in the South as well as the North, and the bombing question as a whole would thus become more of a tactical instrument in the larger strategy of the search for peace and not simply an almost irresolvable issue in itself. The difficulty of calling off the bombing in return for some significant large act of de-escalation on the part of the North Vietnamese, such as an abrupt end to infiltration, would thus be eliminated, or reduced to a more workable perspective. Social psychologists have aptly pointed out that too broad and unspecified a "behavior" has been requested of the North Vietnamese in order to achieve too broad and unspecified a goal, and the longer such demands are made the more difficult it becomes to attain that goal. By breaking the goal down into lesser goals, attainable step by step, the ultimate goal might become more realizable.

This does not, for a moment, mean compromising with our primary goals, foremost of which is our insistence that the territorial and political integrity of South Viet Nam, and for that matter of North Viet Nam too, be preserved and guaranteed. However, the Americans and the South Vietnamese must take certain risks as well as the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, for under any circumstances, especially during a period of fighting and negotiating at the same time, politics, to reverse the classic formula, is simply a means of waging war by other means. Nor is there any reason to suppose that, whatever happens, the North Vietnamese Communists will give up their efforts to subvert South Viet Nam to their own purposes through a phased social-economic and "national democratic" revolution in the South aimed at ultimately building a single nation of some thirty million people. Our objective is to limit the scope and possibilities of subversion by imposing a workable legal framework, and then to convince as many local southern communists as pos-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sible that this framework offers them the best opportunity for the welfare and development of South Viet Nam.

The North Vietnamese themselves have declared that the existence of a communist state in the North "cannot replace the inherent social contradictions of South Viet Nam." An approach of gradualism in the rural areas is obviously best calculated to create conditions for challenging local Viet Cong cadres to a true revolutionary contest. If this groundwork can be laid, suggestions have been made that the establishment of an increasing number of cease-fires accompanied by political accommodation be then tied to a reduction of the bombing of the North on the basis of a phasing down of the attacks. For example, the United States would agree not to bomb certain parts of the North or to halt all bombing north of certain lines, unless violations of the cease-fires in the South occurred. This idea has already had some currency, most recently in the recommendation of a group of Republican Congressmen. It seems unwise to couch any such offer in terms of punishment for violations, although that is what it might amount to, or to place any formal deadlines on it. At some point, perhaps halfway through the process of establishing cease-fire areas in the South, as the selected zones have been extended to a number of important delta provinces and to some key provinces elsewhere, and perhaps the bombing within these provinces as well as in at least part of the North has been cut down, an effort might be made to create two larger cease-fire zones involving both major American search-and-destroy units and communist main-force elements. One logical zone would be within the D.M.Z. and in an area extending south of it for a stretch of at least ten miles; the projected electronic detection barrier to be built by the United States might fit into this plan. The second zone ostensibly could take in an area stretching east from the Cambodian border in the Third Corps region and eventually could extend across the highlands and plateau to the coastal provinces of Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen.

It is perfectly possible, if not likely, that the North Vietnamese would not go along with any gradual reduction of the bombing and would still insist, as they have all along, that the bombing be stopped completely before any discussions can start. However, if the United States dropped its insistence on a positive and specific reciprocal gesture—namely, a cessation of infiltration from the North—the above plan would stand a better chance. The dangers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of permitting infiltration to continue while the plan is being launched are not nearly as great as the advantages that would accrue from a gradual extension of the cease-fire zones, since infiltration, by itself, is more the effect than the cause of the continuing war; for the real cause is the determination of Hanoi and the Viet Cong to go on fighting at the current level of activity or to revert to action somewhere between phase one and phase two. The time to bring up the question of infiltration and the total end of the bombing of the North, as well as the extension of the cease-fire throughout South Viet Nam, would come when the plan had succeeded up to the point of reducing the level of action sufficiently to warrant the hope that an overall agreement might be negotiated. It might even be argued that if there are enough hopeful signs as the process unfolds, the United States could end the bombing unconditionally even before the third level of the negotiatory process gets under way.

IV

If the process of local accommodation accompanied by the establishment of cease-fire zones has even been partially successful, with Hanoi as well as the Viet Cong accepting the challenge, third-level discussions would serve to enlarge the scope and portent of the peace plan. It is at this juncture that the role of the Russians, as adjudicators and as persuaders of Hanoi, would be of paramount importance. The initial spirit and purpose of the 1962 Geneva Conference that sought to neutralize Laos could here perhaps be recaptured. There is no reason to doubt the desire of the Russians to bring an end to the war in Viet Nam, and no reason to suppose that they would not, at this point, join with the Americans in diplomatic manœuvres to encourage and facilitate a broader agreement. As stated earlier, the mechanics and techniques of such an approach are best left to the parties concerned. It would, however, seem advisable to project an agreement on Viet Nam as much as possible into a larger Southeast Asian context, and to bring Cambodia and Laos, and possibly some other nations of the region, into the ultimate discussions, wherever they are held. In so far as possible, the earlier stages of such discussions, of establishing and exploring contacts, should be secret. And certainly the talks, when they begin in earnest, should not aim at the exclusion of the Chinese; in fact, at the opportune time the Chinese should be assured that their participation in the economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development of Southeast Asia is welcomed, and that both the United States and the Soviet Union are eager to discuss such larger problems as nuclear disarmament in coöperation with China. The settlement of the Viet Nam issue, once Peking is forced to accept the idea of a Vietnamese buffer state, may yet prove the way for a larger accommodation with China, unless, of course, that country by then is convulsed in civil war.

A broad Geneva-type conference, if it develops out of initial private soundings and arrangements, would obviously have to deal with the difficult matter of policing any agreement reached. It is the writer's opinion that almost any policing plan that would include such straightjacketed mechanisms as the International Control Commission is doomed to failure. Not only would the present members of the I.C.C., if they are retained, end up in bickering and in vetoing of each other's purposes and prerogatives, but they conceivably would tend to exacerbate friction among the Vietnamese seeking to resolve their own problems. What the Viet Nam situation desperately demands is a more free revolutionary expression of its own ethos, something which, during the long and tragic postwar period when the French refused to let go in the South, was denied it, and which, under Diem and since, has continued to be precluded. If the South is to rediscover its own revolutionary traditions, and to preserve or modify them in relation to the communist North, it must be as unmolested and even as unsupervised as possible. This naturally involves risks of communist domination or subversion, but the risks must be taken in a true revolutionary atmosphere and milieu, and not under the gaze of an ineffective international police element.

This does not mean that the Americans and the Russians and possibly other powers should not play a role, but in so far as possible the role should be of a "good offices" nature. A Geneva-type conference might properly define the purpose of such a mission, and the United Nations might underwrite it. It could project its own mechanism for action, either if called upon by the Vietnamese or perhaps on the basis of its own readings of the unfolding situation in Viet Nam, as a result of which it might interpose suggestions for resolving potential or actual issues and quarrels. There remain some substantive preliminary matters that should rightfully be considered and acted upon at a conference. These include the phased withdrawal of troops from South Viet Nam, both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American and North Vietnamese, the surrender of as many weapons as can feasibly be uncovered in the villages during the prolonged cease-fires (obviously some weapons will always remain hidden), the dismantling of bases or the procedure for turning them over to the Vietnamese, the reëstablishment of fuller trade and communication between North and South Viet Nam, and perhaps the selection of a date, no less than five years away, for the holding of a referendum on reunification. The implementation of a Mekong Valley development program, the benefits of which, as President Johnson has pledged, would extend to North Viet Nam, could also logically be brought within the purview of a broad agreement that genuinely concerned itself with the future of all of Southeast Asia.

None of this is meant, furthermore, to deny or exclude considerations of power or influence. The often stated determination of the United States to remain involved in Southeast Asian affairs is one that this writer strongly shares, though the commitment today is confused and undefined. Such involvement unavoidably requires the existence of a military shield. There would appear to be ample reason to reapproach this matter with a fresh set of ideas and to replace the somewhat tarnished Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with something more acceptable to the Asians and perhaps more palatable to at least part of the neutral and unaligned if not the communist world. To expect that this might become part of a larger Russian-American accommodation is too much, and is illusory or naïve, for Moscow cannot afford to renounce its own concept of revolutionary development and will undoubtedly continue to project it in competition with Peking. We cannot realistically assume anything otherwise. However, we can operate in the hope that a peaceful contest for influence in Southeast Asia, on behalf of nationalist development in revolutionary terms, will prevail; though it would also be naïve to presume that the Chinese will not continue their efforts to disrupt such peaceful evolvement by fomenting violence in Thailand, the Philippines and again in Indonesia. The effort, on our part, should nevertheless be designed to encourage as much peaceful development as possible, and, if that proves ineffective or insufficient, to promote successful programs of counterinsurgency.

Whatever impetus to regional coöperation develops out of a Vietnamese settlement—such coöperation is already burgeoning in several fields, such as education, transportation, banking and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

finance—should not be inhibited by threats or interpositions of major military might from any outside source, including the United States. Once the Viet Nam situation is regulated, the security of the area will nevertheless depend in the immediate future on the existence of a protective shield supplied in large part by the United States, with the help of Australia and perhaps a lingering British contribution. In the final analysis, the degree of American determination to support nationalist development in Viet Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and to back up its support with its multifarious resources, will prove the key factor, politically and economically more than militarily. One of the generally unrealized benefits of the war in Viet Nam has been an awareness on the part of Asian leaders—as best expressed so far by Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew—that the United States has bought time in Viet Nam for the rest of Southeast Asia to get together and avoid another Viet Nam. The success of the American commitment in the future will depend on our inner resolve, on our understanding of the area's problems and potentialities, as well as on our patience and willingness to remain "involved" indefinitely.

If Viet Nam has been a tragic and often misconstrued chapter of this American commitment and involvement, the trend toward withdrawal and neo-isolationism, which has become the confused domestic political by-product of the conflict, does not either represent a practical solution or augur well for acceptance of our unavoidable responsibilities in a world that remains highly combustible and revolutionary. The crisis of indecision that confronts us in Viet Nam has simply prolonged and aggravated the confusion, and has made it more difficult to deal with the long-term problems of creating a constructive peace in Southeast Asia. Whatever the risks involved, we now must face up to the "indecisiveness" of the war and attempt, as best we can with the best elements among the Vietnamese we can find, to reach a political solution for a war that has always been essentially political.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# ASIA AFTER VIET NAM

*By Richard M. Nixon*

THE war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision that it has distorted our picture of Asia. A small country on the rim of the continent has filled the screen of our minds; but it does not fill the map. Sometimes dramatically, but more often quietly, the rest of Asia has been undergoing a profound, an exciting and on balance an extraordinarily promising transformation. One key to this transformation is the emergence of Asian regionalism; another is the development of a number of the Asian economies; another is gathering disaffection with all the old isms that have so long imprisoned so many minds and so many governments. By and large the non-communist Asian governments are looking for solutions that work, rather than solutions that fit a preconceived set of doctrines and dogmas.

Most of them also recognize a common danger, and see its source as Peking. Taken together, these developments present an extraordinary set of opportunities for a U.S. policy which must begin to look beyond Viet Nam. In looking toward the future, however, we should not ignore the vital role Viet Nam has played in making these developments possible. Whatever one may think of the "domino" theory, it is beyond question that without the American commitment in Viet Nam Asia would be a far different place today.

The U.S. presence has provided tangible and highly visible proof that communism is not necessarily the wave of Asia's future. This was a vital factor in the turnaround in Indonesia, where a tendency toward fatalism is a national characteristic. It provided a shield behind which the anti-communist forces found the courage and the capacity to stage their counter-coup and, at the final moment, to rescue their country from the Chinese orbit. And, with its 100 million people, and its 3,000-mile arc of islands containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources, Indonesia constitutes by far the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area.

Beyond this, Viet Nam has diverted Peking from such other potential targets as India, Thailand and Malaysia. It has bought vitally needed time for governments that were weak or unstable or leaning toward Peking as a hedge against the future—time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which has allowed them to attempt to cope with their own insurrections while pressing ahead with their political, economic and military development. From Japan to India, Asian leaders know why we are in Viet Nam and, privately if not publicly, they urge us to see it through to a satisfactory conclusion.

II

Many argue that an Atlantic axis is natural and necessary, but maintain, in effect, that Kipling was right, and that the Asian peoples are so "different" that Asia itself is only peripherally an American concern. This represents a racial and cultural chauvinism that does little credit to American ideals, and it shows little appreciation either of the westward thrust of American interests or of the dynamics of world development.

During the final third of the twentieth century, Asia, not Europe or Latin America, will pose the greatest danger of a confrontation which could escalate into World War III. At the same time, the fact that the United States has now fought three Asian wars in the space of a generation is grimly but truly symbolic of the deepening involvement of the United States in what happens on the other side of the Pacific—which modern transportation and communications have brought closer to us today than Europe was in the years immediately preceding World War II.

The United States is a Pacific power. Europe has been withdrawing the remnants of empire, but the United States, with its coast reaching in an arc from Mexico to the Bering Straits, is one anchor of a vast Pacific community. Both our interests and our ideals propel us westward across the Pacific, not as conquerors but as partners, linked by the sea not only with those oriental nations on Asia's Pacific littoral but at the same time with occidental Australia and New Zealand, and with the island nations between.

Since World War II, a new Asia has been emerging with startling rapidity; indeed, Asia is changing more swiftly than any other part of the world. All around the rim of China nations are becoming Western without ceasing to be Asian.

The dominant development in Asia immediately after World War II was decolonization, with its admixture of intense nationalism. But the old nationalist slogans have less meaning for today's young than they had for their fathers. Having never known a "colonialist," they find colonialists unconvincing as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scapegoats for the present ills of their societies. If dissatisfied with conditions as they see them, the young tend to blame those now in power.

As the sharp anticolonial focus blurs, the old nationalism is evolving into a more complex, multi-layered set of concepts and attitudes. On the one hand are a multitude of local and tribal identifications—the Montagnards in Viet Nam, the Han tribes in Burma, the provincial and linguistic separatisms that constantly claw at the fabric of Indian unity. On the other hand, there is a reaching-out by the governing élites, and particularly the young, for something larger, more like an Asian regionalism.

The developing coherence of Asian regional thinking is reflected in a disposition to consider problems and loyalties in regional terms, and to evolve regional approaches to development needs and to the evolution of a new world order. This is not excessively chauvinistic, but rather in the nature of a coalescing confidence, a recognition that Asia can become a counterbalance to the West, and an increasing disposition to seek Asian solutions to Asian problems through coöperative action.

Along with the rising complex of national, subregional and regional identification and pride, there is also an acute sense of common danger—a factor which serves as catalyst to the others. The common danger from Communist China is now in the process of shifting the Asian governments' center of concern. During the colonial and immediately post-colonial eras, Asians stood opposed primarily to the West, which represented the intruding alien power. But now the West has abandoned its colonial role, and it no longer threatens the independence of the Asian nations. Red China, however, does, and its threat is clear, present and repeatedly and insistently expressed. The message has not been lost on Asia's leaders. They recognize that the West, and particularly the United States, now represents not an oppressor but a protector. And they recognize their need for protection.

This does not mean that the old resentments and distrusts have vanished, or that new ones will not arise. It does, however, mean that there has been an important shift in the balance of their perceptions about the balance of danger, and this shift has important implications for the future.

One of the legacies of Viet Nam almost certainly will be a deep reluctance on the part of the United States to become involved once again in a similar intervention on a similar basis. The war

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has imposed severe strains on the United States, not only militarily and economically but socially and politically as well. Bitter dissension has torn the fabric of American intellectual life, and whatever the outcome of the war the tear may be a long time mending. If another friendly country should be faced with an externally supported communist insurrection—whether in Asia, or in Africa or even Latin America—there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress would now support a unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host government. This makes it vitally in their own interest that the nations in the path of China's ambitions move quickly to establish an indigenous Asian framework for their own future security.

In doing so, they need to fashion arrangements able to deal both with old-style wars and with new—with traditional wars, in which armies cross over national boundaries, and with the so-called "wars of national liberation," in which they burrow under national boundaries.

I am not arguing that the day is past when the United States would respond militarily to communist threats in the less stable parts of the world, or that a unilateral response to a unilateral request for help is out of the question. But other nations must recognize that the role of the United States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future. To ensure that a U.S. response will be forthcoming if needed, machinery must be created that is capable of meeting two conditions: (*a*) a collective effort by the nations of the region to contain the threat by themselves; and, if that effort fails, (*b*) a collective request to the United States for assistance. This is important not only from the respective national standpoints, but also from the standpoint of avoiding nuclear collision.

Nations not possessing great power can indulge in the luxury of criticism of others; those possessing it have the responsibility of decision. Faced with a clear challenge, the decision not to use one's power must be as deliberate as the decision to use it. The consequences can be fully as far-reaching and fully as irrevocable.

If another world war is to be prevented, every step possible must be taken to avert direct confrontations between the nuclear powers. To achieve this, it is essential to minimize the number of occasions on which the great powers have to decide whether or not to commit their forces. These choices cannot be eliminated,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but they can be reduced by the development of regional defense pacts, in which nations undertake, among themselves, to attempt to contain aggression in their own areas.

If the initial response to a threatened aggression, of whichever type—whether across the border or under it—can be made by lesser powers in the immediate area and thus within the path of aggression, one of two things can be achieved: either they can in fact contain it by themselves, in which case the United States is spared involvement and thus the world is spared the consequences of great-power action; or, if they cannot, the ultimate choice can be presented to the United States in clear-cut terms, by nations which would automatically become allies in whatever response might prove necessary. To put it another way, the regional pact becomes a buffer separating the distant great power from the immediate threat. Only if the buffer proves insufficient does the great power become involved, and then in terms that make victory more attainable and the enterprise more palatable.

This is particularly important when the threat takes the form of an externally supported guerrilla action, as we have faced in Viet Nam, as is even now being mounted in Thailand, and as could be launched in any of a half-dozen other spots in the Chinese shadow. Viet Nam has shown how difficult it is to make clear the distinction between this and an ordinary factional civil war, and how subject the assisting power is to charges of having intervened in an internal matter. Viet Nam's neighbors know that the war there is not internal, but our own allies in Europe have difficulty grasping the fact.

The fragmenting of the communist world has lent credence to the frequently heard argument that a communist advance by proxy, as we have seen attempted in Viet Nam, is of only peripheral importance; that with the weakening of rigid central control of the communist world, local fights between communist and non-communist factions are a local matter. This ignores, however, the fact that with the decentralization of communist control has come an appropriately tailored shift in communist tactics. National communism poses a different kind of threat than did the old-style international communism, but by being subtler it is in some ways more dangerous.

SEATO was useful and appropriate to its time, but it was Western in origin and drew its strength from the United States and Europe. It has weakened to the point at which it is little

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than an institutional embodiment of an American commitment, and a somewhat anachronistic relic of the days when France and Britain were active members. Asia today needs its own security undertakings, reflecting the new realities of Asian independence and Asian needs.

Thus far, despite a pattern of rapidly increasing coöperation in cultural and economic affairs, the Asian nations have been unwilling to form a military grouping designed to forestall the Chinese threat, even though several have bilateral arrangements with the United States. But an appropriate foundation-stone exists on which to build: the Asian and Pacific Council. ASPAC held its first ministerial-level meeting in Seoul in June 1966, and its second in Bangkok in July 1967. It has carefully limited itself to strengthening regional coöperation in economic, cultural and social matters, and its members have voiced strong feelings that, as Japan's Foreign Minister Takeo Miki put it at the Bangkok meeting, it should not be made "a body to promote anticommunist campaigns."

Despite ASPAC's present cultural and economic orientation, however, the solidifying awareness of China's threat should make it possible—if the need for a regional alliance is put in sufficiently compelling terms—to develop it into an alliance actively dedicated to concerting whatever efforts might be necessary to maintain the security of the region. And ASPAC is peculiarly well situated to play such a role. Its members (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, South Viet Nam, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with Laos as an observer) all are acutely conscious of the Chinese threat. All except Malaysia have military ties with the United States. It has the distinct advantage of including Australia and New Zealand, which share the danger and would be able to contribute substantially to its strength, without an unbalancing great-power presence.

I do not mean to minimize the difficulties of winning acceptance of such a concept. In Japan, public opinion still lags behind official awareness of military needs. The avowedly neutralist nations under China's cloud would be reluctant, at present, to join any such grouping. But looking further down the road we can project either an erosion of their neutralism or the formation of their own loose association or associations, which might be tied into a militarily oriented ASPAC on an interlocking or coöperative basis. One can hope that even India might finally be persuaded to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

give its support, having itself been the target of overt Chinese aggression, and still cherishing as it does a desire to play a substantial role beyond its own borders.

III

Military security has to rest, ultimately, on economic and political stability. One of the effects of the rapidity of change in the world today is that there can no longer be static stability; there can only be dynamic stability. A nation or society that fails to keep pace with change is in danger of flying apart. It is important that we recognize this, but equally important that in trying to maintain a dynamic stability we remember that the stability is as important as the dynamism.

If a given set of ends is deemed desirable, then from the standpoint of those dedicated to peace and an essential stability in world order the desideratum is to reach those ends by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means. Looking at the pattern of change in non-communist Asia, we find that the professed aims of the revolutionaries are in fact being achieved by an evolutionary process. This offers a dramatic opportunity to draw the distinction between the fact of a revolutionary *result* and the *process* of revolutionary change. The Asian nations are showing that evolutionary change can be as exciting as revolutionary change. Having revolutionized the aims of their societies, they are showing what can be achieved within a framework of dynamic stability.

The "people," in the broadest sense, have become an entity to be served rather than used. In much of Asia, this change represents a revolution of no less magnitude than the revolution that created the industrial West, or that in the years following World War II transformed empires into new and struggling nations. It is precisely the promise of this reversal that has been at the heart of communist rhetoric, and at the heart of the popular and intellectual appeal which that rhetoric achieved.

Not all the governments of non-communist Asia fit the Western ideal of parliamentary democracy—far from it. But Americans must recognize that a highly sophisticated, highly advanced political system, which required many centuries to develop in the West, may not be best for other nations which have far different traditions and are still in an earlier stage of development. What matters is that these governments are consciously, deliberately

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and programmatically developing in the direction of greater liberty, greater abundance, broader choice and increased popular involvement in the processes of government.

Poverty that was accepted for centuries as the norm is accepted no longer. In a sense it could be said that a new chapter is being written in the winning of the West: in this case, a winning of the promise of Western technology and Western organization by the nations of the East. The cultural clash has had its costs and produced its strains, but out of it is coming a modernization of ancient civilizations that promises to leap the centuries.

The process produces transitional anomalies—such as the Indian woman squatting in the mud, forming cow-dung patties with her hands and laying them out to dry, while a transistor radio in her lap plays music from a Delhi station. It takes a long time to bring visions of the future to the far villages—but time is needed to make those visions credible, and make them achievable. Too wide a gap between reality and expectation always produces an explosive situation, and the fact that what the leaders know is possible is unknown to the great mass of the peasantry helps buy time to make the possible achievable. But the important thing is that the leaders do know what is possible, and by and large they are determined to make it happen.

Whether that process is going to proceed at a pace fast enough to keep one step ahead of the pressure of rising expectations is one of the great questions and challenges of the years ahead. But there is solid ground for hope. The successful Asian nations have been writing extraordinary records. To call their performance an economic miracle would be something of a semantic imprecision; it would also be a disservice. Precisely because the origins and ingredients of that success are not miraculous, it offers hope to those which have not yet turned the corner.

India still is a staggering giant, Burma flirts with economic chaos, and the Philippines, caught in a conflict of cultures and in search of an identity, lives in a precarious economic and social balance. But the most exciting trends in economic development today are being recorded by those Asian nations that have accepted the keys of progress and used them. Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia all have been recording sustained economic growth rates of 7 percent a year or more; Japan has sustained a remarkable average of 9 percent a year since 1950, and an average 16.7 percent per year increase in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exports over the same period. Thailand shifted into a period of rapid growth in 1958 and has averaged 7 percent a year since. South Korea, despite the unflattering estimates of its people's abilities by the average G.I. during the Korean War, is shooting ahead at a growth rate that has averaged 8 percent a year since 1963, with an average 42 percent a year increase in its exports.

These rapidly advancing countries vary widely in their social traditions and political systems, but their methods of economic management have certain traits in common: a prime reliance on private enterprise and on the pricing mechanisms of the market as the chief determinant of business decisions; a pacing of monetary expansion to match growth in output; receptivity to private capital investment, both domestic and foreign, including such incentives as tax advantages and quick government clearance of proposed projects; imaginative national programs for dealing with social problems; and, not least, a generally restrained posture in government planning, with the government's role suggestive rather than coercive. These nations have, in short, discovered and applied the lessons of America's own economic success.

## IV

Any discussion of Asia's future must ultimately focus on the respective roles of four giants: India, the world's most populous non-communist nation; Japan, Asia's principal industrial and economic power; China, the world's most populous nation and Asia's most immediate threat; and the United States, the greatest Pacific power. (Although the U.S.S.R. occupies much of the land map of Asia, its principal focus is toward the west and its vast Asian lands are an appendage of European Russia.)

India is both challenging and frustrating: challenging because of its promise, frustrating because of its performance. It suffers from escalating overpopulation, from too much emphasis on industrialization and not enough on agriculture, and from too doctrinaire a reliance on government enterprise instead of private enterprise. Many are deeply pessimistic about its future. One has to remember, however, that in the past five years India has fought two wars and faced two catastrophic droughts. On both the population and the agricultural fronts, India's present leaders at least are trying. And the essential factor, from the standpoint of U.S. policy, is that a nation of nearly half a billion people is seeking ways to wrench itself forward without a sacrifice of basic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

freedoms; in exceedingly difficult circumstances, the ideal of evolutionary change is being tested. For the most populous representative democracy in the world to fail, while Communist China—surmounting its troubles—succeeded, would be a disaster of worldwide proportions. Thus the United States must do two things: (1) continue its aid and support for Indian economic objectives; and (2) do its best to persuade the Indian Government to shift its means and adjust its institutions so that those objectives can be more quickly and more effectively secured, drawing from the lessons not only of the United States but also of India's more successful neighbors, including Pakistan.

Japan has been edging cautiously and discreetly toward a wider leadership role, acutely conscious at every step that bitter memories of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere might rise to haunt her if she pressed too hard or too eagerly. But what would not have been possible ten, or even five, years ago is becoming possible today. Half the people now living in Asia have been born since World War II, and the new generation has neither the old guilts (in the case of the Japanese themselves) nor the old fears born of conquest.

The natural momentum of Japan's growth, the industry of her people and the advanced state of her society must inevitably propel Japan into a more conspicuous position of leadership. Japan's industrial complex, expanding by 14 percent annually since 1950, already is comparable to that of West Germany or the United Kingdom. Japan's gross national product ($95 billion) is substantially greater than that of mainland China, with seven times the population. Japan is expected soon to rank as the world's third-strongest economic power, trailing only the United States and the Soviet Union. Along with this dramatic economic surge, Japan will surely want to play a greater role both diplomatically and militarily in maintaining the balance in Asia. As the Prime Minister of one neighboring country put it: "The Japanese are a great people, and no great people will accept as their destiny making better transistor radios and teaching the underdeveloped how to grow better rice."

This greater role will entail, among other things, a modification of the present terms of the Japanese Constitution, which specifically provides that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." (Japan's 275,000 men presently under arms are called "Self-Defense Forces.") Twenty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years ago it was considered unthinkable that Japan should acquire even a conventional military capability. Five years ago, while some Japanese thought about it, they did not talk about it. Today a substantial majority of Japanese still oppose the idea, but it is openly discussed and debated. Looking toward the future, one must recognize that it simply is not realistic to expect a nation moving into the first rank of major powers to be totally dependent for its own security on another nation, however close the ties. Japan's whole society has been restructured since World War II. While there still are traces of fanaticism, its politics at least conform to the democratic ideal. Not to trust Japan today with its own armed forces and with responsibility for its own defense would be to place its people and its government under a disability which, whatever its roots in painful recent history, ill accords with the role Japan must play in helping secure the common safety of non-communist Asia.

Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China. This does not mean, as many would simplistically have it, rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations and to ply it with offers of trade—all of which would serve to confirm its rulers in their present course. It does mean recognizing the present and potential danger from Communist China, and taking measures designed to meet that danger. It also means distinguishing carefully between long-range and short-range policies, and fashioning short-range programs so as to advance our long-range goals.

Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. But we could go disastrously wrong if, in pursuing this long-range goal, we failed in the short range to read the lessons of history.

The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it *must* change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems.

If the challenge posed by the Soviet Union after World War II

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was not precisely similar, it was sufficiently so to offer a valid precedent and a valuable lesson. Moscow finally changed when it, too, found that change was necessary. This was essentially a change of the head, not of the heart. Internal evolution played a role, to be sure, but the key factor was that the West was able to create conditions—notably in the shoring up of European defenses, the rapid restoration of European economies and the cementing of the Atlantic Alliance—that forced Moscow to look to the wisdom of reaching some measure of accommodation with the West. We are still far from reaching a full détente, but at least substantial progress has been made.

During the next decade the West faces two prospects which, together, could create a crisis of the first order: (1) that the Soviets may reach nuclear parity with the United States; and (2) that China, within three to five years, will have a significant deliverable nuclear capability—and that this same China will be outside any nonproliferation treaty that might be signed, free, if it chooses, to scatter its weapons among "liberation" forces anywhere in the world.

This heightens the urgency of building buffers that can keep the major nuclear powers apart in the case of "wars of national liberation," supported by Moscow or Peking but fought by proxy. It also requires that we now assign to the strengthening of non-communist Asia a priority comparable to that which we gave to the strengthening of Western Europe after World War II.

Some counsel conceding to China a "sphere of influence" embracing much of the Asian mainland and extending even to the island nations beyond; others urge that we eliminate the threat by preëmptive war. Clearly, neither of these courses would be acceptable to the United States or to its Asian allies. Others argue that we should seek an anti-Chinese alliance with European powers, even including the Soviet Union. Quite apart from the obvious problems involved in Soviet participation, such a course would inevitably carry connotations of Europe vs. Asia, white vs. non-white, which could have catastrophic repercussions throughout the rest of the non-white world in general and Asia in particular. If our long-range aim is to pull China back into the family of nations, we must avoid the impression that the great powers or the European powers are "ganging up;" the response should clearly be one of active defense rather than potential offense, and must be untainted with any suspicion of racism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the United States to go it alone in containing China would not only place an unconscionable burden on our own country, but also would heighten the chances of nuclear war while undercutting the independent development of the nations of Asia. The primary restraint on China's Asian ambitions should be exercised by the Asian nations in the path of those ambitions, backed by the ultimate power of the United States. This is sound strategically, sound psychologically and sound in terms of the dynamics of Asian development. Only as the nations of non-communist Asia become so strong—economically, politically and militarily—that they no longer furnish tempting targets for Chinese aggression, will the leaders in Peking be persuaded to turn their energies inward rather than outward. And that will be the time when the dialogue with mainland China can begin.

For the short run, then, this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.

"Containment without isolation" is a good phrase and a sound concept, as far as it goes. But it covers only half the problem. Along with it, we need a positive policy of pressure and persuasion, of dynamic detoxification, a marshaling of Asian forces both to keep the peace and to help draw off the poison from the Thoughts of Mao.

Dealing with Red China is something like trying to cope with the more explosive ghetto elements in our own country. In each case a potentially destructive force has to be curbed; in each case an outlaw element has to be brought within the law; in each case dialogues have to be opened; in each case aggression has to be restrained while education proceeds; and, not least, in neither case can we afford to let those now self-exiled from society stay exiled forever. We have to proceed with both an urgency born of necessity and a patience born of realism, moving step by calculated step toward the final goal.

## V

And finally, the role of the United States.

Weary with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many Americans are heeding the call

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the new isolationism. And they are not alone; there is a tendency in the whole Western world to turn inward, to become parochial and isolationist—dangerously so. But there can be neither peace nor security a generation hence unless we recognize now the massiveness of the forces at work in Asia, where more than half the world's people live and where the greatest explosive potential is lodged.

Out of the wreckage of two world wars we forged a concept of an Atlantic community, within which a ravaged Europe was rebuilt and the westward advance of the Soviets contained. If tensions now strain that community, these are themselves a by-product of success. But history has its rhythms, and now the focus of both crisis and change is shifting. Without turning our backs on Europe, we have now to reach out westward to the East, and to fashion the sinews of a Pacific community.

This has to be a community in the fullest sense: a community of purpose, of understanding and of mutual assistance, in which military defenses are coördinated while economies are strengthened; a community embracing a concert of Asian strengths as a counterforce to the designs of China; one in which Japan will play an increasing role, as befits its commanding position as a world economic power; and one in which U.S. leadership is exercised with restraint, with respect for our partners and with a sophisticated discretion that ensures a genuinely Asian idiom and Asian origin for whatever new Asian institutions are developed.

In a design for Asia's future, there is no room for heavy-handed American pressures; there is need for subtle encouragement of the kind of Asian initiatives that help bring the design to reality. The distinction may seem superficial, but in fact it is central both to the kind of Asia we want and to the effectiveness of the means of achieving it. The central pattern of the future in U.S.–Asian relations must be American support for Asian initiatives.

The industrial revolution has shown that mass abundance is possible, and as the United States moves into the post-industrial world—the age of computers and cybernetics—we have to find ways to engineer an escape from privation for those now living in mass poverty. There can be no security, whatever our nuclear stockpiles, in a world of boiling resentment and magnified envy. The oceans provide no sanctuary for the rich, no barrier behind which we can hide our abundance.

The struggle for influence in the Third World is a three-way

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

race among Moscow, Peking and the West. The West has offered both idealism and example, but the idealism has often been unconvincing and the example non-idiomatic. However, an industrialized Japan demonstrates the economically possible in Asian terms, while an advancing Asia tied into a Pacific community offers a bridge to the underdeveloped elsewhere. During this final third of the twentieth century, the great race will be between man and change: the race to control change, rather than be controlled by it. In this race we cannot afford to wait for others to act, and then merely react. And the race in Asia is already under way.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# MALNUTRITION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

*By Alan D. Berg*

New evidence suggesting a relationship between malnutrition and mental retardation should be cause for major policy concern in a number of world capitals. The recognition that malnourished children may emerge from childhood lacking the ability to reach their full genetic intellectual potential introduces a new and perhaps frightening note into theories of national development.

The implications are ominous. For many years we have assumed that, given educational opportunities and environmental advantages, each normally born infant has every prospect of growing up to be bright and productive. It is now suggested that malnourished children may be basically dull. The significance of this can be appreciated when we recognize that as many as two-thirds of the children of most developing countries are now suffering from some degree of malnutrition.

The relationship of malnutrition to mental growth dramatizes the issue. However, the insidious drain of malnutrition on national development takes other significant forms. Half the deaths in the developing countries occur among children under six years of age. In certain African countries, Libya for example, a mother must have five children to assure that one reaches the age of fifteen. In Northeast Brazil, 48 percent do not survive the first year of life; by the age of four, 63 percent have succumbed. In parts of Southeast Asia, 40 percent of the children die of disease in their first four years. This is a proportion of deaths not reached in the United States until the age of sixty.

The vast majority of these child deaths are attributed to infectious diseases. Yet most of these diseases are relatively minor childhood ailments. The cause of the death, we now know, is not the infection itself, but usually the malnourished condition of the child when he contracted it. In other words, malnutrition debilitates the body to such a degree that it is incapable of resisting what would otherwise be a passing infection. In a country like Ecuador, child death due to measles is more than 300 times greater (per thousand of population) than in North America. Whooping cough is still a major killer in much of the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similarly, such childhood diseases as chicken pox are often fatal because of the child's malnourished condition.

For a sizable portion of the survivors, malnutrition permanently retards physical growth. In many countries the average twelve-year old has the physical stature of an eight-year old in Europe and North America. Indian nutritionist Dr. C. Gopalan reports that 80 percent of preschool-aged children in the rural areas of his country suffer from malnutritional dwarfism. The effect of this on productivity and the limits it places on the individual's potential contribution to his society are obvious.

An increasing body of evidence now suggests a similar relationship between malnutrition in the early years and mental retardation. During the months of breast feeding, children from the poorest areas grow at a rate comparable to the best nourished children elsewhere. Usually after six months of age, however, when breast milk is no longer a sufficient source of protein, growth is progressively retarded.

The result is an important and irretrievable loss of learning time during the most critical years of intellectual development. Further, some prominent nutritionists now suggest the damage may be irreparable (as is acknowledged in the case of physical retardation), even in the unlikely prospect that today's malnourished child eventually has access to proper nutrients. Dr. Joaquin Cravioto of Mexico, a pioneer and leading researcher in the field, says "sufficient evidence is already available to show that chances of *permanent* damage are high."

II

What does this mean to national development? How much more productive is a properly nourished man? How much more will a man with full mental and physical capacities contribute to his society? Conversely, what are the costs to the society of malnutrition in the form of medical treatment, welfare-type relief and waste through death of those who have a limited number of productive years? What would be the cost/benefit ratio of a $10 million investment in food enrichment, for example, as compared to other forms of development expenditure, *e.g.* spending the $10 million for fertilizer or dams or roads or schools? What, in fact, is the relationship of malnutrition to development—or, more specifically, what are the economics of malnutrition?

Unfortunately, little research has been directed to these ques-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions. The scattering of peripheral studies, however, leads to certain inferences worth noting:

1. Limited life expectancy brought about by malnutrition limits the number of productive years. Recent calculations by Dr. Eugene Campbell show that the typical worker of Southeast Brazil will—because of improved health and resulting increased average life expectancy—produce nearly five times as much during his lifetime as the average person born in nutritionally deficient Northeast Brazil. Where malnutrition reduces life expectancy, the cost to society for education and other supporting expenses through the pre-productive years becomes proportionately more costly per year of productive output.

2. Malnutrition decreases a worker's productivity. The body, weak from lack of proper nutrients, protects itself by avoiding the expenditure of energy. This results in apathy, lethargy and lack of initiative—characteristics commonly found in poorly fed groups in protein-deficient countries. In the past, this apparent sluggishness was frequently attributed to laziness, indolence or other so-called "ethnic traits." The Food and Agriculture Organization now reports that those countries with the lowest per capita daily protein (and caloric) consumption are also those with lowest productivity. An interesting demonstration of the relationship was noted during the construction of the Pan American Highway. The disappointing output of local laborers was quickly remedied with the introduction of three well-balanced daily meals. Within a few months, workers averaged an increase in concrete paving from 1.8 to 5.9 cubic yards per day.

3. Malnutrition lowers a worker's resistance to disease and, relatedly, increases his rate of absenteeism from the job. Further, accident rates are higher among those who tire quickly due to malnutrition. A study of the old East African Carrier Corps reported that those laborers who supplemented their rations with herbs and green leaves showed a lower hospitalization rate—10 percent compared to 40 percent for those who did not.

4. The medical costs necessary to treat the effects of malnutrition—either through hospitals or health centers—are many times greater than the cost of providing the necessary nutrients to prevent the malnutrition initially. One estimate, in Guatemala, is that the cost of 90 days of hospitalization for each case arising from inadequate nutrition is $600, compared to an annual cost of $7 to $10 to prevent the malnutrition in the first place.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5. Certain nutritional deficiencies, such as acute vitamin-A deficiency which results in blindness, limit opportunities for productivity. In India alone there are at least one million preventable cases of blindness attributable to this cause alone. In East Pakistan, 50,000 children every year are threatened with a possible lifetime of blindness due to their precariously low vitamin-A intake. The blind have few opportunities to contribute to society and, in one form or another, they usually become a drain on that society. Yet for a few pennies a year, this blindness could easily be prevented.

The Philippine Government is attempting to pin a cost tag on its major diseases. To arrive at a figure, it combines production loss, manpower fatality loss, cost of medical care and burial expenses. Using this calculation, total economic loss per year for beri beri, for example, is estimated to be more than 44 million pesos ($11 million). This is only for those cases reported or recognized. Probably there are many others.

The late Dr. R. R. Williams, synthesizer of thiamine, reported: "Deficiency diseases are extremely insidious in that they are sapping the vitality of Asians to an unknown degree. My conviction is that there are scores of millions, perhaps hundreds of millions, in Asia who are suffering from mild beri beri, and have done so for years, and they still do not know they have it. . . . As a drain on the vitality of many people who suppose they are well, the deficiency diseases are a tremendous handicap to the struggling millions of Asia."[1] Interestingly, due to Dr. Williams' discovery, beri beri could be significantly controlled. Experimental enrichment of rice in seven municipalities in Bataan was responsible for a 76 percent to 94 percent decline of the disease. In one year, the beri beri fatality rate fell to a tenth of what it had been.

A cursory look at some of the other literature suggests: In Newfoundland, compulsory enrichment of flour is credited with a striking 40 percent decline in infant mortality. In Madagascar, a sugar refinery is reported to have reduced the turnover rate of migrant labor from 60 percent to 6 percent by the introduction of a balanced cooked meal. In Indo-China during World War II, study of a rubber plantation showed that there was a 50 percent increase in work output after the opening of a canteen which

[1] Federation of American Society for Experimental Biology, *Proceedings*, n. 20, 1961 (Supplement 7: 323).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provided a liberal diet. In Costa Rica, a public works project showed over three years an increase in work output—from 240 to 1,157 cubic meters of earth moved per man per day—primarily as a result of improved sanitation and provision of substantial meals to the laborers. Other studies in Uganda, Kenya, Brazil and the old Belgian Congo come to comparable conclusions.

Apparently, no one has computed the monetary loss to economic development caused by malnutrition, but one can be sure it is considerable. Mr. George Verghese, Information Adviser to India's Prime Minister, recently reported after a trip to drought-plagued Bihar that "It is quite common to be told that the people are lazy, indolent, stupid. Angry words, but true—and the result of malnutrition over several generations. . . . The economic cost to the nation of the consequent human inefficiency has never been calculated. It must run to hundreds of *crores* of rupees [hundreds of millions of dollars] each year. . . ."

III

Although malnutrition is brought about by a number of dietary deficiencies, the most serious and challenging to scientists at the moment is the inadequacy of protein—the critical nutrient for both physical and mental growth. Protein need cannot be divorced from general food intake—but once the minimum number of calories is available to sustain life, it is the quality of the food which becomes all-important.

Dr. Aaron Altschul, the protein chemist, has calculated that more than half of the 80-odd million tons of protein consumed in the world every year is in the form of grain—not because grain is so high in protein (on the order of 10 percent) but because wheat, rice, corn and other grains are consumed in such enormous quantities. If one could somehow enhance the protein quality of this grain, considerable progress could be made in the battle against protein malnutrition.

The value of protein in foods varies widely. It depends on a series of so-called "essential amino acids"—the value of the protein being only as great as the smallest of these. Envisioning this as a bar chart, with a number of tall bars and one short one, the value of the total protein is only as great as the shortest bar. The rest is wasted. In the case of most cereal grains, this limiting amino acid is lysine.

In one of the most significant scientific discoveries of this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generation, Dr. Edwin Mertz and his associates at Purdue University recently developed, through genetic selection, a strain of corn with a substantially increased lysine content. As a result, the protein value of corn can be nearly doubled—*i.e.* corn may provide a source of protein almost as good as milk. Presumably this genetic approach to protein improvement can be applied also to rice, wheat and other grains. Tests are now being conducted in several countries to see whether such application is possible. As significant as such steps may be, it must be recognized that even under the best of circumstances, the world is still a number of years away from growing a sufficient quantity of such high-protein seed to make the kind of impact required now.

Happily, a short cut may be possible—that is, by adding nutrients synthetically. The technology now exists to incorporate amino acids such as lysine during milling or by treating the whole grain. In processed foods, the system is even simpler. In the United States and Japan, a few commercial firms are already adding lysine to breakfast cereals, drinks, breads and soups.

A number of other possibilities also are under study. Many of them are based on the notion that inexpensive oil seeds—such as peanut, cottonseed, chickpea, soybean, sesame, sunflower and cocoanut—if processed and formulated into acceptable foods, can meet a protein requirement at considerably less cost than milk. (Milk is a luxury that most people in developing countries will not be able to afford for many years.)

After the oil is extracted from these seeds, little use is made of the residue for human feeding. Yet this material, properly processed, contains up to 50 percent good quality protein suitable for the human diet—particularly if combined with other foods. The cost of oilseed protein is well under one-fourth that of dry milk, and less than a tenth that of most other animal protein. The present supply of oilseed meal alone, properly processed, would be sufficient to meet more than twice the world's total protein deficit.

This oilseed principle has been employed by a number of companies in various countries to produce a variety of commercial, low-cost, protein products. The most successful of these is Vitasoy, a soy-based Hong Kong beverage sold in a typical soft-drink bottle and given a typical soft-drink promotion. Its sales keep pace with the major international soft drinks, and it outsells all others in the Hong Kong market. In South Africa, a line of foods, including soups, candies, beverages and cereals, under the label

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pronutro, has been commercially successful—multiplying its sales ten times in the past two years. And in Latin America, Incaparina—a cottonseed-based beverage patterned after the *atole,* a drink the Mayan Indians have taken for centuries—has begun after years of development (and evangelism by the Quaker Oats Company) to be accepted.

There is not a conspicuous number of such projects. There has been enough experience, however, to conclude that certain elements are essential to success: the product must be palatable; it must be inexpensive; it should be similar, if possible, to products already known; it should incorporate ingredients that are locally available (or potentially so); it must be nutritionally potent.

Although this approach offers exciting possibilities, its significance should not be viewed out of context. The claim of some food scientists that this is the answer to the protein problem is perhaps a bit optimistic—at least for the present. Although the commercialized, formulated protein food can be of significant value to the urban poor, it offers less hope to the malnourished multitudes living in non-monetized rural areas.

Another interesting use of oilseeds in some countries could be the "toning of milk." In India, for example, the butterfat content of buffalo milk is more than double that of cow's milk. By adding additional protein, one can dilute the butterfat content and stretch the available milk supply. Toning has been accomplished in the past with non-fat dry milk—now unfortunately in short supply throughout the world. However, Indian food scientists have devised the technology to use oilseed isolate in place of powdered milk—at considerable economy.

Recently much attention has also been given to fish protein concentrate, another good and inexpensive protein suitable for infants. The development of F.P.C. has followed a rocky road—especially in the United States. However, even here the earlier esthetic objection to consuming the whole fish apparently has now been overcome. The same is true of various technical obstacles, as is reflected in the recent approval of two F.P.C. processes by the U. S. Food and Drug Administration. Fish is the most underutilized conventional food source—accounting for only 1 percent of the world's total food consumption. Assuming that widespread cultural and religious taboos can be overcome, the use of fish in combatting malnutrition has great potential.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A number of other protein discoveries have been made of late—some at this point laboratory curiosities, others verging on science fiction. But their potential is too important to overlook. Receiving considerable attention is the prospect of producing edible protein by growing single-cell organisms on natural gas, petroleum, vegetable wastes or even coal. The Dutch Shell Group, for example, has found a bacterium which uses methane, a natural gas, as its sole source of energy for reproduction. These bacteria contain about 50 percent protein, and, according to U. S. nutritionist Dr. Nevin Scrimshaw: "There is little doubt that wholesome and nutritious single cell products utilizing energy from petroleum or natural gas can be developed and produced in almost unlimited quantities within a decade."[2] Some scientists are talking in terms of three to five years. Already, two million pounds of petroleum-based feed are being used to fatten cattle and poultry in a Russian research project. A similar "petroleum diet" experiment is being conducted with pigs in Nigeria.

The potential advantages are many: the relative abundance of petroleum, even in food-short countries; the independence from climatic uncertainties; the small space requirement; the need for only a few technicians; and the rapid growth rate. All these suggest the possibility of unlimited man-made protein production. Most of the world's large petroleum companies are deeply engrossed in protein projects. Some are actively collaborating with major food companies—such as the current Esso/Nestlé liaison. The president of Gulf Oil recently predicted that protein food will become a significant by-product of the oil industry.

Scientific imagination has gone further. "Milk" has been produced from water-soaked leaves. Seaweed and algae are other protein possibilities currently being examined. (A French company recently discovered an entire West African village successfully using algae as its basic protein source.) Much work remains, however, to improve palatability and to find ways of producing economically feasible products.

## IV

Required changes of food habits, indispensable to the success of many of the above approaches, present an imposing obstacle.

[2] "Increasing the Production and Human Use of Protein." Working Paper for U.N. Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, October 5, 1966, p. 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although there is an important correlation between dietary standards and per capita income, food habits also have deep psychological roots and are associated with love, affection, warmth, self-image and social prestige. As a result, there is perhaps no aspect of personal life less flexible than one's eating pattern. Behavioral studies of Tunisian immigrants to France demonstrated that changes in their food habits occurred long after they had accepted the language and newspapers of their adopted country. Change comes hard, even among the most sophisticated elements of society. How many doctors, for example, have altered their breakfast habits—their consumption of eggs, butter, cream, sugar (and the after-breakfast cigarette) in the face of health warnings circulated in recent years? Resistance to change is even stronger in traditional societies lacking the advantages of extensive communications.

To bypass what Dr. Margaret Mead refers to as "the irrational rigidity" of inadequate diets, one might conclude that, when possible, emphasis should be placed on food fortification and the development and multiplication of new varieties of high-protein seed. Neither the color, texture nor taste of the food need be affected. Similarly, no change would be required in existing buying, cooking or eating habits.

This does not eliminate the need for other approaches or for a strong educational effort. In Africa, for example, some believe that mangoes produce jaundice. In India, one of the few foods accepted throughout the country is *dal,* very high in protein, but rarely fed to the weaning infant because of unfounded fears that it will cause digestive problems and eventual death. In this instance, the necessary protein to keep the child healthy is literally in the mother's possession. Yet *dal* typically is fed only to adults of the family—even though the protein requirements of the infant are two and one-half times greater per kilo of body weight.

In a fascinating study of changes in Israeli food habits, Dr. Sarah Bavly concluded that the most important influence in the introduction of new foods—weighed against the influence of newspapers, radio, husbands, neighbors, etc.—is the exposure of the child to nutrition education in school. Second in rank is the provision of a school lunch, even without formal nutrition instruction.

The large programs of child feeding now under way in most developing countries are themselves helping to improve standards of nutrition—but many believe they could be accomplishing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more. Unfortunately, such programs frequently connote relief or charity. As a result, the food is usually provided as an end in itself, rather than to accomplish other important goals—*viz.* intentionally reorienting eating habits, incorporating nutrition education into the curriculum, encouraging the use of local commodities, and helping to establish the necessary agencies to continue a program after current sponsors no longer are involved.

In the critical role played by agriculture in economic development, primary attention is and should be given to greater farm yields. However, the need for more attention to the qualitative side of food production is becoming increasingly apparent. Provision of adequate supplies of grain staples is not enough, as has been demonstrated in Mexico, where the enormously successful campaign to increase overall food production has not resulted in significantly alleviating widespread malnutrition among children. An item on the current agenda of the U.N. Economic and Social Council implies that in agricultural planning, the nutritional needs of the population and particularly of the preschool child should be taken into account.

Finally, no discussion of increasing protein supply is appropriate without some mention of the work needed to prevent sizable protein loss to insects, rodents and mold. In India, this has been estimated at up to four million tons a year. Although there are many questions yet to be answered concerning the most effective techniques, sufficient information is already known—especially in the context of proper storage facilities and environmental control—for major steps to be taken immediately.

## V

Although most of the necessary resources to combat malnutrition may be readily at hand, the solution to this problem is by no means simple. Unlike the successful program to eradicate malaria, more than a can of spray is needed to conquer this more pernicious enemy. Malnutrition is a multifaceted problem requiring a coördinated approach. Other than in a superficial sense, this does not now exist.

One of the basic difficulties is the lack of consensus among the many disciplines working in the field, and often among many of the scientists within the same discipline. Malnutrition is an interdisciplinary problem, but each discipline—nutrition, food technology, health education, marketing—tends to be a bit over-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disciplined in prescribing its own solution. There is a kind of unrealistic parochialism that prevents a clear view of the aggregate problem.

Another impediment is the gap frequently existing between the scientific community and the food industry—or stated another way, between the laboratory and the child's stomach. In essence, the difficulty is one of mutual suspicion. Food industrialists frequently regard nutritionists and food technologists as academic, ivory-towered types who lack any understanding of the problems of marketing. The premium placed on a signed journal article is generally much greater than that given for the sometimes tedious follow-through required to put these findings to use. In turn, food executives are often perceived as onerous "profiteers," or at best as "tradesmen." The result, in many countries, is a serious lack of substantive collaboration.

Still another difficulty in many protein-poor countries lies in the policy and communications gap between government and the fledgling food industry. In some nations, policies relating to licensing, pricing and food standards often cause interminable delays and frustration. The result is a severe inhibition of growth. In these countries, the percentage of earnings going into pioneering work, product development and market testing is considerably smaller than it is in countries with fewer restrictions.

Thus, while promising nutrition activities are taking place in a number of countries, the accomplishments so far fall considerably short of the need. Technologically, malnutrition *can* be overcome. The arduous and expensive task of doing it has hardly begun.

The basic fact, perhaps, is that governments which have discussed the need in principle have not faced up to the magnitude of their role. Although governments recognize that an educated populace is important for development—and hence give substantial support to educational systems—there is not yet the same awareness that a well-nourished population has comparable importance. Perhaps this lack of governmental focus on the importance of nutrition for national growth reflects only an information gap between the laboratory and the political leader that will be overcome in time. Meanwhile, the consequences for national development are increasingly clear. Without improved nutrition in the less favored two-thirds of the world, the development of human resources—and the development of the nations themselves—is sure to be retarded.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# CHINA'S NEXT PHASE

*By Robert S. Elegant*

NO people is fonder of reading the future from the past than the Chinese, perhaps because no other people possesses a past which has for more than three millennia been as minutely recorded and as consistently glorious. The Chinese passion for their own history has bred a propensity for repeating both past triumphs and past mistakes. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese were in many ways in thrall to their own voluminous and detailed chronicles. When the intellectual sat down to the obligatory study of those chronicles, the profuse commentaries thereon and other quasi-sacred works of great antiquity, he was quite consciously performing an act of affirmation. He was at once affirming his personal commitment to the spiritual and political values of the great central tradition and renewing that two-thousand-year-old tradition. He was excluding any radical change in those values or the society based upon them, and he was severely restricting the possibilities of evolutionary change. Alterations did, of course, occur, some of them quite sweeping. But they occurred within the framework of the central tradition—or, at least, the Chinese could pretend that they occurred within that framework. When they considered the probable shape of the future they could therefore assume that it would, with some variations, repeat the past in perpetuity.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the politically engaged vanguard of China has deliberately sought to destroy both traditional society and the moral values on which it rested. Even before the establishment of the Communist Party in 1921, activists and idealists labored to prepare a site for a wholly different future by leveling the customs and the laws of the past. When, at the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the adolescent Red Guards raised the slogan, "Wipe out the old civilization!", they were bringing to its ultimate expression the overriding political and cultural preoccupation of twentieth-century China. The old civilization has now been shattered, and the Cultural Revolution has also blasted the new society developed since the communist "liberation" of 1949.

After devoting the first two-thirds of the twentieth century to sweeping destruction, the Chinese may no longer be captives of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their own past—although their direction is still, in part, determined by that past, just as a fugitive is impelled to put the greatest possible distance between himself and the jail. The moral and political values which were sustained through all the changes of the past and which limited those changes have been discredited. Attempting to read China's future from China's past—immediate or remote—is, therefore, a more hazardous undertaking than it was in the days of the Confucian Empires.

The People's Republic established by Mao Tse-tung eighteen years ago is disintegrating in much the same manner as previous short-lived and radically innovating dynasties like the Ch'in (221–207 B.C.) and the Sui (589–618 A.D.). None the less, changes in the fundamental matrix have rendered the events that followed the collapse of those dynasties only an uncertain guide to the events that will follow the Maoists' collapse. Enduring a few years longer than Adolph Hitler's thousand-year Reich, the "wholly new organization of human society and the wholly new kind of human being" offered by Mao Tse-tung as the model for all mankind could prove no more than the thorough catharsis of traditional Chinese civilization—an essential but hardly a glorious process. However, the phase of destruction appears to be drawing to an end. The Chinese people appear ready to give themselves once again to the great work of construction.

II

Their task is to create a completely new system of values and bring them to general acceptance. Other nations can, perhaps, live without a minutely formulated political and moral creed. The Chinese have never been able to do so in the past, and it is unlikely that they will be able to in the future. The historical phase which is most nearly analogous to the present radical transition was the change from the repressive Ch'in, with its strictly codified laws, to the significantly less intrusive Han dynasty, which endured from 206 B.C. to 221 A.D. The Han was based upon general acceptance of the five sacred relationships among men defined by Confucius four centuries before the dynasty appeared. The Han's succession to the Ch'in represented a fundamental alteration of social values and administrative institutions. All subsequent dynastic changes, including the transition from the Sui to the T'ang (618–805 A.D.), occurred within the broad political and moral framework established by the Han.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New men took power and adjusted the system. They did not contrive a wholly new system as the Han did—and as the successors to the Maoists must do. The great problem the new régime will face is the absence of any well-developed model such as the Han found in the Confucian doctrine and that all its successors followed until the Ch'ing dynasty fell in 1911.

A period of intense disorganization is certain to follow the People's Republic of China, even if a presumptive government still exists in Peking and still calls itself by that name. The necessity to shape a new order, regardless of what it calls itself, will force upon the country's new rulers a problem which no Chinese government before 1900 truly acknowledged and no subsequent government solved—the nature of China's relationship to the outside world. Even before the emergence of an effective government, the Chinese attitude toward the other nations of the world will demonstrate whether the world's largest nation is truly entering a new epoch or is merely repeating the distressing recent past once again.

The Chinese state was for two thousand years aloof and self-centered as no other great realm has been. It developed in substantial isolation from any realms which could claim to be its material or cultural equal, and it was, quite self-evidently, vastly superior in power and size to all its neighbors. The concept of the nation-state therefore never took root in Chinese minds. The Chinese were not only incapable of grasping that specific concept of the nation-state which was a product of the Renaissance and the Reformation in Europe, but were incapable of recognizing the existence of distinct—but equal—national or racial entities.

China was, until the late nineteenth century, a realm without diplomats. Only one relationship was possible between the Great Empire and other peoples—near or far—subordination to the Chinese. Believing themselves the center of a world which would, in time, be brought into harmonious order under their suzerainty, the Chinese could not conceive of entering into relations of equality with other self-avowed nations. The few visitors who were permitted to penetrate the forbidden vastness of China came as "tribute-bearing envoys"—neither as ambassadors nor as traders or tourists. China was *T'ien-hsia*—all under Heaven—and the *Ta-t'ung*—Great Unity—was the goal of humankind—a utopia spanning the entire world and with laws enforced by Chinese wisdom. When Mao Tse-tung promised to "liberate" all man-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kind and create "a wholly new era," he was reaffirming the fundamental Chinese view of the world which rose before Confucius and ended with K'ang Yu-wei, who tried in vain to reform the structure of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1898. Implicit in the Confucians' doctrines and evident in their actions was the use of armed force when force was necessary to move mankind toward the state of unitary blessedness. Mao Tse-tung's theses on "people's war" explicitly declared that force, deceit and subversion originating in China were essential to the "liberation" of mankind from the exploitation of the past. "Power grows out of the barrel of the gun," Mao asserted. "Force is the midwife of the new era," his followers echoed.

The crucial problem of China since it first came into sustained contact with the intrusive West in the eighteenth century has been its inability to adjust to existence as an equal member of the comity of nations. But amid the turmoil of the last days of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, there are signs that a profound change in the Chinese approach to the outside world is now in train. The Chinese pragmatists are being forced toward recognition that China is not so powerful—morally or materially—that she can impose her own order upon mankind. The same men are moving toward the corollary recognition that the outside world is composed not of evil midgets to be controlled by China, but of equal nations with which China must live on amicable terms. Although the vision of millennia will not dissipate for many decades, the auguries are favorable for the essential psychological adjustment without which China can neither build a viable nation, untormented by a messianic mission, nor cease to torment the world.

The chief attack leveled by the Maoists on the foreign-policy doctrines of their opponents, "the power-holders within the Communist Party who follow the capitalist road," is compressed in the Chinese phrase "three harmonies and one reduction." The bald official translation charges the anti-Maoists with championing "the idea of doing away with struggle in our relation with the [American] imperialists, [all] reactionaries, and the [Soviet] modern revisionists, and of cutting down our assistance and support to the revolutionary struggles of other peoples." By the Maoists' own admission, the group that advocates such a radical change is a strong majority of the officials of both the Communist Party and the People's Government. The Chinese masses, though

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bemused by the vision of the Great Unity, have never displayed any great desire to sacrifice either their lives or their comfort to attain it. The pragmatists have been forced to alter their approach to the outside world by the realization that China can afford neither the enormous costs nor the great risks inherent in Mao Tse-tung's policy of perpetual revolution. They recognize that they must choose between China and the world, and they choose China. They have learned that China cannot remake the world and that, in any event, the pursuit—or even the attainment—of that purpose does not necessarily serve China's own interests. Recognizing that much of China's present agony of deprivation and disorder is due to the sacrifices demanded by Mao's forward policy, the pragmatists are moving toward a non-ideological foreign policy. The conviction that China's activities should seek to advance China's self-interest, rather than to found a worldwide utopia under Chinese hegemony, is the beginning of a new wisdom based upon the realities of the modern world, rather than the internal compulsions of men like Mao Tse-tung.

If this much is accurate then some forecasting is possible, however risky. In the beginning, the new Chinese foreign policy is likely to march behind the militant slogans of its aggressive predecessor. But little force is likely to back those slogans. By the summer of 1967, there was solid evidence that Peking was already either too weak or too indifferent to intervene effectively in the "liberation struggles" it supported verbally in Hong Kong and Burma. As new men reshape the mechanism of power and recast foreign policy, the slogans will become less strident. They will in time subside to whispers.

Any Chinese government must provide for the country's defense by denying possession of North Viet Nam to a powerful and hostile power like the United States. But the tenor of support for North Viet Nam is likely to change. Hanoi's total commitment to "liberation" of South Viet Nam at all costs and Peking's belief that the victory of the "National Liberation Front" must be won by internal "people's war" rather than outright invasion had come into conflict even before the Cultural Revolution began. Under the pragmatists, Chinese support of Ho Chi Minh's war to take South Viet Nam will slowly diminish. A foreign policy based upon Chinese self-interest must make that adjustment during a transition period when all China's resources are urgently required for reconstruction. Besides, the most pressing problem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of foreign policy will be to reduce the vicious mutual antagonism which now makes the Chinese fear American invasion.

The Chinese will in the course of the next few years come into possession of a nuclear arsenal adequate for defense of their own borders and of adjacent areas of primary interest, like North Viet Nam. They will be able to take a more relaxed and more confident view of their position in the world than they now can. With the passing of the obsessed Maoists, Chinese foreign policy will, at once, be less aggressive and more wary. If—as is unlikely—the "power-holders" were to come to total power tomorrow morning, China would not rush back into Moscow's arms. The Chinese have learned too much of the world—and of themselves—since 1949 to subordinate themselves again to "Big Brother" Russia. Although the transition is likely to be protracted, the Chinese will probably seek more normal relations with the Russians, just as they will, in time, seek better relations with the United States. Still feeling themselves encircled by the two great powers, they will be determined to keep their guard up. But they will also wish to reduce the present acute tension.

That tension will, of course, diminish when China's foreign policy no longer proceeds from an absolute determination to assert China's absolute supremacy. Lingering Marxist commitment to the world revolution may prevent rapid thawing of Sino-American relations. But, in four or five years' time, Peking and Washington should be progressing toward the same kind of understanding which today prevails between Moscow and Washington. It may actually take longer to restore "fraternal" relations between Moscow and Peking than to arrive at an armed truce between Washington and Peking. Any Chinese government is likely to be wary of the Russians for some time because of its memories of the Russian "betrayal" of China—the "betrayal" having consisted of the Soviet refusal either to give Peking nuclear arms or to underwrite Chinese ambitions in the underdeveloped world. Besides, the 4,000 miles of Central Asian border between China and the Soviet Union will remain a potential source of trouble in view of China's resentment of Russian control of territory that was once Chinese.

III

Tremendously important in itself, the new direction of foreign policy will also indicate the general orientation of their rulers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward the Chinese people. If the new Chinese régime can shake off the millennia-old obsession with imposing a Chinese-directed utopia on the world, all things are possible to it. But pure pragmatism, which can provide guidance for an ad hoc foreign policy, is an inadequate foundation for a consistent internal policy. The fundamental assumptions and basic moral values from which China's new government proceeds are, therefore, at least as important as the exact composition of that government and the name by which it calls itself. The nature of those assumptions and values is also the single most difficult projection to make. The difficulty stems from the fact that the Chinese themselves will find it exceedingly difficult to create a satisfactory new doctrine —if, indeed, they can finally create such a doctrine at all.

The Chinese are an ideological people because they are not a formally religious people. Confucianism provided them not only with a minutely detailed moral code and an intricately organized political system shaped after a legendary Golden Age, but also with spiritual sustenance and a satisfactory relationship to the supernatural. Acknowledging the possible existence of "spirits," the Confucian Mandarins none the less felt that the self-conscious worship of such spirits was a fit occupation only for the lower orders. The philosopher-officials, who managed society by example as much as by authority, derived their own spiritual satisfaction from the unending progression of mankind through this world. Albeit naïvely, the masses also shared that satisfaction. The spiritual pragmatism of Confucianism stemmed from posterity worship rather than the ancestor worship which the West discerned in Chinese doctrines. The past, the present and the future were inextricably linked by the unbreakable continuity of custom and the obvious immortality of humanity.

Starting with Darwinism, modern science has depreciated that doctrine, for an ignoble beginning implies the likelihood of an ignoble end. Modern power has further depreciated the spiritual worth of Confucianism by destroying the political system which was at once its expression, its affirmation and its indispensable matrix. Deprived at once of their temporal grandeur and their spiritual certainty, the Chinese have in the twentieth century tested a wide range of substitutes. Communism was the most recent and the most sweeping of those substitutes, which ranged from parliamentary democracy to science and esthetics among different individuals at different times. The failure of Maoism

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

either to achieve its objectives or even to endure has now deprived the Chinese of their last ideology.

Lacking a generally accepted formal religion to provide both purpose and reassurance, the Chinese will find it difficult to make do with the materialistic pragmatism which is the secular creed of Western nations and the Soviet Union. The new generation of Chinese leaders is almost certain to be pragmatic in the sense that it will test policies by their accomplishments rather than by the towering goals they should ideally attain. None the less, the Chinese will always be driven back to the question: Pragmatism for what end? Even if they could transcend the common human need for submission to a power and a purpose greater than the individual and, ideally, greater than mankind itself, the Chinese could hardly devote themselves totally to the pursuit of material betterment. China's prospect of creating an affluent society within the foreseeable future is so remote as to be almost nonexistent. It would, therefore, hardly be pragmatic for the Chinese to dedicate themselves to making such a society. That is not to deny that gradual material betterment is one of the few clear-cut, concrete purposes on which all Chinese pragmatists can agree when they contemplate the deprivation of their compatriots. In any event, even dwellers in an affluent society need to believe in—or, at least, to believe that they believe in—some supernatural sanction.

The working doctrine, which will probably never be quite satisfactory, will probably include elements from all China's past ideologies, as well as Western and Marxist thought. Certain organizational principles developed by the Communists are likely to endure, in the long run making for greater efficiency. After the first total revulsion from the dogmatic Thought of Mao Tse-tung, the virtues of altruism, honesty and hard work so assiduously preached by the Maoists and the "power-holders" alike will probably be assigned the honored position they always just failed of attaining under Confucianism. But those virtues, like the organizational devices, will be purified of much of the compulsion and extremism that the Maoists attached to them.

## IV

The reaction to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will inevitably shape the China of the immediate future because of the intensity and the viciousness of the Maoists' attempt to destroy all existing institutions, traditional or communist. Words

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like anarchy, confusion, upheaval, even chaos, are too abstract to convey the reality of life in a country where almost all acceptance of authority—moral or temporal—has vanished. Even the reporting of pitched battles between supporters of the half-dozen-odd feuding groups can give no more than an impression of the situation; nor can the Maoists' own anguished appeals to their presumed followers to "restore revolutionary discipline" within their own ranks. An exceedingly minor incident in Shanghai, one of the few cities the Maoists claim to rule, may obliquely illuminate the state of China under the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

A sympathizer of the "power-holders" entered a local branch of the Public Security Office to apply for an exit visa which would permit him to visit Hong Kong. His aged father was ill in the British Crown Colony, he told the sympathetic policeman who interviewed him.

"I'm sorry, but there's nothing I can do for you," the policeman said. "That fellow over there is a 'revolutionary rebel,' the next one is with us, and so on. The whole office is split." "Well," the applicant finally asked, "who's in charge?" The policeman put on a sorrowful face. "I guess nobody's in charge here," he answered.

The episode reveals not only the breakdown of order, but the immense effort which will be necessary to recreate an effective structure of authority. The Maoists have fought a losing battle to impose their own utopian extremism on China; and they are now treading the dreary path to political annihilation. The anti-Maoists too have been battered. The formal structures of both the People's Government and the Communist Party have been gutted, and leaders like President Liu Shao-ch'i and Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing have been publicly humiliated. In the West, a leader like Liu Shao-ch'i who has borne the most vicious calumnies with dignity, restraint and the determination not to yield would probably emerge from his ordeal much revered and much respected. He might come to power on a wave of enthusiastic support from a public that had repudiated his predecessor. Normally such a reaction would be most unlikely in China, where the man's weakness, rather than his strength, would be most apparent. But the manner of the Maoists' attack has had the curious effect of increasing Liu's stature—a fact most simply attested by the growing support his faction enjoys among the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people. (The growth and increasing stubbornness of that popular support is derived neither from the accounts of refugees nor by inference from Peking's reports, but from the Maoists' direct admissions.) Many Chinese find in the attacks on Liu renewed reason to support him. Liu, after all, is the symbol of rational and courageous resistance to the extremist policies of Mao Tse-tung which have spread deprivation and disorder throughout China. The Maoists themselves have declared repeatedly that Liu opposes rigid economic policies at home and an aggressively messianic policy abroad. Since the people, concerned primarily with their own well-being, share those attitudes, Liu's personal prestige has risen. It is, however, still questionable whether he can overcome the great practical obstacles to recapturing power. Although the anti-Maoist forces have managed to maintain themselves in many areas, they possess neither a coherent organization at the provincial level nor any national structure of power. It would therefore be precipitous to predict that the so-called "power-holders" will inherit authority over a united China, particularly since the military remain the key to the future.

The People's Liberation Army has managed to avoid a civil war in which its various units supporting different political groups fight each other. It has also, by and large, managed to retain those units intact. None the less, the Liberation Army, too, has been riven by the Cultural Revolution; it is bewildered by external events and tried by internal strains. It remains, however, the closest thing to a functioning, nationwide institution in China. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect it to play a major role in the consolidation that will follow the Cultural Revolution, when the exhausted combatants realize that neither side can win because they have destroyed the very structure of power for whose possession they fought.

Six of the ten men who held the rank of Field Marshal until formal military ranks were abolished by Mao's chief lieutenant Lin Piao are now disaffected from the Maoists. They are not necessarily supporters of the anti-Maoists, a term which, in any event, describes a loose alliance of men whose opinions and allegiances cover a broad spectrum, rather than the coherent group the term implies. Possessing a wide-meshed—if tenuous—network of allies, clients and supporters throughout the military establishment which covers all China, those former Field Marshals could form the nucleus of a military junta. When the de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clining personal prestige of Mao Tse-tung has fallen even further, they may make a coup at the center. Having either displaced Mao or captured him, they could then attempt to rebuild the Chinese power structure.

Regardless of whether a military junta actually seizes the tattered shreds of central power, the immediate prospect for China is the erection of three separate façades of power with a complex reality half-revealed behind them. The configuration, which was taking definite shape in the high summer of 1967, will, barring unlikely outside intervention, show itself clearly no later than the end of the year.

The first façade will be the "Victory of the Great and Invincible Thought of Mao Tse-tung." There are no avowed anti-Maoists in China today, and all the contending groups fight in the name of Mao and his canonical Thought. Unless anarchy destroys all semblance of the institutions of power, a victory for the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung will be proclaimed and Mao himself will be hailed until his death as "the supreme leader, the helmsman, the great teacher." Since all his extreme policies have already been conceded by the Maoists themselves, Mao will be even more of a figurehead than he has been in the recent past. The rapid decline of his personal prestige, however, means that the first façade will be gossamer-thin. In certain areas, where Mao's name has already become an object of opprobrium, the authorities will spare themselves the bother of maintaining the pretense.

Behind the Great Victory of the Great Thought of Mao Tse-tung will stand another façade, hardly more substantial than the first. A government calling itself the Central Government of the People's Republic of China will exist in Peking. Its authority is, however, likely to be limited to certain sections of Peking, though it will perform the ceremonial functions of a government at home and abroad. Unless the Maoist mania destroys China's relations with almost all foreign nations—a prospect not wholly unlikely—the Peking government will maintain embassies abroad and will treat with foreign embassies in the capital. It will most closely resemble the government maintained by successive warlords in Peking from 1916 to 1928, when the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek took the city. Cut off from effective authority over the great mass of China, that government none the less maintained the dignity of a sovereign government—and, occasionally, extended its sway beyond Peking.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Regardless of whether a junta of generals makes a coup at the center, the third and final façade will be the most substantial. Since the People's Liberation Army is the only coherent institution remaining in a chaotic China, it will appear that the country is under effective, centralized military rule. But the Army will be unable to rule China effectively for a number of reasons. It is itself too badly split to act in a coördinated fashion throughout the country. It is also too heavily committed to regional loyalties and to allegiances with local "power-holders" to function as a wholly independent organism. Besides contending with the problems produced by the shattering of normal communications and lines of command, the Liberation Army will have to settle its own struggles between pro-Maoists and anti-Maoists before it can act as an effective, integral force.

The reality behind the three façades is likely to resemble that reality which existed behind the façade of central rule by the Ch'ing dynasty as it lay dying between 1890 and 1900. Groups of four or five provinces, perhaps corresponding to the six Regions into which the Communist Party divides China, will resemble the viceroyalties of the Ch'ing's last days. No more than the viceroys controlled their sub-realms wholly will the rulers of the new subdivisions exercise total power in every county and prefecture. They will, however, make their political decisions and manage their economies in substantial independence of the ineffective central government. Just as the great viceroys possessed their own semi-autonomous armed forces, treasuries and powers of life and death, the new satraps will possess almost complete discretion. Their relations with the armed units within their territories are likely to be complex and to assume divergent shapes in each of the satrapies, since the People's Liberation Army will still exist as a national organization. But those satraps who are not themselves generals will be dealing with generals who have been so long in specific localities that their dominant, immediate loyalties, too, are regional rather than national. The satraps on the borders, like the viceroys of the Ch'ing, will even manage their own relations with neighboring countries.

The process of growing together of those semi-discrete parts of China is likely to be slow. Perhaps the Army will become so strong and so unified that it can impose an apparent unity and a degree of centralization upon the vast country. The regionalized structure is, however, likely to endure for some time. One of Mao

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tse-tung's chief errors was his attempt to impose complete centralization and total conformity upon a nation and a race which feel themselves one but cherish their differences above their similarities in times of crisis like the present. China is almost too vast and too disparate to be ruled from a single center even by a government which possesses both popular support and the full paraphernalia of modern technology for communicating its decisions and processing the information on which those decisions are based. It certainly cannot be ruled in an intrusive and totalitarian fashion from a single center by a government which possesses few of those devices. A federal pattern of rule is therefore likely to emerge in time from the confusion of regionalization.

In the long run, the temper of the Chinese people will determine the shape of the Chinese nation. The greatest achievement of Mao Tse-tung is, ironically, the very factor that has completed his downfall. That achievement is summed up in the injunction: "Let the masses manage the great affairs of the state!" Brought into the political turmoil by the Maoists, who believed the popular will would support them, the masses turned against Maoist extremism. Since the masses decided the outcome of the struggle, the remaking of the nation must depend largely upon their wishes. They must be wooed with measures of which they approve, since they can no longer either be hypnotized by demagoguery or compelled by coercion.

V

The real future of China, therefore, comes back to the observations which opened this essay—the question of the forging of a new moral consensus which is accepted by most Chinese. The Cultural Revolution has, at once, splintered Chinese society and created a new unity of opinion arising spontaneously from the people, rather than imposed—or exhorted—from above as were all previous attitudes. The Red Guards, the adolescent symbol of the Cultural Revolution, began by supporting the Maoists without reservation. But, as they became aware of their own intellectual and physical powers, they tended to carve out new positions which the essentially authoritarian Maoist leadership found extremely antipathetic. The Red Guards finally escaped from the Maoists' control. Despite the mindless enthusiasm and the vicious vandalism which characterized their early activities, the Red Guards have not withdrawn from Chinese society but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have become totally involved. Despite what the Maoists call their "indiscipline," the Red Guards are not alienated, but *engagé*. Although most Chinese will emerge from the turmoil desiring only a quiet life, both industrial workers and young farmers have realized that they can affect the course of "great affairs"—and their own lives—by their own actions. They will not be content to be quiescent in the future, particularly if they object to the direction the nation is taking. The "masses" must be reckoned with as never previously.

The so-called intellectuals have always been a group apart in China, although, by the Chinese definition, they range from high school graduates to professors with three doctorates. One of Mao's greatest failures has been his inability either to arouse the enthusiasm of the intellectuals for his programs or, even, to bring them into unwilling coöperation. The intellectuals, too, have been united by their revulsion from Maoism. They have in many cases actually converted senior party officials by their example and their stubborn advocacy of reasoned policies. Although the intellectuals are not likely to form a new center of power, the new rulers must depend upon their managerial and technical skills if they are to create a nation out of the present debris of power. The intellectuals, too, are likely to be heard as they have not been heard for decades.

A host of outside factors could, of course, vitally influence the future course of China. The Nationalists, for example, might seek to reassert their authority, and might even succeed in a number of coastal provinces. The Russians may tinker with the northern tier of provinces, since Moscow abhors a political vacuum. American intervention of some sort is most unlikely, but not totally impossible. Given the state of critical equilibrium of the present mixture, insertion of such outside catalysts—even in minute quantities—could have profound effects.

Regardless, however, of the outside influences and the manœuvres of men seeking power, the new state of China will be shaped by the forces released by the Cultural Revolution and, above all, by the will of the Chinese people. It would be excessively optimistic to declare definitely that China is now coming to the adjustment with the outside world—and with her own complex character—which she has sought by so many different roads for the past century and a half. It would be excessively cynical not to recognize that she is moving in that direction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# GROWING INDEPENDENCE IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

*By John W. Holmes*

THE most significant fact about the Canadian-American relationship may prove to be that the United States is growing less dependent on its allies—including Canada. That Canada is growing more dependent on the United States is a more frequent assumption, especially of Canadians, who make a political sport of accusing each other of abetting this deplorable trend. The United States cares less and less what Canada does because it has a declining interest in our territory for its defenses in a missile age. This trend is unlikely to strengthen our bargaining power in Washington, but it leaves us freer to follow our own course. American independence of Canada encourages Canadian independence of the United States. It tempts us to "neutralism" —if "neutralism" means much in a world shifting from alignment to duopoly, when the "neutralist" heretic General de Gaulle could be outflanked by President Johnson on the road to Moscow.

The term "neutralism" will be flung as a red herring in the debate shaping up on Canadian defense and foreign policy. For Americans, this debate is closer to home but not dissimilar from the reappraisal of the "unequal alliance" made in other allied countries of which the United States grows independent. The language of the fifties fits the United States-Canada relationship little better than it fits that between the United States and its European associates. An unspoken assumption behind the principle of joint continental defense was, for example, that whether we like it or not, if the United States was at war, Canada was bound to be at war. Now, the United States is, de facto, at war, and Canada is not. If the United States were to declare war formally on North Viet Nam, embarrassing questions would arise over joint military measures. What language will fit this curious relationship in a period of transition and exploration is uncertain.

It is Canada's good fortune that its behavior normally escapes notice by its benevolent and otherwise preoccupied neighbors, but the mood could turn sour. The attitude toward Canada as a haven for draft-dodgers is not serious but it may be symptomatic. The number seeking refuge from the draft is exaggerated; more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Americans, however, are choosing to live in a country free of the draft and the commitment of Viet Nam, and these factors are reversing the brain drain. Will the fact that Canada in many respects is a more comfortable country than the United States disturb the charitable American view of its neighbor, whose whims could be tolerated as the understandable manifestations of envy? The Canadian standard of living is more than 20 percent below that of the United States, but standards of living are regional. The Canadian standard is exceedingly high and galloping. Figures are unreal even if reliable. And what is affluence? During the same week that we were perturbed over the disruptive performance of General de Gaulle, we were also staring in horror at the smoke rising over Detroit across the river and our troubles seemed minor. Canada is spared race riots not by our virtue but because there are less than fifty thousand negroes among twenty million Canadians, but we do not envy our neighbors across the Lakes. And while Washington calculates the terrible responsibilities of its unsought imperium, Canadian troops return from their most important overseas commitment, the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza, chagrined by the frustration of a mission but safe at home.

Canadians are not noticeably gloating over their relative good fortune. There is too much genuine sympathy with Americans in their terrible dilemmas—and too much concern with our own divisions. Still, the advantages of not being a great power are obvious. Centennial nationalism in Canada is more positive and competitive than anti-American, but resistance to American pressure is implied. The unabashed sentimentality of the celebrations may seem perverse to the citizens of a great power indoctrinated now to regard nationalism—at least other people's—as an archaic vice. Canadians, conscious of the austerity with which they have always buttoned up their patriotic emotions, were surprised and pleased when they wept openly amid the flags and fireworks of their hundredth birthday as a confederation. (One is reminded of an American cartoon showing a family of beavers busy with dam-building. Junior Beaver, watching a tribe of frisky otters at the other end of the pond, says, "Father, why, just because I'm a beaver, can't I sometimes goof off like the other kids?")

The Centennial was restrained in Quebec, but the Canadian idea is older and deeper than the particular 1867 rules for Confederation. It is not a question of a "French-Canadian problem"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be solved but of exploring new formulas that allow Quebec the cultural fulfillment it needs for its health while maintaining the transcontinental association on which the standard of living of both communities depends. Canada could be weakened in the process, or seem to be weakened, if we are judged by traditional ideas of a "nation-state," but as a collectivity of human beings the strengthening of the parts strengthens the whole. The essential Canadian political ideal is not strength in unity but freedom in diversity. It is a revolutionary idea in an age dedicated to larger and tighter communities, but it may better fit a world oppressed by government. It is an ideal which should appeal to General de Gaulle, and yet he jeopardized it by provoking intolerance in both Canadian communities.

That they are the luckiest and probably the freest people on earth is dawning this year on Canadians, accustomed to regarding themselves as poor relations and culturally secondhand. French-Canadians are less sure of their luck but they sense their freedom to change it. The new self-confidence owes much to our successful showcase on the world, Expo '67. Expo is *sui generis*. It was called by *L'Express* of Paris "a first living image of the civilization that is spreading from one end of the globe to the other." It has drawn on European as well as American sources and reflects the new cultural vitality of French Canada and the power of the Canadian economy. It is a phenomenon which proves to all Canadians that cultural cross-fertilization is a blessing rather than a burden. As a young French-Canadian said at Expo to the correspondent of *L'Express,* "We are French, yes, but here, you see, we are above all Americans. That is to say, convinced that there is nothing impossible."

In our paradoxical continental partnership there are always forces driving the United States and Canada together and apart. The forces differentiating us may be more conducive to harmony than those which draw us too close for comfortable management. The virtue of a continent split in two is that it is more easily manageable that way. The increasing differentiation which may come of a greater sense of independence can be good for both of us if we do not fret over it. Even if our functions in world politics draw apart, the cultural, spiritual and economic bonds are indissoluble. It need not be assumed, however, that these bonds are going to make political independence impossible because Canada is, as we are so often told, becoming rapidly Americanized.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Canada always has been part of a North American culture and a North American economy—a fact of life affirmed by leading French-Canadians in their response to General de Gaulle. It is doubtful if we are any more "American" now than we were 150 years ago. The trend can be to greater independence through richer Canadian resources.

In economics the Canadian mood has become bolder, less defensive. The argument still rages between the "nationalists" and the "continentalists," but it may be on the way to resolution with victory to neither. The case for an independent economy is long since lost, but the chance to exploit our share of a continental economy for Canadian national purposes looks brighter. The pressure on American-owned companies to be good corporate citizens is likely to grow, and certain fundamental institutions like banks will be guarded from take-over. (Nothing could be more fundamental for a Canadian than a bank.) If we cannot beat off American industry, we can join it and compete with it at its own game. (Canadian General Electric, for example, was the leading contender to build a nuclear reactor in Finland, with a product developed in Canada). Even the left-wing New Democratic Party, at its June meeting, gave indications of abandoning its traditional opposition to U.S. ownership in favor of exploiting the opportunities presented thereby.

Buoyed by rising exports, Canadians are no longer paralyzed by the view, which still mesmerizes the British, that a country is lost unless it can get itself into a large protected market. This attitude is based on the belief "that the Canadian market has now grown large enough that efficient specialized production facilities for a wide variety of manufactured goods can be located in Canada primarily on the basis of the market available in Canada."[1] In this state of mind we are less concerned with, and less impressed by, the Common Market, with or without Britain, than we were five years ago. It has even been suggested that Canadians may show the way to winning of self-government within the American economic empire just as they once used the British patrimony to establish independence within the British political empire of the last century. The American industrial and financial octopi are becoming more international, and the pressures for native control increase. The world, according to C. P.

[1] From a forthcoming book by H. Edward English in the Atlantic Economic Studies Programme of the Private Planning Association, Montreal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kindleberger, is moving "toward international corporations that elude or evade national control."[2] The analogy cannot be pressed far, but the point is that independence is achieved not by fighting the parent but by developing the heritage. Even with their larger resources, the Europeans, obsessed by visions of thoroughbred industry, may come to wonder whether defensive regionalism is more than a temporary palliative and a common market an anachronistic device.

II

The strategic relationship may prove harder to clarify. As Canada proceeds with a thorough reëxamination of its defense policy, this aspect of Canadian-American relations is likely to dominate discussion. At present the three Canadian services are being integrated into a single force. The move, unprecedented in Western countries, has been controversial but more for its timing than its aim. It has been accepted by the public which seems pleased with a reform that promises economy and is a Canadian experiment. It is certainly related to the central aim, set out in a White Paper several years ago, of emphasizing mobility, but the Government has strongly denied the charge of its critics that it is creating a force suitable only for U.N. peacekeeping. Canada already provides a battalion, stationed in Canada, to the Mobile Force for use on NATO's northern flank, and the Government foresees the possibility in due course, and in agreement with its allies as a good NATO member, of offering its entire contribution from home bases.

These internal changes do not in themselves determine our policy on peacekeeping, NATO or NORAD (the North American Defense Agreement), although they affect the nature of our contribution. What we do about all three of our commitments will be decided by political, strategic, economic and emotional reasons unrelated to the question of integration. There is a broad consensus on the desirability of the peacekeeping role. The withdrawal of UNEF has raised questions as to whether this is likely to be as significant an obligation in the future as in the recent past, and there is a stronger disposition to stipulate terms before we volunteer again; but that our forces should be capable of responding to a U.N. call in the right circumstances is not a major issue. It is participation in NATO and NORAD which is the subject

[2] "The Economics of Partnership," by C. P. Kindleberger. *Interplay*, June/July 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of controversy. Détente, resurgence in Western Europe, the singularity of the American military role and capacity, technological escalation, fascination with our own economic growth, all of these raise questions about the raisons d'être of our military establishment. The belief that it is an essential factor of middle-power status is shaken, and even respectable citizens are asking whether we would not do the world and ourselves more good by scrapping most of it and making economic development our major mission.

Viet Nam is, of course, at the heart of the matter. Rightly or wrongly, no NATO ally has offered military help in Viet Nam, though most of them are officially sympathetic, even if dubious about American involvement. They know their fate is bound up in that war and they do not want the United States to be beaten. There are, of course, sizable and articulate groups in all NATO countries, including Canada, which denounce American "intervention," but they represent not so much national attitudes as an international civil resistance movement led by the opposition within the United States itself. In Canada, opinion ranges from staunch support of the United States to virulent opposition, but no political leader has suggested we join in the fighting. For one thing, none of them wants at this time to rouse the old division between French and English Canadians over sending troops abroad in "imperial wars," even though the division of opinion in Canada on Viet Nam is not on linguistic lines. The fact that Canada has had since 1954 an obligation to be objective by virtue of its membership in the International Control Commissions is for the Government a valid argument and a convenient excuse. It would not stand in the way of military participation if there was a strong national conviction.

Why is it that Canadians, who went to war in 1914 and 1939 without the Americans, and who, English-speaking and French-speaking alike, willingly went to Korea in support of Americans in 1950, will not go to Viet Nam? One reason is that they know the American military capacity to be such that their contribution would not affect the outcome. That is a consequence for the whole Alliance of having a superpower in the Club who does not need our help. The only reason for us to go would be as a gesture of moral support or out of fear of American displeasure. Neither motive is clear enough—at least not yet. The difference in Korea was that, whatever the military realities, it was a U.N. operation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and we were asked to participate by the Security Council. We had in the United Nations our fair chance to share in the strategy. In Viet Nam the United States has acted unilaterally and pursued, in fact, a policy which veered away from that of the rest of us at the Geneva Conference of 1954. Hence the feeling that it is not our war, a feeling shared even by those sympathetic to the American quandary. It is a feeling perhaps similar to that of Americans toward the British predicament in 1941. The uniqueness of the American world position is such that a united Allied front in Viet Nam was probably never possible, but because the United States cannot share policy decisions it finds itself going it alone.

So the United States is isolated by its own super-power. To a dwindling extent the British, who share the American sense of global responsibility if not the power to do much about it, can collaborate in the Middle East and East Asia. Americans who for years encouraged the British to abandon their Commonwealth "illusions" and isolate themselves "sensibly" in Europe now complain of British abdication of their responsibilities east of Suez. The British, lectured by Washington on the folly of believing they have any "special relationship" with the United States, are tempted to buy their way into Europe by severing their defense association with the United States.

But what of Canada, tied to the United States not umbilically but like a Siamese twin? How could it sever its military ties with the giant of the continent? Most Canadians consider it unthinkable, but it is an age when the unthinkable is being doggedly thought about sex and religion and world politics, especially by young people—and half Canada's population is under twenty-five. The note has shifted from a canny "Why?" to a challenging "Why not?" As NATO completes its twenty years of compulsory membership in 1969 and NORAD comes up for renewal in 1968, many Canadians are asking for contemporary reasons why arrangements made for an earlier world situation still apply. The Government seems disposed to renewal in both cases but has ordered a thorough study and is encouraging debate.

These strategic questions are being faced when Canadians are in an impudent mood, feeling their oats but also feeling frustrated. They know they are not the factor in the world they were as one of the few consequential nations on their feet after the war. They had what has been called a "golden decade" of middle-power

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diplomacy in the fifties and are living on that reputation. At home the concept of Canada as the judicious and moderate fixer is under assault from a new generation impatient of what seems like moral neutrality. (Although they deplore the middle-power role, they often demand nevertheless that their Government be a bolder fixer than ever by stopping wars in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central Africa firmly, instantly and according to independent Canadian specification.) In 1945 being a middle power had meant a promotion. Now, with all this land and all this future, conscious of our position as the fifth trading power, young Canadians are impatient of lesser-power status. They do not always realize how hard it is to achieve even middling power in rough competition. We had greatness thrust upon us because in the diplomacy of the postwar period if Canada, the middle power, had not existed, it would have had to be invented. Now, that influence seems to be waning as our ambitions grow. The Arabs have sent us home from the Middle East, and doubts are raised about our qualifications for our favorite role as a U.N. peacekeeper.

The familiar props with which we played our middle-power role are no longer fixed. The Commonwealth, which gives us influence among the leading powers of the Third World and a useful instrument of diplomacy, is threatened by African crises and British weariness. The West Europeans are disposed to shut us out of their preserve, although Claude Julien of *Le Monde* has written a persuasive book, "Canada, Dernière Chance de l'Europe," in which he pleads with Europeans to associate themselves with the development of Canada as the last area with the resources to counterbalance the hegemony of the United States. In Eastern Europe, Canada is taken more seriously. The Rumanians seek inspiration from Canada's experience as an ally with independent notions. In an article of May 28 in *Scanteia,* for example, much attention is paid to the Canadian notion of a middle-power role. The interest of the Rumanians in Canada is that, like them, it is aligned and yet able to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy. It would be ironic if the Rumanians were to adopt middle-powermanship at a time when Canadians may be turning away from it. As for the Western Hemisphere, there has been a Canadian initiative toward closer association with the Commonwealth West Indies, but public enthusiasm for joining the O.A.S. seems to have diminished since the Dominican

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affair, partly because the Left, French-Canadian nationalists and others most interested in Latin America have come to regard the O.A.S. as a "tool" of United States foreign policy.

A new element of Canadian foreign policy in recent years has been the calculated move toward closer relations with France in order to reflect our national life in a more balanced international association. Given the present relations of Paris with Washington, this trend has had in it the possibility of alienation from the United States, and it has been particularly welcomed by those French and English Canadians who would like Canada to adopt a more Gaullist style toward the United States. The Canadian Government has seen it more as bridge-building. The hardening of opinion in English-speaking and to some extent French-speaking Canada against de Gaulle after his visitation to his St. Lawrence parish is going to make the pursuit of this policy more difficult—although there remains the need for Canada, if it is not to be divided, to have something more than just friendly relations with France, as distinct from its present President.

## III

The feeling that we have lost our touch and that the world is moving in its inexorable way regardless of what we do or say has caused a reaching for new modalities of foreign policy. The fact that frustration is the lot even of citizens of larger powers who want to shape the world rationally is not always recognized. Our inability to manipulate the situation in Viet Nam or Palestine is attributed by the critics to the acceptance of middle-power status by a pusillanimous government that clings to outmoded ideas of exerting influence by "quiet diplomacy." The debate on our foreign policy is too often a sterile argument over the extent to which it is dictated from Washington rather than whether it is wise. It is an obsession also of our British cousins, with whom we seem to have more and more in common as frustrated middle powers, unable and unwilling to detach ourselves from our superkinfolk, and less and less capable of budging them. There is a widespread assumption that it is our too close ties to Washington that have ruined our reputation and spoiled our act.

There is some truth in the charge. It has always been essential for Canada to renew faith in its integrity by differing with the United States from time to time, as we have over Cuba and China or the law of the sea. These differences, however, are not con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sidered fundamental or raucous enough for those critics who will not accept the restraints of an alliance relationship. The real question, of course, is whether the advantages of greater freedom of movement are worth the disadvantages of greater friction with the United States. The comfortable majority probably still does not want to risk the hostility of Congress, but there are many articulate voices arguing that the world has changed and we are too fearful. As one of them said, "Despite the U.S. perfection of an inconceivably destructive U.S. nuclear arsenal, middle powers like Canada enjoy an increasing range of independent international activity. Once we accept this new freedom we enjoy on the international scene, we can ask anew what Canada's aims should be and then see whether our foreign policy cannot be reformulated to achieve them."[8]

The danger of the new impatience in the country is that we shall lose our sense of proportion and the good reputation we have acquired. Whether we like it or not, we are a middle-sized power and we cannot get our way by throwing our weight about like a great power or having tantrums acceptable only from an outraged small power. On the other hand, the reaction against Canada as "fixer" may be a healthy enough response to an overconcentration in our doctrine on means rather than ends, on diplomacy rather than foreign policy, and a protest against the illusion that all conflicts are adjustable. Our middle-power theory is still valid, but it has been suffering from overstatement and too literal definition. It was never a hard theory but an approach, a recognition that as conflict had to be contained in a nuclear world lesser powers could be helpful in their own way in this process. Canada always insisted that the containment of conflict must be accompanied by somewhat ruthless efforts to tackle the causes of dispute, recognizing that the major role in knocking heads together rested with the great powers. The revelation in the Middle East of how futile the former could be without the latter has encouraged skepticism, along with misunderstanding, of the function of the "peacekeeper." To get back to a view, in proportion, of the useful but supplementary function of the peacekeeper would be better than rejecting it all in frustration. We are not likely to be asked back to the Middle East, but the requirement of impartiality is ad hoc and trouble is brewing in many places.

Canadian defense policy is always confusing because the dis-

[8] Stephen Clarkson in *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, July 12, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

position of our forces is determined—and quite properly so—by political and diplomatic considerations rather than simply for the protection of our territory. We have a defense policy not because it is required but because we feel we should do something. Our soil is threatened by those who might attack "the West" in general and the United States in particular. Hence we have long since committed ourselves to the principle of coöperative defense within NATO and the sharing with the United States of continental defense. We know the United States is not the enemy, but our defense arrangements are determined more with Washington in mind than Moscow or Peking.

As for NATO, Canadians are affected by the general assumption that its value has been eroded by disunity and détente, even though the Government insists that it should be preserved as an element of stability. The particular Canadian reason for welcoming in 1949 an alliance which fortified our national unity by uniting us with the powerful neighbor and both mother countries is threatened by the rift between France and "the Anglo-Saxons." We are not encouraged, either, by the persistence of the "twin-pillar" concept of the Alliance which postulates against all evidence a united Europe and a united North America. The alliance of fifteen independent voices, the kind of alliance we joined, suits us better. It grows harder also to justify the maintenance of Canadian troops in Germany. The argument that we thereby gain a voice in European policy is hard to prove, although it is the negative effect of withdrawal on our close military and political relations with the major powers which concerns officials. The reason for keeping our forces in Europe is largely that their withdrawal would be regarded as a prelude to American disengagement, but as all the larger allies are reducing their forces that argument is weakened. Reducing the Canadian establishment in Europe is difficult, as smaller numbers would hardly justify the logistic base. The Government, however, knows that if it is to maintain versatile troops—even for peacekeeping—it has to keep them somewhere and there is much to be said for their staying where they are well installed. There seems little doubt, nevertheless, that unless there is some dramatic alteration of the international scene Canadian forces will be out of Europe in a few years. We are not likely, however, to forego the advantages of participation with the greater powers in NATO unless the country is converted by those who think the only way to cut a figure

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the issues that really matter, North-South as distinct from East-West relations, is to rid ourselves of our entangling alliances.

The political argument for maintaining relations with the Old World to correct the imbalance of the New remains, but Canadians are less Europe-oriented than they used to be. Even the assertion of the French fact in Canada is directed to Francophonie at large and not merely France in Europe. Young Canadians are more interested in the Third World and its problems, race relations and the challenge of coexistence with China and Eastern Europe. The German problem bores them. There is discernible a new and quite unideological attitude to our Soviet neighbors, a land like ours and people with so much to learn from each other. In a recent Canadian study of our northern frontier a number of authors stress the concept of the Arctic as a Mediterranean Sea.[4] Even on the right-wing prairies our profitable trade with the Soviet Union and China has conditioned attitudes to communist states. Some Canadians, like some Europeans, see themselves as arbiters between the Russians and the Americans, even though Messrs. Johnson and Kosygin do not seem to need introduction. Middle countries with mediatory aspirations have a strong nostalgia for the days of John Foster Dulles, for it was his black-and-white diplomacy that created a role for the grays.

IV

Military detachment from Europe is one thing; detachment from the United States something quite different. Nevertheless, there is vigorous opposition in Canada to the renewal in 1968 of the NORAD agreement. Part of this is attributed to U.S. policy in Viet Nam. Those who want nothing to do with this crusade consider that through NORAD, and more particularly the Defense Production Sharing agreements from which the Canadian economy profits considerably, Canada is bound to the "American war machine," unable to obey its own will and its own conscience. Because of its requirements as a member of the I.C.C. to adhere to the provisions of the Geneva Agreements, Canada forbids direct export of war materials to Viet Nam, but we could prevent Canadian military matériel from reaching Viet Nam via the United States only by abandoning the Defense Production Sharing agreements entirely. The Government assumes that Canadian

[4] "The Arctic Frontier," edited by R. St. J. Macdonald for the Arctic Institute of North America and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. University of Toronto Press, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opposition to the Viet Nam war is neither certain nor general enough to support the severe setback to our industry which that would entail. Whatever one's convictions, the situation is uncomfortable. The Prime Minister stated it candidly in a recent interview:

> This is not the over-riding consideration in determining our own policy, of course, but we can't ignore the fact that a first result of any open breach with the United States over Vietnam, which their Government considered to be unfair and unfriendly on our part, would be more critical examination by Washington of certain special aspects of our relationships from which we, as well as they, get benefit. . . . It is not a very comforting thought, but, in the economic sphere, when you have 60 percent or so of your trade with one country, you are in a position of considerable economic dependence.[5]

The opposition to NORAD has other grounds. Although NORAD is only a framework embodying the principle of joint defense and adjustable to changing requirements, there is a persistent belief that its function is defense against the bomber threat of the late fifties which is now out of date. Military experts insist, however, that the threat of manned bombers always remains as an alternative to missiles. It is argued also by the opponents of NORAD that, whatever may be necessary for the superpowers, Canada should, in the interest of nonproliferation, contract out of any activities involving nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, however, our case is looked upon as so privileged by other countries that our example is not persuasive. In the negotiations at Geneva, furthermore, it now seems as if the two-key arrangements which the United States has with countries such as Canada are no longer regarded by the Russians as an obstacle to an agreement. There is an assumption also that a renewal of NORAD would oblige us to join with the United States in an extravagant anti-ballistic missile program. It seems likely, however, that the United States will not care much whether or not Canada does collaborate in an A.B.M. program. Experts are uncertain, but they tend to regard Canadian soil as of marginal value in any of the programs the United States is likely to embark upon. More serious is the problem for Canadian politicians of leaving our cities unprotected if American cities have their A.B.M. defenses up. A.B.M. would probably not be a joint project like NORAD, with costs shared according to means. Each country would be responsible for its own citizenry—a new factor of differentiation.

[5] *Maclean's Magazine*, Toronto, July 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Canadian journalist who assessed opinion in Washington on the renewal of NORAD concluded that the State Department would be unhappy if it were not renewed because political relations would deteriorate if we abandoned the principle of mutual defense. The Pentagon, on the other hand, might be relieved as it has found the obligation to consult and to consider Canada a nuisance; and it has not forgotten the reluctance of the Canadian Government to go on full alert at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The present Government may seem more coöperative than its predecessor, but even it is "nonbelligerent" in the present war.

Canadians' opposition to NORAD may be diminished if it is obvious that we would be renewing not under American pressure but because we still find it the cheapest and most logical way of protecting Canada. On the other hand, as suggested above, the more independent the United States can be of Canada, the more independent Canada can be of the United States. If the United States does not need our military collaboration and if it pursues its own policies in Viet Nam and elsewhere with only lip service to our will, then, some Canadians ask, why shouldn't we go our own way? What is the meaning of alliance with a country so powerful that it could not, even if it were so disposed, allow its defense and foreign policies to be determined in concert? Why would the Soviet Union or China waste their bombs on us? Must we in self-respect, as is always said, assist the country that protects us with its nuclear power? Are we not protected by the umbrella of Soviet-American nuclear deterrence, a fact of life in the world we live in rather than a "luxury" we enjoy at the expense of a kind friend? The defense of Canada is a by-product, not a gift. The United States is a great power which has to pay for the benefits which accrue to a great power. So long as we play our part as a responsible middle power in international causes and behave as a decent neighbor, what need is there for us to be tied militarily to the United States? The only distinction the United States makes between neutrals and allies is that it takes the latter for granted and pays off the former. Lesser powers, furthermore, are so completely outclassed in modern weaponry that we might as well give up the game altogether or just concentrate on what we can do best, U.N. peacekeeping. So runs the argument.

None of these questions is, of course, unanswerable. The point is that they are being asked, and they will not be answered with conventional warnings about what happened to Belgium in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

another age. Even the National President of the Conservative Party, Mr. Dalton Camp, has questioned the size of our commitment to NATO and suggested that we get out of NORAD as soon as possible. "I would hope," he said at a Party conference in August, "that ten years from now this nation would be without the encumbrance of any nuclear association; that our commitment to foreign aid would be maximum; and our obligations to military alliances and a military establishment would be minimal." Even those who abhor neutralism are forced to contemplate some kind of disengagement if the United States is to be whirled off in a new spiral of weapons-escalation. The basis on which the continental partnership has rested has become a subject for discussion. The two countries have been military allies during only about 25 out of 200 years of mostly peaceful coexistence, but a problem about alliances is that even if they have outlived their usefulness, the act of dissolving them seems hostile.

The significance of the new heresies is not so much that they are likely to determine Canadian defense policy but rather that they will affect it. The Canadian instinct has always favored gradual adjustment to circumstances rather than leaps in the dark. It has also had a canny awareness of the facts of life on this continent. We must never be—or even seem to be—a threat to the vital interests of the United States. We can be "independent" but we must not seem "unreliable." Whether we like it or not—and we do not—we are vulnerable to American displeasure. This displeasure is not likely to take the form of punitive action or crude reprisal; we would feel it rather in the drying up of the good will which restrains the United States from exploiting the economic and military power it has to do us damage. We have powerful economic weapons in our hands too—bountiful supplies of fresh water, for example—and we have had, and may have again, strategic advantages to exploit, but it is not in the interest of the weaker partner to provoke a raw matching of strength. The price we pay for the national independence we have is that we do not push it too far.

This is galling in the abstract, but in practice we are freer than most other countries of our size in the world. What we seem to lose from proximity to the great we gain in the sense of security necessary for a confident foreign policy. Some deference to American interests and even American prejudices is worth paying for the sovereignty which shelters us from the troubles and burdens

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of life as citizens of a great power. The enduring validity of the argument for the joint approach to continental problems, whether it be NORAD, the International Joint Commission or the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, is that we avoid being trampled by putting our relations with a superpower on a basis in which we claim formal equality. In spite of vigorous criticism of American pressures, Canadians know that we would not survive if the United States ceased behaving toward us like a civilized country. We need not feel obliged to a country for behaving as any civilized country should, but we recognize that such behavior is unusual in great powers, that we are fortunate and well advised not to rock the boat. These are the traditional Canadian responses which one could always count upon in the past to prevail—but Canadians are changing so rapidly that one is not sure.

And what is likely to be the reaction of the United States to a trend of its allies away from identification with the American *mission civilisatrice?* It has been patient over the failure to rally in Viet Nam. Is this because military help is not needed and Americans realize that it would impair their own freedom of action, that there is a connection between participation and decision-making? We cannot ignore, of course, the natural American response to the suggestion that we sit back and let the United States sustain its pax Americana: that the United States will go back to isolationism. There are many Europeans and Canadians —and Americans—who think that would be a good thing for the peace of the world, but most of us would be uneasy over such a prospect. Is it not, however, an empty threat? Just as empty, perhaps, as the threat of its allies to seek absolute neutrality. The old formulas of alliance, the rhetoric of free and equal partnership may not be applicable any more—if they ever were. We are all less likely to pay lip service to solidarity, but in practice it is doubtful if we can escape, or really want to escape, from the habits of consultation, the recognition of mutual interests, the restraint on our disputations which we work out in forms that defy neat definition but represent a basic need to hang together in a highly uncertain world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# THE POPULATION CRISIS: REASONS FOR HOPE

*By Frank W. Notestein*

A discussion of the crisis of population growth must be organized around two sharply contrasting themes: one, of almost unrivaled dangers; the other, of new hope that it may be resolved during the remainder of this century. It is difficult to overstate the importance of either theme. The dangers threaten the entire process of modernization among the two-thirds of the world's people in the technologically backward nations, and thereby the maintenance of their political coherence; they threaten, indeed, a catastrophic loss of life. The hope lies in the fact that there is now new reason to think that, if the world is willing to bend its energies toward solving the problems, it can go far toward doing so during the coming decades. The time has passed when the problem must be viewed as insuperable.

In what follows, I shall be concerned with the technologically backward nations. The question here is not what population they might ultimately be capable of supporting if they achieve a high state of development. At present they are desperately poor, grossly uneducated and badly organized to make use of what knowledge they have. They have to start from where they are, and not from where they should like to be. The problem in the real world is that the rate of population growth is proving to be a major obstacle to economic development. Mounting rates of population growth are proving to be almost insuperable obstacles to the technological development on which our future hopes must depend. The heart of the demographic problem is that of slowing the rate of population growth sufficiently to permit the development of the lagging economies and of doing this in the next two or three decades.

The case is now too well known to require detailed documentation. Most of the newly developing nations have populations that are growing by at least 2.5 percent per year. Moreover, those with slower rates of growth have negligible health protection and will quickly come to that rate whenever rudimentary health services are developed. The rates of growth go up to 3.5 percent and occasionally higher. Growth continuing at 2.5 percent doubles the size of the population in 28 years and growth at 3.5 percent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doubles it in 20 years. In short, unless growth slows down, most of the technologically backward countries face the problem of dealing with double their present population well before the end of the century: that is, well before the children born this year have completed their own childbearing.

The sources of this rapid growth are easily identified. Birth rates are very much higher and death rates are very much lower than they were, for example, in the nineteenth-century period of modernization in Europe. There, populations seldom grew by as much as 1 percent per year. Whereas in Europe there tended to be about 35 births a year per 1,000 population, in today's newly developing countries birth rates generally range from 40 to 55. The source of this difference lies mainly in the universality of marriage in the developing nations and in the young ages at which it occurs.

Death rates differ even more spectacularly. In nineteenth-century Europe, death rates of 25 per 1,000 population were common and a rate as high as 30 was not unusual. In today's newly developing countries a rate of 25 is very high, 20 is common and the rates go as low as 6 per 1,000 population. A primary cause of these low figures is, of course, the new efficiency with which disease is controlled by sulpha drugs, antibiotics and insecticides. The expectation of life at birth has risen remarkably in most of the newly developing countries. Indeed, in a few areas it now exceeds 60 years—not so very much less than the U.S. figure of 70 years.

The low death rates also come from another and less commonly recognized source. The death rate is simply the annual number of deaths per 1,000 population and therefore is affected by the age composition of the population. Under anything like reasonable health conditions a young population tends to have a low death rate and an old population a high death rate. One of the important reasons that the newly developing countries have low death rates is that their very high birth rates have generated very young populations. It is this that accounts for the fact that the lowest death rates in the world today are found in newly developing countries that have relatively good health services. Taiwan, for example, has a lower death rate than the United States, and Ceylon has a lower death rate than France or England. Moreover, although death rates in the newly developing world are low by historical standards, many remain very high in the light of modern abilities to control disease. Hence we can expect that death rates will continue to be reduced.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It would be unwise, then, to expect even a very rapid decline of birth rates to reduce population growth below 1 percent by the end of the century. This figure is about the rate of natural increase in the United States at the present time. Barring catastrophe, and under the best possible circumstances, the newly developing world will have to achieve its modernization in spite of rates of population growth running from the present figure of 2.5 to 3.5 percent down to 1.0 or 1.5 percent by the end of the century. Any such trend will clearly require a very rapid reduction of birth rates.

The cost of this growth must be met before new investment can be made in educational and productive facilities. The dilemma is now widely understood: if a nation is increasing its product by 5 percent a year—a level that rather few of the developing nations have thus far been able to sustain—and if its population is growing at 3 percent per year, then per capita income rises at a rate of 2 percent. This means that incomes will not have doubled until after the turn of the century. Per capita incomes would rise from, say, $100 per year to only $200 per year over the next 35 years. But, meanwhile, the population would have increased by a factor of 2.7. In short, an excellent economic performance would result in 2.7 times as many people continuing to live in almost abject poverty, with resources for the improvement of education and productive equipment having increased only minimally.

In the densely settled regions of the world the problem is much more difficult than these simple numbers suggest. Consider the situation of India. A perpetuation of its present rate of growth of 2.4 percent would mean that its present population of about half a billion would rise to one billion before the end of the century. India already faces acute shortages of food. Its agriculture is poorly developed. If it is to support such growth, it must make strenuous efforts to enhance the production of the land. A rapid but theoretically possible development of agricultural technology should enable India to meet at least its minimum needs. But to increase production in this fashion requires very little more labor. It requires instead the rationalization of agriculture through development of better crop practices, transportation, credit facilities, pest control and fertilization. It does not require more people. And yet if its present population growth continues, India faces the problem of finding—within about 29 years—the means to support another half-billion people outside of agriculture. In an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

era of rising expectations how long can political coherence be maintained in the presence of unemployment on a possibly unprecedented scale?

If political coherence cannot be maintained, the risks change—from those of growth to those of a catastrophic loss of life. The margins of safety are pathetically thin. It would not take much disorganization to block transportation and public health activities so that famine and epidemic disease would stalk the land. To anyone inclined to point out that this would at least be one solution to the problems of population pressure, the reply must be that massive upheavals also jeopardize every aspect of the development process and every hope of representative government in unregimented societies. The risks of events of this kind are real in such densely settled areas as India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Egypt. Mainland China, about which we know very little, may already be experiencing these catastrophes.

II

In view of the foregoing it may seem reckless to turn to the optimistic side of the picture, but there is such a side which I think is persuasive. Optimism does not carry us to the point of forecasting that the problems will be solved without intervening tragedies. But we do have reason to believe that the problems can be solved by a world fully alert to the dangers and willing to devote serious resources and energy to attacking them. We now have a basis for expecting that a rapid decline in birth rates can be achieved in the next decades. The problems and the crisis need not be prolonged indefinitely. Much will depend on the scale of efforts both in developing the economies and in reducing birth rates in the next 20 or 30 years. We cannot argue that the solution is in sight, but we can argue that the prerequisites for a solution are at hand.

In this hopeful judgment four elements are important: (1) the development of national policies favoring family planning; (2) the demonstrated public interest in limiting childbearing; (3) the improvement of contraceptive technology; and (4) the fact that for the first time in history several Oriental populations have begun to cut their birth rates as a result of governmental programs to spread the practice of birth control. I shall consider each of these topics briefly.

A decade ago, India was the only country that had adopted a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national policy to promote the practice of family planning, although for several years the plan had more words than substance. Today, more than half the people of the newly developing world live under governments that have decided to reduce their birth rates by family planning. These include Mainland China, Nepal, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Malaysia, Indonesia (if still a bit ambiguously), Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan (in deed, if not in word), South Korea, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Kenya, Barbados, Jamaica and Honduras. Many other countries, such as Colombia and Chile, are setting up active governmental and quasi-governmental programs. In still other countries substantial efforts are going on in universities, public hospitals and in local health departments. These include, for example, Thailand, the Philippines and Venezuela.

It must immediately be said that a governmental policy does not guarantee an effective program; there has often been a lag of several years between the adoption of a policy and the beginning of effective work. The point, however, is one of future relevance. The fact is that the newly developing nations have themselves been coming to an awareness of the seriousness of their population problems and of the extent to which their best work in economic development is being frustrated by too rapid increases in the numbers of their people. Their awakening to the urgency of the problem has come with remarkable and accelerating speed. It foreshadows energetic work.

The second reason for optimism concerning the possibilities of reducing rates of population growth is that the public has been shown to be interested in limiting family size. The finding is surprising, for students of traditional agrarian societies have long reported that motivation for restricting fertility generally is not high. Many of the attitudes, customs, beliefs and familial arrangements remain those of centuries past in which survival, not overrapid growth, posed the problem. These factors continue today to weaken interest in family planning.

Nevertheless, sample surveys conducted in some 20 developing countries show that, without exception, substantial majorities of married couples want to restrict their childbearing. Moreover, these attitudes are found in the villages as well as in the cities—among illiterates as well as among the educated. The women want to limit their childbearing, not necessarily to only two or three children, for they may often want four or five and at least one son.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But they want to curtail their childbearing, and this attitude is widespread even in communities in which there is little evidence of modernization.

Actually, these communities often have a great deal more modernization than first strikes the eye of the prosperous Western visitor. His overwhelming impression is that of poverty. But the villager has movies (either regularly or through traveling theaters), transistor radios and a desire to educate his children. He is aware that his children no longer die in infancy as they used to do, that sweeping epidemics no longer appear. He is also aware that more surviving children mean more difficulty in providing enough food, and he sees that today a medium-sized family will provide enough surviving adults to protect him in his old age. All these factors have increased the proportion of couples who say that they would like to practice contraception.

The demonstration of interest is based on much more than responses to surveys. In many societies a large number of crude and illegal abortions gives eloquent testimony to the motivations for restriction. Moreover, wherever there have been well-organized contraceptive services through which information and supplies are readily available, the response has been large. Where there is indifference, it usually has been to poorly organized services poorly supported by educational effort. Any lack of interest on the part of the public is less serious than the apathy of the middle classes and the lesser officials who cannot bring themselves to believe that their illiterate peasants are sufficiently intelligent to understand their own problems. Both surveys and the public response to services clearly demonstrate that ordinary people have a much better understanding of their own problems than their lesser officials appreciate.

The third encouraging fact is the improvement of contraceptive technology. During the past decade we have gained two methods which are safe, cheap and highly effective and that for the first time make no demands on the couple at the time of coition. One is the new plastic intrauterine device (I.U.D.) that, once inserted, remains indefinitely in place for those who tolerate it. Experience with it varies, depending on the quality of service and the the extent to which the patient is warned to expect some initial discomfort. The weight of evidence is that with reasonable care (including re-insertion in some patients who expel it) some 55 or 60 percent of women continue to be completely protected after

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two years. The other 40 to 45 percent include women whose husbands have died, those who have decided to have a child and those who prefer other methods; only 20 to 30 percent cannot tolerate or retain it. The rate of pregnancy among users, including women who have unknowingly expelled the device, is 2 to 3 a year per hundred women. This is less than half the rate with conventional contraceptives under the best conditions.

The oral steroids offer the other most promising method. Until recently, they were too expensive to meet the needs of the majority in the developing countries. Recently, however, prices for bulk orders have dropped to about 15 cents per cycle, which permits their use in governmental programs, at least for those patients who cannot use the I.U.D. When the pill is systematically taken it is absolutely effective. We do not yet know how effective it is in actual use or what proportion of women will continue to use it. Preliminary indications in Taiwan and Korea are that the rates of discontinuation are, if anything, somewhat higher than those with the I.U.D.

The new methods go far toward meeting the needs of couples so weakly motivated that they will not take troublesome precautions. The limitations loom large only when they are compared with an abstract ideal rather than with earlier experience. Moreover, knowledgeable scientists from several laboratories are saying that we may come much closer to the abstract ideal within the next four years. Several possibilities are now being studied in animals. One of the more promising is an injection, or implant, that will prevent pregnancy for a year or more. It is hoped to release a progestin in such very small amounts that its effect is achieved exclusively at the uterine level without involving either the ovary or pituitary. If this proves to be possible, the reduction of dose and the elimination of estrogen should greatly reduce the undesirable side effects of the present combined pill and bring the cost to well under 50 cents a year. One cannot count on the success of anything in the early research stage, but there are now so many good leads that the prospects for major improvements in contraceptive technology in the near future are excellent.

The fourth reason for optimism about the possibility of reducing birth rates is that some countries have already done so. This is the case in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and perhaps in other countries where the evidence is more difficult to marshal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

South Korea offers no accurate birth rates, but consider the indirect evidence that they are falling.[1] Last year over 390,000 women had I.U.D.s inserted, bringing the total in the two-and-a-half-year program through 1966 to 737,000. Since 1962 there have been at least 80,000 male sterilizations. At the end of 1966 about 170,000 couples were receiving conventional contraceptive supplies from government stations. Altogether, with allowance for duplications, something like 900,000 couples have been served by the government effort. Since the program began (mostly since 1963), more than 20 percent of the women of childbearing age have taken part, and surveys indicate that about 20 percent of all couples are currently practicing contraception. Moreover, growing acceptance continues in 1967 with no indication that a saturation point has been reached.

According to year-end population registrations, of admittedly defective quality, the ratio of children under age five to women of childbearing age shows a sharp decline between 1962 and 1965, both nationally and in every province of the country. The Planning Board believes that the rate of natural increase has dropped from an estimated 3 percent in 1962 to about 2.5 percent in 1966; it has set a target of 2 percent by 1971. Clearly the birth rate has begun to fall rapidly in response to a strong governmental program.

In Taiwan the birth rate has been dropping for the last ten years, from 45 per 1000 in 1955 to 34.5 in 1964, 32.7 in 1965 and to a record low of 32.4 in 1966. (The actual and comparable figure would have been below 31 if a census in December 1966 had not brought in early birth registrations and omissions from the previous years.) The goal is to reach a birth rate of 20 by 1973. The program has depended heavily on the I.U.D. The target has been 600,000 Lippes loops inserted in five years, and at the halfway point the actual number falls only 39,000 short of 300,000. The fertility rates of women 25 to 29 are beginning to drop and the proportion of I.U.D. acceptors with only three children is rising. The fact that 37 percent of the I.U.D. patients have discontinued after 18 months has led to efforts to improve the service and to make pills available. It appears, however, that even those who discontinue the I.U.D. control their fertility rather effectively.

[1] The following discussion draws heavily on: Mauldin *et al.*, "Retention of IUDs: An International Comparison," and Chow and Freedman, "Taiwan: Births averted by the IUD program," from The Population Council's *Studies in Family Planning*, issues No. 18, April 1967, and No. 20, June 1967, respectively.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chow and Freedman find that if they include all the experience of those who have had I.U.D.s inserted, regardless of subsequent use, the fertility rate of the group has been reduced by something between one-half and two-thirds. There can be no doubt that the family-planning program has been highly successful in speeding the reduction of Taiwan's birth rate. Similarly, in Hong Kong and Singapore, family-planning programs have been major factors in producing sharp declines in birth rates.

The glow of optimism that can come from considering these successful programs fades when we consider India and Pakistan. Those nations have had appropriate policies, but they cannot yet point to reduced birth rates with any certainty. It has been only in the last two or three years that the programs have had much substance. Now they are getting under way, and by the end of this year India will apparently have inserted more than two million I.U.D.s and Pakistan nearly one million. In both countries sterilization is beginning to take a significant place, and work with pills is beginning. If the programs continue to go forward at the new pace the efforts can become highly significant in a few years.

Equally encouraging is the breadth of interest around the world. The Population Council alone has filled requests for some 2.6 million Lippes loops from the governments or medical institutions of 39 developing countries, and has helped governments in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey to establish local manufacturing. It has sponsored a coöperative birth-control program in the postpartum services of 26 large delivery hospitals of 20 cities in 15 countries, including the United States. Although this program is only about a year and a half old, some 25 percent of the obstetrical patients have used the contraceptive service, and they have been markedly younger and have had fewer children than the patients attending the usual service. They have flocked to the clinics whether in Alexandria, Ankara, Santiago, Caracas, Mexico City, New York, Manila, Singapore or Bangkok. From this and many other projects it becomes evident that the difficulties do not lie in lack of interest by the public. The main obstacles to the development of highly successful birth-control programs everywhere lie in the organizational and administrative field.

Newly developed nations offer examples of rapidly falling birth rates. Japan's birth rate, for example, had dropped by last year from a postwar high of 34 per thousand to 14; Japan now shares

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Hungary the lowest birth rate in the world.[2] The decline was not the result of a governmental birth-control program; it was mainly due to abortion rather than contraception, and came almost in spite of the government. The public took such enthusiastic advantage of abortion permitted by the "Eugenic Protection Law" that it was politically impossible to interpret the law narrowly. At present there is a marked trend away from abortion and toward contraception, but Japan has shown that population growth can be drastically reduced by a prosperous people having few inhibitions against abortion and served by a competent medical establishment. The Japanese medical community's enthusiasm for abortion has seeped into Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, though it remains illegal.

Abortion is legal in the U.S.S.R. and all of Eastern Europe except East Germany and Albania. As in Japan, it has been a major factor in reducing birth rates which were high before the war but now are for the most part lower than in the United States. Abortion is apparently legal under many circumstances in Mainland China, and there is a good deal of talk about making it legal in India and in Pakistan. In view of the dearth of medical personnel and facilities and the improved efficiency of modern contraceptives, it is doubtful that abortion will play the major role in reducing population growth in India and the Moslem world that it did in Japan, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Abortion is, nevertheless, important today. In Turkey, where until two years ago contraception was illegal, the Ministry of Health estimates that more than one in four pregnancies is terminated by illegal abortion. In Latin America, where church opposition has held back the development of governmental contraceptive services, abortion is rife. No one knows the number even approximately, but the obstetrical services of many hospitals devote from one-quarter to one-half of their beds to patients with incomplete or septic abortions. Professor Freedman suggests that in the world as a whole abortion is today the most common female method of preventing birth. Where abortion is common it is difficult to suggest the absence of motivation for family planning.

[2] The rate dropped from 19 to 14 last year, reflecting the fact that girls born in the year of the "fiery horse" have the worst horoscopes as brides of any for the last 60 years. The rate will probably rise this year, but the sharp response to astrological portents shows that fertility is under voluntary control.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

This, then, is the optimistic case for saying that the newly developing countries can, if they will, bring their rates of population growth to reasonably low levels in the next two or three decades provided that they have the needed assistance from international, governmental and private agencies in the developed world. In absolute terms the assistance needed from the developed world is large, but it is small compared to that needed for economic development. Aid should include help with training at the professional and sub-professional levels in a wide range of biological, medical and social science specialties; assistance in building and enriching the medical infrastructure on which contraceptive services depend; assistance with organization, logistics, supplies and materials for informational and educational programs. Basic and applied research that seeks to attain new efficiency in the regulation of fertility needs to be increased throughout the world.

There are two kinds of major disagreement with the foregoing summary. One questions the objective of reducing the rates of population growth; the other accepts the goal but doubts that the appropriate means are being used for its attainment.

In both Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America there is substantial opposition to family planning in official quarters. In most cases it is merely the continuation of the usual pre-modern view. When disease was uncontrolled, healthy and prosperous years produced rapid population growth. Bigger was, indeed, better. Things are still thought of in that light by many leaders who are impressed that they have large territories of undeveloped land. They are inclined to think in terms of traditional agriculture, and have little realization that a slower rate of population growth could mean a faster pace of educational and economic development, greater national prosperity and greater national power. This kind of opposition has been rapidly disappearing as governments gain new experience with the frustrations of development in the face of very rapid population growth.

There is also opposition from the more doctrinaire Catholics and communists, whose preoccupation with the defense of orthodoxy makes them slow to recognize the problem, and when recognizing it, inclined to prefer private and euphemistic to public and explicit solutions. When these groups are very strong, the govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments tend to avoid policies and official programs, and the actual work goes on in the medical institutions and local health departments. Even then the assistance given is known not as contraception but as child-spacing, family health, pre-pregnancy health and anti-abortion service. Such opposition will undoubtedly delay somewhat the reduction of the rate of population growth, but everything on the horizon suggests it is rapidly disappearing.

Finally, there are dissident views among persons fully alert to the need for reducing birth rates. Objections have been voiced that too much of the effort is concentrated specifically on family planning, and that this overemphasis is particularly evident in the technical assistance from the developed world. This conclusion is based on a different reading of the record than that presented here. Overstated somewhat, this argument runs as follows: A number of countries such as India, Pakistan and Egypt have had national family-planning policies for a long time with inconsequential results; claims about public interest in family planning drawn from field surveys are worth little because they are too superficial to eliminate the favorable responses given mainly to please the perceived interests of the investigator; the majority of patients attracted to governmental programs are older women who will not have many more children in any event; the new contraceptive methods are proving unsuitable for a substantial proportion of people; and the only programmatic successes are in small Oriental nations.

The replies have been suggested. Nations with positive policies did not develop significant programs until the advent of the I.U.D. convinced their leaders that appropriate methods existed. Actual work is scarcely three years old. Responses to surveys are not to be taken at full face value, but the differences by education and income are in the expected direction, as are the changes of responses over time as programs develop. The real danger is that we do not take the surveys seriously enough, because, whenever put to the test, the public has backed its opinion with requests for service. Naturally older women with many children are the first to come for help. To them the problem is desperate. But one must start somewhere, and it can be argued that bringing the older and respected couples to the practice of family planning may well serve to legitimize the practice and to encourage imitation by younger couples for purposes of child spacing. Methods of contraception are less than perfect, but the important fact is that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we now have methods with which more than 50 percent of women are happy and successful. For the 30 percent with real difficulties, there are the conventional methods, not to mention the new methods on the horizon. Finally, it is true that the beginnings of success have come only in small Oriental countries. The question, however, is not whether birth rates have been reduced in all the world, but whether they can be reduced by family-planning programs. The successful countries have shown what can be done. To me it seems that the skeptics are concentrating on the problems that remain to be solved rather than reading the lessons for the future in the recent and quite remarkable past.

Perhaps the basic reason for skepticism about the future significance of recent efforts lies in the conviction that institutional structures are too hostile to the very idea of family planning to permit any substantial success. One objection is that efforts to spread the practice of birth control ought to be reduced so that the resources could be devoted to economic development. Might not the construction of a school or a factory do more to spread birth control than the same funds devoted to family-planning services? The alternative is not a real one because of differences in the magnitude of the requirements. Efforts to promote economic development are grossly insufficient to avoid the danger of major catastrophe, and the modernized world, if it values its own interests, will awaken to that fact. The most powerful effort imaginable to spread birth control could not cost anything like 1 percent as much as the cost of economic development. Indeed, the cost of preventing one birth, probably about $20, falls far short of the cost of one year's schooling. Much more costly efforts to reduce birth rates than any that have been attempted can be shown to be worthwhile in speeding the process of development by cutting the burden of population growth.

Another suggestion is to go directly to the problem of institutional change. Some of the resources now devoted to birth control should, the argument runs, be devoted instead to changing the institutional setting in ways that would favor family planning. We should study the possibilities of changing marriage age, of finding ways in which the state can reward the parents of small families, and, perhaps, of penalizing the parents of large families (a policy now being debated in India). Undoubtedly, some support for such studies should be available, but before their results can have any influence on reproduction they will have to be car-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ried through the entire political process. It is my impression that obtaining living examples of family planning will be much more important, even in changing social institutions, than efforts to change the governmental rules. Changes in the institutional setting are needed, but at this stage it seems more important to help those people who are willing to become the innovators.

Whatever happens, it is probable that, short of a major rise in the death rate, population growth will not be stopped for some decades. Given the necessary effort, however, it does seem likely that growth will be reduced to levels that can be coped with in a world of rapidly developing science and technology. In the long run, of course, growth must stop. Quite possibly it will not do so even if every couple is able to limit its childbearing to the precise number of children it wants. But a world in which all couples are able to choose the size of their family will be a world in which an alteration of institutional constraints would prove rather quickly effective. If the developing nations can move from their present growth rates of 2.5 and 3.5 percent to 1 and 1.5 percent while health improves, the problems will not all be solved, but the crisis will be passed.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that we will move into the future with a linear extension of past performance. No one ten years ago would have forecast the rapid changes of the past decade in policies, in contraceptive technology, in public interest and in programmatic successes. We must assume that the future will bring an accelerated pace of change. We have already moved from a position of public apathy to one of deep concern by many people. Today, governments, international agencies and private organizations are talking a great deal about major efforts and new groups are entering the discourse every day. Everything on the horizon suggests a further deepening of interest, both public and private. Our estimate of the future possibilities should be based on the premise that we are at the beginning of an accelerating trend. Almost all of the actual work, national and international, remains to be done. If our efforts are commensurate with our opportunities, however, we have reason to believe that by the end of the century the spectre of poverty perpetuated by population growth can be lifted from the earth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# GOLD AND THE DOLLAR

*By William F. Butler and John V. Deaver*

THE persistent deficit in the United States' balance of international payments and the continuing loss of gold have led to increasing discussion of national policies relating to gold and the dollar. While the issues involved are quite technical and complex, they are important to the future of the nation and the world. Broader understanding of the forces impinging on the nation's balance of payments is essential if the United States is to react properly to the changes in its role in the world economy.

The authors start from the firm belief that the present gold-exchange standard is the most efficient, equitable and powerful international monetary system in the world's history. It has performed remarkably well under conditions of unprecedented world growth, and has contributed significantly to that growth. The objective must be to preserve the present system, while working to improve it by gradually supplementing it with some new source of international liquidity. The key to this proposition is that the official dollar price of gold must remain unchanged regardless of the pressures that might be put on the United States to revalue gold. To achieve this, it is essential to recognize that our responsibility for fiscal and monetary stability extends beyond our borders. Not only are non-inflationary policies desirable for domestic reasons; they are necessary to maintain the purchasing power of the large liquid dollar assets held by foreigners. Foreign dollar holders must feel confident that dollars constitute the best available store of internationally acceptable purchasing power. It should continue to be a major objective of U.S. policy to achieve a viable balance in international payments, but this objective should be pursued through responsible monetary and fiscal policies rather than through new controls over international capital movements, foreign exchange transactions or tourism.

These propositions deviate little from the conventional wisdom. Yet because of the changing position of the United States in the world economy, they have far-reaching implications. There is a reluctance to recognize that the situation has changed radically from only a few years ago, when we had a much larger gold stock and when the leverage that other countries could exercise over us

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was minimal. Our balance of payments is not independent of actions and policies of other countries. Their coöperation is needed if the present international monetary system is to be preserved and improved, and if we are to reduce or eliminate our balance-of-payments deficit. Other nations can adjust their monetary, fiscal and other policies to offset American efforts to reduce our external deficit. The leverage exercised by foreign central banks through their gold-buying policies could, if carried far enough, force us to take steps detrimental to all nations concerned. It is thus imperative that the United States have a strategy to avert such a contingency, and to minimize the damage to this country and to the world if the contingency should materialize.

II

The evolution of the U.S. balance of payments has passed through three distinct phases. The sharpness of the recent debate on our strategy with respect to gold arises largely because we are in a transition to a fourth phase. This new phase requires a much higher degree of international coöperation than did either of the previous ones, which were based to an unusual extent on the policies and behavior of the United States. Other free nations were nearly powerless to influence U.S. policy, which, in any case, was considered by most to be highly beneficial to all.

The first four years after the war was a period of massive shipments of American goods and services to the rest of the world, particularly Western Europe, for reconstruction and development. Even against all of Europe combined, we were the dominant economic power, our economy having expanded rapidly during the war and quickly converted to peacetime needs. In this period, exports exceeded imports by an average of $8 billion a year. Although some $3.5 billion of this annually was in the form of grants to Europe and elsewhere, and about $2.5 billion a year was financed by long-term credit, the United States had a substantial balance-of-payments surplus. In these years over $5 billion of gold was sold by foreign governments to obtain dollars to finance purchases in the United States, with the result that its gold stock rose to a peak of $24.6 billion. The first postwar phase was one of U.S. balance-of-payments surpluses and gold-stock increases.

During the second phase, 1950 through 1957, the United States continued to be the dominant supplier in an era of rapidly grow-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing world trade. American private investments overseas were swiftly expanding. Moreover, a substantial proportion of exports continued to be financed by U.S. aid programs. Thus, foreign nations actually accumulated dollar balances averaging about $1.7 billion a year, on top of their receiving a net flow of real resources from the United States. These dollar balances were held in official international reserves. The private demand for dollars to finance imports from this country and elsewhere was kept in check by exchange controls and various trade restrictions. Indeed, during this period most of the more advanced nations were trying to build up reserves, and many tended to prefer dollars to gold because they were considered more convenient, earned interest and were virtually riskless in terms of the possibility of depreciation relative to gold. Thus, the second phase was one of U.S. deficits, financed almost entirely by a build-up of foreign short-term dollar balances. This was the period of the "dollar gap," since foreign demand for dollars to use and to hold exceeded the available supply, and the dollar was almost universally considered as good as gold as an international reserve asset.

The third phase, beginning with the worldwide recession in 1958 and extending to about the present time, was one of greatly increased American deficits and substantial outflows of U.S. gold. The $4.2 billion deficit in 1958, due in large part to a sharp decrease in U.S. exports, was financed almost two-thirds in gold. In subsequent years, U.S. trade surpluses varied in size, but capital exports continued to grow as did overseas government spending for aid and defense. Symptomatic of this period was the sharply reduced inclination of a number of important foreign central banks to increase their dollar holdings when their balance of payments was in strong surplus. Thus, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain—all surplus countries during most of this period—built up their gold reserves more than their dollar reserves.

The third phase was characterized by a very rapid reduction in U.S. gold stocks from $23.3 billion in 1957 to about $13 billion today. Meanwhile, total short-term dollar liabilities rose to $27 billion, of which about $12 billion is held by foreign central banks, and is technically subject to conversion to gold at the U.S. Treasury. Although the likelihood of any massive conversion is practically nil, the potential damage to our present system from undue withdrawals has been cause for concern. It has made the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dollar appear quite vulnerable in the view of those who continue to think in terms of absolute convertibility between dollars and gold, as was the case before 1958 when U.S. gold stocks were far in excess of dollar liabilities.

The problem now is to work out a system consistent with these changing conditions. This undoubtedly will involve some form of new international reserves or substantial increases in international credits having the character of such reserves. But however it is worked out, the role henceforth played by gold clearly will be different than in the past. Since gold has for many decades been the key to the international monetary framework, such a change is bound to touch sensitive political nerves.

III

In the phase we are now entering, it is important to recognize the interrelationship between our economic policies and those of the rest of the world. Within broad limits, other countries tend to adjust their monetary, fiscal and other policies to take account of changes in American policy. Other nations can, and have, kept their interest-rate structure in line with ours, thereby offsetting American efforts to reduce our deficit by the traditional method of tightening credit and attracting an inflow of foreign capital. Furthermore, most other countries, particularly the richer industrialized nations, can adjust more easily than we can to changes in their balance of payments, through monetary and fiscal measures and restrictions on trade and capital flows. They can do this because a larger share of their economies is affected by international trade. The natural consequence has been for some industrial countries to use this ability to adjust in a manner which gives them balance-of-payments surpluses and increasing international reserves. Part of the problem is that some of these countries at one time or another have used their growing reserves to make the United States' position appear weaker than it really is—through rapid build-up of gold holdings. To a considerable degree it is because of this sense of weakness that the United States adopted a series of measures to restrain capital flows, measures of no more than short-run expediency but clearly damaging in the long run.

The leverage exercised by foreign central banks through their gold-buying policies could, if carried far enough, force us to take steps detrimental to all nations concerned.

It is thus imperative that the United States have a plan, in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

event of such a contingency, that would minimize damage to our long-term interests. Until recently, at least, it has been accepted by many experts and most laymen in this country as well as in Europe that if such a crisis were to occur, an increase in the price of gold would be virtually inevitable. Such an increase would be welcomed by at least three countries—South Africa, the Soviet Union and France. A number of other countries with substantial gold reserves, principally in Europe, would find a gold-price increase an acceptable, perhaps desirable, solution in the event of a crisis severe enough to force us to suspend the sale of gold.

It is the central thesis of this article that even under the most extreme circumstances, in which the U.S. gold stock was reduced to zero, a gold-price rise would be contrary to the interest of the United States; it would be far preferable for the U.S. Treasury, while maintaining a price of $35 an ounce, to trade in gold only at its discretion. This is important for political reasons because the United States cannot be compelled to raise the gold price; and it is the only country that could lead in a general and worldwide gold revaluation. Before discusssing this in greater detail, it may be well to look back at the previous line of reasoning and consider where it may be vulnerable.

Probably the most potent case against the foregoing thesis has been expressed by Robert V. Roosa, partner of Brown Brothers Harriman and formerly Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. He has been quoted as saying: "There is nothing we can do about gold that would free us from the actual problems in our balance-of-payments deficits." This seems to imply that at least one step in the reasoning above must be wrong, and that the United States *can* deal with its balance-of-payments problem as if other countries could not, or would not, adapt their own policies so as to offset ours. Certainly, the importance of maintaining non-inflationary fiscal and monetary policies should not be minimized, but Mr. Roosa's view of the problem minimizes both the impact of the United States on the world economy and the propensity of other leading nations to pursue policies that yield balance-of-payments surpluses. And it seems to ignore the legitimate desires of these nations to influence U.S. policy through their own gold policies.

The American economy has a massive impact on other nations. Nearly one-quarter of world trade crosses our frontiers; we provide nearly half the world's private foreign investments; probably

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than half of all international money transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars. Because of our economic size, changes in this country are rapidly transmitted to other nations through changes in our exports, imports and capital flows. During a business upswing U.S. imports rise rapidly and have an immediate and profound impact on such countries as Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, the United Kingdom and Japan. In turn, changes in these countries collectively affect all the rest of the world. Similarly a U.S. recession invariably results in slower economic advances throughout the world. It is no accident that the slowdowns in this country in 1954, 1958, 1960 and 1967 correspond to slower advances in most other countries of the world. When the U.S. economy has a recession, other countries have little choice: they must adjust to the decline in their exports to this country and to other countries affected by the United States. To avoid balance-of-payments difficulties, they must conduct tighter monetary and fiscal policies which tend to slow economic expansion but keep up interest rates. On the other hand, when American imports rise, the corresponding rise in other countries' exports relieves the pressure on their balance of payments and allows them to adopt more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.

If France or Italy experiences balance-of-payments difficulties, it can adopt corrective monetary and fiscal measures with the expectation that few if any offsetting measures will be taken by other countries; the international trade and investment flows of such countries are relatively small. The United States is not so free. Policies that would otherwise lead to a balance-of-payments surplus may be frustrated unless other leading countries pursue policies consistent with those surpluses—namely, policies that lead to smaller surpluses or larger deficits of their own. This they have not done. At least since 1957 most European countries, Japan, Australia and a few smaller countries have preferred to increase their international reserves and have therefore pursued policies leading to surpluses in their balance of payments. We would argue that this tendency, followed by a large bloc of independent countries, is one of the reasons for continued U.S. deficits.

There are other reasons for the deficit, including our heavy military and aid commitments, which involve a large annual dollar outflow. Certainly the Viet Nam conflict has added substantially to this burden. If we were willing to curtail sharply all military and economic aid programs, the balance of payments would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

undoubtedly improve, but there are questions of broad national interest involved and such action, if taken, must be taken gradually and carefully.

Other extreme methods of dealing with U.S. deficits conjure up the black years of the Great Depression. No one would recommend a severe economic contraction leading to much lower levels of employment and output, even though this could result in large balance-of-payments surpluses. Likewise, no one, or very few, would wish to see the United States drift toward policies involving exchange controls or large increases in tariff barriers, though these measures, also, could give us a balance-of-payments surplus.

It is necessary to find a more just, more productive, way out. But to find this way will require the help and coöperation of other nations. Meanwhile, the United States must make clear what its gold policy will be if such coöperation is not forthcoming. No responsible official of any major industrial country would purposely support policies he believed would lead to an international monetary crisis. Nevertheless, some leading countries have pursued policies that are contrary to American interests. There are several reasons for this.

For one thing other nations have a legitimate desire to influence U.S. policies on matters of direct concern to them. What the United States does in Viet Nam, in its aid program and its military alliances is bound to affect them. Perhaps more important for some nations is concern over the large equity investment by U.S. companies in their industries. While recognizing the benefits of these investments, many foreign leaders have become increasingly worried that control of their economies is slipping into foreign hands. Thus, they would like to see us control the outflow of capital, thereby eliminating the need for individual governments to impose restrictions. To the extent that other governments believe they can influence our actions through gold and balance-of-payments policies, they may be tempted to do so.

A second reason is that most measures that could be taken to reduce payment surpluses would be politically unpopular. Most nations with a surplus have more restrictive non-tariff restraints on trade than the United States, a hangover from the 1940s and 1950s. Yet these restrictions affecting, for example, coal, automobiles and farm products involve protection of home industries and are politically difficult to remove.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But there is no blinking the fact that more could have been done, particularly by the countries of continental Europe, had they felt an urgent responsibility to maintain the gold-exchange standard at the present gold price of $35 per ounce. Until recently, however, there has been a widespread presumption that the price of gold would be likely to go up if balance-of-payments conditions became too difficult for the United States. Recent utterances by American officials should modify that presumption.

IV

Most European central bankers have declared themselves opposed to an increase in the price of gold. Yet, if it were to occur after a run on U.S. gold, many might consider that it was, on balance, a good thing. To be sure, for some countries there would be inflationary pressures that would have to be offset, perhaps by new legislation, to prevent the profits from the gold revaluation from affecting the economy. But gold reserves would be increased by the amount of the revaluation, and the convertibility of gold into dollars would be assured.

For the United States, however, this would pose very serious economic and political problems. It would raise the question of whether the United States should compensate foreign official institutions for the devaluation losses on their dollar holdings, which could have been converted to gold at an earlier time. Failure to do this would seem to imply renunciation of a moral commitment, and would at the least be embarrassing to this country. Furthermore, a gold-price increase would inequitably favor the gold-producing nations, especially South Africa, Canada and the Soviet Union. It would inequitably favor other nations and individuals that have hoarded gold and speculated in favor of a price rise. Yet little would be accomplished in terms of establishing a stable monetary system. With a higher gold price the United States would again become the residual buyer of the world's gold. Gold production throughout the world would undoubtedly increase and over the years we would accumulate vast stocks of gold which would find their way into the vaults of Fort Knox. For these economic reasons the United States has steadfastly refused to consider an increase in the price of gold. Political considerations are also compelling. Any devaluation of the dollar would be regarded as an admission that an administration's economic policies had failed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A sensible American strategy on gold must take account of four facts about dollars: First, they constitute a stable store of value, their purchasing power having dropped less than that of any other major currency. Second, they can be used in and obtained from an economy that is huge, and that is little affected by external factors. Third, they are widely used both as a transaction currency and as a reserve currency, for which there is no adequate substitute now, nor in prospect for some time. Fourth, the only international asset that can compete with the dollar is gold, and gold can compete only because of the speculative possibility of a price increase.

If there were no possibility of a gold-price rise within the next fifteen years, there would be no incentive to insure against a depreciation of the dollar relative to gold. This would hold true for central banks as well as private citizens. Only the belief that some contingency might arise which would force a gold-price increase makes it worth the gamble to hold gold, which yields no interest, rather than dollar assets, which can. And it is important to remember that only the United States is capable of leading in a worldwide gold revaluation. If we were to raise the price of gold, all other countries would quickly follow suit in order to maintain the same rate of exchange between their currencies and the dollar. No other country or group of countries could do this unless we went along, for by breaking the link between the dollar and gold, they would assume the heavy burden of supporting the higher price.

Since the United States can determine whether or not the gold price will rise and since it is against our interest that it do so, our attitude can be firm. If we make credible our unwillingness ever to consider a gold-price increase, then the incentive of foreign central banks to speculate on a gold-price increase—or to insure against a devaluation of the dollar, which is the other side of the same coin—will be reduced or eliminated, and they will prefer to hold earning assets instead of a sterile metal.

But to make a credible case, official U.S. statements must clearly indicate that we will never support a price higher than $35 an ounce *even if other central banks should use their dollars to buy all the gold in the U.S. Treasury*. And, to make this credible, it is necessary to register a preference for the consequences of such a policy over the consequences of a gold-price rise. This does not involve threatening our European neighbors. It does

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

involve spelling out our response to a threat to the international monetary framework in the form of an assault on our gold stocks.

If that response were to be a suspension of the privilege now granted by the U.S. Treasury to buy and sell gold, with future sales and purchases of gold made only at the discretion of the Treasury and at the fixed price of $35 an ounce, then the end of the trail would be bleak indeed for all nations, but especially for those with large international reserves, including gold. Under these hypothetical circumstances the United States would lose control over the price of gold and over the foreign exchange value of the dollar. There would, of course, be a gold price on the open market; but it would be up to the European central banks or any combination of central banks to decide whether to stabilize the price, and, if so, at what level.

In any case, they would have to decide what to do with the dollar. They could continue to support the dollar at its current rate, which would be the same as going on a full dollar standard, because if dollars were presented to a central bank by a commercial bank, they would have to be purchased at the present price. This, of course, is what central banks do now. But, under the present setup, if these banks consider their dollar balances unduly large, they come to the U.S. Treasury and demand gold. If we were to buy and sell gold only at our discretion, they could not be certain of this privilege. They would be more unequivocally than ever on a dollar standard.

Their other alternative would be to permit the dollar to float for a while, to support it at some rate other than the present one. This might well be a devalued rate, for a time. But if it were at a devalued rate, European exporters and traders would be at a disadvantage relative to those in the United States. No one in Europe wants to see a devalued dollar. When the German mark and the Dutch guilder were revalued by 5 percent in 1964, many Dutch and German exporters were extremely concerned about the loss of competitive advantage. If the dollar were devalued, let us say, by allowing it to float until it reached a rate at which foreign central banks were content to support it, the disadvantages to European traders would be great. No one believes that the dollar is overvalued in this sense, and no one wants to see it devalued.

There are those who argue that such possibilities would not impress the Europeans; that they have a third alternative based

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the Swiss example, during earlier postwar years, of a dual exchange system. Under this system the present exchange rate on dollars for purposes of trade would be maintained, and a separate market established on which dollars used for other purposes would be traded at a devalued rate. This system at first glance would seem to avoid the problem of conducting normal trade transactions with a devalued dollar, and at the same time take care of the "surplus" dollars in a special market. The trouble is that there are simply too many dollars involved; few, if any, central banks would want to mark down the value of their dollar assets by permitting the exchange rate on them to fall—especially since their purchasing power among countries accepting a dollar standard and in the United States itself would be presumably unimpaired. The total volume of dollars held by foreign individuals and banks would be nearly $17 billion, assuming that the total U.S. gold stock were converted. If all of these dollars were channeled through special exchange-controlled markets at a devalued rate, the whole international movement of funds would be grievously impaired, and with no ready substitute for the dollars at hand.

Some have suggested that important financial countries would have little interest in maintaining the parity of the dollar. This comes down to saying that the surplus countries of Europe would prefer a situation involving extensive exchange controls, trade and capital restrictions, confiscations and the chaos this implies, to a more orderly adjustment involving maintenance of the existing currency parities with a gradual reduction of their payments surpluses. It seems unlikely that this argument would be thoughtfully accepted by responsible central bankers in Europe. There might be some conditional endorsement of the idea because it is in the interest of Europeans that the United States act on the assumption that Europe *might* prefer chaos to an orderly and progressive development of affairs; this enhances their bargaining position. But nothing in European behavior suggests that they would act in such an irrational manner.

One superficially logical explanation of the expected European choice of chaos over an orderly development might be that they would thus be opting for the lesser of two evils—namely, exchange controls and other undesirable devices in preference to continued and permanent financing of the U.S. deficit. However, this is a poor answer, since they have another, and pleasanter,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

choice. They need not permanently finance our deficit. They need only help us to reduce it, which it is in their interest to do. They can reduce non-tariff barriers to imports, encourage a greater outflow of private capital or increase their aid to the less developed nations. The fact is that if other industrial nations insist on running balance-of-payments surpluses, and pursue policies to that end, the U.S. deficit will continue.

All of this underlines the central theme of this discussion. The present world financial system—the gold-exchange standard resting essentially on the stability of the dollar and the commitment of the United States to buy and sell gold at $35 an ounce—has served the world well. It has evolved with the changing times; witness the development of the International Monetary Fund and such arrangements as the General Agreement to Borrow, and swap agreements among central banks. There is need to continue this process of evolution. It can continue only with the full and close coöperation of the industrial nations. The United States can no longer call the tune, despite its great economic power. Yet it is fully in the interests of other industrial nations to coöperate in this effort, as the above review of the options available to the United States indicates. If the United States adopts a strategy which completely and convincingly rules out any possibility of an increase in the price of gold, the interests of the rest of the world will be clear. All nations can then concentrate on the real problem of making the present system of international finance capable of dealing with the future requirements of world economic growth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# LIVING WITH THE REAL JAPAN

*By George R. Packard III*

IN the first century of our relations with Japan, both countries swung from extremes of high hope to despair, and back again to hope. Now, with greater opportunities to know each other and with a dialogue reopened between our intellectuals, there should be wiser calculations on both sides of the Pacific. Instead, we are again moving in different directions and, at least for the moment, there is the danger that high expectations will again founder on misunderstandings.

It is not surprising that we are badly informed about Japan. Our press coverage of the major power in Asia and the fourth greatest industrial power in the world is absurdly inadequate. Only one of the regular American correspondents in Tokyo can speak and read Japanese usefully. American editors seem determined to limit all stories on Japan to the exotic, inscrutable or threatening. Scholarly works, with few exceptions, are becoming increasingly specialized. Despite new attention to East Asia in college and high school courses, it is still hard for the layman to find out what he needs to know about our most important and difficult Asian ally.

The Japanese, it should be added, have done little better. Members of their press corps in Washington speak English badly as a rule, and reach few important sources. Their editors favor critics of the Administration without giving equal space to majority views. Japanese visitors tend to be subjective and emotional when they record their impressions of the United States, and scholars are either specialized like our own or committed to a viewpoint before they arrive. Because of the Occupation and our continuing physical presence in Japan, it is easy for Japanese to feel they know us when often they are dealing in false images.

It may be that we can each survive our misapprehensions, letting the diplomats try to untangle the knots, but it would seem better to try to get the picture in focus now than to face a new round of frustrations later on.

II

There is a new myth in Washington that Japan is beginning to wake up to the responsibilities of adulthood after fifteen years of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passive dependence on American power. According to this myth, an economically resurgent, nationalistic Japan will necessarily play a larger political and perhaps military role in Asia, that such a role will inevitably fit in with our strategy of containing communism, and that it is mainly the political Left in Japan that has been standing in the way of a more useful alliance.

As a consequence of these assumptions, there is a warm feeling in Washington each time Japan raises its defense outlay, buys more sophisticated (American) military equipment, sponsors a conference of Asian nations or shows any other hint of wanting to become involved again in Asian politics. There is happiness when an influential journal publishes "realistic" Japanese thinking about the need for more forceful diplomacy backed by military power. We have been patient long enough, it is said, with idealistic pacifism, and it is time the Japanese were jolted from their dream world and apprised of the nasty facts of political life.

It is true, of course, that Japan has recently shown a greater willingness to take on the burden of its own sea and air defense, and that the naïve pacifism of the postwar period is disappearing. But there is an enormous difference between these halting steps and full involvement in the containment of communism in Asia, and it is this distinction which our policy-makers have failed to perceive.

Ever since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and particularly since 1953 when Vice President Nixon openly urged the Japanese to change Article Nine of their Constitution, the Japanese have been under pressure from Washington to increase their defense forces. They have responded, but at their own slow pace and in the spirit of former Prime Minister Yoshida, who wrote in his memoirs in 1961, "To me, the idea of rearmament has always seemed to be one verging on idiocy. . . . The necessary wealth is lacking, and, even more than wealth, the necessary psychological background."

Now that Japan seems to be moving toward "realism" about its own security (even Yoshida has changed his position and advocates more arms) there is a tendency in Washington to assume that, with its new muscles, Japan will help the United States balance the scale against mainland China. To the extent that a stronger, independent Japan is by itself a countervailing power, this assumption is correct. But to the extent that it envisions a stronger Japan complementing our own power in the Pacific, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

helping the United States to defend weaker Asian nations against the threat of communist aggression, it is highly misleading.

We continue to urge Japan to rearm, not in specific, formal messages, but in the overall thrust of our policies. Yet we have not clearly defined either for ourselves or for the Japanese precisely what it is that we want them to do. We like to hear them talk tough about the communist threat in Asia, but we also want them to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. At the cost of demonstrations and considerable trouble for local authorities, we bring nuclear-powered submarines into Sasebo, to provide rest and recreation for the crews, and as the Navy puts it, to get the Japanese over their "nuclear allergy." Yet, when the Japanese decide to build a nuclear-powered merchant ship of their own, Westinghouse is prohibited from giving Mitsubishi the necessary information on marine reactors. It is clear that we are not urging Japan to acquire nuclear arms, but it is not clear what we want them to do with their stronger conventional forces beyond defending themselves. "It seems," said one official in Japan's Defense Agency recently, "that the Pentagon wants us to play the infield while you play the outfield against the Chinese."

The hope in Washington for a stronger Japan to complement American power in the Pacific arises, understandably, from our frustration and sense of isolation in Viet Nam, from our eagerness to share the burden, from our conviction that Asians should be more interested in their own security, and from our feeling that the Japanese have had a long free ride. But it runs headlong into the mood of Japan today.

The essential point about Japan and the United States today is that while we are becoming more deeply involved in Asia, the Japanese, despite a few tentative and cautious moves toward regional coöperation, are absorbed more than ever in their own domestic problems. Ironically, it is partly because we *are* the predominant power in Asia that Japan abstains from playing the role that its economic power could support.

Japan's introspective mood should not be surprising. Critics who charge that its foreign policy is figured on an abacus tend to forget the wrenching changes that rapid modernization has brought to Japan, and to overlook the tensions in Japanese society that still persist from the war, total defeat and occupation.

Far from designing a bolder foreign policy, the Japanese are trying to cope with problems involved in rapid urbanization, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

huge gulfs between generations, civilian rule, the shallow bases of political parties, the democratic process in an hierarchical society, the role of the individual where the group prevails, the breakup of the traditional family structure and the loss of an entire value system. For the first time they are enjoying each other—even their domestic squabbles—liberated in an explosion of energy from rigid class divisions and police-state repression. Although there has been no great social upheaval, the prewar military and imperial household élites have suddenly disappeared, leaving the bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen to fight it out at the top.

Unlike other élite groups in Asia, Japan's leaders must respond to the popular will, and that will has made itself felt again and again: it is against war, against taking risks abroad, against rocking the boat in any way that could threaten the new prosperity, against foreign commitments that could drag Japan into a war that did not involve its immediate interests. The consumer-voter is learning to make his will felt at the polls, and the politicians are learning to respond.

Japan's "economic miracle" has left serious problems in its wake. The public sector has been neglected, and taxes, which have been going down for a decade, are scheduled to go up in the next decade. The additional revenue will go not to defense or foreign aid, but to roads, schools and hospitals. A third of Tokyo's eleven million citizens live in housing that is considered substandard, and those with decent homes still face a daily penance of smog and traffic jams. The farms are being deserted for the cities, rural poverty is widespread, small businesses are folding, larger ones are merging in the face of capital liberalization policies, the debt structure of private business is staggering and juvenile delinquency is on the rise. This is not a nation that is about to embark on a drive to influence the rest of Asia.

Considering all these problems, the political scene has been remarkably stable. But the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, in power for almost twenty years, has been more of a steward than a producer of dynamic leadership. Government policy has been set by a consensus among the new élites, and initiatives have been trimmed to the lowest common denominator. The highly competitive factions within the party tend to cut down the overly ambitious, and there is no de Gaulle or even a Thanat Khoman on the Japanese horizon. There has been broad agreement on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

general guidelines for economic growth, and the factional struggles are not about what shall be done but who shall do it. It has not been the leftist intellectuals so much as the ingrained bureaucratic caution of the conservative leaders themselves that has checked new initiatives abroad.

Recent developments have further reduced opportunities for forceful leadership. The conservatives, for the first time since the war, won less than 50 percent of the popular vote in the general elections of January 1967 and, despite their majority in the Diet, they will be more dependent than before on bargaining with the opposition. The "Yoshida School," of which Prime Ministers Ikeda and Sato have been the star alumni, has nearly run out its string, and a new generation of politicians is adding further uncertainty to the political scene. None of the leading candidates to succeed Sato advocates significant change in foreign policy.

The leading opposition party, the Socialists, lost ground in the January elections and buried the old myth that time, youth and urbanization would inevitably carry them to power. This and the advance of two minor parties, the Democratic Socialists and the Komeito (Soka Gakkai), with 30 and 25 seats respectively in the lower house, have opened up new possibilities for fluidity, leading perhaps to coalitions and shifting alliances—again scarcely the conditions for new undertakings abroad.

The primacy of domestic politics in Japan is evident most clearly in the fact that foreign ministers in recent years have almost all been chosen from the thick of domestic politics. They are often without experience in foreign affairs, and usually unable to speak any language but Japanese. The opposition has shown much the same concern for domestic politics: a Socialist leader travels to Moscow, Peking or Hanoi not so much to exchange views or cement ties as to get the better of a competing domestic faction. This is not to suggest that Japan has been standing still diplomatically, but that its foreign policy reflects the popular conviction that the tasks of rebuilding and adjusting to changes at home must come first.

Japan's increased international involvement over the past three years has been more a matter of winning friends than influencing people. The major moves have been joining O.E.C.D. in 1964; accepting, as a member of the Development Assistance Committee, a pledge to raise foreign aid to 1 percent of the national income; normalizing relations with the Republic of Korea

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1965; quietly opposing the Chinese Communists at Algiers in 1965; calling a conference on Asian agricultural development in 1966; joining in multilateral aid to Indonesia in 1966–67; joining the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); pledging $200 million to the Asian Development Bank and providing its president; and promising $100 million to the special agricultural fund in 1967. Lately Foreign Minister Miki has put forward the idea of an Asia-Pacific sphere, calling for closer consultation among the five advanced nations and the less developed countries of the area. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from all this that Japan is about to jump back into the power politics of Asia.

For one thing, Japan's aid to the less developed countries was only $520 million in 1966, or 0.69 percent of national income, a slight drop from the previous year. (About half of this aid went to Asian countries.) This is a respectable showing (fifth in the free world) for a country that ranks twenty-second in the world in per capita national income. But it is not likely, even when combined with trade and technical assistance, to give Japan a major voice in Asian politics in the near future, and it is not likely to rise dramatically in the short run. Leading politicians predict that the public will strongly oppose any attempt to raise the figure substantially. Some of them even admit that the concept of Pan-Asian solidarity is more a dream of the left and right fringes than a popular guide to action.

The new relationship with the Republic of Korea brings economic benefits to both sides, but it does not necessarily foreshadow a convergence of foreign policies and it will surely not lead, as some have speculated, to joint security arrangements. Japan joined ASPAC reluctantly, and only after the Koreans and Thais agreed not to give it a strong anti-communist coloration. As one senior Japanese diplomat put it, "We are on the extreme left in ASPAC." The Japanese role will continue to be one of blocking ASPAC from taking a strong anti-Peking line.

Nothing could illustrate Japan's wariness of political involvement with its neighbors better than a tea party that took place in Seoul on July 2 this year. Vice President Humphrey, Vice President C. K. Yen of Nationalist China and Prime Minister Sato were attending the inauguration of President Park Chung Hee, and a meeting of the four leaders was proposed. Japan agreed to attend a tea party, but only on condition that wives might also attend. The purpose of this condition, according to *Asahi Shim-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

*bun* (July 3, 1967), was to avoid the political coloration that might otherwise attach to such a gathering. Observers in Tokyo could recall no other occasion when the Japanese had been first to suggest bringing wives along.

III

There have, however, been three major changes of attitude in Japan that could affect foreign policy in the future. The first is the rise of national self-confidence, a continuation of the trend that began with the economic boom of the late 1950s, found expression in the security-treaty riots of 1960, was notable at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, and continues to grow with the new generations that never knew war and defeat. The massive inferiority complex of the postwar decade has given way to a more relaxed and stable public mood. Japan no longer panics at the first rise in international tension, no longer sees its economic quarrels as affairs of national honor. With new confidence and national pride, the people have learned to live with dissension at home despite their traditional love of consensus.

The new mood seeks a greater voice for Japan at international councils, but not at the price of risky commitments or costly ventures, or of going beyond Article IX, the war-renouncing clause of the Constitution. For example, while the United Nations has always been popular, any suggestion that Japan might contribute to a United Nations peacekeeping force is enough to set off a furor. The present self-defense forces have won over 80 percent public acceptance in the opinion polls, but only a small minority would like to see them strengthened. The army has never been able to recruit enough volunteers to fill its quota. The conservative leaders, far from being nostalgic about the good old days of national power, are acutely conscious of the dangers of usurpation by the military in a land that has known military supremacy for centuries. They scrutinize each new budget request from the Defense Ministry with jaundiced eyes. The new nationalism in Japan does not translate quickly or easily into a desire for more military power.

The second trend, related to the first, is an eagerness to escape from the shadow of American power, to prove to the world and to itself that Japan is not an American puppet, to disengage emotionally from the overwhelming influence that economic, military and cultural ties have exerted in the past 22 years. The trend

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was inevitable, and even therapeutic in view of the larger-than-life role we played during the Occupation and afterwards. But in the last two years, uneasiness, mistrust and in some quarters hostility have been added largely as a result of Viet Nam.

For most Japanese, the war is seen primarily as white men shooting Asians, Westerners using sophisticated weaponry against nationalists defending their homeland. Above all it is unpopular because it could lead to a wider war involving Japan, though this fear has subsided somewhat in recent months. Among Japanese leaders, other considerations have entered the picture; some of the sting is removed by our war-related spending in Japan, estimated at $600 million last year. Some leaders have been impressed by the fact that the United States appears determined to stay in Asia for the long haul. Still others are noting that, by its inability to win a quick victory, it is proving itself less than omnipotent. It is too early to say which of these calculations will be more important in the long run, and much depends on the outcome of the war.

In any event, for the first time in many years, the United States is no longer the nation best liked by the Japanese people, having been replaced by Switzerland, according to at least one poll.[1] Increasingly, our shortcomings are noted in the press while our successes are belittled or ignored. American importations which are admirable are now so familiar as to seem Japanese, while the side effects of modernization such as juvenile delinquency are blamed on American influence. Individualism is still suspect as profit-seeking egoism. When Stalin's daughter came to America, members of the establishment in Japan spoke of it in the same vein as *Pravda*: it was a C.I.A. operation and she was unstable and greedy. A leading newsweekly ignored the story as "insignificant." When the Marines entered the Demilitarized Zone in Viet Nam, it was the United States that committed "dangerous escalation," not the entrenched North Vietnamese regulars.

When President Johnson was planning a visit to Korea after the Manila Conference of October 1966, consideration was given to a visit to Japan. The reaction in Tokyo was prompt: "inconceivable." The Japanese Government wanted no part of a visit that would have linked it, however remotely, to American military strategy in Asia. Even today, with Prime Minister Sato

[1] Poll taken by Central Survey Institute in January 1967, published in *Shukan Jiji*, February 4, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scheduled to pay his second formal visit to Washington, an attempt by President Johnson to visit Tokyo would set off bloody rioting and end in cancellation. It is possible that these tensions will disappear with the end of the fighting in Viet Nam, but for the moment, the United States Government's image in Japan is at a postwar low.

The third change in attitude, also related to nationalism, is truly revolutionary: for the first time since 1949, there is widespread disillusionment with Communist China, which recently replaced the Soviet Union at the bottom of a popularity poll. Persecution of intellectuals, excesses of the Red Guards, the blatant power struggle and Mao's unexpected fallibility have combined to reduce the former awe and respect for the Chinese revolution even among the progressive intellectuals. And the Japanese Communist Party, once putty in the hands of Peking, has declared its independence. Still, as noted below, Japanese views of the future of China are vastly different from our own.

These changes in Japanese thinking have recently permitted a group of younger intellectuals to advocate publicly a more assertive diplomacy supported by more military power and possibly even nuclear weapons—ideas that were previously taboo. The new debate, which has been cheered from the sidelines by Washington, examines Japan's potential as a Gaullist power, ponders the uncertainties of relying on the United States for long-range security, and usually accepts the premise of Japan as a "better because more independent" ally of the United States. The new realists, as they are called, have exerted little influence on Government leaders, who have been privately considering these arguments for years, but it may be significant that they are getting space in the journals that once belonged exclusively to the pacifist left wing. The debate has gained impetus in the past months from public discussion of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In a remarkable show of unity, all parties except the Communists have indicated reservations about signing the treaty without commitments from the superpowers to disarm.

Yet, for all the debate, there is no important politician in Japan today who would dare openly to advocate nuclear weapons for Japan, and even the realists agree that the obstacles to joining the nuclear club are enormous. Article IX of the Constitution and the Basic Atomic Energy Law would have to be revised, at the cost of huge demonstrations and strikes. Agreements with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Atomic Energy Agency and with the United States would have to be revised or broken. Nuclear fuel would have to be imported with no strings attached. A testing site would have to be found. It is questionable whether enough Japanese scientists, who incline to the left, could be induced to coöperate. The expense, while not prohibitive, might run by one current Japanese estimate to $300–500 million a year for twenty years, and even then the nuclear force would be equal only to that of England or France. Against whom would it be used, and how? And would it not revive fear and suspicion of Japan without adding to Japan's actual ability to influence events in Asia?

And so while the nuclear-shy Japanese are having their first open debate on these questions, the fact is that government leaders have concluded that the time is not ripe to start producing nuclear weapons. The most positive of them ask only that the options be kept open, and this of course is being done: Japan is moving forward rapidly in the development of nuclear power and rocketry; in fifteen years it may be the world's leading producer of nuclear energy for peaceful uses. It is estimated that if and when Japan decided to become a nuclear power, weapons could be produced in about two years. Meanwhile, the defense budget remains at the relatively low figure of 1.1 percent of gross national product, and this percentage is not expected to rise much during the current defense plan (1967–71).

Without its own nuclear force, and with Communist China building a strategic force of its own, the Government continues to believe that the only practical alternative is the security treaty with the United States and the American nuclear umbrella. A sudden withdrawal by the United States from the Pacific or a serious threat from China could change these calculations, but at the moment most conservative leaders favor continuing the treaty after 1970, when it can be legally terminated on one year's notice; even left-wing leaders doubt that the riots of 1960 will be repeated.

The Government, however, is as usual out ahead of the public in its support of the treaty. A poll taken earlier this year shows that only 37.7 percent of the people actually support the treaty, 13.9 percent are opposed, 18.2 percent consider it unavoidable, 7.9 percent have other opinions and 23.1 percent don't know. Despite Diet ratification of the revised treaty in 1960, there is still a feeling among many Japanese that the treaty serves Amer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ican interests more than their own. Far from being seen as a munificent gift from Washington in return for which the Japanese should be happy to play a supporting role, it is at best a burden that defies the new nationalism, and at worst a lightning rod that in a world war might attract a hail of missiles.

In the United States we tend to feel that we should have a voice in Japan's military posture since we provide most of its security; many Japanese feel, rightly or wrongly, that their tolerance of foreign bases and troops in Japan for purposes going beyond the defense of Japan evens the score. Because of these attitudes, the Government is severely restricted in its ability to play a more active role within the framework of the current treaty.

IV

It may not, after all, be so important that Washington continues to lecture Japan on the virtues of "defense-mindedness," since the days when we could influence Japan's policies are largely over. It is worth remembering, though, that our involvement in domestic issues has brought some unexpected results. Consider, for example, the fact that the United States was instrumental in setting up Sohyo, the huge (4.5 million) labor federation, which promptly became the leading opponent of the security treaty and has fought it ever since. There is, of course, a fine irony in the fact that by urging Japan to rearm ever since 1950 we have unwittingly thrown the weight of nationalist sentiment to the side of holding down the size of the army. And there is irony, too, in the fact that those in the Pentagon who have led the drive to induce Japan to rearm will be the first to shout betrayal should Japan use its new arms to pursue independent or competitive objectives.

It would be well if all parts of the American Government could find common answers to two questions: First, how do we want to see Japan's new power used in the future? And second, to what extent, if any, can we influence the directions it will take?

If my assessment of the direction of popular attitudes and political trends is correct, it is inconceivable that Japan will agree in the coming decade to associate itself more closely with our strategic objective of containing Communist China. And as the desire to get out from under the American shadow grows, as it surely will, Japan will be even less content with a subordinate role. Fields other than conventional military power, such as space,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

technology and economic prosperity will be found to satisfy the need for international prestige.

It may be that by asking for less, we will gain more. It could be that after Viet Nam, we will redefine our own concept of power in Asia, relying less on conventional military force and more on economic development to deal with the predictable insurgencies of the future. In such an event, and assuming that Communist China continues to be contained by our nuclear deterrent and the Seventh Fleet, a stable, wealthy and independent Japan could be more valuable to us than a closely allied and more heavily armed Japan. It could be a magnetic attraction as Asia's first and most successful open society, in stark contrast to the dreary alternative of communism on the mainland. Its very lack of offensive military power might actually make it a more trusted source of capital and technology. Its own experience in rapid modernization in an Asian setting, its relevant agricultural experience and its racial affinity would all add to its influence.

Finally, a Japan that is not closely tied to our military containment strategy might in the long run prove to be the link by which the Chinese return to the real world. Already Peking is looking to Japan for technology, and if it is true that a developing China is less dangerous to world peace than a hungry and frustrated China, Japan might serve as a useful bridge. Once before, at the turn of the century, Japan briefly played a similar role, educating a generation of Chinese leaders in Western technology; a more rational régime in Peking might turn again toward Tokyo for assistance. While all this is speculation, it is interesting to note that even in the current furor of the Cultural Revolution, conservative Japanese leaders are thinking along these lines. Despite our efforts to make them fear Peking, most Japanese believe that their long-range interests will be better served by building closer ties to the mainland and trying to moderate China's current militancy.

Our special relationship with Japan will survive the war in Viet Nam and could ultimately be the basis for peace in Asia. But it is going to take hard work on both sides, and out of habit and frustration we will continue to advise the Japanese on defense and security problems. Whether we are right or wrong may not matter very much, because they will make the decisions. But it is worth considering the possibility that they may be on the right track.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By John G. Stoessinger*

*with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Janis A. Kreslins, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.*

## *General: Political and Legal*

THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. By Leon Gordenker. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 380 p. $8.50.

This workmanlike and thoughtful study of three Secretaries-General and how they viewed their political functions fills a large gap in the literature.

PROGRESS AND REVOLUTION: A STUDY OF THE ISSUES OF OUR AGE. By Robert Waelder. New York: International Universities Press, 1967, 372 p. $7.00.

A somewhat diffuse though immensely learned and frequently brilliant *tour d'horizon* of major international political forces by a leading psychoanalyst.

FROM ATLANTIC TO PACIFIC: A NEW INTEROCEAN CANAL. By Immanuel J. Klette. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1967, 143 p. $4.50.

A careful exploration of the major alternatives faced by the United States in planning the construction of a new sea-level waterway. The author's preference is the Sasardi-Morti route in Panama, "provided nuclear excavation methods could be used and provided an agreement satisfying United States interests could be negotiated with Panama."

WORLDS IN CONFLICT. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 133 p. $4.50.

The outgrowth of the Jacob Blaustein Lectures in International Relations at Lehigh University. Below par for Brogan.

THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES. By Oran R. Young. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 427 p. $10.00.

A highly sophisticated though over-theoretical effort to explore the possibilities of third-party intervention in different types of international crises. Borrows heavily from the insights of Thomas Schelling.

THE POLITICAL ILLUSION. By Jacques Ellul. New York: Knopf, 1967, 258 p. $8.95.

A fierce indictment of the modern democratic state, based largely on the experience with *dirigisme* in France. (Orginally published in Paris in 1964.)

NOTE—By special arrangement with World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain, *post free*, any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, with check or money order, to Desk FA, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TREBLINKA. By Jean-François Steiner. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967, 415 p. $5.95.

A darkly lyrical, terrible and beautiful book about the madness and terror that was Treblinka. The author's central message: Some Jews *did* resist.

THE RACE WAR. By Ronald Segal. New York: Viking, 1967, 416 p. $6.50.

A passionate, single-factor interpretation of recent world history as a conflict between whites and non-whites, with the moment of truth close at hand.

A HISTORY OF WAR AND PEACE, 1939–1965. By Wilfrid Knapp. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1967, 639 p. $10.00.

A fairly comprehensive narrative of world politics since 1939 by a British scholar, who covers familiar ground in a straightforward manner.

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: Free Press (for the Princeton Center of International Studies), 1967, 340 p. $7.50.

A group of ten scholars and the editor attempt to demonstrate the primacy of domestic politics in the foreign policy decision-making process. Useful though uneven.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Edited by Senator Henry M. Jackson. New York: Praeger, 1967, 309 p. $6.95.

Testimony on NATO before the Jackson Subcommittee by Richard E. Neustadt, Dean Acheson, Christian A. Herter, Lauris Norstad, Thomas C. Schelling, Malcolm W. Hoag, John J. McCloy, Dean Rusk and Robert S. McNamara.

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PRECEDENT OF THE WEST. By G. Lowell Field. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, 247 p. $6.75.

A brave but somewhat labored effort to forge new conceptual tools for comparative political analysis.

AFTER VICTORY: CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN AND THE MAKING OF THE PEACE. By William L. Neumann. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 212 p. $5.95.

Covers the same ground as Herbert Feis' "Churchill—Roosevelt—Stalin" (1957) but not with the same thoroughness.

THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT 1952–1957. By Robert S. Jordan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 307 p. $9.60.

A substantial study of Lord Ismay's impact on the NATO Staff/Secretariat.

CONTAINMENT AND CHANGE. By Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 248 p. $5.95 (Paper $1.45).

Two intellectual leaders of the "New Left" address themselves to the challenge of understanding social revolution in the developing nations. Oglesby is often fuzzy, Shaull a poor man's Camus.

COMMUNICATION AND CHANGE IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967, 333 p. $9.50.

A useful though uneven symposium of eighteen essays growing out of a conference held at the East-West Center in 1964.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM. By Bernard A. Ramundo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (in coöperation with Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University), 1967, 262 p. $6.95.

An attempt to demonstrate that Soviet jurists are dedicated to the promotion of "peaceful coexistence" as the governing principle of contemporary international law.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION: EXPERIENCES IN POLICY RESEARCH. By Hadley Cantril. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967, 202 p. $7.50.

The author argues for the inclusion of "all necessary psychological factors" in the formulation of foreign policy in order to avoid disasters like the Bay of Pigs. The supporting material consists of a number of sketchy vignettes that tease but do not satisfy.

THE POLITICS OF THE THIRD WORLD. By J. D. B. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1967, 126 p. $3.75.

A balanced though somewhat cursory survey, by an Australian scholar, of the disparate policies of the Afro-Asian countries. Whatever unity of purpose one perceives in these nations, the author contends, exists not in their politics but in their common quest for economic development.

## *General: Military, Technical and Scientific*

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY. By Russell F. Weigley. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 688 p. $12.95.

A thoroughgoing study of the Army from colonial days to the present, though somewhat thin on counterinsurgency warfare. The author's main thesis: the partnership between the professional and the citizen soldier that is the distinctive feature of the United States Army must remain unimpaired despite the perplexities of the war in Viet Nam.

THE SEA IN MODERN STRATEGY. By L. W. Martin. New York: Praeger, 1967, 190 p. $5.00.

An impressive study of seapower in the nuclear age by a British scholar, particularly good on blockades and seaborne nuclear forces.

EISENHOWER AND BERLIN, 1945: THE DECISION TO HALT AT THE ELBE. By Stephen E. Ambrose. New York: Norton, 1967, 119 p. $4.00.

A spirited defense of Eisenhower's decision not to try for Berlin, against the advice of Patton and Montgomery. The Russians took the casualties, the author argues, but gave up over half the city to the U.S. and Britain. Had Eisenhower taken Berlin, the U.S. would have taken the casualties, but half of Berlin would have been given to the Russians two months later.

CONTRACTING FOR ATOMS. By Harold Orlans. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967, 242 p. $6.00.

An excellent analysis of the contract policies and problems of the Atomic Energy Commission. The author suggests a fairly extensive overhaul.

THE MEANING OF LIMITED WAR. By Robert McClintock. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 239 p. $5.00.

A fine series of eight case studies of limited war in the nuclear age with a concluding prescription on how to keep wars of the future limited as well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS: TECHNIQUES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. By Julian Paget. New York: Walker, 1967, 189 p. $5.95.

A well-done British view of the subject, based on the experiences with insurgency in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus.

MANHATTAN PROJECT. By Stephane Groueff. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, 372 p. $6.95.

The author, a French journalist, recounts the dramatic story of the building of the first atomic bomb. He does the job with felicitous style, few new insights, but many lapses. The nature of the barrier for the gaseous diffusion process, for example, is no longer classified, as the author wrongly contends.

THE BROKEN SEAL: THE STORY OF "OPERATION MAGIC" AND THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER. By Ladislas Farago. New York: Random House, 1967, 439 p. $6.95.

A fascinating and, on the whole, well-documented story of the competition between American and Japanese code breakers between 1923 and December 7, 1941. The author served as chief of research and planning in the office of U.S. Naval Intelligence during World War II.

THE TEST BAN TREATY: MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. By James Hubert McBride. Chicago: Regnery, 1967, 197 p. $5.75.

This book, largely an echo of Dr. Edward Teller's arguments before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1963, concludes that "the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was a serious mistake and a threat to the future security of the nation."

SET EUROPE ABLAZE. By E. H. Cookridge. New York: Crowell, 1967, 410 p. $7.95.

A fast-paced account of the successes and failures of Britain's "Special Operations Executive," the espionage ring that operated in Nazi-occupied Europe during World War II.

SPACE FRONTIER. By Wernher Von Braun. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, 216 p. $4.95.

The Director of NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, formerly of V-2 fame at Peenemünde, has written a primer on space flight for the layman.

THE COMING OF THE ITALIAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR. By George W. Baer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 404 p. $9.50.

An authoritative diplomatic and political history, well-documented with a comprehensive bibliography, by a professor of history at the University of California, Santa Cruz.

## *General: Economic and Social*

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 427 p. $6.95.

Witty, learned and idiosyncratic, this book is, over much of its length, an unequalled synthesization of the evidence that modern industries are not like corner grocery stores. There are less satisfactory parts where some interesting ideas are stretched rather far, a part of the picture is allowed to stand for the whole, and the line between description and prediction is left fuzzy. But the book is provocative and not to be ignored.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EXPORT INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Alasdair I. MacBean. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 367 p. $6.95.

For a long time it has been generally accepted that countries producing primary products are more vulnerable to short-term market fluctuations than industrial countries and that this fact jeopardizes their chances of development. MacBean's extensive statistical analysis, buttressed by many kinds of cross-checking, shows the error of these views and of related beliefs about how the bad effects are produced. Therefore, measures to counter instability should emphasize specific circumstances, not supposed general causes. An important book.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING. Edited by Max F. Millikan. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967, 413 p. (Columbia University Press, distributor, $10.00).

Four country studies and five functional analyses make up a major addition to the literature of planning.

TRADE AND TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT. By Staffan Burenstam Linder. New York: Praeger, 1967, 179 p. $6.00.

Increasingly the feeling grows that the trade problems of underdeveloped countries are different from those of industrialized nations. Here a Swedish economist constructs a theory that takes account of some of the differences and leads to different policy conclusions from those implied by classical theory.

LES FONDEMENTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DES SYSTÈMES ÉCONOMIQUES. By Jacques Rueff. Paris: Payot, 1967, 523 p. Fr. 35.

*Festschrift* comprising a number of papers by the French economist (some unpublished) and articles about him and his work by an impressive list of figures from many countries.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING. By Georges R. Delaume. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications (for the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University), 1967, 371 p. $15.00.

A clear summary usable by laymen.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND ORGANIZATION. Edited by Wayne R. LaFave and Peter Hay. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967, 506 p. $7.50.

A wide range of issues considered largely from a legal standpoint.

CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION 1924–31. By Stephen V. O. Clarke. New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1967, 234 p. $2.00 (Paper).

Timely history of successes and failures, from the records of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and private papers.

## *The United States*

TO MOVE A NATION. By Roger Hilsman. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 602 p. $6.95.

The author, who was head of Intelligence in the State Department and then Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East in the Kennedy Administration, has added new insights into specific crises such as Laos, Cuba One and Two, the Congo and Viet Nam. The role of the C.I.A. looms large in the story.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATION IS BURDENED. By Roger D. Masters. New York: Knopf, 1967, 319 p. $6.95.

This is an eloquent and at times philosophically profound appeal to base U.S. foreign policy on the defense of the national interest in a world that is still governed by the principle of the balance of power. There is much of Hans J. Morgenthau here but much that is original too. The book stands above most of the present backwash of partisan commentary on the subject.

PAX AMERICANA. By Ronald Steel. New York: Viking, 1967, 371 p. $6.95.

This is a highly polemical, but cogently argued book covering similar ground and reaching very similar conclusions as does Senator Fulbright in "The Arrogance of Power."

ABUSE OF POWER. By Theodore Draper. New York: Viking, 1967, 244 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.25).

A balanced polemic against "the supersession of political by military instrumentalities in the conduct of American foreign policy," especially in Viet Nam, where the author analyzes seven turning points cutting across four American administrations.

THE OAS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. By Jerome Slater. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967, 315 p. $6.00.

U.S. policy toward the O.A.S. has vacillated among three objectives, in the author's view: internal collective security in the hemisphere, anti-communism and anti-dictatorship. This cogently reasoned study suggests that the United States has been most effective when pursuing the first objective but has tended to split the alliance when pursuing the second and third.

THE CHALLENGE OF FOREIGN AID: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND POSSIBILITIES. By Jacob J. Kaplan. New York: Praeger, 1967, 405 p. $8.50.

This is a first-class book. Not a history, it draws on a wide range of the national experience; emphasizing economics, it treats foreign policy problems more realistically than many other works in the field. Mr. Kaplan is blunt about failures and firm but reasonable about what might result if people followed his own recommendations.

AMERIKA AUF DEM EUROPAMARKT: US-DIREKTINVESTITIONEN IM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT. By Rainer Hellmann. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1966, 237 p. DM. 28.

This is the best book so far on American direct investment and the controversies it has given rise to. Full of facts, it is also readable and shows the author, a German journalist, to have a very balanced judgment and a fairly relaxed attitude toward the problem.

PROFILE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY: A SURVEY OF GROWTH AND CHANGE. By Emma S. Woytinsky. New York: Praeger, 1967, 601 p. $12.50.

Remarkably comprehensive presentation of figures with text tracing changes in the American economy over fifty years and often much longer.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Lawrence D. Weiler and Anne Patricia Simons. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1967, 589 p. $8.00.

A scholarly and comprehensive study of U.S. peace and security policies in the United Nations during the organization's first ten years.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DIPLOMACY OF A NEW AGE: MAJOR ISSUES IN U.S. POLICY SINCE 1945. By Dexter Perkins. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967, 190 p. $5.75.

A series of fairly disconnected essays based on the Patten Lectures delivered at Indiana University in 1966.

ANATOMY OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. By Smith Simpson. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 285 p. $5.95.

A fierce critique of State's internal shortcomings. The author's proposed remedy, the appointment of a "general manager" with extensive powers of internal overhaul, seems called for in the light of his findings.

JOHN F. KENNEDY AND AMERICAN CATHOLICISM. By Lawrence H. Fuchs. New York: Meredith Press, 1967, 271 p. $6.95.

The author explores the interaction among three factors—the American national character, the Roman Catholic Church and John F. Kennedy. The President, "an ecumenical man" in the author's view, was the catalytic agent who stirred a more ecumenical spirit in the politics of America.

THE INTELLECTUALS AND McCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER. By Michael Paul Rogin. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, 366 p. $12.50.

This is a fine book with a misleading title. The author hardly deals at all with McCarthy's impact on the intellectual community, but is primarily concerned with the socio-political roots of his electoral successes.

ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1970'S: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO COLONEL GEORGE A. LINCOLN ON HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY. Edited by Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1967, 336 p. $7.50.

A collection of fifteen essays of generally high quality in honor of an experienced soldier, now Professor of Social Science at West Point. Written by fourteen military experts and Ruth B. Russell on various problems of American security during the coming decade.

FDR: ARCHITECT OF AN ERA. By Rexford G. Tugwell. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 270 p. $4.95.

A member of the original Roosevelt "Brains Trust" covers familiar ground in a footnote to history.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1966. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1967, 487 p. $6.95.

The latest volume in this indispensable series presents a concise yet comprehensive account of the international experience of the United States in a critical year. The Viet Nam conflict and its repercussions inevitably hold the central place, but there are also balanced and authoritative accounts of such developments as the French withdrawal from NATO, the Chinese "Cultural Revolution," the negotiation of the new outer space treaty, and U.N. actions relating to South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1966. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1967, 530 p. $9.50.

Continuing the well-known series initiated in 1939, this companion volume to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The United States in World Affairs, 1966" presents authoritative, annotated texts of the year's most important presidential messages, communiqués, U.N. resolutions and other major foreign policy documents, among them the President's speeches in favor of East-West *détente* and the numerous proposals for nuclear nonproliferation, peace in Viet Nam and the demilitarization of outer space.

## *The Western Hemisphere*

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY. By A. E. Safarian. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada, 1967, 346 p. $8.95.

Embodying years of careful work by a leading Canadian economist, this book throws more light on the behavior of foreign-owned companies in Canada than most of the writing and talking that has preceded it. Big companies seem to meet Canadian standards better than small ones. Improvement, says Safarian, depends more on broad policy and industrial reorganization than on measures to regulate investment.

BLICKPUNKT SÜDAMERIKA: DIE REVOLUTION DER STEIGENDEN ERWARTUNGEN. By Gerhard Maurer. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1967, 149 p. DM. 12.80.

A brief but thorough survey of the complicated political, economic and social problems of Latin America. The author, a young German scholar, gives a clear exposition of the goals, tactics and achievements of both the Moscow and Peking brands of communism, advocates agrarian reforms and writes favorably about the entrepreneurship of the often denounced oligarchies.

PARASITISM AND SUBVERSION: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA. By Stanislav Andreski. New York: Pantheon Books, 1967, 303 p. $5.95.

An imaginative and wide-ranging analysis—pessimistic in its conclusions—by a Polish-born British sociologist. Of particular value because the author relates the phenomena of Latin American society to similar phenomena in other countries.

CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF CHILE AND BRAZIL. By Andre Gunder Frank. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967, 298 p. $7.50.

Four essays, framed in Marxian terms, examining the "Indian Problem" in Latin America and various aspects of economic development in Chile and Brazil. The author contends that only by the destruction of the capitalist system would it be possible to solve the economic issues of Latin America.

LATIN AMERICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. By Edward J. Williams. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967, 305 p. $7.50.

A pioneering and well-documented study of the Christian Democratic parties in Latin America. The author, a professor at Marquette University, is convinced that the ideological bent of the Christian Democratic movement "is remarkably appropriate" to the continent.

REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? ARMED STRUGGLE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA. By Régis Debray. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967, 126 p. $4.00.

A tract, of which the Cuban-sponsored Spanish edition has been widely distributed in Latin America, propounding a revolutionary theory based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

author, a young French philosopher, argues that the revolution in Latin America will be accomplished only with the help of guerrilla warfare.

MY 14 MONTHS WITH CASTRO. By Rufo López-Fresquet. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1966, 223 p. $4.95.

Cuba's Minister of the Treasury from January 8, 1959 to March 17, 1960, now living in Puerto Rico, has written a useful account of his experience. Commissioned by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University.

EXPANDING ECUADOR'S EXPORTS: A COMMODITY-BY-COMMODITY STUDY WITH PROJECTIONS TO 1973. By Ralph J. Watkins. New York: Praeger, 1967, 430 p. $15.00.

This study, undertaken by Surveys and Research Corporation for the Government of Ecuador, contains a wealth of information on the country's economy and foreign trade.

POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930–1964: AN EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY. By Thomas E. Skidmore. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 446 p. $8.75.

Attempting to investigate the causes of the fall of President João Goulart in 1964, the author, a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, has written a detailed interpretation of what he regards "as the most important factors determining the trend of Brazilian politics since the Revolution of 1930." Comprehensive bibliography.

VARGAS OF BRAZIL. By John W. F. Dulles. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967, 395 p. $8.50.

A biography of Getúlio Vargas, the dictatorial and revolutionary statesman and politician who centralized Brazil and dominated its politics from 1930 until 1954.

## *Western Europe*

EUROPE'S POSTWAR GROWTH: THE ROLE OF LABOR SUPPLY. By Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 270 p. $6.50.

With his customary perception and vigor, the author presses the case for attributing much of the rapid growth in postwar Europe to a plentiful supply of labor. He discusses the implications of the end of "supergrowth" and tells a good bit about the migration of labor within Europe.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. VOLUME I: YOUTH. 1874–1900. By Randolph S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 614 p. $10.00.

The first part of a five-volume biography, in scale and style worthy of its subject, woven out of an astounding mass of Winston's letters, and covering his first 26 years, at the end of which he wrote from an American lecture tour: "I am vy [sic] proud of the fact that there is not one person in a million who at my age could have earned £10,000 without any capital in less than two years." He was of course wrong: his capital consisted of brains, courage and ambition—and good connections turned to excellent use.

CHURCHILL AND BEAVERBROOK: A STUDY IN FRIENDSHIP AND POLITICS. By Kenneth Young. New York: James H. Heineman, 1967, 349 p. $6.50.

A moving and absorbing study of the vicissitudes of friendship that for 55 years linked two giants of English life. Based principally on hitherto unpublished letters in the Beaverbrook archives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HAROLD NICOLSON: THE WAR YEARS: 1939–1945. VOLUME II OF DIARIES AND LETTERS. EDITED BY NIGEL NICOLSON. New York: Atheneum, 1967, 511 p. $8.50.

The noted writer's wartime diary, historically revealing as well as entertaining for its portrait of London politics and society during the war.

UNE HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DE L'ARMÉE. I: DE PÉTAIN À PÉTAIN, 1919–1942. BY JACQUES NOBÉCOURT. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967, 332 p. Fr. 18.

A brief, popular history of the political role of the French Army and its leaders from the aftermath of victory to the antagonisms of defeat, by a well-known correspondent of *Le Monde*.

UNE HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DE L'ARMÉE. II: DE DE GAULLE À DE GAULLE, 1940–1967. BY JEAN PLANCHAIS. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967, 382 p. Fr. 18.

A useful account of the successive political involvements of the French Army from de Gaulle's proclamation of a Free France to his conflict with army leaders over Algeria. The author, *Le Monde*'s military correspondent for the last twenty years, raises some interesting questions about the army's likely role in the future when France's nuclear deterrent will become the mainstay of defense.

HISTOIRE DE L'ÉPURATION. I: DE L'INDULGENCE AUX MASSACRES, NOVEMBRE 1942–SEPTEMBRE 1944. BY ROBERT ARON. Paris: Fayard, 1967, 661 p. Fr. 24.50.

A veteran chronicler of Vichy and the liberation of France presents the first of two volumes on one of the most controversial episodes in recent French politics: the various purges of collaborators. This volume deals with the purges in North Africa and the first beginnings of them in France in 1944. Considering the complexity and importance of the subject, it is regrettable that he is fairly miserly in identifying his sources.

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. BY FRANÇOIS FEJTÖ. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, 225 p. $10.00.

A brief, somewhat uneven survey of the French Communist Party from Stalin's death to Khrushchev's fall. The author places illuminating emphasis on the relations of the French with the Italian Communist Party.

ERINNERUNGEN: 1953–1955. BY KONRAD ADENAUER. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966, 556 p. DM. 24.80.

Dr. Adenauer's second volume covers his conduct of foreign policy from 1950 to his Moscow trip in 1955. More revealing and hence more absorbing than the first volume, it is a record of his relentless drive toward achieving German equality with her Western allies. His extraordinary sense of Germany's responsibility for the past finds expression in his chapter on negotiations with Jews and the state of Israel.

BERLIN: THE WALL IS NOT FOREVER. BY ELEANOR LANSING DULLES. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967, 245 p. $6.00.

Another account of postwar Berlin, enlivened by the personal recollections of the author who, during many years at the State Department, helped shape our German policy. Her loyalty to the embattled city may in a few instances have affected her judgment of present-day trends.

WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1949–1963. BY WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, 275 p. $7.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A political scientist uses new forms of analysis to illuminate the by now familiar story of West Germany's postwar foreign policy.

THE SWASTIKA AND THE EAGLE: HITLER, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II. By James V. Compton. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 297 p. $5.95.

A scholarly elaboration on Hitler's attitude and policies toward the United States in the years before Pearl Harbor. Familiar ground.

FRANKREICH IN HITLERS EUROPA: DIE DEUTSCHE FRANKREICH-POLITIK IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By Eberhard Jäckel. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (for Institut für Zeitgeschichte), 1966, 396 p. DM. 28.

A reliable and fascinating account of German policy toward France, by a young German scholar with a grasp of problems and sources.

CHARISMA AND FACTIONALISM IN THE NAZI PARTY. By Joseph Nyomarkay. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967, 161 p. $5.00.

Interesting in analyzing Nazi factions before 1934 but not so successful in elaborating a new theory of factionalism.

BEAMTENTUM IM DRITTEN REICH. By Hans Mommsen. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (for Institut für Zeitgeschichte), 1966, 246 p. DM. 9.80.

An incisive analysis of the relations between the Nazi régime and German bureaucracy, followed by a hundred pages of carefully selected documents. An important contribution to the history of the Third Reich.

ÖSTERREICHS SOUVERÄNITÄT, NEUTRALITÄT, PROSPERITÄT. By Heinrich Siegler. Bonn: Siegler, 1967, 287 p. DM. 22.

A short, useful survey, by several hands, of the major aspects of Austrian political and economic developments since 1945.

## *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*

SOVIET FOREIGN AID. By Marshall I. Goldman. New York: Praeger, 1967, 265 p. $8.50.

Two chapters on the aid element in Soviet economic relations with other communist countries are followed by detailed examinations of Soviet aid to the U.A.R., India, Afghanistan and Indonesia and shorter accounts of Russian and Chinese activities in other less developed countries. Motives, techniques and results are looked at with an inquiring mind based on much first-hand observation.

UNION SOVIÉTIQUE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE. By Henri Chambre. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1967, 430 p. Fr. 36.

A French student of Marxism and the Soviet Union here deals with two problems: the economic development of the U.S.S.R. itself, and the relevance of Soviet concepts and methods to the needs of underdeveloped countries.

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: RUSSIA 1917–1967. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 115 p. $3.75.

In these George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures, Mr. Deutscher reviews with mixed feelings the achievements and failures of the Soviet Union since the Revolution. A provocative interpretation, from the Marxist perspective but in a rather different vein from the author's earlier post-Stalin writings.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KHRUSHCHEV. By Mark Frankland. New York: Stein and Day, 1967, 213 p. $6.95.

This "essay in biography" by the former Moscow correspondent for the London *Observer* is particularly useful in its account of the last phases of Khrushchev's remarkable career.

LE POUVOIR EN U.R.S.S.: DU DÉCLIN DE KHROUCHTCHEV À LA DIRECTION COLLECTIVE. By Michel Tatu. Paris: Grasset, 1967, 604 p. Fr. 35.

A solid study by a correspondent of *Le Monde* of the decline of Khrushchev's position, his fall and his replacement by a collegial system. The author was in Moscow from 1957 to 1964.

SOVIET LEADERS. Edited by George W. Simmonds. New York: Crowell, 1967, 405 p. $10.00.

Biographical sketches, by a number of hands, of 42 prominent contemporary Soviet figures in the fields of political, military and foreign affairs, science and philosophy, and the arts.

STALIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 661 p. $12.50 (Paper, $2.95).

This second edition of a well-known biography first published in 1949 is virtually unchanged—Mr. Deutscher found little to change—with the exception of an extensive postscript covering Stalin's last years.

WILLIAM C. BULLITT AND THE SOVIET UNION. By Beatrice Farnsworth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967, 244 p. $7.50.

A concise, informative monograph on the late diplomat's attitudes toward and relations with revolutionary Russia, from his ill-starred mission of 1919 through his bitter disillusionment as Ambassador in the 1930s. Based on considerable use of unpublished documents.

AMERICANS AND THE SOVIET EXPERIMENT, 1917–1933. By Peter G. Filene. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 389 p. $7.95.

An informative history of the evolution of attitudes in various groups of American society toward the Soviet Union during the years of non-recognition and of marked changes in both the Russian and American scenes.

THE SOVIET MILITARY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY. By Roman Kolkowicz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 429 p. $9.00.

A very substantial study, analytical and historical, of the ambiguous and changing relationship between the Communist Party and the military establishment in the Soviet Union.

DISARMAMENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET LAW. By Harold J. Berman and Peter B. Maggs. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications, 1967, 154 p. $7.50.

An analysis of Soviet law with respect to its relevance, as a channel for, or an obstacle to, disarmament inspection.

ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. New York: Praeger (in association with the Central Asian Research Centre, London), 1967, 272 p. $7.00.

An historical survey, by two leading specialists, of the vicissitudes of the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union during and since the Russian Revolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 1801–1917. By Hugh Seton-Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 813 p. $10.00.

In this third volume of the Oxford History of Modern Europe, Professor Seton-Watson has presented a massive and balanced general survey of Russian history from the accession of Alexander I to the end of the monarchy in the February Revolution.

THE SOVIET BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT. By Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 599 p. $9.95.

A considerably revised and enlarged edition of an important study, first published in 1960.

SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNISM: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES. Edited by Donald W. Treadgold. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967, 452 p. $10.00.

A symposium based on a conference of Russian and Chinese specialists in 1965, dealing centrally with a comparison of Soviet and Chinese Communism in their history, changes, power structure, economic policies and international behavior.

WEHEN UND WUNDER DER ZONENWIRTSCHAFT. By Hans Apel. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1966, 286 p. DM. 24.

An American economist of German origin analyzes the East German economy up to 1963 and, looking ahead, expects it to improve substantially.

THE POLITICS OF FUTILITY. By Bernard K. Johnpoll. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, 298 p. $8.75.

An investigation of the General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland during the interwar period. Critical of the policies and political premises of the Bund as a party in evading the practical task of influencing the direction of the Polish state.

THE NEW RUMANIA: FROM PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY TO SOCIALIST REPUBLIC. By Stephen Fischer-Galati. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, 126 p. $6.00.

A concise but very informative analysis of the evolution of communist Rumania, with particular and much-needed emphasis on the role of the late leader Gheorghiu-Dej, a little-known and underestimated figure.

## *The Middle East*

SUEZ. By Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 261 p. $5.95.

A fascinating and generally credible account of the British side of the Suez fiasco of 1956. Its virtues and weaknesses derive from the author's method and from the time of writing, ten years after the event and thus midway between "the snipers of contemporary politics and journalism" and "the artillery of history." Many of the crucial facts and judgments of the book come from the author's conversations with cabinet ministers, advisers and others who cannot be specifically named. None of the principal actors comes out with much glory, least of all the Prime Minister.

THE SHAPING OF THE ARABS: A STUDY IN ETHNIC IDENTITY. By Joel Carmichael. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 407 p. $7.95.

Sweeping through history from Muhammad to Nasser, a journalist and political analyst undertakes the impossible task of disentangling the strands of religion, language, cultural identity and political and social organization in the "shaping" of the Arabs over the centuries. The modern and contemporary periods get rather

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

routine and cursory treatment. Drawing on established authorities for data, the author provides his own interpretations, which are stimulating and controversial.

EGYPT. By Gordon Waterfield. New York: Walker, 1967, 230 p. $6.50.

A brisk popular tour through Egyptian history from the Pharaohs to Arab socialism by a veteran British journalist. The final sixty pages cover the period since 1952, with a generally sympathetic but occasionally skeptical view of Nasser's leadership.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN LEBANON: THE CHALLENGE OF A FRAGMENTED POLITICAL CULTURE. By Michael W. Suleiman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, 326 p. $7.50.

A scholarly, documented description and analysis of Lebanon's nineteen parties, legal and illegal. Not a political history, it tells a great deal about the politics of Lebanon and, because some of the parties ignore existing frontiers, the politics of other Arab states as well.

THE END OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE? By Georges Friedmann. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 307 p. $5.95.

The main theme is the difference between Jew and Israeli; the method is part scholarly inquiry, part personal observation; the author is a distinguished French sociologist. The result is a stimulating, even provocative, book. The French edition appeared in 1965.

THE ISRAEL-SYRIAN ARMISTICE: PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION, 1949–1966. By N. Bar-Yaacov. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1967, 377 p.

While the conclusions of this work of solid research consistently support official Israeli positions, the individual chapters provide detailed factual treatment of all the main items of dispute: drainage of Lake Hula, the use of Jordan water, the demilitarized zones, infiltration and reprisal, etc. Valuable background for any consideration of the broader Arab-Israel conflict.

MODERN YEMEN: 1918–1966. By Manfred W. Wenner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 257 p. $6.95.

Yemen's politics, national and international, especially during the reigns of the Imams Yahya and Ahmad, based on both Western and Arabic sources. Following a chapter devoted to the civil war of the 1960s the author suggests that the establishment of a "constitutional Imamate" might be a solution.

OMAN SINCE 1856: DISRUPTIVE MODERNIZATION IN A TRADITIONAL ARAB SOCIETY. By Robert Geran Landen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 488 p. $12.50.

A scholarly political and economic history of Muscat and Oman, primarily during the latter half of the nineteenth century, with a brief chapter on more recent developments. An extensive annotated bibliography is included.

AFGHANISTAN. By John C. Griffiths. New York: Praeger, 1967, 179 p. $5.00.

Brief but balanced treatment of current political and social problems, particularly those of disunity versus cohesion and traditionalism versus modernization. The author also weighs both Soviet influence on Afghanistan and the latter's ability to retain its highly prized neutrality and independence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA. By W. K. Fraser-Tytler. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 362 p. $7.20.

Third edition of a classic volume (originally published in 1950) on the history, diplomacy and strategic importance of this Central Asian kingdom by a one-time British Minister in Kabul. Revised, and with a final chapter which brings the story up to 1964, by M. C. Gillett.

## *South and Southeast Asia*

THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM. By George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis. New York: Dial Press, 1967, 465 p. $5.95.

The authors, both of Cornell, interviewed Vietnamese and Westerners and analyzed relevant documentary materials. Their purpose was to provide essential facts for a better understanding of the developments leading to the present Viet Nam situation. They assert that the U.S. Administration, by withholding information or rendering it out of context, has presented a "seriously distorted picture."

THE QUICKSAND WAR: PRELUDE TO VIETNAM. By Lucien Bodard. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1967, 372 p. $7.95.

"L'Enlisement" and "L'Humiliation," concerning the Viet Nam crisis from the end of World War II to 1950, translated and condensed into one volume. The author, a highly regarded foreign correspondent with years of experience in Asia, harshly criticizes U.S. as well as French involvement in the area.

HO CHI MINH ON REVOLUTION. Edited by Bernard B. Fall. New York: Praeger, 1967, 389 p. $6.95.

The late Bernard Fall edited these writings covering the period 1920–1966 and showed the conflict between Ho's own love for his country and the insistent demands faced by him for furthering overall communist strategies.

BEHIND THE LINES—HANOI: DECEMBER 23, 1966–JANUARY 7, 1967. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 243 p. $4.95.

Mr. Salisbury expands his now-famous dispatches to *The New York Times* by providing background information and deeper analysis of the situations observed during his brief but fruitful trip to North Viet Nam.

THE CHINESE IN CAMBODIA. By William E. Willmott. Vancouver: Publications Centre, University of British Columbia, 1967, 132 p.

A University of British Columbia anthropologist examines the position of the Chinese community and its relation to Cambodian society on the basis of 1962–63 interviews with 250 elderly men born in China and other demographic and sociological information.

ASIA'S POPULATION PROBLEMS: WITH A DISCUSSION OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION IN AUSTRALIA. Edited by S. Chandrasekhar. New York: Praeger, 1967, 311 p. $8.50.

Essays on population facts and figures shown within the national, economic and political framework of each Asian country (in this case, including Australia), edited by the Director of the Indian Institute for Population Studies.

FRIENDS NOT MASTERS: A POLITICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Mohammad Ayub Khan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 275 p. $7.50.

A reëvaluation of the past and interpretation of significant developments which have influenced the history of Pakistan up to the 1965 presidential elections.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTION MAKING IN PAKISTAN, 1958–1962. By Edgar A. and Kathryn R. Schuler. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967, 286 p. $6.00.

A husband-wife team living nearly three years under martial law in Pakistan used English-language newspaper sources for this chronological account of public reaction to the rewriting of the 1956 constitution.

KASHMIR IN CRUCIBLE. By Prem Nath Bazaz. New Delhi: Pamposh Publications, 1967, 318 p. Rs. 24.

Mr. Bazaz finds the Kashmiris pawns in the Indo-Pakistani territorial acquisition dispute. He foresees a completely autonomous Kashmir within the framework of the Indian Constitution as a probable solution to the problem.

TIBET: A POLITICAL HISTORY. By Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 369 p. $10.00.

The author, a former government official who has been close to high-ranking lamas, attributes Tibet's fall to lack of understanding of its historical right to independence and of the true nature of priest-patron relationship. Sources include many original Tibetan documents.

## *East Asia and Pacific Ocean*

CHINA AFTER MAO. By A. Doak Barnett. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 287 p. $6.00 (Paper, $1.95).

Professor Barnett of Columbia, regarded as one of the best informed "China watchers," discusses China's unresolved problems, Mao's prescriptions for the future and succession to Mao's post. Well over half the book contains key documents translated from the Chinese.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY IN ACTION: THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH. By Alexander L. George. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 255 p. $6.95.

A RAND Corporation specialist in political and military studies examines, through interviews with 300 Chinese war prisoners in Korea in 1951, the nature and workings of the Communists' social organization, political controls and morale system to enhance and exploit the human element in the Red Army. The model, he suggests, could be applied to Southeast Asian guerrilla forces.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF CHINA. By Henry McAleavy. New York: Praeger, 1967, 392 p. $7.50.

A highly readable survey of China since 1840 by a Lecturer in Oriental Laws at the University of London who lived in China from 1935 to 1950.

APPROACHES TO MODERN CHINESE HISTORY. Edited by Albert Feuerwerker and others. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 356 p. $7.50.

Twelve essays on China's pre-1949 internal political and institutional history, intellectual life, traditional and semi-modern economy, and foreign relations, selected by the editors as a tribute to Professor John King Fairbank of Harvard.

U.S. AID TO TAIWAN: A STUDY OF FOREIGN AID, SELF-HELP, AND DEVELOPMENT. By Neil H. Jacoby. New York: Praeger, 1967, 364 p. $8.50.

An expansion of an independent evaluation commissioned by A.I.D. analyzing the results of the $1.4 billion U.S. assistance provided Taiwan from 1951 to 1965, which helped the country to achieve a self-sustaining economic growth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JAPAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM. By Robert E. Ward. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 126 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

An outstanding specialist at the University of Michigan uses the theory of comparative politics to evaluate Japan's high level of accomplishments and to point to two primary problems obstructing true parliamentary procedures: the stability and form of its political system and the conflict between the present leaders (mostly experienced elders) and the opposition, leaving "distressingly little room for maneuver or compromise."

JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE ON THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE APPROACH TOWARD ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION. By Leon Hollerman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 291 p. $7.50.

An identification of the structural difficulties of the Japanese economy during the process of liberalization of its trade and payments, together with an evaluation of the policies with which that liberalization has been associated.

TOJO: THE LAST BANZAI. By Courtney Browne. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, 260 p. $6.95.

Mr. Browne, with Rediffusion Television in England since 1958, relies heavily on the Proceedings of the International Tribunal (Far East), the Kido diaries and Konoye memoirs to depict the life of this archetype of Japanese militarists who was hanged, December 23, 1948.

THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1938–1965. By Alan Watt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 387 p. $11.50.

The Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs examines his country's consciousness of drastic changes in world situations, its ability to adapt successfully to meet these changes and the adequacy of methods used in its diplomatic contacts with other nations.

MASK OF ASIA: THE PHILIPPINES TODAY. By George Farwell. New York: Praeger, 1967, 227 p. $6.95.

A history of the Philippines, including chapters on the role of the Muslims, prospects of political union with Malaysia and Indonesia and impediments to agricultural and political development.

PHILIPPINE COLLABORATION IN WORLD WAR II. By David Joel Steinberg. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967, 235 p. $7.50.

A sympathetic study of the loyalty crisis in a country on the verge of gaining its independence, where choice lay between collaboration with its Japanese conquerors and support for the U.S.

## *Africa*

AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By William A. Hance. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1967, 326 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.50).

While giving an overall picture of staggering underdevelopment, Professor Hance's revision of his 1958 book isolates certain pockets of measurable progress which encourage one's view of Africa's long-run prospects. This country-by-country survey carries the analysis up to the developments of the mid-sixties.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL REFORM: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MOROCCO, TUNISIA, AND PAKISTAN. By Douglas E. Ashford. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 439 p. $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A solid comparative study which gets to the roots of some of the problems obstructing steady development in the new nations. The focus is the lower levels of politics and action where institutional patterns and public attitudes may have but slight relevance to national policies, yet are crucial to their success.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA: THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS. By Jacques Berque. New York: Praeger, 1967, 422 p. $12.50.

First published in French in 1962, this penetrating study by a distinguished Arabist combines literary quality with knowledge of the area.

INDEPENDENT AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION. By L. C. B. Gower. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 154 p. $3.95.

This expansion of the 1966 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard takes a fresh, pragmatic and open-minded look at the impact of the colonial experience upon English-speaking Africa, and assesses the post-independence innovations and alterations in institutions and practices. The author was formerly a professor of law both at the University of London and at the University of Lagos, Nigeria.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY PAPERS ON AFRICA: TRANSITION IN AFRICAN POLITICS. Edited by Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno. New York: Praeger (for the African Studies Center, Boston University), 1967, 342 p. $15.00.

A collection of generally first-rate essays, treating in considerable detail such topics as trade unionism, political parties, ideology, and corruption in local government.

AFRICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY. By Rupert Emerson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 117 p. $4.50 (Paper, $1.95).

An up-to-date survey of relations between sub-Saharan Africa and the United States by an eminent student of African politics. The lack of analysis of U.S. policy as a response to Soviet policies in Africa is its major deficiency.

BLACK AFRICA: AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA FROM PRE-HISTORY TO INDEPENDENCE. By Russell Warren Howe. New York: Walker, 1967, 2 v. $15.00.

A sweeping, well-written survey of the highlights of sub-Saharan African history from Leakey's terrestrial ape to contemporary Pan-Africanism, intended for readers with a non-scholarly interest in Africa.

A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY GHANA. VOLUME TWO: SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE. Directed and edited by Walter Birmingham and others. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967, 271 p. $9.00.

An authoritative treatment containing detailed demographic analysis and statistical data as well as discussion of religious practices, family life, the educational system and some aspects of land tenure. Volume I dealt with the economy.

NIGERIA. By Sir Rex Niven. New York: Praeger, 1967, 268 p. $7.00.

A standard, non-academic introduction to Nigerian development from the beginning of the colonial period, by a Briton whose long service in Nigeria included several posts in the Northern Region Government up until 1962.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN NIGERIA. By Okoi Arikpo. Baltimore: Penguin, 1967, 176 p. $1.25 (Paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Secretary of the National Universities Commission and author of a cultural history of Nigeria has written a sometimes searing critique of political life in his country through the early months of 1966. The author's legal training and his use of almost exclusively British sources lead him to an overemphasis on constitutional developments.

THOUGHTS ON NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION. By Obafemi Awolowo. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 196 p. $2.00 (Paper).

The former Prime Minister of the Western Region proposes a fragmented federation of eleven states organized along linguistic lines. Written before his release from prison, this proposal for a new constitution was put forward in the period between the two 1966 coups and the Biafra secession.

ENTER GAMBIA: THE BIRTH OF AN IMPROBABLE NATION. By Berkeley Rice. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 389 p. $6.95.

A spirited, impressionistic report on the problems of Gambia by a former *Newsweek* correspondent.

MANPOWER STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LESSONS FROM ETHIOPIA. By Eli Ginzberg and Herbert A. Smith. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 188 p. $6.75.

The U.S. Agency for International Development sponsored this investigation by an American and an Israeli economist. The work contains an excellent balance of statistical and analytical material on the Ethiopian economy, to the extent that available data permit.

REVOLUTION IN ZANZIBAR. By John Okello. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967, 222 p. Shs. 8.

The leader of the January 1964 revolution, now discredited and imprisoned in Kenya, gives his version of the events surrounding the uprising. Clyde Sanger of the Manchester *Guardian* provides an excellent introduction.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA. By Ronald H. Chilcote. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 149 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A political scientist at the University of California, Riverside, has written a compact survey of Portugal's colonial theory and practice in her so-called "overseas provinces" in Africa.

LESOTHO, BOTSWANA, AND SWAZILAND: THE FORMER HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Richard P. Stevens. New York: Praeger, 1967, 294 p. $7.50.

A realistic history and analysis of contemporary developments by a Lincoln University political scientist who finds the economic and political dominance of the Republic of South Africa to be the single most important factor shaping political life in the three territories.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# SOURCE MATERIAL

*By Donald Wasson*

## I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 10022. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 10027. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 90th Congress, 1st Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

### Africa

Report of the Symposium on Industrial Development in Africa, Cairo, 27 January to 10 February, 1966. N.Y., 1966. 58 p. (E/CN.14/347.)

Report of the ECA mission on economic co-operation in Central Africa. N.Y., 1966. 212 p. (66.II.K.11.) $3.00.

Ghana's economy and aid requirements in 1967. Accra, Ministry of Information, 1967. 43 p.

Foreign investment in the Republic of South Africa, by the Unit on Apartheid. N.Y., 1967. 18 p. (67.II.K.9.) 50¢.

### Agriculture

Agricultural policies in 1966: Europe, North America, Japan. Paris, O.E.C.D., 1967. 664 p. (Agricultural Policy Reports.) $12.00.

Catalogue systématique des ouvrages [1958–1965]: Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, Bibliothèque. Brussels, Communauté Économique Européenne, 1967. 2 v. $7.00.

### Asia and Pacific Ocean

Report of the Asian Conference on Industrialization, Manila, Philippines, 6–20 December, 1965. N.Y., 1966. 105 p. (E/CN/11.719.)

Mainland China in the world economy. Hearings, Joint Economic Committee, Apr. 5–12, 1967. Washington, 1967. 248 p.

——. Report, Je. 1967. Washington, 1967. 25 p. (S. Rept. 348.)

Emergency food assistance to India. Hearings, Committee on Agriculture, House, on H.J. Res. 262 and H. J. Res. 267, Feb. 28–Mar. 2, 1967. Washington, 1967. 95 p.

——. Hearing, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, on S.J. Res. 29, Mar. 1, 1967. Washington, 1967. 32 p.

——. Act, approved Apr. 1, 1967. Washington, 1967. 2 p. (90–7—H. J. Res. 267.)

Basic development plan for the Calcutta Metropolitan District, 1966–1986. Calcutta, Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organisation, 1966. 176 p.

Economic effect of Vietnam spending. Hearings, Joint Economic Committee, Apr. 24–27, 1967. Washington, 1967. Vol. I.

——. Report, Jl. 7, 1967. Washington, 1967. 9 p. (S. Rept. 394.)

Improper practices, commodity import program, U.S. foreign aid, Vietnam. Hearings, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 53, Apr. 25–27, 1967. Washington, 1967. Pt. 1.

French reactions to American involvement in Vietnam, by J. W. Annunziata. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air Univ., Aerospace Studies Institute, Documentary Research Division, 1967. 93 p.

Continuance of civil government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Hearing, Territories and Insular Affairs Subcommittee, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, on S. 303, Feb. 2, 1967. Washington, 1967. 23 p.

——. Report, Mar. 3, 1967. Washington, 1967. 32 p. (S. Rept. 62.)

### Atlantic Community

The Atlantic alliance: current views. Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, (pursuant to S. Res. 54, 90th Cong.) May 1, 1967. Washington, 1967. 29 p. (Com. Print.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET view of NATO: speech by Leonid I. Brezhnev, April 24, 1967. Prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, (pursuant to S. Res. 54, 90th Cong.) May 8, 1967. Washington, 1967. 22 p. (Com. Print.)

### COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

UNCTAD commodity survey 1966. N.Y., 1966. 224 p. (67.II.D.9.) $3.50.

GOVERNMENT purchasing in Europe, North America and Japan: regulations and procedures. Paris, OECD, 1966. 115 p. $2.50.

IMPACT of imports and exports on American labor. Hearings, General Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Education and Labor, House, on H.R. 16831 and H.R. 17248, Aug. 29–Oct. 12, 1966. Washington, 1967. 607 p.

THE FOREIGN policy aspects of the Kennedy Round. Hearings, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 15–Apr. 5, 1967. Washington, 1967. Pt. II.

——. Report, May 1, 1967. Washington, 1967. 10 p. (Subcom. Print.)

CANADIAN automobile agreement. 1st annual report of the President to the Congress on the implementation of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, Committee on Finance, Senate, Mar. 22, 1967. Washington, 1967. 85 p. (Com. Print.)

### CULTURAL RELATIONS

INTERNATIONAL educational exchange: the opening decades, 1946–1966; a report of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Washington, Board of Foreign Scholarships, 1966. 40 p.

U.S. informational media guaranty program. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 1030, Mar. 21–Apr. 25, 1967. Washington, 1967. 119 p.

——. Report, May 16, 1967. Washington, 1967. 8 p. (S. Rept. 234.)

SOME facts and figures on the migration of talent and skills, prepared by the Staff of the Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. Washington, Dept. of State, 1967. 113 p.

### DISARMAMENT

THE UNITED Nations and disarmament 1945–1965. N.Y., 1967. 338 p. (67.I.9.)

FURTHER documents on disarmament: ninth session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 27 January to 10 May 1966. London, 1966. 257 p. (Cmnd. 3120.) 18s.6d.

UNITED States armament and disarmament problems. Hearings, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Feb. 3–Mar. 3, 1967. Washington, 1967. 181 p.

### FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

THE DEVELOPMENT of a European capital market: report of a group of experts appointed by the EEC Commission. Brussels, European Economic Community, 1966. 382 p. $4.00.

ECONOMIC policies and practices. Foreign government restraints on United States bank operations abroad (Paper No. 10.). Joint Economic Committee, Washington, 1967. 56 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

SPECIAL report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, transmitting a special report . . . , May 3, 1967. Washington, 1967. 67 p. (H. Doc. 117.)

TO AMEND the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Hearings, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, on H.R. 6649, Apr. 11–28, 1967. Washington, 1967. 144 p.

——. Report, May 11, 1967. Washington, 1967. 27 p. (H. Rept. 256.)

INTEREST equalization tax extension act of 1967. Hearings, Committee on Ways and Means, House, on H.R. 3813, Feb. 15–16, 1967. Washington, 1967. 214 p.

### INTERNATIONAL LAW

NEVER again War! A documented account of the visit to the United Nations of His Holiness Pope Paul VI with texts of the Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII *Pacem in Terris* and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. N.Y., 1965, 134 p. (65.I.27.) $5.50.

COLLECTIVE defense treaties, with maps, texts of treaties, a chronology, status of forces agreements, and comparative chart. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 10, 1967. Washington, 1967. 514 p. (Com. Print.)

THE DIPLOMATIC Relations Act of 1967. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 1577, Je. 14, 1967. Washington, 1967. 8 p.

SITES for foreign chancieries. Hearings, Subcommittee No. 3, Committee on the District of Columbia, House, on H.R. 3322 [and others.], Feb. 15–16, 1967. Washington, 1967. 117 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

### Labor

SUBJECT guide to publications of the International Labour Office, 1919–1964. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1967. 478 p. (Bibliographical Contributions, 25.)

### Outer Space

TREATY on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies: analysis and background data. Staff report, prepared for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Senate, Mar. 1967. Washington, 1967. 84 p. (Com. Print.)

NASA authorization for fiscal year 1968. Hearings, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Senate, on S. 1296, Apr. 18–27, 1967. Washington, 1967. 2 pts.

——. Report, Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, to accompany H.R. 10340, Je. 6, 1967. Washington, 1967. 194 p. (H. Rept. 338.)

### Underdeveloped Areas

THE PROMOTION of industrial standardization in developing countries: report of the United Nations Interregional Seminar, Helsingör, Denmark, 4–27 October, 1965, N.Y., 1966. 30 p. (66.II.B.12.)

WORLD Bank atlas of per capita product and population. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1966. n. p.

PEACE Corps Act amendment of 1967. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 1031, May 4, 1967. Washington, 1967. 41 p.

——. Report, May 11, 1967. Washington, 1967. 8 p. (S. Rept. 223.)

BRITAIN and the developing countries: agriculture. London, Central Office of Information, 1966. 58 p. (RF.P. 5780/66.)

### United States

WORLDWIDE military commitments. Hearings, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Feb. 21–Mar. 2, 1967. Washington, 1967. Pt. 2.

WINNING the cold war: the U.S. ideological offensive. Pt. X of hearings together with Rept. No. 5: Modern communications and foreign policy, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, pursuant to H. Res. 179, Apr. 30, 1967. Washington, 1967. 216 p. (Com. Print.)

DEPARTMENT of Defense appropriations bill, 1968. Report, Committee on Appropriations, House, to accompany H.R. 10738, Je. 9, 1967. Washington, 1967. 67 p. (H. Rept. 349.)

MILITARY procurement authorizations for fiscal year 1968. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, on S. 666, Jan. 25–Feb. 2, 1967. Washington, 1967. 965 p.

——. Act, approved Je. 5, 1967. Washington, 1967. 3 p. (90-22—S.666.)

AMENDING and extending the draft law. . . . Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, on S. 1432, Apr. 12–19, 1967. Washington, 1967. 657 p.

——. Report, May 4, 1967. Washington, 1967. 26 p. (S. Rept. 209.)

——. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, House, May 2–11, 1967. Washington, 1967. p. 1913–2719.

——. Report, Committee of Conference, House, to accompany S. 1432, Je. 8, 1967. Washington, 1967. 17 p. (H. Rept. 346.)

SELECTED economic indicators. Washington, Dept. of Defense, 1967. 3 p.

PRODUCTIVITY, prices and incomes. Materials prepared by the Committee staff for the Joint Economic Committee, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, 1967. 213 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

BACKGROUND material on economy in government—1967. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, Apr. 1967. Washington, 1967. 299 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

IMMIGRATION. Hearings, Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on the Judiciary, House, on H.R. 1 [and others], Mar. 1–8, 1967. Washington, 1967.

ENCOURAGING private participation in international activities. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R. 7484, Apr. 18–20, 1967. Washington, 1967. Pt. I.

### Western Europe

THE COUNCIL of Europe. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1967. 52 p.

STUDIES and other publications, issued under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe, 1947–1966. N.Y., 1967. 81 p. (67.II.E.4.) $1.00.

THE COMMON agricultural policy of the European Economic Community. London, 1967. 20 p. (Cmnd. 3274.) 2s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISPOSAL of United States military installations and supplies in France. Report, Subcommittee on Foreign Expenditures, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, Apr. 6, 1967. Washington, 1967. 47 p. (S. Doc. 16.)

THE FIFTH Plan, 1966–1970. N.Y., French Press and Information Service, 1967. 32 p.

DOKUMENTE zur Deutschlandpolitik. III. Reihe, Band 3: 1. Januar bis 31. Dezember 1957, ed. by Ernst Deuerlein, Gisela Biewer and Hansjürgen Schierbaum. Frankfurt am Main, Metzner (for the Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen), 1967. 3 vols. DM.114.00.

AKTEN zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945.

Serie B: 1925–1933; Band I, 1: Dezember 1925 bis Juli 1926: Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Belgien, Sowie deutsche Entwaffnung, Reparationen, Völkerbund und internationale Abrüstung. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck, 1966. 799 p. Serie D:1937–1945; Band XI, 1–2: Die Kriegsjahre, Vierter Band [1. September 1940–31. Januar 1941]. Bonn, Gebr. Hermes, 1964.

PRICES and income policy after 30th June 1967. London, 1967. 7 p. (Cmnd. 3235). 1s.

### WESTERN HEMISPHERE

A LIST of selected publications and sources of information on Canadian-American relations. Ottawa, U.S. Information Service, n. d. 75 p.

LATIN American summit conference. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S.J. Res. 53, Mar. 17–21, 1967. Washington, 1967. 163 p.

SUPPORT for a new phase of the Alliance for Progress at forthcoming meeting of the American chiefs of state. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, to accompany H.J. Res. 428, Mar. 20, 1967. Washington, 1967. 9 p. (H. Rept. 145.)

INTER-AMERICAN Development Bank Act amendments of 1967. Report, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, to accompany H.R. 9547, May 18, 1967. Washington, 1967. 32 p. (H. Rept. 266.)

THE PROCESS of industrial development in Latin America. N.Y., 1966. 272 p. (66.II.G.4.) $4.00.

REPORT of the Symposium on Industrial Development in Latin America, Santiago, Chile, 14–25 March, 1966. N.Y., 1966. 74 p. (E/CN/12/755/Rev.1.)

THE PLEBISCITE on the political status of Puerto Rico to be held on July 23, 1967. San Juan, Dept. of State of Puerto Rico, 1967. 50 p.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC data and parameters of Venezuela, 1950–1965. Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, 1967. v.p.

### WORLD WAR II

LA MARINA Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Rome, Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1966.

Vol. XVIII. La guerra di mine. 485 p. L.2200.

LE SAINT Siège et la situation religieuse en Pologne et dans les Pays Baltes, 1939–1945. Vatican City, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1967. 2 v. (Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 3.)

## II. PAMPHLETS

ADELPHI PAPERS. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. $1.00 each.

*34.* Armed forces in Central and South America, by David Wood. 24 p. *35.* The Asian balance of power: an American view, by William Chapin. 12 p. *36.* The watched and unwatched: inspection in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Arnold Kramish. 13 p. *37.* Europe in the seventies, by Curt Gasteyger. 16 p.

AGRICULTURE: THE COST OF JOINING THE COMMON MARKET, by T. K. Warley. London, Chatham House and P.E.P., 1967. 57 p. (European Series, 3.) 7s.6d.

AGRICULTURE IN TURKEY: LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND, by E. Z. Palmer. Bebek, Robert College, School of Business Administration and Economics, 1966. 165 p.

AIR TRAVEL AND COMMERCE: A STUDY OF NORTH-ATLANTIC RELATIONS. Brussels, European Airlines Research Bureau, 1967. 31 p.

AMERIKA—EIN ZU FERNER NACHBAR? By Werner Bollmann. Vorwort by K. G. Kiesinger. Stuttgart, J. Fink Verlag, 1966. 84 p. (Politikum-Reihe,20.)

AMERIKANISCHE INVESTITIONSPOLITIK IN DER EWG, by K.-H. Standke. Berlin, Beuth-Vertrieb, 1965. 111 p.

ANTIROBOTVAPEN—HOT ELLER LÖFTE? By J. J. Holst. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1967. 64 p. (Strategisk Bulletin, Vol. 3, no. 2–3.) Kr. 7.00.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: THE CRITICAL ISSUES, by J. E. Dougherty. Washington, Georgetown Univ., Center for Strategic Studies, 1966. 88 p. (Special Report Series.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE: PROPOSALS AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS, by B. M. Russett and and C. C. Cooper. Denver, Univ. of Denver (for the Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies), 1967. 62 p. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2.)

THE ATLANTIC NATIONS: CONVERGING OR DIVERGING? PROSPECTS FOR 1975; REPORT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC COLLOQUIUM HELD AT ROYAUMONT, FRANCE, JULY 7–10, 1966. Boulogne-sur-Seine, Atlantic Institute, 1967. 97 p.

THE AUTHORITY CRISIS IN CHINESE POLITICS, by L. W. Pye. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1967. 35 p.

BEHIND THE HEADLINES. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966. 35¢ each.
*Vol. XXVI. No. 1.* Keeping the peace, by R. B. Rackaberry. 26 p. No. *2.* The Mexican model, by J. D. Harbron. 20 p. *No. 4.* The issues that will not die, by Bruce Macdonald. 25 p.

BERLIN. FREIE UNIVERSITÄT. Osteuropa-Institut. Berichte. Berlin, 1967.
*76.* Analyse der Entwicklung der Handelsflotten in den Mitgliedsländern des RGW unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Zusammenarbeit auf den Gebieten des Handelsshiffsbaus und der Handelsschiffahrt, by J. F. Tismer. 77 p.

BONN. INSTITUT FINANZEN UND STEUERN. Schriftenreihe. Bonn, Author, 1967.
*86.* Die soziale Sicherung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: bisherige und künftige Entwicklung; Stand:1. März 1967. 94 p. *87.* Die deutsche Finanzpolitik im Zeichen von Stabilität und Wachstum, by F. J. Strauss. 31 p.

CAPITAL MARKETS IN ATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS, by S. E. Rolfe. Boulogne-sur-Seine, Atlantic Institute, 1967. 83 p. $1.00.

CHANGES IN ARGENTINIAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS, by D. F. Fienup. St. Paul, Univ. of Minnesota, Institute of Agriculture, 1967. 23 p. (International Agriculture Series, 5.)

THE CHILEAN POLITICAL RIGHT AND AGRARIAN REFORM: RESISTANCE AND MODERATION, by R. R. Kaufman. Washington, Operations and Policy Research, 1967. 48 p. (Political Studies, 2.)

CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE, a series sponsored by the Barnette Miller Foundation and the Mayling Soong Foundation. Wellesley, Wellesley College, 1966–67. 149 p.

THE CONDITIONS OF CIVIL VIOLENCE: FIRST TESTS OF A CAUSAL MODEL, by Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1967. 111 p. $2.50.

CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAGONISSI, GREECE, APRIL 3–8, 1966: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS. Geneva, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (European Centre), 1967.
1. Les cours d'eau internationaux. 80 p. Sw. Fr. 6.00. *2.* The concept of Jus Cogens in international law. 140 p. Sw. Fr. 6.00.

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRATEGY, by M. H. Halperin. Boston, Little, Brown, 1967. 156 p.

DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG. Sonderhefte, Neue Folge. Berlin, Duncker, 1967.
*78.* Das westberliner Handwerk 1955 bis 1965, by Uta Möbius. 91 p.

DIPLOMACY AND POWER IN WASHINGTON-PEKING DEALINGS: 1953–1967, by K. T. Young. Chicago, University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1967. 47 p.

DOCUMENTS ON THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE GDR. Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1967.
*2.* The two German states and the aggression in the Near East; from the speech made by Walter Ulbricht . . . on the occasion of an electoral assembly in Leipzig, June 15, 1967. 29 p.

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE, by J. W. Masland. N.Y., Education and World Affairs, 1967. 48 p. (Occasional Reports, 4.)

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE FOREIGN-EXCHANGE MARKET: TEST OF A THEORY, by F. R. Glahe. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Dept. of Economics, International Finance Section, 1967. 62 p. (Princeton Studies in International Finance, 20.) $1.00.

DIE EUROPÄISCHE EINIGUNG: ENTWICKLUNG UND STAND, by Alfred Jüttner. Munich, Günter Olzog Verlag, 1966. 160 p. (Geschichte und Staat, Bd. 120.) DM. 2.90.

THE FEDERAL BUDGET: ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY; FISCAL 1968 EDITION. N.Y., National Industrial Conference Board, 1967. 41 p. $15.00.

FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A TIME FOR DECISION, by G. D. Woods. N.Y., Columbia Univ., School of International Affairs, 1967. 18 p. (Gabriel Silver Memorial Lecture.)

FOREIGN STATISTICAL DOCUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, INCLUDING HOLDINGS OF THE STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES, ed. by Joyce Ball and comp. by Roberta Gardella. Stanford, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967. 173 p. (Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series, 28.) $5.00.

FOREIGN TRADE AND AMERICAN AGRICULTURE, by L. F. Hesser [and others]. Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, [1966]. 52 p.

GENERAL TASKER HOWARD BLISS AND THE "SESSIONS OF THE WORLD," 1919, by D. F. Trask. Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1966. 80 p. (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 56, Pt. 8.) $2.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERICHTSHOF FÜR EUROPA? VORAUSSETZUNGEN UND MÖGLICHTEITEN DER GRÜNDUNG EINES OBERSLEN EUROPÄISCHEN GERICHTSHOFS MIT ALLGEMEINER KOMPETENZ, by Hans Wiebringhaus. Leiden, Sijthoff, 1967. 129 p. (Europäische Aspekte; Reihe E: Recht, 6.) Gldrs. 7.50.

GOLD: BARBAROUS RELIC OR USEFUL INSTRUMENT? By M. A. Kriz. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Dept. of Economics, International Finance Section, 1967. 41 p. (Essays in International Finance, 60.)

HEADLINE SERIES. N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1967.
*182.* Understanding the international monetary system, by Elliot Zupnick. 63 p. 75¢. *183.* The new states of Africa, by Arnold Rivkin. 63 p. 85¢.

INDUSTRY IN PUERTO RICO, prepared by the Economic Research Division of the Chase Manhattan Bank. N.Y., Chase Manhattan Bank, 1967. 32 p.

INPUT-OUTPUT-RECHNUNG: INVESTITIONSVERFLECHTUNG IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1950 BIS 1970, by Dieter Mertens and Wolfgang Kirner. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot (for the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), 1967. 79 p. (DIW-Beiträge zur Strukturforschung, 1.)

LA INTEGRACION LATINOAMERICANA: SITUACION Y PERSPECTIVAS, by Rómulo Almeida [and others]. Buenos Aires, Instituto para la Integración de America Latina, 1965. 217 p.

INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS PROBLEMS: A SYMPOSIUM. Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1966. 203 p.

INTERNATIONALRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DES EWG-WETTBEWERBSRECHTS, by Eric Homburger and Hans Jenny. Bern, Verlag Stümpfli & Cie, 1966. 140 p.

INTRODUKTION TILL SOVJETSAMHÄLLET, by G. Nordenstam and P. G. Ennerfelt. Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967. 122 p. Kr. 18.

ISAN: REGIONALISM IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND, by C. F. Keyes. Ithaca, Cornell Univ., Dept. of Asian Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1967. 86 p. (Cornell Thailand Project, Interim Reports Series, 10.) $2.00.

JAPAN AS A MARKET & SOURCE OF SUPPLY, by G. C. Allen. N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1967. 140 p. $3.75.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF EASTERN EUROPE: A FIRST HAND REPORT BY A STUDY MISSION OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS. N.Y., Stephen Wise Congress House, 1967. 72 p.

KIELER STUDIEN. Forschungsberichte des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1967.
*80.* Wirtschaftsplanung und Wirtschaftswachstum in Frankreich, by Lotte Müller-Ohlsen. 178 p. DM 36.00. *81.* Die interindustrielle und interregionale Verflechtung der Wirtschaft des Landes Schleswig-Holstein: Versuch der Erstellung einer Input-Output-Tabelle für ein einzelnes Bundesland, by Berndt Lehbert. 89 p. DM. 30.00.

KIELER VORTRÄGE. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel, 1966–67. DM. 3.00 each.
*47.* Forschungsplanung: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, by Gerhard Stoltenberg. 13 p. *48.* Deutsche Presse zwischen Konzentration und Subvention, by Axel Springer. 20 p. *49.* Die weltwirtschaftlichen Aspekte des internationalen Luftverkehrs, by Hans Süssenguth. 21 p.

DIE KURZFRISTIGE INTERNATIONALE KREDITHILFE, by Hans Meyer. Zurich, Polygraphisher Verlag, 1966. 137 p. (Veröffentlichungen der Hochschule St. Gallen für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften: Volkswirtschaftlich-wirtschaftsgeographische Reihe,8.)

LATEINAMERIKAS EXPORTFINANZIERUNG IM WANDEL: ANPASSUNG AN EINE NEUE EXPORTSTRUKTUR, by H.-J. Hartmann. Hamburg, Übersee-Verlag, 1966. 80 p. (Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Iberoamerika-Kunde, 8.)

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, by Leonard Binder. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1967. 27 p.

THE MONETARY MECHANISM OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT, by R. A. Mundell. London, University of Surrey, 1967. 22 p. (International Economics, 1.) 4s.6d.

NEW PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE OF DEVELOPMENT, by N. T. Wang. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Dept. of Economics, International Finance Section, 1967. 27 p. (Essays in International Finance, 59.)

OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. Kingston, Univ. of Rhode Island, 1967.
*1.* India's reaction to the Hungarian Revolution: an appraisal, by A. B. Stein. 13 p. *2.* Messianic influences in Israeli foreign policy, by Samuel Decalo. 16 p.

DIE OSTASIENFORSCHUNG IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, by Fritz Opitz. Hamburg, Institut für Asienkunde, 1967. 61 p. (Mitteilungen, 18.)

OUR ACHILLES HEEL: WORLD LIQUIDITY, by H. Christian Sonne. n.pl., Author, 1967. 84 p.

PRESENT SYSTEM OF TRADE AND PAYMENTS VERSUS FULL EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE STATE, by Eprime Eshag. N.Y., Kelley, 1966. 42 p. $3.00.

PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCENE, by Gyula Kallai. Prague, Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1967. 54 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL AND WORLD AFFAIRS, by the Committee on the Professional School and World Affairs. N.Y., Education and World Affairs, 1967.
Report of the Task Force on Business Administration and Public Administration. 112 p. Report of the Task Force on Agriculture and Engineering. 110 p. Report of the Task Force on Law. 64 p.

PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT WORLD AFFAIRS, by J. P. Robinson. Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1967. 69 p.

REALIDADES E IDEALES DE AMÉRICA LATINA, by P. Olmedo Sánchez. São Paulo, Editôra "Ave Maria," 1967. 79 p.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN RECENT TURKISH POLITICS, by Ergun Özbudun. Cambridge, Harvard Univ., Center for International Affairs, 1966. 54 p. (Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 14.) $1.25.

THE RULE OF LAW IN AN UNRULY WORLD, by A. J. Goldberg. N.Y., Columbia Univ., School of International Relations, 1966. 20 p. (Adlai E. Stevenson Memorial Lecture.)

SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING IN WESTERN EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES; THE FOURTH WOOLWICH ECONOMIC LECTURE. . ., by Gisèle Podbielski. Woolwich, Woolwich Polytechnic, 1967. 26 p. (Woolwich Economic Papers, 12.) 3s.6d.

SOVIET NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES, by G. D. Hollander. Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security, 1967. 137 p.

SPAIN AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945–1950, by R. E. Sanders. N.Y., Vantage, 114 p. $2.75.

THE STERLING AREA, THE COMMONWEALTH AND WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH, by J. O. N. Perkins. London, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967. 120 p. (University of Cambridge, Dept. of Applied Economics Occasional Papers, 11.)

THE STERLING PROBLEM AND THE SIX, by Susan Strange. London, Chatham House and P.E.P. 1967. 70 p. (European Series, 4.) 7s.6d.

STRATEGIC SURVEY 1966. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 39 p.

TEORÍA REALIDAD Y POSIBILIDAD DE LA ALALC EN LA INTEGRACIÓN ECONÓMICA LATINOAMERICANA, by V. L. Urquidi. Mexico City, El Colegio de México, 1966. 60 p. (Jornadas, 61.)

TRADE BETWEEN COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD; statement adopted by the Executive Committee and report of the Commission on the Expansion of International Trade. Paris, International Chamber of Commerce, 1967. 23 p. (Brochures, 243.)

TRADE POLICY TOWARD LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES, prepared in association with the European Committee for Economic and Social Progress, Japan Committee for Economic Development, Political and Economic Planning (Britain), and Industrial Council for Social and Economic Studies (Sweden). N.Y., Committee for Economic Development, 1967. 44 p. (A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee.) $1.00.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN GEOGRAPHY AND RELATED SOCIAL AND NATURAL SCIENCES, by C. L. Vinge and A. G. Vinge. Totowa, N.J., Littlefield, Adams, 1967. 360 p. $3.45.

VÄRLDSPOLITIKENS DAGSFRÅGOR. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1967.
*2–3.* EEC i arbete, by John Ekström. 72 p. Kr. 5.20. *4.* Kinesiska toppfigurer, by Hans Granqvist. 32 p. Kr. 2.60. *5.* Albanien i storpolitiken, by L. E. Blomqvist. 32 p. Kr. 2.60.

VIETNAM: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL, by Howard Zinn. Boston, Beacon Press, 1967. 131 p. $1.25.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM, prepared by the Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1967. 62 p. $1.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# The definitive firsthand account of World War II's least known operation has just been published.

# Perhaps it's not too late.

Early in 1942, Milton E. Miles, career officer in the U.S. Navy was sent to China under secret orders: to establish weather stations and do what he could to hurt the Japanese.

By war's end, "Mary" Miles's men — the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) — numbered 2500 Americans and thousands of Chinese fishermen, pirates, police, and guerrillas. Not only had they reported on the weather and on Japanese fleet movements, they had killed tens of thousands of the enemy and wreaked havoc on his supply lines. This despite continual lack of cooperation and even harassment from American Army, State Department, and OSS sources.

On his retirement in 1958, Vice Admiral Miles began to set down his story of this bizarre affair. At his death in 1961, the manuscript was complete but in a state of voluminous disarray. Hawthorne Daniel has now succeeded in organizing it, while cutting nothing. What has emerged is a heretofore unknown tale of heroic endurance and superhuman achievement, and a scathing denunciation of wartime and post-war U.S. policies in China.

"What happened to SACO, and what the gallant men of SACO caused to happen, are important to an understanding of World War II events. What is set down here is important to an understanding of any conflict in Asia, and it is important now."—*Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, Ret.*

**A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR**
**Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles, USN**
as prepared by Hawthorne Daniel
from the original manuscript
*$7.95 at all booksellers*

**DOUBLEDAY**



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# The BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
## focuses on world affairs

### A WORLD OF NATIONS
**Problems of Political Modernization**

*Dankwart A. Rustow*

An inquiry into the politics of nationhood and modernization, the twin drives that have precipitated the end of colonial empires in Asia and Africa and hastened social change in Latin America. This study compares the political experience of emerging nations with earlier experiences in Europe, North America, Russia, and Japan, and analyzes salient elements of the modern nation-state: the search for unity, the growth of governmental authority, and the demand for civic participation.

**LC 67-26139** **306 pp. $7.95**

### CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES
**Long-Range Perspectives**

*John Plank, Editor*

A distinguished collection of essays providing a context, historical and global, within which the reader can interpret the unfolding Cuban story and the alternatives confronting the United States in its relations with that nation. The authors concern themselves not with yesterday's headlines, but with enduring aspects of the Cuban situation in its many dimensions. Contributors are Raymond Aron, Alfred Grosser, Hanson W. Baldwin, Raymond Carr, Leon Lipson, Bayless Manning, Kalman H. Silvert, Robert F. Smith, J. Wilner Sundelson, Tad Szulc, and Henry Wriston, with an introduction by John Plank of the Brookings Senior Staff.

**LC 67-21483** **265 pp. $6.75**

### ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

*Harry G. Johnson*

UNCTAD II, scheduled for early 1968, will be faced with the issues raised but not resolved at the 1964 meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Professor Johnson's study provides the necessary political, economic, and institutional background for an informed public consideration of the issues and discusses the policy alternatives open to the United States. "Combining the intellectuality of a Brahmin with a Falstaffian appetite for sociability, Johnson is one of the brightest lights in the firmament of economics . . . an irreverent and thoroughly brilliant book."—The Washington Post.

**LC 67-14972** **279 pp. $6.75**

### DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS OBSERVED

*Albert O. Hirschman*

A first-hand independent study of eleven selected projects financed by the World Bank, ranging from electric power in El Salvador to irrigation in Italy and telecommunications in Ethiopia, with special attention given to the ways in which decision-making is molded, activated or hampered by the specific nature of the project. "The author has come up with an enormous bag of striking insights of such importance that they cannot help but be of lasting value to social science."—Charles E. Lindblom, Yale University.

**LC 67-27683**

**194 pp. Cloth $5.00 Paper $2.25**

**You may obtain any of these books from your bookstore—or, order direct by writing to:**
**Publications Division**

# The BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
**1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.**
**WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036**




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# 1931
## —Nobody believed . . .



# 1967
## —A repeat performance?

Three years before Hitler took power, Karl Jaspers, Germany's most prominent philosopher, exposed the seeds of dictatorship within the German political structure. In *Man in the Modern Age* he foretold the coming of Nazism. No one listened!

Today, Dr. Jaspers finds Germany moving rapidly from democracy to oligarchy and possibly to dictatorship again. Hannah Arendt judges this to be politically the most important book to come out of postwar Germany.

The German edition of THE FUTURE OF GERMANY has been on the bestseller list for over a year.

## THE FUTURE OF GERMANY
**by**
## Karl Jaspers

**Introduction by Hannah Arendt**

**Translated and Edited by E. B. Ashton**

**$5.00**

***Now in paperback . . .***

**AMERICA'S FAILURE IN CHINA, 1941-50**
**Tang Tsou**

America championed China for half a century. By 1950 China was a hostile power. In an attempt to explain this paradox, Tang Tsou "sets the stage admirably for the study of Sino-American relations as contact-and-conflict between civilizations — an effort that is long overdue and increasingly needed."—JOHN K. FAIRBANK. 2 vol. set, ea. vol. $2.45; cloth $12.50

**THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION**
**David E. Apter**

An arresting analysis, which finds that Western-type liberal democracies have proved the least successful and efficient forms of government for emerging nations. "One of the most stimulating and important books in political science to have appeared in recent years." — *The Manchester Guardian.*
$2.95; cloth $7.50

**UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Random House— a window on Foreign Affairs

**HOUSE OF BONDAGE**
By ERNEST COLE with Thomas Flaherty. Introduction by Joseph Lelyveld. A black South African photographer's searing exposé—in an eloquent text and powerful, infuriating pictures—of what life is really like in his homeland today. *A Ridge Press-Random House Book.* $10

**THE DOLLAR AND WORLD LIQUIDITY**
By ROBERT V. ROOSA. The former Under Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy Administration assesses the problems confronting the U.S. dollar. Will be used at the International Monetary Reform meeting. $7.95

**SUEZ: TEN YEARS AFTER**
By PETER CALVOCORESSI. Verbatim broadcast interviews with Nasser, Ben-Gurion, and other key British, French, Egyptian, and Israeli participants in the 1956 Suez crisis—filled with insight and hindsight. *A Pantheon Book.* published by arrangement with the BBC. $3.95

**THE LAST, BEST HOPE**
Eduardo Frei and Chilean Democracy. By LEONARD GROSS. A shrewd, thoughtful analysis of the society, the problems, and the prospects of today's Chile—which has become, under Frei, a test case for Latin American democracy. $5.95

**THAILAND**
The War That Is, the War That Will Be By LOUIS LOMAX. This is an appalling portrait of another Vietnam in the making: the first full account of our political and military involvement in Thailand—based on interviews with hundreds of Thais, and with American servicemen there. $4.95

**CHINA LOOKS AT THE WORLD**
By FRANÇOIS GEOFFROY-DECHAUME. A distinguished French expert on the Orient shows why the Western and Soviet confrontation with Red China is a conflict not merely between ideologies but between civilizations—and points the way toward understanding. *A Pantheon Book.* $4.95

**A CARTOON HISTORY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR I**
Edited by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION. Introduction by Richard Rovere. America's diplomatic history over the past half century, as seen, argued, and mocked by Herblock, Mauldin, Kirby, Ding, and other masters of the editorial cartoon. With 300 cartoons. $6.95

NOW AT YOUR BOOKSTORE
RANDOM HOUSE



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

## Louis J. Halle
## THE COLD WAR AS HISTORY

GEORGE F. KENNAN says, "Louis Halle has done a very rare and difficult thing: which is to look at a recent period of history as though it were a hundred years in the past. He has given us, in this serene, detached and thoughtful treatise, a view on the cold war that will have a lasting effect on the treatment of the cold war in historical literature." ADOLF A. BERLE: "The most important commentary on the Cold War in recent years." $6.95

## Herbert J. Muller
## ADLAI STEVENSON
A STUDY IN VALUES

The distinguished author of FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN WORLD presents a penetrating – and admiring – assessment of Stevenson's impact on history in terms of his efforts to adapt the democratic tradition to an age of revolution. $6.95

## Caroline F. Ware, Jan Marius Romein and K. M. Panikkar
## THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
HISTORY OF MANKIND, VOLUME VI

A new volume in the global history sponsored by UNESCO which *The New York Times* hailed as "a grand and unparalleled publishing venture." Covering the arts and sciences as well as political and social history, it describes with authority and eloquence man's extraordinary experiences in the first half of our century. With more than 98 illustrations, maps and charts. $18.50

## Richard P. Stebbins
## THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1966

The latest volume in an authoritative series discusses the mounting conflict in Vietnam and its world-wide repercussions, as well as readjustments in NATO and U.S. policy in the UN and throughout the world. With maps, cartoons, documentary references, and a world chronology of significant events. PUBLISHED FOR THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. $6.95

## DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1966

With ELAINE P. ADAM. U.S. foreign policy is expertly discussed and annotated in the latest volume of a well-established series. Cross references to THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS and a five-year cumulative index enhance the permanent utility of this volume for all serious students. PUBLISHED FOR THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. $9.50

150th ANNIVERSARY

AT ALL BOOKSTORES

Harper & Row New York, N. Y. 10016




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Oxford University Press

## African Integration and Disintegration

*CASE STUDIES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNION*

*Edited by* ARTHUR HAZLEWOOD, *Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics.* Economic integration and the formation of common markets is vital for the developing African nations. Here is the first book to analyze in detail the experiences and problems of economic and political unity in the various regions of tropical Africa. Among the subjects covered are: the Equatorial Customs Union, the East African common market, the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and pan-Africanism and integration. (*Royal Institute of International Affairs.*) *9 maps.* $10.10

## The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957

*A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION*

*By* ROBERT S. JORDAN, *George Washington University.* Looking beyond NATO's public image as representing military preparedness, this study examines one very important aspect of NATO's functioning that has not yet been written about: the detailed working and role of the leading civilian agencies—the Council, the Office of the Secretary-General, and the International Staff/Secretariat. *21 tables.* $9.60

## Economic Co-operation in Africa

*RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT*

*By* R. H. GREEN, *Makerere University College; and* K. G. V. KRISHNA, *University College, Nairobi.* Based on the International Seminar on Economic Co-operation in Africa held at University College, Nairobi, in December, 1965, the authors here present a synthesis of the ideas, concepts, and applications which emerged from the discussions. This practical volume presents lines of action, institutions, constitutional frameworks and means for resolving conflicts which can provide the basis for actual initiation of new or reformed economic groupings in Africa. *Paper,* $2.50

## Defeat in the East

*By* MICHAEL ELLIOTT-BATEMAN, *University of Manchester.* This vigorous book urges radical revision of the methods of warfare used by Western forces in South East Asia, in the hope of diverting the trend towards their defeat in the East. The book cites historic victories won by forces smaller and weaker in arms and illuminates the psychology behind them by reviewing the theories of Mao Tse-Tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap and showing how they have been vindicated. $7.20

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

A-38


LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Oxford University Press

## William Henry Seward

*By* GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, *University of Rochester.* "Historians will welcome this important, judicious, and well-written biography. A new study of Seward has been badly needed, and no scholar was better qualified to write it than Glyndon G. Van Deusen."—DON E. FEHRENBACHER, Stanford University. "Van Deusen's life of William Seward fulfills the high expectations of those who have read his biographies of Weed and Greeley . . . brilliant."—DAVID ELLIS, Hamilton College. *16 pages of halftones.* $12.50

## The Russian Empire

*1801–1917*

*By* HUGH SETON-WATSON, *University of London.* This third volume in *The Oxford History of Modern Europe* surveys the development of the Russian empire from the reign of Alexander I to the abdication of Nicholas II. The focus is on political and social history—the history of institutions, classes, political movements, and individuals. The book draws on a large body of Russian documentary material, and the important work of Soviet and foreign scholars in recent decades. *17 maps.* $10.00

## Friends Not Masters

*A POLITICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY*

*By* MOHAMMAD AYUB KAHN, *President of Pakistan.* Here is a rare event; a book written by a head of state and head of government when in office. It is both Mohammad Ayub Khan's biography and an intimate description of the major events in the history of Pakistan. The major part of the book describes the revolution of 1958, the reforms the author introduced, and Pakistan's attitudes towards India and the world. Of special importance are the chapters on foreign policy explaining the author's reaction to increasing Indian military capability after the Indo-Chinese clashes of 1962. *33 halftones, 2 maps.* $7.50

## The Unfinished Revolution

*RUSSIA, 1917–1967*

*By* ISAAC DEUTSCHER. "The most perceptive and illuminating work of its kind, either currently in print or likely to be published in the foreseeable future. I know of no other account which presents with such insight and in such highly readable prose a survey of the origins and course of the Russian Revolution, the current structure of Soviet society, the dilemmas and problems of the Kremlin, the course of Sino-Soviet relations, and the issues of present and prospective relations between the Soviet Union and the West."—FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College $3.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

A-39


LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# WASHINGTON PAPERBACKS ON RUSSIA AND ASIA

## Soviet and Chinese Communism

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Edited with an Introduction by Donald W. Treadgold. Twenty of the Western world's most distinguished authorities on the Soviet Union and Communist China provide an illuminating analysis of the ideological, political, and economic issues underlying the controversy between the two Communist giants. 416 pages. Cloth, $10.00. WPRA-2, $3.95

## The Development of the USSR

AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

Edited with an Introduction by Donald W. Treadgold. "The debate is conducted on the highest level. . . . As a result the reader, whatever his specialty, will profit from the wide range of contributions in history, political science, economics, and literature."—*Slavic and East European Journal*. 474 pages. Cloth, $7.50. WPRA-1, $3.95

## Rural China

IMPERIAL CONTROL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Kung-chuan Hsiao. "On the 'must read' lists of students of politics, social organization, anthropology, and world affairs . . . a well-balanced, comprehensive picture of a rural society caught up in a process of decay and tortured stagnation."—*American Political Science Review*. "A triumph rare in historical scholarship."—*Journal of Southeast Asian History*. 797 pages. Cloth, $10.00. WPRA-3, $4.95

## The Chinese Gentry

STUDIES ON THEIR ROLE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINESE SOCIETY

Chung-li Chang; Introduction by Franz Michael. "An important contribution to the institutional history of recent China. Its conscientious research goes far to establish the China of yesterday as a root of modern pre-Communist and Communist China."—*American Historical Review*. 272 pages. Cloth, $7.50. WPRA-4, $2.95

## Mao's China

PARTY REFORM DOCUMENTS, 1942-44

Translation and Introduction by Boyd Compton. The "Mein Kampf" of Chinese Communism—". . . Should arouse the interest of everyone—specialist and nonspecialist—whose curiosity about Communist China has been stimulated by recent events."—*American Political Science Review*. 332 pages. Cloth, $6.50. WP-4, $2.95

**UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS** Seattle and London



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



**Timely and significant books from VIKING**

# THE CASE FOR ISRAEL

## by FRANK GERVASI
## Introduction by ABBA EBAN, Foreign Minister of Israel

An authoritative historical and political analysis of why Israel fought the war with her Arab neighbors in June 1967, why she fought the wars preceding it, and what her hopes for the future of the peace in the Middle East have been and continue to be. In its view of the Arab world, *The Case for Israel* is not a case against the Arab people, but a documentation of the follies of Arab leadership.

The Israeli government has cooperated fully in providing documentation. Material contributed includes copies of captured Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian military plans for the conquest and destruction of Israel, and the substance of Israeli memoranda outlining Israel's design for peace in the Middle East, with detailed recommendations for the settlement of Arab refugees, and for the establishment and protection of irrigation and navigational rights for all nations involved.

Mr. Gervasi, a veteran journalist, foreign correspondent, and author of, among other books, *To Whom Palestine?* (1946), made a special trip to Israel to authenticate factual material for this absorbing new work. Because of its importance, the book has been made simultaneously available in both paper and cloth.

*Paper edition $1.95* *Cloth edition $4.50*

●

# PAX AMERICANA

## by RONALD STEEL

". . . the most persuasive critique of American foreign policy over the last 20 years that has yet appeared. Though primarily concerned with the conduct of the cold war, Mr. Steel explores almost every phase of American foreign policy—our relations with Latin America, for example, and with Germany, and our programs of economic aid throughout the globe . . . "—HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, *N.Y. Times* $6.95

# ABUSE OF POWER

## by THEODORE DRAPER

"This documented and responsible indictment of American policy . . . is invaluable for all citizens who are increasingly apprehensive about our tragic involvement in a civil war in an obscure nation in southeast Asia, which is costing billions of dollars and thousands of American soldiers' lives."—REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Cloth edition $4.95
Paper edition $1.95

**THE VIKING PRESS** 625 Madison Avenue, N.Y. 10022



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

## *The China White Paper*

**AUGUST 1949**

*With a New Introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke.* A reissue of the original State Department publication, with an extensive Index prepared for this edition. The work begins with a 400-page summary of American China policy down to the summer of 1949; the remainder of the volume consists of over 600 pages of official documents, most of which were highly classified until the date of publication.

November. Paper, 2 volumes, $5.95; cloth, 1 volume, $15.00

## *Enemies and Friends*

**THE UNITED FRONT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY**

*Lyman P. Van Slyke*

For over forty years the united front has played an important part in the political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party. This book traces the theory and practice of the united front in China since 1922, with emphasis on its three most important manifestations: the Kuomintang-Communist alliance in the 1920's, the military alliance against the Japanese in 1937–45, and the Party's post-1949 campaigns to transform China's society and economy. $8.50

**STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

---

**Send to the World Affairs Book Center for free newsletter describing new books on world affairs.**

Join the readers of *Foreign Affairs* who have discovered the best source for the latest books on international relations is the WORLD AFFAIRS BOOK CENTER. (See note on page 205.)

This unique bookstore has the largest selection of books, pamphlets and paperbacks on world affairs available anywhere and serves customers all over the world promptly and efficiently.

Books on international affairs make wise gifts for the alert and informed people on your Christmas list. Why not consider giving a gift-certificate, in any amount, from the World Affairs Book Center?

**Write:**

**World Affairs Book Center**
**Dept. O, 345 East 46 Street**
**New York, New York 10017**

**Or call:**
**(212) 697-3934**

**a service of the Foreign Policy Association**




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# EXPERTS ON THE PAST & THE PRESENT

**JOHN K. FAIRBANK**
**China:** ***The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.***
"Marked by an exhilarating simplicity of style, and so graceful a compression of history that for those who love the harmonies of history they are almost musical . . . *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* is much more than scholarship. It is wisdom."
—THEODORE H. WHITE. $3.95*

**ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE**
**A Strategy of Peace in a Changing World**
A collection of articles, papers, and lectures by one of America's most distinguished political scientists on world peace and the structure, achievements, shortcomings, and potentialities of the U.N. $7.95

**NADAV SAFRAN**
**The United States and Israel**
"Probably the best book yet about Israel."—*N. Y. Times Book Review*. "One of the finest single volumes on the internal politics and problems of contemporary Israel."
—*The Middle East Journal* Maps. $5.95**

**WILLIAM R. POLK**
**The United States and the Arab World**
"Consistently and brilliantly related historical-geographic-societal factors to shed light upon present-day actions and reactions of the Arab leaders and people."
—*American Political Science Review* Maps. $5.95**

**CHARLES F. GALLAGHER**
**The United States and North Africa:**
***Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia***
"Excellent . . . absolutely first-rate."—*Foreign Affairs*. "No better writer than Mr. Gallagher could have been selected to write this volume." — *The Middle East Journal* Maps. $5.50**

*Belknap Press **American Foreign Policy Library

At bookstores

# HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

A-43


LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# New Books Of *catholic* Interest

## PERSONALITY, POWER AND POLITICS

*Gordon J. DiRenzo*

Professor DiRenzo finds that the professional politician may be distinguished from the non-politician in terms of a modal personality structure that is dogmatically closed-minded and which is characterized by an authoritarian orientation toward power.

**272 pages** **Nov. 13** **LC 67-22144** **$7.95**

## COEXISTENCE: COMMUNISM AND ITS PRACTICE IN BOLOGNA, 1945-1965

*Robert H. Evans*

The city of Bologna possesses the required elements of a successful democracy—a tradition of liberty, an independent people and a balanced economy. Yet, in its Italian context, Bologna is a center of reference for the Italian Communist Party.

**224 pages** **Oct. 4** **LC 67-22149** **$7.95**

## FAMILY AND FERTILITY

*Edited by William T. Liu*

Dealing with the relation between the family system and the procreative behavior of the family—past, present and future.

**400 pages** **Oct. 10** **LC 64-17608** **$9.95**

## FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN THE WEST

*Edited by George N. Shuster*

Men and women of distinction in the Church, State and the world of scholarship participated at a Conference on "The Condition of Western Man: The Problem of Freedom and Authority." Papers at the conference presented various aspects of the same problem.

**208 pages** **Nov. 6** **LC 67-22146** **$8.50**

## THE CANAL

Aspects of United States—Panamanian Relations

*Sheldon B. Liss*

This study offers a concise history of United States' relations with Panama from 1903 to 1966. A comprehensive examination is made of the post-World War II era along with a detailed analysis of the rise of communism on the Isthmus of Panama. "The Canal" states a basic future problem.

**304 pages** **Oct. 2** **LC 67-22147** **$5.95**

**UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS**
**Notre Dame, Indiana 46556**
**London, England**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



**Cornell University Press**

**TO BE PUBLISHED IN NOVEMBER**

# *Israel on the Road to Sinai*

***A Small State in a Test of Power***

*By* ERNEST STOCK. As history repeats itself in the Middle East much can be gained from a backward look at the causes and the results of the Sinai Campaign of October, 1956. Ernest Stock's incisive study of small-state diplomacy focuses on Israel's foreign policy leading up to that campaign. The objectives of Israeli policy—and the means employed to achieve them—are discussed in terms of the contemporary theory of international relations, and the policy's global as well as regional implications are analyzed in depth. In his concluding chapter, the author reflects on the present strife and the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict. *254 pages.* $6.50

**IMPORTANT BACKLIST TITLES**

# *Russian Political Thought*

***An Introduction***

*By* THORNTON ANDERSON. In this lucid and fully documented appraisal of Russian political theory and practice, the author stresses the *continuity* as well as the evolution of ideas. He examines the present Soviet regime, not simply in terms of its Marxist-Leninist concepts, but as a development of traditional Russian political assumptions. *432 pages.* $9.75

# *Parliament in the German Political System*

*By* GERHARD LOEWENBERG. This first comprehensive study of the German Bundestag from 1949 through 1965 provides the background for assessing recent developments in the political life of West Germany. The book analyzes the sources of the parliamentary tradition in Germany, the composition and structure of the Bundestag, and its record in meeting the needs of a modern democratic society. *464 pages.* $10.00

# *Political Parties in Lebanon*

***The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture***

*By* MICHAEL SULEIMAN. The role of political parties in a "confessional democracy" like Lebanon's demonstrates the function and limitations of parties in many emerging nations. In this pioneering study, Professor Suleiman examines the parties on their own terms—as political guides and critics in a highly sectarian society. *336 pages.* $7.50

***Cornell University Press** ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850*

A-45


LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Concerning the world in flux

## ARMS CONTROL FOR THE LATE SIXTIES

**Edited by James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman**

An outgrowth of the Third International Conference on Arms Control, this volume presents a spectrum of current—often controversial—views of diverse experts on the most profound problems facing nations in this age of nuclear warfare. $5.95

## THE ESSENCE OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION

**Dun J. Li**

Spanning the broad perspective of Chinese culture for 3,000 years, this volume exposes the reader in translations, almost all for the first time in English, to the great statesmen, philosophers, and writers of China on four main themes: Philosophy and Religion; Government; Economics; and Family and Society. Essential for those who would understand Chinese thinking. $7.95

## THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE 1917-1967

**Edited by Samuel Hendel**

A rich, skillfully balanced collection of writings on Soviet institutions by men who shaped its system—from Marx to Khrushchev—and by such observers of the Soviet scene as George F. Kennan, Isaac Deutscher, Harrison Salisbury, W. W. Rostow, Bertram D. Wolfe, E. H. Carr, and Sidney Hook. $6.95

## PRELUDE TO NATION-STATES

**The French and German Experience, 1789-1815**

**Hans Kohn**

In this comprehensive study of the entire spectrum of French and German nationalism, Kohn makes extensive use of quotations from original sources to scrutinize the political organization of the European nation-state and to make a full display of the classic case of nationalism. $7.50

## A HISTORY OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

**Hostile Co-Existence**

**John Rowland**

In dramatic narrative, the author focuses his attention on the Himalayan boundary regions separating India from Communist China as he reveals the origins, nature and significance of the festering tensions there and their relationship to Sino-Soviet hostilities. $6.75

## KOREA

**Land of Broken Calm**

**Shannon McCune**

A westerner brought up in Korea shows how the militarization accompanying Japanese exploitation, the division into Soviet and American zones, the Korean War, the opposing regimes of the monolithic communist state, and the political instability of the young Republic of Korea have brought drastic revisions in the old system. $4.95

**Van Nostrand**
120 Alexander St., Princeton, N. J. 08540




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

## *Events, issues, personalities— backgrounds for tomorrow*

### A great public servant's recollections and reflections— personal and professional

# GEORGE F. KENNAN
# MEMOIRS:
## 1925-1950

In this long-awaited, illuminating volume, Mr. Kennan describes 25 years of a distinguished diplomatic career — his roles in Moscow, Prague, Berlin, Washington, and Tokyo during times of crisis; his encounters with such eminent figures as Stalin, Marshall, Roosevelt, MacArthur, von Moltke, Harriman, Truman, Davies, and Bohlen; his views on America's responsibilities in world affairs. Excerpts from his journals as well as his historically significant position papers are also included. Publication: November 6. A Book-of-the-Month Club selection. ***An Atlantic Monthly Press book.*** $10.00



*To be published in January*

### THE DISCIPLINE OF POWER
**Essentials of a Modern World Structure**

**George W. Ball.** The former Undersecretary of State draws upon his intimate involvement in the major foreign crises of recent years to propose new directions that the free world should now pursue. ***An Atlantic Monthly Press book.*** $7.50

### ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER
**Their Correspondence, 1928-1945**

**Annotated by Max Freedman.** The record of an extraordinary friendship described by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., as "fascinating . . . a contribution of brilliant and indispensable importance." ***An Atlantic Monthly Press book.*** Illustrated, $15.00

***Informative, timely, provocative***

**WARREN:**
**The Man, The Court, The Era**
***John D. Weaver.***
Illustrated, $7.95

**THE UNITED NATIONS AND U. S. FOREIGN POLICY**
***Lincoln P. Bloomfield.***
Revised edition, $5.95

**FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DE GAULLE**
***Alfred Grosser.*** $5.00

**JOB CORPS:**
**Dollars and Dropouts**
***Christopher Weeks.*** $4.95

**THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL**
***An Atlantic Monthly Press book.*** Illustrated, $7.95

**POVERTY U. S. A.**
***Thomas Gladwin.*** $4.75

**FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS:**
**The American and British Experience**
***Kenneth N. Waltz.*** $7.50

**TALLY'S CORNER**
***Elliot Liebow*** $5.95

**THE QUICKSAND WAR:**
**Prelude to Vietnam**
***Lucien Bodard. An Atlantic Monthly Press book.*** $7.95

**UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE THIRD WORLD**
***Charles Wolf, Jr.*** $5.75

**INSIDE BUREAUCRACY**
***Anthony Downs.*** $6.50

At all bookstores **LITTLE, BROWN and COMPANY**
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 02106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Six good reasons to stay up all night

***Can we learn from Asia's past?***

## STORM OVER ASIA

**Robert Karr McCabe.** The stakes and relationships involved for both the United States and China are the background for this analysis of the history, mores, and social fabric of Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Today's wars and coups have ancient roots, and this volume uncovers them in the light of today's complex, highly technical world. $5.50

***Can the West shape "emerging societies"?***

## IN SEARCH OF THE MODERN WORLD

**I. Robert Sinai.** While dubious of Western efforts to impose political and social customs on developing new societies, a distinguished scholar, tracing the erratic and explosive processes of "modernization" from ancient Greece to the present, presents a masterful argument for the ultimate failure of all forms of despotism. $5.50

***And coming in December***

***American science — lagging behind or coming of age?***

## THE POLITICS OF PURE SCIENCE

**Daniel S. Greenberg.** The News Editor of *Science* magazine reveals in intimate detail the structure, personalities, procedures and history of the scientific establishment in America. Mr. Greenberg shows where the power is, and how the nation uses its scientific resources, praising the triumphs and dissecting the failures. $5.95

***You'll also want to read these recent books***

**RUSSIA IN REVOLUTION, 1890-1918**

**Lionel Kochan.** "Fully documented, careful history . . . very readable." — *Library Journal.* $6.95

**THE ROOTS OF APPEASEMENT**

**Martin Gilbert.** A new appraisal of an old policy in "a brilliant book." — *Washington Star.* $5.95

**POWER IN AMERICA**

**David T. Bazelon.** The politics of the new class. "Provocative and stimulating." — *Saturday Review.* $7.50

At bookstores

NAL

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY

A SUBSIDIARY OF THE TIMES MIRROR COMPANY




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# NORTON

*"Books that Live"*

## CONTEST OVER JAPAN

**By HERBERT FEIS.** A Pulitzer Prize-winning historian traces the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over the occupation of Japan against the background of the developing cold war in Europe. Here is a dramatic, authoritative account of a crucial, relatively little-studied test of power and diplomacy. $5.00

## GERMANY'S AIMS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

**By FRITZ FISCHER.** With an Introduction by Hajo Holborn. Professor Fischer's great work, the German edition of which has received wide attention in the American press, is probably the most important book of history — certainly the most controversial — to come out of Germany since the war. 672 pp. With 24 pp. of illustrations, plus 5 maps. $15.00

## COLLISION IN BRUSSELS

### The Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965

**By JOHN NEWHOUSE.** Detailed but highly readable, this is a study of the Common Market crisis which paralyzed that unique institution and had far-reaching economic and political repercussions. The first volume in THE TOCQUEVILLE SERIES — a joint W. W. Norton and Twentieth Century Fund project, focusing on relations between Western Europe and the United States. $5.00

At all bookstores

**W. W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC.**
New York, N. Y. 10003



**IRS**

**MAJOR UNITED NATIONS ISSUES**

# INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE

**Edited by A. G. MEZERIK**

## IRS LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

**Essential for understanding UN**

☐ **UN Chronology.** Major resolutions, actions at all major conferences, General Assembly and Security Council digest, events outside UN affecting UN, appendixes and index, document numbers given. This is the only chronology of UN—invaluable.

☐ 1960 Chronology of the United Nations 5.00
☐ 1961 Chronology of the United Nations 5.00
☐ 1962 Chronology of the United Nations 5.00
☐ 1963 Chronology of the United Nations 5.00
☐ 1964 Chronology of the United Nations 5.00
☐ 1965 Chronology of the United Nations 5.00
☐ 1966 Chronology of the United Nations 5.00

**Authoritative review and analysis of major issues before the United Nations.**

☐ Algerian-French Conflict, 2 Vol. ..... Ea. 2.50
☐ Apartheid in South Africa ..... 5.00
☐ Arab-Israel Conflict ..... 2.50
☐ Arab Refugees in the Middle East ..... 2.50
☐ Arms Race: Satellites, Nuclear ..... 2.50
☐ Atom Tests and Radiation Hazards ..... 2.50
☐ Berlin and Germany ..... 2.50
☐ China: Representation in the UN ..... 5.00
☐ Colonialism and South West Africa ..... 5.00
☐ Common Market: Political Impacts ..... 2.50
☐ Congo and the UN, 3 Vol. ..... Ea. 2.50
☐ Cuba and the United States ..... 2.50
☐ Disarmament: Impact on Underdeveloped Countries ..... 2.50
☐ Disarmament: 2 Vol. ..... Ea. 2.50
☐ Hungary and the UN ..... 2.50
☐ International Policy—1965 ..... 5.00
☐ Kuwait-Iraq Dispute ..... 2.50
☐ Malaysia-Indonesia Conflict ..... 2.50
☐ Middle East Crisis ..... 2.50
☐ Rhodesia and the UN ..... 5.00
☐ Tunisian-French Dispute ..... 2.50
☐ Trade, Aid and Economic Development ..... 2.50
☐ Energy and the UN: Oil, Gas, Atomic ..... 2.50
☐ Food and Population ..... 2.50
☐ Natural Resources—Restrictions, Regulations, Agreements ..... 5.00
☐ Directory of State and Cooperative Oil Enterprises ..... 15.00

**UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold:** "The interest shown by your service for the United Nations and its activities is greatly appreciated."

**IRS** also offers special services in the fields of **TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT** and of **ENERGY**. Up-to-date world-wide intelligence in concise form. A unique feature of **IRS** special services entitles subscribers to receive fuller information, interpretation and documentation on any aspect of reports. Special arrangements now being made for complete coverage for UNIDO Industrial Symposium and 2nd UNCTAD. Important for international business.

Order from your bookseller or—
**IRS** 15 Washington Place, N. Y. 10003
☐ Send reports checked above
☐ Enter subscription to **IRS**; $25.00 annually
☐ Send details **IRS** special services

Organization .....
Address .....
Signature .....
☐ Place on mailing list ☐ Check enclosed




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

STANFORD UNIVERSITY • STANFORD, CALIFORNIA


## THE POLITICS OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY

### A Translation of "The Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army"

*Edited by J. Chester Cheng.* This translation of a top secret and important Red Chinese military document (Kung-tso T'ung-hsün) has been described as "one of the most important caches" of material from Red China in recent years. $35.00

## ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FAR EAST

For the first time an arms control and disarmament plan is drawn up that could be made to work *now* in one part of the world. The approach and methodology used in its preparation should provide guidelines for future programs attempting to formulate similar regional arrangements in other parts of the world. $5.00

## DOLLARS, DEPENDENTS AND DOGMA

### Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China

*By Chun-hsi Wu.* In recent times the Chinese living outside China have sent part of their earnings to the homeland for the support of dependent families and investment purposes. This practice has had a wide effect on the balance of international payments. All available material on this many-faceted subject is analyzed in this study. $7.00

## AFRICAN OPPOSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

### The Failure of Passive Resistance

*By Edward Feit.* The first study in depth of the two major passive resistance campaigns of the African National Congress against the Western Areas removals and the Bantu Education program—considered as essential planks in the Government's apartheid policy, this should prove of interest to students of political conflict. $7.50

## THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNISM IN TURKEY

*By George S. Harris.* A thoroughly documented study of the Turkish communist movement and its ties with the French and Russian Communist parties as well as with the Kemalist movement, this work is of considerable value to those interested in communist parties of the world as well as for specialists in modern Turkish history. $5.90

## THE COMMUNIST REGIMES OF EASTERN EUROPE

*By Richard F. Staar.* This is a geographic and functional approach dealing with the post-1945 history and current situation of each of the Eastern European communist states that came into being after the Second World War. Detailed accounts are given of the origin of communism, governmental structure, and domestic and foreign policies in each country. $10.00

## ADOLF HITLER

### His Family, Childhood and Youth

*By Bradley F. Smith.* This is the first scholarly study devoted solely to a factual account of Hitler's youth. By consolidating all available source materials, including previously unpublished accounts, this engrossing biography also serves as a handy chronological guide for the exploration of one of the most disquieting careers of recent times. $6.50

## GUIDE TO RUSSIAN REFERENCE BOOKS

### Volume V: Science, Technology, and Medicine

### Volume II: History and Auxiliary Historical Sciences

### Volume I: General Bibliographies and Reference Books

*By Karol Maichel.* Designed for the scholar of Russian or Soviet material, this valuable series of reference works will save him the countless hours formerly needed for the identification and location of wanted documents.

Vol. V: $22.50; Vol. II: $16.00; Vol. I: $5.00

## CONTEMPORARY CHINA

*By Peter Berton and Eugene Wu.* The various reference sources on contemporary China for the first time are brought together in this comprehensive bibliography. Scholars and librarians will find that this expert guide provides access to new routes of inquiry and research aids perhaps hitherto unknown. $22.50

## I. V. STALIN SOCHINENIIA (COLLECTED WORKS): VOLUMES I–III

*Edited by Robert H. McNeal.* Thirteen volumes of Stalin's collected works—covering from the beginning of his political career through January 1934—were published in the Soviet Union before this project was abruptly halted with the Soviet dictator's death in March 1953. The present three volumes, in the Russian language, complete the official Stalin *Sochineniia.* $20.00



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# MEN and MOVERS OF MEN

## THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY:
### Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi
**E. VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN**

A psycho-political investigation into the fundamental characteristics of three revolutionists. "Professor Wolfenstein makes a conscientious effort to get at the truth regarding Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi — to plumb their secret selves and learn what forces turned them into revolutionaries."—*Los Angeles Times. Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.* 340 pages. $7.50

## REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND THE CUBAN WORKING CLASS
**MAURICE ZEITLIN**

The first book to use the sociological approach of in-depth interviews, conducted in Cuba during the summer of 1962, to discover the workers' personal responses to the social revolution. Helps to elucidate our understanding of the Castro phenomenon and to determine what kinds of political behavior can be anticipated in the future among workers in times of social crises. 352 pages. $8.50

THE PAPERS OF
## WOODROW WILSON
*Volume 3, 1884-1885*
**EDITED BY ARTHUR S. LINK AND ASSOCIATES**

Beginning with Wilson's second semester at The Johns Hopkins University, this third volume in the Wilson papers contains the almost daily exchange of letters between Wilson and his fiancée Ellen Louise Axson.
700 pages $15.00

(Subscriptions for the entire series are invited. Write Box F, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540, for a descriptive brochure.)

## Princeton University Press




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE

## JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

**ADOLF A. BERLE:**

"The New Industrial State will make economic history ....Galbraith deals with realities instead of fiction. This may not make him popular — but from here out no serious scholar will be able to skate along on past assumptions." (in *The Saturday Review*)

**KENNETH E. BOULDING:**

"This book will not disappoint Mr. Galbraith's numerous admirers . . . a book with something to say and it says it well, as we could expect, and it is a worthy addition to its predecessors . . . very interesting and very exciting." (in *Book Week*)

**BEN SELIGMAN:**

"Urbane, witty, persuasive, forceful, and directed to the major issues of our time. To my mind it is the greatest book in economics since Thorstein Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class.*"

**ROBERT L. HEILBRONER:**

"Important and original, and by comparison with the pale stuff of so much contemporary economics, powerful." (in *New York Review of Books*)

$6.95 at all bookstores

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY, *Publishers*



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

*New Books in Political Science from the New Publisher: Pegasus*

# The Politics of Poverty

by *John C. Donovan*, Bowdoin College

What is the political controversy over the War on Poverty? This book about the drafting of the Economic Opportunity Act explores the implications of the words "maximum feasible participation" in the role the poor themselves should play in the community action programs of urban neighborhoods. What has happened to Lyndon Johnson's own domestic power stakes in the poverty program, given America's twenty billion dollar a year involvement in an escalated Vietnam war? Mr. Donovan shows how Johnson's preoccupation with Vietnam blinded him to the political nature of his own reform program at home, blurred his vision and thus distorted the nation's priorities.

*160 pages, clothbound $5.75, paperbound $1.45*

# Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi

by *Donald Zagoria*, Hunter College

A leading authority on the communist world explains why Russia, China and North Vietnam have different interests in the war and different hopes for its final outcome. VIETNAM TRIANGLE goes far to clarify common misunderstandings about the war in Southeast Asia. It gives us a framework for reasonable discussion about America's role in Vietnam and a fresh perspective for a more effective United States policy towards that conflict.

*288 pages, clothbound $6.95, paperbound $1.95*

# The War Myth

by *Donald A. Wells*, Washington State College

Is war justified as a response to international anarchy? Mr. Wells traces the traditional Western arguments—philosophical, theological and institutional—in favor of resort to war. He makes an eloquent plea for semantic clarity in a subject long obscured by irrelevant distinctions. Convinced that the problem of war and peace is one of semantic confusion, the author disperses the verbal fog that envelops the "war system" and relates the problem to the myths of Communism, the "domino theory" and the "free world."

*288 pages, clothbound $6.95, paperbound $1.75*

NOW AT YOUR BOOKSELLERS

*Division of Western Publishing Company, Inc.*



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# The Strategy of World Order:

A set of Materials, edited by Richard A. Falk, Princeton University, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, Rutgers Law School. World Law Fund, 1966. Four-volume set, paperbound, $10.00; hardcover, $14.00. Volumes I and II, $2.50 each. Volumes III and IV, $3.50 each. 2,296 pp.

**Vol. I:**
Toward a Theory of War Prevention
Foreword by Harold D. Lasswell

**Vol. II:**
International Law
Foreword by Wolfgang Friedman

**Vol. III:**
The United Nations
Foreword by Oscar Schacter

**Vol. IV:**
Disarmament and Economic Development
Foreword by J. David Singer

"There now exists an excellent set of teaching books—not on international law, not on the United Nations, not on war prevention, or disarmament, but rather on the overall, interrelated strategy of world order." *Michigan Law Review*

**Vol. V:**
Regionalism and World Order

**Vol. VI:**
The Role of the Individual and World Order

Projected for 1968 publication. Research for Volumes V and VI supported by The Carnegie Corporation.

The World Law Fund, 11 West 42nd Street, New York City 10036

---

# *Guidelines for World Policy*

in these three new Spectrum Books for fall.

## A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

by Franklin W. Houn, University of Massachusetts. Houn draws upon first-hand knowledge and current research to provide a thorough analysis of the CCP from its beginning to the present. The book covers the Party's strategy, structure, progress, and its future programs, and reviews the meaning and causes of the Cultural Revolution.

Oct., 1967
Paper $2.45, cloth $5.95

## THE QUEST FOR PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY

by Stephen D. Kertesz, University of Notre Dame. The author, both as scholar and former diplomat, analyzes successes and failures of past diplomatic methods. He urges more constructive use of such organizations as the UN and the EEC, and notes the growing importance of "economic diplomacy" in the search for international cooperation.

July, 1967
Paper $2.45, cloth $4.95

## THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE

**An American Assembly Book**

edited by Robert F. Byrnes, Indiana University. Eight experts describe the modern problems of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and East Germany, and evaluate U.S. policy towards these nations. The writers call for more cooperation between the U.S. and East Europe.

July, 1967
Paper $1.95, cloth $4.95

**SPECTRUM BOOKS**

Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs,
N.J. 07632




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# War-making and peace-keeping

## THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY IN ACTION

**by Alexander L. George.** A reconstruction, based on interviews with Chinese Army prisoners, of the ethos, organization, and methods of the People's Liberation Army. "Excellent... Mr. George makes the most of a unique opportunity to take a close look at the Chinese Army from the inside. His sophisticated account presents fresh and fascinating insights on the political organization and practices of that army and its problems of morale and motivation."

—*Ellis Joffe, New York Times Book Review.* $6.95

## CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA

**by A. Doak Barnett, with a contribution by Ezra Vogel.** This detailed analysis of the party and government machinery at ministry, county, and village levels describes the tremendous ball of red tape in Peking and follows its unwinding around 700,000,000 people in every corner of China. $12.00

## THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

**by Leon Gordenker.** Traces the techniques employed by the three Secretaries-General in keeping or restoring the peace in the crises in which the UN has been involved. $8.50

## THE FIRST VIETNAM CRISIS

**by Melvin Gurtov.** Analyzes the political crisis of 1953-54, which resulted in French withdrawal, two Vietnams, and the beginning of United States involvement. "Makes a solid contribution to better public understanding of the morass into which we permitted ourselves to become engulfed, and performs a national service by showing how we may avoid similar pitfalls in the future."—*General Matthew B. Ridgway.* $7.00

## THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

**by Gabriella Rosner.** "A definitive work... a must for any study of the UN's role in Cold War world politics."

—*Journal of International Affairs.* $7.50

At better bookstores

**COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS**

440 West 110th Street, New York, N. Y. 10025




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# BORZOI BOOKS



## Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking

*Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919*

by ARNO J. MAYER

This monumental work of scholarship examines the efforts of the Big Four at Versailles to work out a stable peace while revolutionary movements both Communist and non-Communist — whose significance they barely understood — burgeoned throughout the world. Coming in January. $15

## Beyond Vietnam

*The United States and Asia*

by EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

A scholar-diplomat, long a leading authority on Asia, presents his dynamic proposals on how to avoid future Vietnams in other Asian lands.

Cloth $4.95;
Vintage Book paperback $1.65

## Sketches in the Sand

by JAMES RESTON

A collection of his writings from *The New York Times* and other publications, ranging over a quarter-century, which exhibit his endlessly curious mind, his pragmatic view of issues, and the distinguished reporting that brought him two Pulitzer prizes.

$7.95

## The Nation Is Burdened

*American Foreign Policy in a Changing World*

by ROGER D. MASTERS

"A book of distinction and merit which deserves the widest attention in the growing debate over the uses and abuses of American power." — RONALD STEEL, front page, *Book Week*.

$6.95

*Now at better bookstores*

ALFRED·A·KNOPF




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

*Hemingway the reporter,*
*Pulitzer the eccentric*
*genius, Russia's revolution,*
*and a legacy*
*of brinkmanship*




## BY-LINE: ERNEST HEMINGWAY

### Selected Articles and Dispatches of Four Decades

***Edited by William White.*** This first collection of Hemingway's reportage became a national bestseller within days of publication. One reason: "These selections shine like a hoard of gold pieces brought newly to light... Hemingway's special brand of journalism still makes...fresh and lively reading. It was news, in Ezra Pound's phrase, that has stayed news." —CARLOS BAKER, *N.Y. Times Book Review* $8.95

## FACING THE BRINK

### An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy

***by Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett.*** This is the widely acclaimed book which tells how four Presidential administrations reacted to—or failed to react to—crisis. "Rich in insights... No one interested in foreign policy can afford to ignore it."—*Washington Post.* "I suspect that certain of the revelations will be as new to some of the participants as to the general reader."—ARTHUR KROCK $5.95

## PULITZER

***by W. A. Swanberg.*** The author of *Citizen Hearst* and *Dreiser* brilliantly delineates the astonishing egotist who revolutionized American journalism — in the face of near-blindness, tormenting physical and mental infirmities, and his own violent, even sadistic, temperament. "A fine and fascinating picture."—*Publishers' Weekly.*

*Photographs* $8.95

## RED OCTOBER

### The Bolshevik Revolution

***by Robert V. Daniels.*** Despite their nearness in time, the events of the October Revolution have never been fully documented. Through intensive analysis of records and writings in the West *and in the Soviet Union itself,* Professor Daniels reconstructs the progression of events as accurately as is now possible, providing fresh insights into the questions of Lenin's power, the Bolshevik cult of force, and the background of certain fateful decisions. *Illustrated.* $6.95

**CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS**
*Over a Century of Responsible Publishing*



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

McKAY

## Books of International Importance

### By Pulitzer Prizewinner JOHN HUGHES, INDONESIAN UPHEAVAL

The author was the first U.S. newspaper correspondent to arrive in Djakarta after the murder of six high-ranking generals of the Indonesian Army. This act was to set in motion a chain of events that broke the Indonesian Communist Party amid the slaughter of hundreds of thousands and ultimately brought about the downfall of Sukarno.

For his original articles from Indonesia, Hughes, Far Eastern Correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor*, was awarded the 1967 Pulitzer Prize for foreign reporting. In this book, the author has expanded his articles to reveal fully a vital page in history. $5.95

"A fine book" — Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, USA (Ret.)

### 1942: THE YEAR THAT DOOMED THE AXIS




**by Henry H. Adams, Capt., USNR**
Professor of History, U.S. Naval Academy

"I enjoyed '1942' tremendously. . . . Of course, I lived all through that period . . . so I found it fascinating to reread all of the detailed background of the time that Professor Adams has researched so well. Against that backdrop, he writes of specific military engagements on land and sea. Together they make the most interesting account of that period that I have read. Again, I am tremendously impressed by the amount of detailed information that he has brought together from many sources. It is this that gives the book that rare quality that makes you feel very much part of the scene. It is a fine book."
— Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin

With map endpapers and 24 pages of battle maps. $8.95

"A controversial and sometimes tendentious book [by the former Commander of the UN's peacekeeping forces] that created a sensation in Europe and in Israel . . . well organized and well indexed." — *N.Y. Times Book Review*
Illustrated. $6.95

### SOLDIERING FOR PEACE
**by Major General Carl von Horn**

### F.D.R.'S UNDECLARED WAR: 1939-1941
**by T. R. Fehrenbach**

By the author of *This Kind of Peace* and *This Kind of War*. "A freelance writer who has earned a reputation as a historian of the postwar world . . . now brings his clarity of mind and style to the years immediately preceding World War II. The result is one step backward in time and two steps forward in understanding."
— *N. Y. Times Book Review* $6.50

DAVID McKAY COMPANY, INC., New York



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# New insights into the current state of affairs (foreign and domestic)

## THE LIMITS OF POWER
America's Role in the World

**By Eugene J. McCarthy**
United States Senator and Member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

A distinguished Senator speaks out about America's foreign policy in this urgent report to the nation. Senator McCarthy says we did not seek the burden of world leadership, but we have nevertheless had it thrust upon us. We must now examine the limits of what we will and will not do in terms of involvement with the rest of the world. One of the most important political books of the year—just published and already the center of attention wherever opinion-makers gather. $5.95

## WE NEHRUS
**By Krishna Nehru Hutheesing**
with Alden Hatch

An intimate, very human picture of one of the world's most amazing political families, written by a woman who is at its very heart — as Jawaharlal Nehru's youngest sister, Indira Gandhi's aunt, and an important Indian revolutionary in her own right. "The scholars and historians can write all they want to of the perilous, demanding, and exciting times which have elevated the Nehrus to prominence, but this personal reminiscence may reveal more." — *Publishers' Weekly*. Illustrated with photographs from the Nehru family album. $6.95

## AMERICA IN THE MARKET PLACE
**By Paul Douglas**
Former United States Senator

"An admirably written exposition of America's place in the world economy. . . . Effectively mingles lucid exposition, personal experience, and policy prescription." — *New York Times Book Review* $7.95

## JOURNEY THROUGH A HAUNTED LAND
The New Germany

**By Amos Elon**

"An important analysis of both East and West Germany." — *Time*. "The best single introduction to Germany today. . . . A vivid portrait in depth of the continuing battle for, and within, the German soul." — *Washington Post* $6.50




FROM YOUR BOOKSELLER

**HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, INC.**



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# Nelson Rockefeller, Adolph A. Berle, Romulo Betancourt, and David Dubinsky say it much better than we could:

"Here, for the first time, the inside history of one phase of the vast struggle [to avoid Communist and Fascist domination of the Latin American Labor Movement] is presented to the public... It deserves careful reading: this is what the battle really looked like. It should make the next phase of the Latin American epic more comprehensible in the United States."
—ADOLPH A. BERLE
(from his Foreword)

"Serafino Romualdi has a tremendous story to tell, and I am delighted that he is telling it... Mr. Romualdi is one of the most effective and articulate spokesmen of free enterprise and democracy to be found anywhere. Publication of his book is an event of major importance in the Western Hemisphere."
—NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

"With his liaison work between the labor movements of the two Americas, Romualdi earned the friendship and the appreciation of the free trade union movement. Communists and dictators equally attempted to slander and discredit him. His book contains a vigorous and enlightening story of one phase of the inter-American events of the fifties not yet fully known to the general public."
—ROMULO BETANCOURT,
Former President of Venezuela

"Serafino Romualdi has worked with the labor movements in Latin America for over two decades... Locked up within him was a great treasure-house of information and insights. We are indeed most fortunate in being able to share his experiences and thoughts through the pages of this book."
—DAVID DUBINSKY

## PRESIDENTS AND PEONS:

**Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America**

**by SERAFINO ROMUALDI**

Available November at your bookseller, $8.95

FW **FUNK & WAGNALLS** 380 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

---

NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME,

## The full story of the Suez conspiracy of 1956

—TOLD BY THE MINISTER OF STATE WHO REFUSED TO JOIN IT.

- The book cited in the General Assembly debates on the current Middle East crisis
- The book that stirred up a major political storm when serialized in the *London Sunday Times*
- The book that explains the origins of continuing turmoil in the Middle East

## NO END OF A LESSON

**By ANTHONY NUTTING**

$5.00, now at your bookstore

*Clarkson N. Potter, Inc./Publisher*

---

winner of the $2500 STACKPOLE AWARD... as making "the most significant contribution to military thinking."

# Peaceful Conflict

**the non-military use of the military**

Temple University political scientist **EDWARD BERNARD GLICK** makes a provocative proposal for more constructive use of all armies without jeopardizing their functions of defense. With the underlying reality of international conflict, political unrest in developing countries, the growing pressures of insurgency, and the need for disarmament, social and economic development...**PEACFUL CONFLICT** boldly suggests how armies of the world can contribute to socio-economic needs through broader and stronger civic action. Despite recognizable problems, Dr. Glick concludes that the promise and benefits make a much greater opportunity to bend reality toward international good. At leading booksellers, $6.50

**STACKPOLE BOOKS** Harrisburg, Pa. 17105



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

**The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1965**
This volume provides for the interested public an account of the years the United Nations has devoted to achieve a solution to the problem of disarmament. 67.I.8 Cloth $4.50

**Statistical Yearbook, 1966**
Comprehensive compilation of international statistics relating to: population, energy, balance of payments, national income, public finance, other fields. 67.XVII.1 Cloth $15.00 Paper $11.00

For continuous information about United Nations activities, subscribe to **UN Monthly Chronicle**
Annual subscription: $7.00

**Demographic Yearbook, 1965**
International compendium of demographic statistics, covering 250 geographic areas of the world. Special topic: natality statistics (1955-1964). 66.XIII.1 Cloth $15.00 Paper $11.00

**World Economic Survey, 1965**
A comprehensive review of world economic conditions.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Financing of Economic Development | Paper | $2.50 |
| Current Economic Developments | Paper | $1.25 |
| Parts I and II combined 66.II.C.3 | Cloth | $4.50 |

**UN Publications reflect the work of the Organization and therefore provide vital reference in many fields**




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basic Facts about United Nations | 66.I.12 | | $0.35 |
| Charter of UN and Statute of ICJ | 65.I.3 | | $0.50 |
| UN Juridical Yearbook, 1964 | 66.V.4 | Cloth | $4.50 |
| Economic Survey of Europe, 1965 | 66.II.E.1 | | $3.00 |
| Economic Survey of Latin America, 1964 | 66.II.G.1 | | $4.50 |
| Economic Survey of Asia and Far East, 1965 | 66.II.F.1 | | $3.50 |
| Yearbook on Human Rights, 1963 | 66.XIV.1 | Cloth | $5.75 |
| Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965 | 67.XVII.2 | | $11.50 |
| Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1965 | 66.XVII.2 | | $7.00 |
| Water Desalination in Developing Countries | 64.II.B.5 | | $4.00 |
| Never Again War! Visit of Pope Paul VI to United Nations | 65.I.27 | Cloth | $5.50 |
| Your United Nations, illustrated tour of UN Headquarters | 64.I.15 | Cloth<br>Paper | $3.50<br>$1.50 |
| World Weights and Measures, Handbook for Statisticians | 66.XVII.3 | | $2.00 |
| World Population Prospects | 66.XIII.2 | | $2.00 |
| Studies in Petrochemicals, I-II | 67.II.B.2 | | $25.00 |
| Yearbook of International Court of Justice | ICJ 301 | | $1.50 |
| Libraries of the United Nations | 66.I.6 | | $1.50 |
| Local Government Personnel Systems | 67.II.H.1 | | $2.00 |
| Young Adult Offender | 65.IV.5 | | $1.25 |
| Family, Child and Youth Welfare Services | 65.IV.9 | | $0.75 |
| Progress in Land Reform | 66.IV.1 | | $2.00 |
| External Financing in Latin America | 65.II.G.4 | | $3.50 |
| Civil and Political Education of Women | 64.IV.7 | | $0.75 |
| Training for Social Work | 65.IV.3 | | $1.50 |
| Asian Population Conference, 1963 | 65.II.F.11 | | $2.50 |
| Space Activities and Resources | 65.I.4 | | $2.00 |
| Planning for Balanced Social and Economic Development | 64.IV.8 | | $3.50 |
| Handbook of Training for Civil Service | 66.II.H.1 | | $4.00 |

**International Court of Justice and UNICEF publications are distributed through the United Nations and complete listings are available upon writing to United Nations Publications.**

**United Nations Publications, New York, New York, 10017**



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

## *By Reason or Force*

*Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905*

ROBERT N. BURR

"This is a pioneer work. . . . Professionals will appreciate the thoroughness of the author's scholarship . . . his careful documentation . . . and his successful effort at objectivity."—John J. Johnson, in the *American Historical Review*. Professor Burr's book was awarded the *Bolton Memorial Prize in Latin American History* for 1966. $7.95

## *The Rise of Fascism*

F. L. CARSTEN

In this survey, Professor Carsten examines the origins and development of fascist movements and the social upheavals and the economic depression following World War I which provided a ready-made opportunity for leaders with the mass appeal of Mussolini or Hitler. $6.50

## *The First Rapprochement*

*England and the United States, 1795–1805*

BRADFORD PERKINS

"This superlative monograph, based principally on American and British archives, is an irenic study of Anglo-American relations from the Signature of Jay's Treaty in 1795 until the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars in 1803, following the short-lived peace of Amiens."—Samuel Flagg Bemis in *The American Historical Review* $6.50

## *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908*

KENNETH BOURNE

The War of 1812 provoked British apprehension in regard to the long, vulnerable land frontier that lay between Canada and the United States. Professor Bourne describes British naval and military strategy, planned in the event of a possible war with the United States, and how these calculations affected the course of British foreign policy in North America. $8.00

## *Sea Warfare, 1939-1945:* *Revised Edition*

JOHN CRESWELL, *Captain, R. N.*

This single volume deals with the entire war at sea: the efforts of all the principal navies and their strategy, tactics, weapons developments, single actions, and campaigns. Captain Creswell's account brings into play his rich background in the strategic and tactical facets of naval warefare. $7.95



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

## *Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950*

*An Evaluation of American Responsibility*

SOON SUNG CHO

Mr. Cho offers a dispassionate, forthright analysis of the United States failure in Korea, focussing his attention on problems of the division and reunification of Korea. He attempts particularly to ascertain and explain how various policies were adopted and why they failed. *A publication of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies.* $7.50

## *The Korean Minority in Japan, 1910-1963*

RICHARD HANKS MITCHELL

Mr. Mitchell explores the background of the long-standing problems posed by the presence of a large Korean community in Japan. He discusses the Korean Communist and nationalist movements, the Korean community's response to developments of World War II, and other conflicts arising from within the community itself, as well as those created by relations with the Japanese. $5.75

## *Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia*

GAYL D. NESS

Mr. Ness attempts to explain the success of Malaysian national development, a success of interest not only for itself, but for the sidelights it affords on other, less successful, developing nations in Southeast Asia. *A publication of the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan.* $6.50

## *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*

*Social and Economic Change in a Hong Kong Village*

J. M. POTTER

This account of changes occurring in a Hong Kong village since the end of the Pacific War provides both a profile of a traditional village in the process of change and a contribution to our understanding of the socio-economic effects of Western-style treaty ports on their rural environs. "This is a work of major importance; it will be a key piece to the study of Southeastern China."—Maurice Freedman. $7.00



*from California*

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley • Los Angeles • New York




LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# 26 weeks of news like this $2.87

Now you can get the "useful news" in U.S. News & World Report for just about 11 cents an issue . . .

You will like what you get in U.S. News & World Report. The list at the right is a sample of articles and reports from recent issues.

U.S. News & World Report digs beneath the headlines to bring you the real story of the news. Why it happened. How important it is. How it will affect the way you live, work, plan, save, invest . . . And what you can expect next.

Try reading U.S. News & World Report for a while, and see how helpful it can be to you, your family, your career. It won't cost you a penny unless you're convinced that you can't afford to be without it.

## Send no money

Simply mail the coupon. It will bring you the next 26 weekly issues for only $2.87. We'll be glad to bill you later. And your money will be refunded if the magazine does not live up to your highest expectations.

1. **Next Step in Vietnam: The Search for a Way Out**
2. **The Anatomy of Riot — Report from 39 Cities**
3. **An Upturn for Business? What the Signs Indicate**
4. **Resolving the Middle East Crisis: Concessions to Expect**
5. **The Changes Congress is Making in the Great Society**
6. **China's H-Bomb: Its Impact in Asia, in Russia, in U.S.**
7. **20 Stocks the Experts Favor Now**
8. **What the Tax Increase will do to Business**
9. **Next for LBJ: "Agonizing Reappraisal" of U.S. Policy**
10. **New Defense Line for U.S. in the Pacific**
11. **20 Questions About the New Draft Law — The Answers**
12. **Political After-Effects of the Big City Riots**
13. **The Big Issues at Stake in Auto-Labor Negotiations**
14. **How America's Critics Embrace the U.S. Way of Life**
15. **A Close Election in '68? What the "Pros" Have to Say**
16. **How Experts Size Up Today's Stock Market**
17. **Eleven Pleasant Places to Live in the U.S.A.**
18. **Postwar Babies Come of Age — Impact on Business**
19. **LBJ's Early Plans for the '68 Campaign**
20. **Crime and Punishment: The Scale Goes Far Out of Balance**
21. **More Blackouts Ahead? What's Wrong with Power Systems**
22. **Exclusive Interview with Israel's Prime Minister Eshkol**
23. **Electric Cars: How Good? What Impact on Economy?**
24. **Black Power Manifesto: What Negro Extremists Stand For**
25. **Real Estate — "Growing Sideline" for Big Business**
26. **The New Left in the Democratic Party**
27. **The High Cost of College — Now, Next Year, Years Ahead**

## U.S. News & World Report

**1426-86 24th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037** **AT13-J**

I want to find out whether your magazine can be as useful as you say. Please send it each week for the next 26 weeks. You may send me a bill later for the trial subscription price of $2.87 (a substantial saving).

It is understood that my $2.87 will be refunded in full at any time during this trial subscription if I find that the magazine does not live up to my expectations.

Please Print Name

Address

City

State Zip Code

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED